Force v. Facebook, Inc.
This text of 934 F.3d 53 (Force v. Facebook, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinions
Droney, Circuit Judge:
The principal question presented in this appeal is whether
The district court granted Facebook's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis of Section 230(c)(1) immunity, an affirmative defense. After entering judgment without prejudice to moving to file an amended complaint, the district court denied with prejudice plaintiffs' motion to file a second amended complaint on the basis that the proposed complaint did not cure the deficiencies in the First Amended Complaint.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the district court improperly dismissed their claims because Section 230(c)(1) does not provide immunity to Facebook under the circumstances of their allegations.
We conclude that the district court properly applied Section 230(c)(1) to plaintiffs' federal claims. Also, upon our review of plaintiffs' assertion of diversity jurisdiction over their foreign law claims,
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint
Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss, we recount the facts as plaintiffs provide them to us, treating as true the allegations in their complaint.
See
Galper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
,
A. The Attacks
Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist organization centered in Gaza. It has been designated a foreign terrorist organization by the United States and Israel. Since it was formed in 1987, Hamas has conducted thousands of terrorist attacks against civilians in Israel.
Plaintiffs' complaint describes terrorist attacks by Hamas against five Americans in Israel between 2014 and 2016. Yaakov Naftali Fraenkel, a teenager, was kidnapped by a Hamas operative in 2014 while walking home from school in Gush Etzion, near Jerusalem, and then was shot to death. Chaya Zissel Braun, a 3-month-old baby, was killed at a train station in Jerusalem in 2014 when a Hamas operative drove a car into a crowd. Richard Lakin died after Hamas members shot and stabbed him in an attack on a bus in Jerusalem in 2015. Graduate student Taylor Force was stabbed to death by a Hamas attacker while walking on the Jaffa boardwalk in Tel Aviv in 2016. Menachem Mendel Rivkin was stabbed in the neck in 2016 by a Hamas operative while walking to a restaurant in a town near Jerusalem. He suffered serious injuries but survived. Except for Rivkin, plaintiffs are the representatives of the estates of those who died in these attacks and family members of the victims.
B. Facebook's Alleged Role in the Attacks
1. How Facebook Works
Facebook operates an "online social network platform and communications service[ ]." App'x 230. Facebook users populate their own "Facebook 'pages' " with "content," including personal identifying information and indications of their particular "interests." App'x 250-51, 345. Organizations and other entities may also have Facebook pages. Users can post content on others' Facebook pages, reshare each other's content, and send messages to one another. The content can be text-based messages and statements, photos, web links, or other information.
Facebook users must first register for a Facebook account, providing their names, telephone numbers, and email addresses. When registering, users do not specify the nature of the content they intend to publish on the platform, nor does Facebook screen new users based on its expectation of what content they will share with other Facebook users. There is no charge to prospective users for joining Facebook.
Facebook does not preview or edit the content that its users post. Facebook's terms of service specify that a user "own[s] all of the content and information [the user] post[s] on Facebook, and [the user] can control how it is shared through [the user's] privacy and application settings." App'x 252 (alterations in original).
While Facebook users may view each other's shared content simply by visiting other Facebook pages and profiles, Facebook also provides a personalized "newsfeed" page for each user. Facebook uses algorithms-"a precisely defined set of mathematical or logical operations for the performance of a particular task," Algorithm , Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2012)-to determine the content to display to users on the newsfeed webpage. Newsfeed content is displayed within banners or modules and changes frequently. The newsfeed algorithms-developed by programmers employed by Facebook-automatically analyze Facebook users' prior behavior on the Facebook website to predict and display the content that is most likely to interest and engage those particular users. Other algorithms similarly use Facebook users' behavioral and demographic data to show those users third-party groups, products, services, and local events likely to be of interest to them.
Facebook's algorithms also provide "friend suggestions," which, if accepted by the user, result in those users seeing each other's shared content. App'x 346-47. The friend-suggestion algorithms are based on such factors as the users' common membership in Facebook's online "groups," geographic location, attendance at events, spoken language, and mutual friend connections on Facebook. App'x 346.
Facebook's advertising algorithms and "remarketing" technology also allow advertisers on Facebook to target specific ads to its users who are likely to be most interested in them and thus to be most beneficial to those advertisers. App'x 347. Those advertisements are displayed on the users' pages and other Facebook webpages. A substantial portion of Facebook's revenues is from such advertisers.
2. Hamas's Use of Facebook
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Droney, Circuit Judge:
The principal question presented in this appeal is whether
The district court granted Facebook's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis of Section 230(c)(1) immunity, an affirmative defense. After entering judgment without prejudice to moving to file an amended complaint, the district court denied with prejudice plaintiffs' motion to file a second amended complaint on the basis that the proposed complaint did not cure the deficiencies in the First Amended Complaint.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the district court improperly dismissed their claims because Section 230(c)(1) does not provide immunity to Facebook under the circumstances of their allegations.
We conclude that the district court properly applied Section 230(c)(1) to plaintiffs' federal claims. Also, upon our review of plaintiffs' assertion of diversity jurisdiction over their foreign law claims,
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint
Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss, we recount the facts as plaintiffs provide them to us, treating as true the allegations in their complaint.
See
Galper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
,
A. The Attacks
Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist organization centered in Gaza. It has been designated a foreign terrorist organization by the United States and Israel. Since it was formed in 1987, Hamas has conducted thousands of terrorist attacks against civilians in Israel.
Plaintiffs' complaint describes terrorist attacks by Hamas against five Americans in Israel between 2014 and 2016. Yaakov Naftali Fraenkel, a teenager, was kidnapped by a Hamas operative in 2014 while walking home from school in Gush Etzion, near Jerusalem, and then was shot to death. Chaya Zissel Braun, a 3-month-old baby, was killed at a train station in Jerusalem in 2014 when a Hamas operative drove a car into a crowd. Richard Lakin died after Hamas members shot and stabbed him in an attack on a bus in Jerusalem in 2015. Graduate student Taylor Force was stabbed to death by a Hamas attacker while walking on the Jaffa boardwalk in Tel Aviv in 2016. Menachem Mendel Rivkin was stabbed in the neck in 2016 by a Hamas operative while walking to a restaurant in a town near Jerusalem. He suffered serious injuries but survived. Except for Rivkin, plaintiffs are the representatives of the estates of those who died in these attacks and family members of the victims.
B. Facebook's Alleged Role in the Attacks
1. How Facebook Works
Facebook operates an "online social network platform and communications service[ ]." App'x 230. Facebook users populate their own "Facebook 'pages' " with "content," including personal identifying information and indications of their particular "interests." App'x 250-51, 345. Organizations and other entities may also have Facebook pages. Users can post content on others' Facebook pages, reshare each other's content, and send messages to one another. The content can be text-based messages and statements, photos, web links, or other information.
Facebook users must first register for a Facebook account, providing their names, telephone numbers, and email addresses. When registering, users do not specify the nature of the content they intend to publish on the platform, nor does Facebook screen new users based on its expectation of what content they will share with other Facebook users. There is no charge to prospective users for joining Facebook.
Facebook does not preview or edit the content that its users post. Facebook's terms of service specify that a user "own[s] all of the content and information [the user] post[s] on Facebook, and [the user] can control how it is shared through [the user's] privacy and application settings." App'x 252 (alterations in original).
While Facebook users may view each other's shared content simply by visiting other Facebook pages and profiles, Facebook also provides a personalized "newsfeed" page for each user. Facebook uses algorithms-"a precisely defined set of mathematical or logical operations for the performance of a particular task," Algorithm , Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2012)-to determine the content to display to users on the newsfeed webpage. Newsfeed content is displayed within banners or modules and changes frequently. The newsfeed algorithms-developed by programmers employed by Facebook-automatically analyze Facebook users' prior behavior on the Facebook website to predict and display the content that is most likely to interest and engage those particular users. Other algorithms similarly use Facebook users' behavioral and demographic data to show those users third-party groups, products, services, and local events likely to be of interest to them.
Facebook's algorithms also provide "friend suggestions," which, if accepted by the user, result in those users seeing each other's shared content. App'x 346-47. The friend-suggestion algorithms are based on such factors as the users' common membership in Facebook's online "groups," geographic location, attendance at events, spoken language, and mutual friend connections on Facebook. App'x 346.
Facebook's advertising algorithms and "remarketing" technology also allow advertisers on Facebook to target specific ads to its users who are likely to be most interested in them and thus to be most beneficial to those advertisers. App'x 347. Those advertisements are displayed on the users' pages and other Facebook webpages. A substantial portion of Facebook's revenues is from such advertisers.
2. Hamas's Use of Facebook
Plaintiffs allege that Hamas used Facebook to post content that encouraged terrorist attacks in Israel during the time period of the attacks in this case. The attackers allegedly viewed that content on Facebook. The encouraging content ranged in specificity; for example, Fraenkel, although not a soldier, was kidnapped and murdered after Hamas members posted messages on Facebook that advocated the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. The attack that killed the Braun baby at the light rail station in Jerusalem came after Hamas posts encouraged car-ramming attacks at light rail stations. By contrast, the killer of Force is alleged to have been a Facebook user, but plaintiffs do not set forth what specific content encouraged his attack, other than that "Hamas ... use[d] Facebook to promote terrorist stabbings." App'x 335.
Hamas also used Facebook to celebrate these attacks and others, to transmit political messages, and to generally support further violence against Israel. The perpetrators were able to view this content because, although Facebook's terms and policies bar such use by Hamas and other designated foreign terrorist organizations, Facebook has allegedly failed to remove the "openly maintained" pages and associated content of certain Hamas leaders, spokesmen, and other members. App'x 229. It is also alleged that Facebook's algorithms directed such content to the personalized newsfeeds of the individuals who harmed the plaintiffs. Thus, plaintiffs claim, Facebook enables Hamas "to disseminate its messages directly to its intended audiences," App'x 255, and to "carry out the essential communication components of [its] terror attacks," App'x 256.
II. Facebook's Antiterrorism Efforts
A. Intended Uses of Facebook
Facebook has Terms of Service that govern the use of Facebook and purport to incorporate Facebook's Community Standards.
B. Prohibited Uses of Facebook
According to the current version of Facebook's Community Standards, Facebook "remove[s] content that expresses support or praise for groups, leaders, or individuals involved in," inter alia , "[t]errorist activity." 2. Dangerous Individuals and Organizations , Community Standards , Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/dangerous_individuals_organizations (last visited June 26, 2019). "Terrorist organizations and terrorists" may not "maintain a presence" on Facebook, nor is "coordination of support" for them allowed. Id . Facebook "do[es] not allow symbols that represent any [terrorist] organizations or [terrorists] to be shared on [the] platform without context that condemns or neutrally discusses the content." Id . In addition, Facebook purports to ban "hate speech" and to "remove content that glorifies violence or celebrates the suffering or humiliation of others." Objectionable Content , Community Standards , Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/objectionable_content (last visited June 26, 2019).
Facebook's Terms of Service also prohibit using its services "to do or share anything" that is,
inter alia
, "unlawful" or that "infringes or violates someone else's rights."
According to recent testimony by Facebook's General Counsel in a United States Senate hearing, Facebook employs a multilayered strategy to enforce these policies and combat extremist content on its platform.
The General Counsel also testified that, for content that is not automatically detected, Facebook employs thousands of people who respond to user reports of inappropriate content and remove such
content.
Id.
Facebook also has a 150-person team of "counterterrorism specialists," including academics, engineers, and former prosecutors and law enforcement officers.
III. District Court Proceeding
Plaintiffs brought this action on July 10, 2016, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. On consent of the parties, the action was transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York on September 16, 2016.
Facebook moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court determined that it had personal jurisdiction over Facebook, a ruling that Facebook does not challenge on appeal. But the district court also held that
Plaintiffs then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter the judgment, asking the district court to reconsider its dismissal of their First Amended Complaint, and filed a motion seeking leave to file a second amended complaint. The proposed complaint retained all of plaintiffs' prior claims for relief and added a claim that Facebook had concealed its alleged material support to Hamas. In January 2018, the district court denied plaintiffs' motions with prejudice, holding that plaintiffs' proposed second amended complaint was futile in light of
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the district court determined that it was futile to allow plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint, we evaluate that proposed complaint "as we would a motion to dismiss, determining whether [it] contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
DISCUSSION
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the district court improperly held that Section 230(c)(1) barred their claims. Plaintiffs argue that their claims do not treat Facebook as the "publisher" or "speaker" of content
In response to plaintiffs' claims, Facebook contends that Section 230(c)(1) provides it immunity and that, even absent such immunity, plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that Facebook assisted Hamas in the ways required for their federal antiterrorism claims and Israeli law claims.
We first turn to the issues regarding
Section 230(c)(1).
I. Background of Section 230(c)(1)
The primary purpose of the proposed legislation that ultimately resulted in the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") "was to protect children from sexually explicit internet content."
FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC
,
In the seminal Fourth Circuit decision interpreting the immunity of Section 230 shortly after its enactment, Zeran v. America Online, Inc. , that court described Congress's concerns underlying Section 230 :
The amount of information communicated via interactive computer services is ... staggering. The specter of ... liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their services, interactive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted. Congress ... chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.
The addition of Section 230 to the proposed CDA also "assuaged Congressional concern regarding the outcome of two inconsistent judicial decisions,"
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,
To "overrule
Stratton
,"
id
., and to accomplish its other objectives, Section 230(c)(1) provides that "[n]o provider ... of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider."
In light of Congress's objectives, the Circuits are in general agreement that the text of Section 230(c)(1) should be construed broadly in favor of immunity.
See
LeadClick,
II. Whether Section 230(c)(1) Protects Facebook's Alleged Conduct
The parties agree that Facebook is a provider of an "interactive computer service," but dispute whether plaintiffs' claims allege that (1) Facebook is acting as the protected publisher of information, and (2) the challenged information is provided by Hamas, or by Facebook itself.
A. Whether Plaintiffs' Claims Implicate Facebook as a "Publisher" of Information
Certain important terms are left undefined by Section 230(c)(1), including "publisher."
Plaintiffs seek to hold Facebook liable for "giving Hamas a forum with which to communicate and for actively bringing Hamas' message to interested parties." Appellants' Reply Br. 37;
see also, e.g.
, Appellants' Br. 50-51 (arguing that the federal anti-terrorism statutes "prohibit[ ] Facebook from supplying Hamas a platform and communications services"). But that alleged conduct by Facebook falls within the heartland of what it means to be the "publisher" of information under Section 230(c)(1). So, too, does Facebook's alleged failure to delete content from Hamas members' Facebook pages.
See
LeadClick
,
Plaintiffs also argue that Facebook does not act as the publisher of Hamas's content within the meaning of Section 230(c)(1) because it uses algorithms to suggest content to users, resulting in "matchmaking." Appellants' Br. 51-52. For example, plaintiffs allege that Facebook's "newsfeed" uses algorithms that predict and show the third-party content that is most likely to interest and engage users. Facebook's algorithms also provide "friend suggestions," based on analysis of users' existing social connections on Facebook and other behavioral and demographic data. And, Facebook's advertising algorithms and "remarketing" technology allow advertisers to target ads to its users who are likely most interested in those ads.
We disagree with plaintiffs' contention that Facebook's use of algorithms renders it a non-publisher. First, we find no basis in the ordinary meaning of "publisher," the other text of Section 230, or decisions interpreting Section 230, for concluding that an interactive computer service is not the "publisher" of third-party information when it uses tools such as algorithms that are designed to match that information with a consumer's interests.
Indeed, arranging and distributing third-party information inherently forms "connections" and "matches" among speakers, content, and viewers of content, whether in interactive internet forums or in more traditional media.
Plaintiffs' "matchmaking" argument would also deny immunity for the editorial decisions regarding third-party content that interactive computer services have made since the early days of the Internet. The services have always decided, for example, where on their sites (or other digital property) particular third-party content should reside and to whom it should be shown. Placing certain third-party content on a homepage, for example, tends to recommend that content to users more than if it were located elsewhere on a website. Internet services have also long been able to target the third-party content displayed to users based on, among other things, users' geolocation, language of choice, and registration information. And, of course, the services must also decide what type and format of third-party content they will display, whether that be a chat forum for classic car lovers, a platform for blogging, a feed of recent articles from news sources frequently visited by the user, a map or directory of local businesses, or a dating service to find romantic partners. All of these decisions, like the decision to host third-party content in the first place, result in "connections" or "matches" of information and individuals, which would have not occurred but for the internet services' particular editorial choices regarding the display of third-party content. We, again, are unaware of case law denying Section 230(c)(1) immunity because of the "matchmaking" results of such editorial decisions.
Seen in this context, plaintiffs' argument that Facebook's algorithms uniquely form "connections" or "matchmake" is wrong. That, again, has been a fundamental result of publishing third-party content on the Internet since its beginning. Like the decision to place third-party content on a homepage, for example, Facebook's algorithms might cause more such "matches" than other editorial decisions. But that is not a basis to exclude the use of algorithms from the scope of what it means to be a "publisher" under Section 230(c)(1). The matches also might-as compared to those resulting from other editorial decisions-present users with targeted content of even more interest to them, just as an English speaker, for example, may be best matched with English-language content. But it would turn Section 230(c)(1) upside down to hold that Congress intended that when publishers of third-party content become especially adept at performing the functions of publishers, they are no longer immunized from civil liability.
Second, plaintiffs argue, in effect, that Facebook's use of algorithms is outside the scope of publishing because the algorithms
automate
Facebook's editorial decision-making. That argument, too, fails because "so long as a third party willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless of the specific edit[orial] or selection process."
Carafano
,
Our dissenting colleague calls for a narrow textual interpretation of Section 230(c)(1) by contending that the Internet was an "afterthought" of Congress in the CDA because the medium received less "committee attention" than other forms of media and that Congress, with Section 230, "tackled only ... the ease with which the Internet delivers indecent or offensive material, especially to minors." Dissent at 78. But such a constrained view of Section 230 simply is not supported by the actual text of the statute that Congress passed. In addition to the broad language of Section 230(c)(1) and the pro-Internet-development policy statements in Section 230 (discussed supra at 63, 67), Congress announced the following specific findings in Section 230 :
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
We therefore conclude that plaintiffs' claims fall within Facebook's status as the "publisher" of information within the meaning of Section 230(c)(1).
B. Whether Facebook is the Provider of the Information
We turn next to whether Facebook is plausibly alleged to
itself
be an "information content provider," or whether it is Hamas that provides all of the complained-of content. "The term 'information content provider' means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service."
The term "development" in Section 230(f)(3) is undefined. However, consistent with broadly construing "publisher" under Section 230(c)(1), we have recognized that a defendant will not be considered to have developed third-party content unless the defendant directly and "materially" contributed to what made the content itself "unlawful."
LeadClick
,
Employing this "material contribution" test, we held in
FTC v. LeadClick
that the defendant LeadClick had "developed" third parties' content by giving specific instructions to those parties on how to edit "fake news" that they were using in their ads to encourage consumers to purchase their weight-loss products.
LeadClick
,
Although it did not explicitly adopt the "material contribution" test, the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in
Marshall's Locksmith Service v. Google
,
As to the "less-exact" location information, such as area codes, provided by the scam locksmiths, the plaintiffs also argued that the mapping services' algorithmic translation of this information into exact pinpoint map locations developed or created the misleading information. Id . at 1269-70. The D.C. Circuit also rejected that argument, holding that "defendants' translation of [imprecise] third-party information into map pinpoints does not convert them into 'information content providers' because defendants use a neutral algorithm to make that translation." Id . at 1270. In using the term "neutral," the court observed that the algorithms were alleged to make no distinction between "scam" and other locksmiths and that the algorithms did not materially alter (i.e., they "hew[ed] to") the underlying information provided by the third parties. Id . at 1270 n.5, 1270-71.
Here, plaintiffs' allegations about Facebook's conduct do not render it responsible for the Hamas-related content. As an initial matter, Facebook does not edit (or suggest edits) for the content that its users-including Hamas-publish. That practice is consistent with Facebook's Terms of Service, which emphasize that a Facebook user "own[s] all of the content and information [the user] post[s] on Facebook, and [the user] can control how it is shared through [the user's] privacy and application settings." App'x 252.
Nor does Facebook's acquiring certain information from users render it a developer for the purposes of Section 230. Facebook requires users to provide only basic identifying information: their names, telephone numbers, and email addresses. In so doing, Facebook acts as a "neutral intermediary."
LeadClick
,
Plaintiffs' allegations likewise indicate that Facebook's algorithms are content "neutral" in the sense that the D.C. Circuit used that term in
Marshall's Locksmith
: The algorithms take the information provided by Facebook users and "match" it to other users-again, materially unaltered-based on objective factors applicable to any content, whether it concerns soccer, Picasso, or plumbers.
Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. For one, they point to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Roommates.Com
as holding that requiring or encouraging users to provide
any
particular information whatsoever to the interactive computer service transforms a defendant into a developer of that information. The
Roommates.Com
holding, however, was not so broad; it concluded only that the site's conduct in requiring users to select from "a limited set of pre-populated answers" to respond to particular "discriminatory questions" had a content-development effect that was actionable in the context of the Fair Housing Act.
See
Plaintiffs also argue that Facebook develops Hamas's content because Facebook's algorithms make that content more "visible," "available," and "usable." Appellants' Br. at 45-46. But making information more available is, again, an essential part of traditional publishing ; it does not amount to "developing" that information within the meaning of Section 230. Similarly, plaintiffs assert that Facebook's algorithms suggest third-party content to users "based on what Facebook believes will cause the user to use Facebook as much as possible" and that Facebook intends to "influence" consumers' responses to that content. Appellants' Br. 48. This does not describe anything more than Facebook vigorously fulfilling its role as a publisher. Plaintiffs' suggestion that publishers must have no role in organizing or distributing third-party content in order to avoid "develop[ing]" that content is both ungrounded in the text of Section 230 and contrary to its purpose.
Finally, we note that plaintiffs also argue that Facebook should not be afforded Section 230 immunity because Facebook has chosen to undertake efforts to eliminate objectionable and dangerous content but has not been effective or consistent in those efforts. However, again, one of the purposes of Section 230 was to ensure that interactive computer services should not incur liability as developers or creators of third-party content merely because they undertake such efforts-even if they are not completely effective.
We therefore conclude from the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint that Facebook did not "develop" the content of the Facebook postings by Hamas and that Section 230(c)(1) applies to Facebook's alleged conduct in this case.
III. Whether Applying Section 230(c)(1) to Plaintiffs' Claims Would Impair the Enforcement of a Federal Criminal Statute
Plaintiffs also argue that Section 230(c)(1) may not be applied to their claims because that would impermissibly "impair the enforcement" of a "Federal criminal statute." Appellant's Br. at 52 (quoting
We agree with the district court's conclusion that Section 230(e)(1) is inapplicable in this civil action. Even accepting,
arguendo
, plaintiffs' assertion that a civil litigant could be said to "enforce" a criminal statute through a separate civil remedies provision, any purported ambiguity in Section 230(e)(1) is resolved by its title, "No effect on criminal law."
IV. Whether the Anti-Terrorism Act's Civil Remedies Provision,
Plaintiffs also argue that the ATA's civil remedies provision,
"[R]epeals by implication are not favored and will not be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal is clear and manifest."
Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife
,
V. Whether Applying Section 230(c)(1) to Plaintiffs' Claims Would Be Impermissibly Extraterritorial
Plaintiffs also argue that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal statutes bars applying Section 230(c)(1) to their claims because Hamas posted content and conducted the attacks from overseas, and because Facebook's employees who failed to take down Hamas's content were allegedly located outside the United States, in Facebook's foreign facilities. In response, Facebook contends that Section 230(c)(1) merely limits civil liability in American courts, a purely domestic application.
Under the canon of statutory interpretation known as the "presumption against extraterritoriality," "[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic application."
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty.,
--- U.S. ----,
If the statute is not extraterritorial on its face, then "at the second step we determine whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute, and we do this by looking to the statute's 'focus.' "
Id
. "The focus of a statute is the object of its solicitude, which can include the conduct it seeks to regulate, as well as the parties and interests it seeks to protect or vindicate."
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.
, --- U.S. ----,
The two-step framework arguably does not easily apply to a statutory provision that affords an affirmative defense to civil liability. Indeed, it is unclear how an American court could apply such a provision "extraterritorially." Even if it could be applied extraterritorially-say, by somehow treating the defendant's conduct rather than the lawsuit itself as the "focus" of a liability-limiting provision-the presumption against extraterritoriality primarily "serves to avoid the international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries." Id . at 2100. Allowing a plaintiff's claim to go forward because the cause of action applies extraterritorially, while then applying the presumption to block a different provision setting out defenses to that claim, would seem only to increase the possibility of international friction. Such a regime could also give plaintiffs an advantage when they sue over extraterritorial wrongdoing that they would not receive if the defendant's conduct occurred domestically. It is doubtful that Congress ever intends such a result when it writes provisions limiting civil liability.
The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in
Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft Co.
,
merely eliminates the power of any party to bring a suit for damages against a general aviation aircraft manufacturer, in a U.S. federal or state court, after the limitation period. The only conduct it could arguably be said to regulate is the ability of a party to initiate an action for damages against a manufacturer in American courts-an entirely domestic endeavor. Congress has no power to tell courts of foreign countries whether they could entertain a suit against an American defendant.
Id . at 953. "Accordingly," the Ninth Circuit held, "the presumption against extraterritoriality simply is not implicated by GARA's application." Id .
The Supreme Court has left open the question of whether certain types of statutes might not be subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality.
See
WesternGeco
,
VI. Foreign Law Claims
Turning next to plaintiffs' foreign tort claims, the parties disagree as to the reach of Section 230 immunity. The district court held that Section 230 applies to foreign law claims brought in United States courts, but it did not address the basis for its exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. Before we can reach the merits of those causes of action, including the applicability of Section 230, we must independently ensure the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.
,
Plaintiffs allege that, under
Here, a substantial majority of the plaintiffs are alleged to be United States citizens domiciled in Israel.
In addition, "[i]t is well established that for a case to come within [ § 1332 ] there must be complete diversity,"
Cresswell
,
The joinder of Israel-domiciled U.S.-citizen plaintiffs requires us either to dismiss the diversity-based claims altogether, or exercise our discretion to: 1) dismiss those plaintiffs who we determine are "dispensable jurisdictional spoilers;" or 2) vacate in part the judgment of the district court and remand for it to make that indispensability determination and to determine whether dismissal of those individuals would be appropriate.
SCS Commc'ns, Inc. v. Herrick Co.
,
We decline to exercise our discretion to attempt to remedy these jurisdictional defects. This is not a case in which a small number of nondiverse parties defeats jurisdiction, but rather one in which-after multiple complaints have been submitted-most of the plaintiffs are improperly joined. Moreover, the case remains at the pleading stage, with discovery not yet having begun. Proceeding with the few diverse plaintiffs would be inefficient given the expenditure of judicial and party resources that would be required to address the jurisdictional defects. The most appropriate course is for any diverse plaintiffs to bring a new action and demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction in that action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court as to plaintiffs' federal claims and DISMISS plaintiffs' foreign law claims.
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