[534]*534OPINION
McDermott, justice.
In the early afternoon hours of December 15, 1980, the appellant, Howard Young, was operating a vehicle in a southerly direction on U.S. Route 22, in Maidencreek Township, Berks County. As he entered a left-hand curve, his vehicle crossed over into the right-hand northbound lane and thus collided with appellee’s, north-bound vehicle. A passenger in Mr. Young’s automobile died in the collision. Mr. Young was subsequently charged and found guilty, by a jury, of driving at an unsafe speed1 and homicide by vehicle.2
Appellees later instituted a civil action, by way of complaint, against appellant Young, Judith N. Agsten and Kendall Stitzel in which they alleged that Young was traveling too fast for weather conditions and that Agsten and Stitzel, the owners of the vehicle, negligently entrusted their car to Young. Appellant Young filed a Motion in Limine to exclude any evidence of his Motor Vehicle Code Violation convictions. The trial court granted the motion.
At the conclusion of the civil trial the jury found that Young was not negligent and accordingly entered judgment in his favor.3 Appellees, in turn, filed a motion for post-trial relief, which was denied. They then appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a new trial directing the entry of a verdict for appellees on the issue of Young’s negligence. The Superior Court reasoned that Young’s conviction for driving at an unsafe speed, 75 Pa.C.S.A., § 3361, was conclusive proof of his negligence, since that conviction formed [535]*535the basis for his vehicular homicide conviction.4
Appellant argues that the Superior Court erred by reversing and remanding to the trial court with instructions to enter a directed verdict as to negligence, based upon his conviction for driving at an unsafe speed, because the introduction of summary convictions was held to be inadmissible by this Court in Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965) and Loughner v. Schmelzer, 421 Pa. 283, 218 A.2d 768 (1966). We disagree. The appellant’s failure to drive at a safe speed was an operative fact in his vehicular homicide conviction. Vehicular homicide is clearly a non-summary offense as it entitles an accused to a jury trial and is punishable by up to five years imprisonment. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732 and 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 106 and 1104. As a consequence the issue is whether a conviction for a summary offense is conclusive in a later civil proceeding when the summary offense is a necessary operative fact in a non-summary conviction. This Court has allowed operative facts necessary for non-summary criminal convictions to be admitted as conclusive facts in civil suits arising from the same event. See Commonwealth Department of Transportation v. Mitchell, 517 Pa. 203, 535 A.2d 581 (1987); In re Estate of Klein, 474 Pa. 416, 378 A.2d 1182 (1987); and Kravitz Estate, 418 Pa. 319, 211 A.2d 443 (1965). The rule is not inconsistent with either Hurtt or Loughner for neither case directly addressed the issue presented. In Hurtt for example, this Court stated:
The defendant was presented with more than ample opportunity to overcome the charges lodged against him while he was swathed in a cloak of presumed innocence. His case was twice presented to a federal jury which found him guilty of extortion beyond a reasonable doubt, upon the same facts which are now urged as the basis for his civil liability. To now hold that the effect of those jury determinations is nil not only would be to fly in the face of reason but would also be a general indictment of [536]*536the whole American jury system ... The defendant should not now be heard to deny that which was established by his prior criminal conviction, without proof that his conviction was procured by fraud, perjury or some manner of error now sufficient to upset the conviction itself. Defendant has had his day in court and has failed to instill even a reasonable doubt in the collective mind of his then jury. No valid reason exists why he should be given a chance to try his luck with another jury.
In so deciding, we recognize a valid existing distinction in cases involving the record conviction of relatively minor matters such as traffic violations, lessor misdemeanors, and matters of like import. Especially in traffic violations, expediency and convenience, rather than guilt, often control the defendant’s “trial technique.” In such cases, it is not obvious that the defendant has taken advantage of his day in court, and it would be unreasonable and unrealistic to say he waived that right as to a matter (civil liability), which was probably not within contemplation at the time of the conviction. Compare also the effect given in Pennsylvania to a plea of nolo contendere: Teslovich v. Fireman’s Fire Ins. Co., 110 Pa.Super.Ct. 245, 168 A. 354 (1933).
The policy shifts with regard to major criminal convictions such as the one presented. We find it incredible in such a situation that a defendant would present less than his best defense, knowing that his failure would result in the loss of substantial property, or even his liberty. Id. at 498-99, 206 A.2d at 626-627.
A reading of the above decision in Hurtt illustrates that the court only sought to insure that the party bound by the prior determination had adequate incentive to contest the issue and an adequate forum in which to litigate. Clearly these requirements were satisfied in the instant action. Here the appellant was faced with a possible five year period of incarceration and was provided with trial by jury. This Court in Hurtt made it absolutely clear that once there is a finding of guilt by jury or judge, a collateral attack [537]*537upon such a finding will not be allowed unless it is established that the conviction was procured by fraud, perjury or some manner of error sufficient to upset the conviction.5 The rule is predicated upon society’s recognition of the bench or jury trial system as the most equitable forum and the recognition by this Court in Hurtt that commission of a serious offense entitles the defendant to a jury trial. Accordingly we find the appellant’s claim to be frivolous. In so holding however, we reiterate the strong sentiment expressed in Hurtt, and later applied in Loughner, that convictions for summary offenses by themselves, where an accused is not entitled to a jury trial, are inadmissible.
The appellant next asserts that application of his conviction in the prior proceeding to a subsequent civil trial is a violation of his right to due process under our decision in Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192, 535 A.2d 575 (1987). He further asserts that he may be guilty of no more than ordinary negligence. These issues are meritless for several reasons.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[534]*534OPINION
McDermott, justice.
In the early afternoon hours of December 15, 1980, the appellant, Howard Young, was operating a vehicle in a southerly direction on U.S. Route 22, in Maidencreek Township, Berks County. As he entered a left-hand curve, his vehicle crossed over into the right-hand northbound lane and thus collided with appellee’s, north-bound vehicle. A passenger in Mr. Young’s automobile died in the collision. Mr. Young was subsequently charged and found guilty, by a jury, of driving at an unsafe speed1 and homicide by vehicle.2
Appellees later instituted a civil action, by way of complaint, against appellant Young, Judith N. Agsten and Kendall Stitzel in which they alleged that Young was traveling too fast for weather conditions and that Agsten and Stitzel, the owners of the vehicle, negligently entrusted their car to Young. Appellant Young filed a Motion in Limine to exclude any evidence of his Motor Vehicle Code Violation convictions. The trial court granted the motion.
At the conclusion of the civil trial the jury found that Young was not negligent and accordingly entered judgment in his favor.3 Appellees, in turn, filed a motion for post-trial relief, which was denied. They then appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a new trial directing the entry of a verdict for appellees on the issue of Young’s negligence. The Superior Court reasoned that Young’s conviction for driving at an unsafe speed, 75 Pa.C.S.A., § 3361, was conclusive proof of his negligence, since that conviction formed [535]*535the basis for his vehicular homicide conviction.4
Appellant argues that the Superior Court erred by reversing and remanding to the trial court with instructions to enter a directed verdict as to negligence, based upon his conviction for driving at an unsafe speed, because the introduction of summary convictions was held to be inadmissible by this Court in Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965) and Loughner v. Schmelzer, 421 Pa. 283, 218 A.2d 768 (1966). We disagree. The appellant’s failure to drive at a safe speed was an operative fact in his vehicular homicide conviction. Vehicular homicide is clearly a non-summary offense as it entitles an accused to a jury trial and is punishable by up to five years imprisonment. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732 and 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 106 and 1104. As a consequence the issue is whether a conviction for a summary offense is conclusive in a later civil proceeding when the summary offense is a necessary operative fact in a non-summary conviction. This Court has allowed operative facts necessary for non-summary criminal convictions to be admitted as conclusive facts in civil suits arising from the same event. See Commonwealth Department of Transportation v. Mitchell, 517 Pa. 203, 535 A.2d 581 (1987); In re Estate of Klein, 474 Pa. 416, 378 A.2d 1182 (1987); and Kravitz Estate, 418 Pa. 319, 211 A.2d 443 (1965). The rule is not inconsistent with either Hurtt or Loughner for neither case directly addressed the issue presented. In Hurtt for example, this Court stated:
The defendant was presented with more than ample opportunity to overcome the charges lodged against him while he was swathed in a cloak of presumed innocence. His case was twice presented to a federal jury which found him guilty of extortion beyond a reasonable doubt, upon the same facts which are now urged as the basis for his civil liability. To now hold that the effect of those jury determinations is nil not only would be to fly in the face of reason but would also be a general indictment of [536]*536the whole American jury system ... The defendant should not now be heard to deny that which was established by his prior criminal conviction, without proof that his conviction was procured by fraud, perjury or some manner of error now sufficient to upset the conviction itself. Defendant has had his day in court and has failed to instill even a reasonable doubt in the collective mind of his then jury. No valid reason exists why he should be given a chance to try his luck with another jury.
In so deciding, we recognize a valid existing distinction in cases involving the record conviction of relatively minor matters such as traffic violations, lessor misdemeanors, and matters of like import. Especially in traffic violations, expediency and convenience, rather than guilt, often control the defendant’s “trial technique.” In such cases, it is not obvious that the defendant has taken advantage of his day in court, and it would be unreasonable and unrealistic to say he waived that right as to a matter (civil liability), which was probably not within contemplation at the time of the conviction. Compare also the effect given in Pennsylvania to a plea of nolo contendere: Teslovich v. Fireman’s Fire Ins. Co., 110 Pa.Super.Ct. 245, 168 A. 354 (1933).
The policy shifts with regard to major criminal convictions such as the one presented. We find it incredible in such a situation that a defendant would present less than his best defense, knowing that his failure would result in the loss of substantial property, or even his liberty. Id. at 498-99, 206 A.2d at 626-627.
A reading of the above decision in Hurtt illustrates that the court only sought to insure that the party bound by the prior determination had adequate incentive to contest the issue and an adequate forum in which to litigate. Clearly these requirements were satisfied in the instant action. Here the appellant was faced with a possible five year period of incarceration and was provided with trial by jury. This Court in Hurtt made it absolutely clear that once there is a finding of guilt by jury or judge, a collateral attack [537]*537upon such a finding will not be allowed unless it is established that the conviction was procured by fraud, perjury or some manner of error sufficient to upset the conviction.5 The rule is predicated upon society’s recognition of the bench or jury trial system as the most equitable forum and the recognition by this Court in Hurtt that commission of a serious offense entitles the defendant to a jury trial. Accordingly we find the appellant’s claim to be frivolous. In so holding however, we reiterate the strong sentiment expressed in Hurtt, and later applied in Loughner, that convictions for summary offenses by themselves, where an accused is not entitled to a jury trial, are inadmissible.
The appellant next asserts that application of his conviction in the prior proceeding to a subsequent civil trial is a violation of his right to due process under our decision in Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192, 535 A.2d 575 (1987). He further asserts that he may be guilty of no more than ordinary negligence. These issues are meritless for several reasons. The first is that the appellant never appealed his conviction. Since it was only voidable, it is to be given its full effect. Commonwealth v. Mackley, 380 Pa. 70, 110 A.2d 172 (1955). Secondly, all that was required of the appellees was a demonstration of ordinary negligence. This was established beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal case. Accordingly, these arguments are merit-less.
The appellant last asserts that the Superior Court’s decision will preclude him from presenting evidence of justification or excuse for his violation of the statute and [538]*538that the jury’s decision in the civil proceeding was not against the weight of the evidence. We disagree. As a matter of law the trial court erred in submitting the question of the appellant’s negligence to the jury. Commonwealth Department of Transportation v. Mitchell, 517 Pa. 203, 535 A.2d 581 (1987); In re Estate of Klein, 474 Pa. 416, 378 A.2d 1182 (1977); Kravitz Estate, 418 Pa. 319, 211 A.2d 443 (1965); and Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965). The appellant was negligent per se.6 Accordingly the order of the Superior Court is affirmed.
STOUT, Former Justice, did not participate in the decision of this case.
ZAPPALA, J., files a dissenting opinion.
ZAPPALA, Justice,
This opinion was reassigned to this writer.