Flynn v. O'Malley

D. Utah

Flynn v. O'Malley

DecidedJanuary 16, 2024

Docket2:22-cv-00798

StatusUnknown

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Flynn v. O'Malley, (D. Utah 2024).

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Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

KAREN F., MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER AFFIRMING THE Plaintiff, COMMISSIONER’S DECISION DENYING DISABILITY BENEFITS v.

MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Case No. 2:22-cv-00798 the Social Security Administration, Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg Defendant.

Plaintiff Karen F.1 filed this action for judicial review2 of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s decision denying her applications for disability insurance benefits under Title II3 and supplemental security income under Title XVI4 of the Social Security Act. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Ms. F.’s applications, finding she did not qualify as disabled.5 Ms. F. argues the ALJ erred in his supportability and consistency analysis of the medical opinions of Dr. Maurine Cobabe, such that the ALJ’s determination is unsupported by

1 Pursuant to best practices in the District of Utah addressing privacy concerns in certain cases, including social security cases, the court refers to Plaintiff by her first name and last initial only. 2 (See Compl., Doc. No. 5; Opening Br., Doc. No. 16.) 3 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434. 4 Id. §§ 1381–1385. 5 (Certified Tr. of Admin. R. (“Tr.”) 18–37, Doc. Nos. 12, 13.) substantial evidence.6 The court7 held a hearing on January 11, 2024,8 and has carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs. Because the ALJ properly considered Dr. Cobabe’s opinions and his findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW Sections 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of Title 42 of the United States Code provide for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. This court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether substantial evidence supports his factual findings and whether he applied the correct legal standards.9 “[F]ailure to apply the correct legal standard or to provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been followed is grounds for reversal.”10 An ALJ’s factual findings are “conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.”11 Although the evidentiary sufficiency threshold for substantial evidence is “not high,” it is “more than a mere scintilla.”12 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

6 (Opening Br. 13–20, Doc. No. 16.) 7 The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 8.) 8 (See Minute Entry, Doc. No. 29.) 9 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). 10 Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005). 11 Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153, ___ U.S. ___ (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 Id. at 1154 (internal quotation marks omitted). might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”13 “The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence.”14 And the court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.15

APPLICABLE LAW The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment” which is expected to result in death or last for at least twelve consecutive months.16 An individual is considered disabled only if her impairments are so severe, she cannot perform her past work or “any other kind of substantial gainful work.”17 In determining whether a claimant qualifies as disabled, the ALJ uses a five-step sequential evaluation, considering whether: 1) the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; 2) she has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment;

3) the impairment is equivalent to an impairment precluding substantial gainful activity (listed in the appendix of the relevant disability regulation); 4) she has the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work; and

13 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 14 Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (internal quotation marks omitted). 15 Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2004). 16 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also id. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). 17 Id. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). 5) she has the residual functional capacity to perform other work, considering her age, education, and work experience.18 The claimant has the burden, in the first four steps, of establishing disability.19 At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant retains the ability to perform other work in the national economy.20

PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 2019, Ms. F. applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning in 2009.21 Ms. F. later amended her alleged disability onset date to July 5, 2018.22 After an ALJ denied her applications, the Appeals Council remanded the case for additional proceedings.23 On remand, the ALJ found Ms. F. not disabled, in a decision dated September 2, 2022.24 At step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found Ms. F. had the severe impairments of asthma, bipolar disorder, depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, alcohol use disorder, and cannabis use disorder.25

18 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140–42 (1987); Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750–51 (10th Cir. 1988). 19 Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989). 20 Id. 21 (See Tr. 445, 449.) 22 (Tr. 18, 185.) 23 (Tr. 184–96, 204–07.) 24 (Tr. 18–37.) 25 (Tr. 21.) At step three, the ALJ first found Ms. F.’s impairments met an impairment listing when including substance abuse.26 The ALJ then considered whether substance abuse was a contributing factor material to the disability determination.27 The ALJ found that if Ms. F. stopped abusing substances, her remaining impairments would not meet or medically equal an impairment listing.28 The ALJ also determined that if Ms. F. stopped abusing substances, she

would have residual functional capacity (“RFC”)29 to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with the following nonexertional limitations: [Ms. F.] must avoid even moderate exposure to pulmonary irritants.

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