Floyd v. Saber Fitness Hegenberger, LLC

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: February 10, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-01278
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 MICHAEL DEVIN FLOYD, Case No. 24-cv-01278-TSH

7 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 8 v. LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT 9 SABER FITNESS HEGENBERGER, LLC, Re: Dkt. No. 64 10 Defendant.

11 12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Michael Devin Floyd’s motion to file a fourth 14 amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). ECF No. 64. Defendant 15 Saber Fitness Hegenberger, LLC filed an Opposition (ECF No. 71) and Floyd filed a Reply (ECF 16 No. 74). The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and 17 VACATES the February 13, 2025 hearing. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons stated below, 18 the Court DENIES the motion.1 19 II. BACKGROUND 20 A. Factual Background 21 Floyd, who is African-American, opened an all-access gym membership at Saber’s Planet 22 Fitness in Jacksonville, Florida in 2019. Third Am. Compl. (“TAC”) ¶¶ 9, 22, ECF No. 52. 23 While visiting family in San Jose in July 2021, he went to a Planet Fitness location there and was 24 subsequently told by his home gym in Florida that there was a complaint about his “vulgarity and 25 personality.” Id. ¶ 9. Staff at the San Jose Planet Fitness said Floyd was no longer allowed there, 26 but they did not provide any further details. Id. Floyd began using other Planet Fitness gyms in 27 1 the nearby area, but “other incidents occurred” at these gyms, and his home gym in Florida 2 subsequently informed him that his membership was cancelled. Id. ¶ 10. 3 On September 17, 2021, Floyd opened another Planet Fitness membership in Oakland, 4 California. Id. ¶ 12. Floyd alleges several incidents took place at the Oakland Planet Fitness, 5 including a report on October 13 that he was “slamming weights down,” that on October 16 the 6 Director of Operations asked gym staff to watch him carefully, that on November 10 he heard a 7 staff member say to him “Have a good day, bum,” although the staff member denied calling him a 8 bum, and that there were “multiple incidents” in December 2021 where other gym patrons and 9 staff members reported they felt uncomfortable. Id. ¶¶ 14-17. 10 Floyd alleges the “last incident,” which is undated, occurred at the Planet Fitness on Ranch 11 Drive in Milpitas. Id. ¶ 19. Floyd alleges he “met a girl at the water fountain. We both took an 12 interest in each other. At no time did she tell me she wanted to stop talking to me, nor expressed 13 she was uninterested in me.” Id. Floyd alleges “[s]he forgot her lock at home and when she was 14 about to buy a lock, I attempted to pay for it, when Majenta then told me I was making the woman 15 feel uncomfortable,” even though the member “never expressed to me she was feeling 16 uncomfortable. The Planet Fitness member also did not express to Majenta she was feeling 17 uncomfortable nor made any movements to indicate she was uncomfortable.” Id. When Floyd 18 told “Majenta to mind her business, the woman even backed me up, telling Majenta not to tell me 19 anything and that she will talk to me when she wants. Unfortunately, Majenta and other staff 20 members asked me to leave before I could purchase the lock for the woman.” Id. After this 21 incident, Floyd was banned from all Planet Fitness locations in the Bay Area. Id. ¶ 20. 22 B. Procedural Background 23 On July 3, 2023, Floyd filed his initial complaint in the Alameda Superior Court, Case No. 24 23CV037550, naming “Planet Fitness of Oakland, CA,” as the defendant. ECF No. 1-1; Ex. A. 25 On January 30, 2024, Floyd filed a First Amended Complaint naming Saber. Not. of Removal, 26 Ex. B, ECF No. 1-2. He alleged ten causes of action: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; 27 (3) California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51; (4) Cal. Civ. Code § 51.5; (5) 1 Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750; (7) Negligent Training and Supervision; 2 (8) “Restatement (Third) of Law, Agency Law, Agency § 7.04, § 7.06, § 7.07, § 7.08 – Principal’s 3 Liability to a Third Party”; (9) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (10) Cal. Civ. Code 4 § 1714. 5 Saber removed the matter to this Court on March 1, 2024 and subsequently moved for 6 dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 6. On June 11, 2024, the Court granted Saber’s 7 motion with leave to amend. ECF No. 39; Floyd v. Saber Fitness Hegenberger, LLC, 2024 WL 8 2971669, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2024). 9 On July 11, 2024, Floyd filed a Second Amended Complaint, re-alleging three claims from 10 his previous complaint (violation of the Unruh Act, violation of the UCL, and Negligent Training 11 and Supervision) and adding a new claim under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, 12 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940. ECF No. 40. Saber again moved for dismissal. ECF No. 44. On 13 August 23, 2024, the Court granted Saber’s motion in part and denied it in part, again with leave 14 to amend. ECF No. 51; Floyd v. Saber Fitness Hegenberger, LLC, 2024 WL 3924688, at *1 15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2024). 16 On September 18, 2024, Floyd filed the operative TAC, alleging six claims: (1) 17 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51; (2) California’s UCL; (3) Negligent 18 Training and Supervision; (4) Breach of Contract; (5) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith 19 and Fair Dealing; and (6) Breach of Implied Duty to Perform with Reasonable Care. Saber again 20 moved for dismissal, ECF No. 53, but the Court denied its motion, ECF No. 56. Saber answered 21 the TAC on November 13, 2024. 22 On December 5, 2024, the parties filed a joint case management statement. ECF No. 58. 23 At that time, Floyd indicated he would seek leave to amend “based on the Defendant’s 24 unanswered requests for exculpatory evidence in a criminal investigation.” Id. at 3. He also 25 indicated he “does not expect to add anything to the pleadings.” Id. at 4. On December 6 the 26 Court issued a case management order, setting February 6, 2025 as the deadline to seek leave to 27 amend pleadings and March 5, 2025 as the deadline for fact discovery. ECF No. 59. 1 Complaint (“PFAC’), Floyd alleges that on August 18, 2021, an incident occurred in the parking 2 lot of a Planet Fitness off Saratoga Road in San Jose, California. PFAC ¶ 32, ECF No. 62. Floyd 3 attaches as Exhibit 10 to the PFAC a subpoena issued to “Planet Fitness on Saratoga Avenue, San 4 Jose.” ECF No. 65. During that incident, Floyd was criminally charged with brandishing a 5 firearm at a witness. PFAC ¶ 32. After he was released from custody on August 20, Floyd 6 informed Planet Fitness that he desired the video surveillance footage. Id. Three years later, on 7 September 23, 2024, a state investigator informed Floyd that she was unable to obtain the video 8 surveillance footage. Id. Based on these additional facts, Floyd seeks to assert claims against 9 Saber for spoliation, promissory estoppel, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 10 dealing for failing to provide the surveillance footage located at the Planet Fitness on Saratoga 11 Road in San Jose. Id. ¶¶ 32-36. 12 III. LEGAL STANDARD 13 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), a party may amend its original pleading 14 once as a matter of course within 21 days of serving it. “In all other cases, a party may amend its 15 pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 15(a)(2). The Court considers five factors in deciding a motion for leave to amend: (1) bad faith 17 on the part of the movant; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of 18 amendment; and (5) whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint. In re W. States 19 Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Oneok, Inc. 20 v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015). The rule is “to be applied with extreme liberality.” 21 Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and 22 citation omitted). Generally, a court should determine whether to grant leave indulging “all 23 inferences in favor of granting the motion.” Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th 24 Cir. 1999). “Courts may decline to grant leave to amend only if there is strong evidence of ‘undue 25 delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies 26 by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance 27 of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment, etc.’” Sonoma Cnty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. 1 (1962)). 2 IV. DISCUSSION 3 A. Bad Faith 4 As to the first factor, bad faith may be shown when a party seeks to amend late in the 5 litigation process with claims which were, or should have been, apparent early. Bonin v. 6 Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 846 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, Floyd states he did not learn all the facts 7 related to his new claims until September 18, 2024, and he notes that he originally informed Saber 8 and the Court that he intended to seek leave to amend in both his October 8 opposition to Saber’s 9 motion to dismiss his third amended complaint and in the parties’ December 5 case management 10 statement. Mot. at 2. As such, it does not appear that Floyd seeks to add these claims in bad faith. 11 B. Undue Delay 12 As to the second factor, a moving party’s inability to sufficiently explain its delay may 13 indicate that the delay was undue. Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 14 1990). Whether the moving party knew or should have known the facts and theories raised in the 15 proposed amendment at the time it filed its original pleadings is a relevant consideration in 16 assessing untimeliness. Id.; Acri v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 17 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[L]ate amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed favorably 18 when the facts and the theory have been known to the party seeking amendment since the 19 inception of the cause of action.”). 20 Although the new allegations relate to an incident that took place on August 18, 2021, 21 Floyd did not learn that the state investigator was unable to obtain the video surveillance footage 22 until September 23, 2024, over six months after he filed his original complaint. Id. As such, there 23 is no indication Floyd knew of the legal theories raised in the proposed amendment at the time he 24 filed his original complaint. However, to the extent Floyd seeks to tie the new allegations to his 25 claims against Saber for his removal from the Planet Fitness in Oakland, he presents no argument 26 that he was unaware of the facts related to the incident. See Alsabur v. Autozone, Inc., 2014 WL 27 1340730, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014) (denying leave to amend where plaintiff “had knowledge 1 filing his first amended complaint. That he has since obtained new evidence to bolster the new 2 causes of action does not excuse his failure to include these allegations in previous pleadings.”). 3 Further, it is unclear why Floyd waited until January 6 to file the present motion, which 4 comes over three months after he first informed the Court that he intended to seek leave to amend. 5 With fact discovery set to close on March 5, this would not allow either party enough time to 6 conduct discovery regarding these additional claims. In other words, Floyd’s proposed 7 amendment would likely cause undue delays in the litigation, forcing extensions of the discovery 8 cutoff deadlines and continuance of other dates. See AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., 9 Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court’s denial of leave to amend, even 10 though eight months of discovery remained, because allowing plaintiff to “‘advance different legal 11 theories and require proof of different facts’ at this stage in the litigation would have prejudiced 12 Dialysist West and unfairly delayed Dialysist West’s collection of a judgment worth 13 approximately $2.2 million.”); Solomon v. N. Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th 14 Cir. 1998) (motion “on the eve of the discovery deadline” properly denied because it would have 15 required reopening discovery, thus delaying proceedings). Moreover, as discussed below, Floyd’s 16 new claims, which advance different legal theories than those that the form the crux of his claims 17 against Saber, are properly brought against a different party. 18 At the same time, the Court recognizes that “delay alone no matter how lengthy is an 19 insufficient ground for denial of leave to amend.” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 980 (9th 20 Cir. 1981). Rather, undue delay combined with other factors may warrant denial of leave to 21 amend. See, e.g., Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1387-89 (holding that prejudice and undue delay are 22 sufficient to deny leave to amend); Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 1991) 23 (same). Accordingly, the Court considers the likely delay that would ensue should it allow Floyd 24 leave to file his PFAC, but it must also determine whether other factors also warrant denial of 25 leave to amend. 26 C. Prejudice to the Opposing Party 27 “[I]t is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight. 1 (9th Cir. 1987)). However, “[t]o overcome Rule 15(a)’s liberal policy with respect to the 2 amendment of pleadings a showing of prejudice must be substantial.” Stearns v. Select Comfort 3 Retail Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Abbott 4 Lab’ys, 127 F.R.D. 529, 530-31 (N.D. Cal. 1989)). 5 Floyd’s attempt to amend his complaint—for a fourth time—just weeks before the 6 discovery cutoff deadline could support a finding of prejudice. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 7 Network Solutions, 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A need to reopen discovery and therefore 8 delay the proceedings supports a district court’s finding of prejudice from a delayed motion to 9 amend the complaint.”) (citing Solomon, 151 F.3d at 1139). As noted above, Floyd’s proposed 10 amendment would not allow either party enough time to conduct discovery under the current 11 deadlines. 12 Beyond timing, Floyd’s new allegations also seem to bear no relation to the gravamen of 13 his claims in this case—that Saber unfairly removed him from the Planet Fitness gym it owns in 14 Oakland. Saber has stated it does not own the Planet Fitness in San Jose. Opp’n at 3. As such, it 15 is not the entity that Floyd alleges engaged in the actions related to the video surveillance footage. 16 Saber cannot reasonably be expected to defend itself against claims that do not pertain to it. See 17 Alsabur, 2014 WL 1340730, at *4 (“Prejudice typically arises where the opposing party is 18 surprised with new allegations which require additional discovery or will otherwise delay 19 resolution of the case.”) (citing Acri, 781 F.2d at 1398-99); see also Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1387 (A 20 party may be found unduly prejudiced if “[t]hese additional claims advance different legal theories 21 and require proof of different facts.”). 22 Moreover, even if Floyd later sought to add the owner of the San Jose gym as a defendant, 23 any attempt to bring claims against a different entity would not comply with Federal Rule of Civil 24 Procedure 20, which provides that persons may be joined in one action as defendants if “(A) any 25 right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or 26 arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) 27 any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.’” 2 Randle v. Contra Costa Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 2024 WL 459062, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2024) 3 (quoting George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)). “Unrelated claims against different 4 defendants belong in different suits.” George, 507 F.3d at 607; see also Shepard v. Bell, 2015 WL 5 3751799, at *3 (D. Nev. June 16, 2015) (“Since the proposed defendants, causes of action, and 6 subject property of those causes of action are all separate and distinct from what Plaintiff has 7 alleged thus far in the instant case, the Court finds that allowing Plaintiff’s proposed amendment 8 would materially alter the current nature of this litigation.”). In his reply, Floyd argues his new 9 claims are not independent, as the same person works as a manager at both locations. Reply at 1- 10 2. But even if this is true, Floyd has not brought claims against the manager; his claims are 11 against Saber, which should not be forced to defend against allegations related to a gym it does not 12 own. 13 In sum, as Floyd’s new claims are based on events that occurred at a Planet Fitness not 14 owned by Saber, the Court finds they are properly brought in a separate action against the owner 15 of that gym. See Scott v. McCay, 2024 WL 3033619, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2024) (“To seek 16 relief for claims arising out of other incidents or raising different questions of law, Plaintiff must 17 bring separate actions.”); Nevarez v. Napa State Hosp., 2024 WL 647643, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18 15, 2024) (same). As such, the Court finds Saber would be prejudiced if it allows Floyd to amend 19 his complaint for a fourth time as proposed. 20 D. Futility of Amendment 21 “A motion for leave to amend may be denied if it appears to be futile or legally 22 insufficient. However, a proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under 23 the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim[.]” Miller v. 24 Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court 25 has held, ‘[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper 26 subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.’” Foman, 27 371 U.S. at 182. Here, however, Floyd’s proposed amendments would be futile against Saber 1 own. While Floyd may have claims against the entity that owns the San Jose gym, they are not 2 || properly brought as part of his case against Saber. See Union Pac. R. Co. v. Nevada Power Co., 3 950 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Amendments seeking to add claims are to be granted more 4 || freely than amendments adding parties.”). “Courts have held that a ‘supplemental pleading may 5 seek to bring in additional parties[,] plaintiff or defendant[,] when the subsequent events alleged in 6 || the new pleading make it necessary to join them.’” Vanguard Med. Mgmt. Billing, Inc. v. Baker, 7 || 2018 WL 6137190, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2018) (alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting 8 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1507 (2018)). Here, adding the San Jose owner as a defendant is 9 || unnecessary because any claims Floyd seeks to add bear no relation to his claims in this case. 10 || E. Previous Amendments 11 Courts have broader discretion in denying motions for leave to amend after leave to amend 12 || has already been granted. See Rich v. Shrader, 823 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen the 5 13 district court has already afforded a plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint, it has wide 14 || discretion in granting or refusing leave to amend after the first amendment, and only upon gross 3 15 abuse will [its] rulings be disturbed.”) (alteration in original; internal quotations and citation a 16 omitted); Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (district court’s discretion 3 17 || is “particularly broad” when it has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend). This would be S 18 Floyd’s fourth amended complaint, and the Court has already provided Floyd two opportunities to 19 || amend. See ECF Nos. 39, 51. As Floyd seeks to add claims against a different entity, and they 20 || bear no relation to the crux of his complaints against Saber in this case, the Court finds it would be 21 improper to grant him a third opportunity to amend. 22 Vv. CONCLUSION 23 The Court concludes that leave to amend is not warranted under Rule 15. Accordingly, 24 || Floyd’s motion to amend is DENIED. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: February 10, 2025 27 AY \ - |} 4 _ THOMAS S. HIXSON 28 United States Magistrate Judge