Flowers v. Clary

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ZACHARY FLOWERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-01179 (UNA)

v. )

)

RAYMOND CLARY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court grants plaintiff’s IFP application and, for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses the complaint, and this matter, without prejudice.

Plaintiff, who is currently staying at Adam’s Place Emergency Shelter in the District, sues a single defendant, Raymond Clary, who plaintiff contends is located in Boston, Massachusetts, see Compl. at 1, but he provides no further contact information for defendant, in contravention of D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1). The allegations are spare, at best. Plaintiff alleges that defendant has stalked him in Massachusetts and the District of Columbia, has poisoned him with fentanyl, and has scared plaintiff’s family members. Plaintiff also separately asserts that some of his family members have been murdered, but it is unclear if those events are allegedly connected to defendant. He seeks a restraining order against defendant. See id.

Pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v.

Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239–40 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a);

see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).

A claim is facially plausible only when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A pleading must offer more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Here, plaintiff fails to supply any details or context to support a cognizable claim. He does not clearly explain the nature of his relationship with defendant, nor does he describe where or when defendant’s acts allegedly occurred. Without such basic facts, neither the defendant nor this court has clear notice of plaintiff’s claims.

For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

__________/s/_____________ Date: May 24, 2024 AMIT P. MEHTA United States District Judge