Florida Parole Commission v. Padovano
Opinion
The Florida Parole Commission petitions this court for writs of prohibition, contending the respondent circuit judges lack jurisdiction to consider mandamus petitions filed by inmates who are challenging their presumptive parole release dates (PPRDs).1 We deny relief.
Petitioner’s basic premise is that judicial review of PPRDs violates the separation of powers provision of Article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution. That is, as section 947.18, Florida Statutes, gives the commission discretion as to which inmates are to be released on parole, petitioner contends judicial review of that determination constitutes an encroachment of the judiciary upon the executive branch. We cannot agree.
We believe Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla.1974) is controlling authority in this cause. There the court expressly held that “while there is no absolute right to parole, there is a right to proper consideration for parole.” Id. at 720.2 The commission’s argument fails to address this legal principle and also fails to properly consider the procedural requirements of sections 947.-165, 947.172, and 947.173, Florida Statutes, in establishing PPRDs. The commission’s discretion as described in section 947.18 is not inconsistent with sections 947.165, .172, and .173, Florida Parole and Probation Commission v. Paige, 462 So.2d 817 (Fla.1985).
Accordingly, we find the commission has failed to demonstrate entitlement to the relief it seeks and we deny the petitions for writ of prohibition.
Footnotes
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554 So. 2d 1200 (Florida Parole Commission v. Padovano) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.