Flippin v. Gray

Ohio Court of Appeals

Flippin v. Gray

2026 Ohio 515

Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided February 17, 2026·No. CA2025-06-045·Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO WARREN COUNTY

JOSHUA FLIPPIN, :

CASE NO. CA2025-06-045

Appellant, :

OPINION AND

vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 2/17/2026

ASHLEIGH GRAY, :

Appellee. :

:

CIVIL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. 24DV11278

Joshua Andrew Flippin, pro se. Lawrence W. Henke III, for appellee.

OPINION

PIPER, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Joshua Flippin ("Father"), appeals the decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, adopting a magistrate's

order denying his petition for a domestic violence civil protection order ("DVCPO") against appellee, Ashleigh Gray ("Mother"), naming both himself and their non-verbal, autistic son, Adam, as protected persons.1 For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the domestic relations court's decision.2 Background Information Related to DVCPOs

{¶ 2} "The purpose of a DVCPO is the protection of a petitioner from violence by the respondent." Halcomb v. Greenwood, 2020-Ohio-2768, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.). "A petition requesting the issuance of a DVCPO against the respondent is governed by R.C. 3113.31." Hankinson v. Cooper, 2022-Ohio-1896, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). "Pursuant to that statute, for the petitioner to obtain a DVCPO against the respondent, 'the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has engaged in an act of domestic violence against petitioner, petitioner's family, or petitioner's household members.'" Id., quoting McBride v. McBride, 2012-Ohio-2146, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.). R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a)(iii) defines the phrase "domestic violence" to include the commission of any act with respect to a child that would result in the child being an "abused child" as that term is defined by R.C. 2151.031.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} The parties have a son, Adam, born on March 19, 2013. Adam is non-verbal and autistic. On February 23, 2021, the parties entered into a shared parenting plan that set forth their respective parental rights and responsibilities with respect to Adam. The plan designated Mother as Adam's residential parent for school purposes and awarded Father parenting time. More recently, in the spring of 2024, Father moved for sole legal

1. To protect the child's privacy, we have provided the child with a fictitious name.

2. Pursuant to Loc.R. 6(A), we sua sponte remove this appeal from the accelerated calendar for purposes of issuing this opinion.

custody of Adam, a request that, if granted, would terminate the shared parenting plan. Father also petitioned at least two courts for a civil protection order against Mother. This appeal addresses one of those two petitions.

{¶ 4} On October 10, 2024, Father filed a petition seeking a DVCPO against Mother, naming both himself and Adam as persons in need of protection. To support the petition, Father argued that, over the preceding few months, Adam had been acting out in an apparent attempt to communicate his "dread" when confronted with the possibility of staying in Mother's custody rather than Father's. Father also alleged that Adam was "terrified" of Mother and that the "anxiety that she causes him destabilizes his mind." Father further alleged that Mother was the likely cause of the bruising recently discovered on Adam's body, noting that Mother had supposedly not been "taking her meds for mental health." The domestic relations court granted Father a temporary ex parte DVCPO against Mother later that same day.

{¶ 5} On March 5 and April 2, 2025, a full hearing was held on Father's petition.

A magistrate presided over the hearing. Shortly after the hearing concluded, the magistrate issued an order denying Father's DVCPO petition and vacating the temporary ex parte DVCPO previously imposed on Mother. The magistrate found the evidence insufficient to support Father's allegations that Mother had committed an act of domestic violence against their son, Adam, that would necessitate the issuance of a DVCPO. In reaching this decision, the magistrate noted his belief that Father's efforts to obtain a DVCPO against Mother were nothing more than an attempt to influence the decision on Father's then still-pending motion for sole legal custody of Adam. The domestic relations court adopted the magistrate's order later that same day.

{¶ 6} On April 16, 2025, Father filed his initial objections to the domestic relations court's decision adopting the magistrate's order. He supplemented those objections on

May 8, 2025. However, Father never filed with the domestic relations court a transcript of the hearing held on his petition for a DVCPO against Mother. This was a requirement imposed upon Father by Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iv). Pursuant to that rule, "[o]bjections based upon evidence of record shall be supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate or an affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available."

{¶ 7} On May 20, 2025, the domestic relations court issued a decision overruling Father's objections to its adoption of the magistrate's order. In so ruling, the court noted that Father had not provided it with a transcript of the full hearing held on his DVCPO petition, as required by Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iv). The court determined that the lack of a transcript made it impossible to know "what evidence was presented to the magistrate" and "no way of knowing whether the magistrate made the proper ruling based on the evidence submitted." The court thereafter concluded that, given Father's failure to provide the necessary transcript, "Father's objections must be overruled for that reason alone."

{¶ 8} Notwithstanding the lack of a transcript, the domestic relations court then addressed—to the extent that it could—the merits of Father's objections. This included the domestic relations court's initial statement regarding Father's argument that the magistrate's order was against the manifest weight of the evidence, as follows:

In his initial objection, Father argued that the Magistrate's finding was erroneous because it was against the manifest weight of the evidence and failed to adequately consider the totality of the circumstances, including new evidence Father had. In his supplemental memorandum, Father added that it was unclear what evidence and exhibits were admitted, creating "substantial ambiguity" and "potentially obscuring key information."

{¶ 9} Continuing, the domestic relations court then stated:

Upon consideration of this objection, the Court notes that this is exactly why Father should have followed the law and provided a transcript of the proceedings. Without it, the Court is unable to know what Father testified to and whether the

Magistrate was wrong in not believing it. Accordingly, Father's first objection is overruled.

The domestic relations court ruled in a substantially similar manner on each of Father's other objections.

{¶ 10} On June 20, 2025, Father filed a notice of appeal. Father's appeal was submitted to this court for consideration on January 14, 2025. Father's appeal is now properly before this court for decision. To support his appeal, Father has raised one assignment of error for review.

Father's Single Assignment of Error for Review

{¶ 11} THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY VIOLATING O.R.C. § 5123. – BY VIOLATING O.R.C. § 5123.62 WHEN IT CREATED A JUDICIAL CATCH-22: DEFERRING TO A PARTIALLY INFORMED JUVENILE COURT WHILE EXCLUDING CRITICAL EVIDENCE, INCLUDING EXPERT TESTIMONY, BASED IN PART ON INFECTED PRIOR COURT DECSION[S] POSING A PROCEDURAL DEADLINES [sic], ULTIMATELY DENYING THE ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE THE MERITS OF HIS PETITION, AND DISMISSING PROTECTIONS DESPITE CURRENT PROOF OF ONGOING HARM TO A NON- VERBAL AUTISTIC CHILD.

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