Flippin v. Gray

Ohio Court of Appeals

Flippin v. Gray

2026 Ohio 515

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedFebruary 17, 2026

DocketCA2025-06-045

StatusPublished

This text of 2026 Ohio 515 (Flippin v. Gray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Flippin v. Gray, 2026 Ohio 515 (Ohio Ct. App. 2026).

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Opinion

[Cite as Flippin v. Gray, 2026-Ohio-515.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

WARREN COUNTY

JOSHUA FLIPPIN, : CASE NO. CA2025-06-045 Appellant, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 2/17/2026 ASHLEIGH GRAY, :

Appellee. :

:

CIVIL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. 24DV11278

Joshua Andrew Flippin, pro se.

Lawrence W. Henke III, for appellee.

____________ OPINION

PIPER, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Joshua Flippin ("Father"), appeals the decision of the Warren

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, adopting a magistrate's Warren CA2025-06-045

order denying his petition for a domestic violence civil protection order ("DVCPO") against

appellee, Ashleigh Gray ("Mother"), naming both himself and their non-verbal, autistic

son, Adam, as protected persons.1 For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the domestic

relations court's decision.2

Background Information Related to DVCPOs

{¶ 2} "The purpose of a DVCPO is the protection of a petitioner from violence by

the respondent." Halcomb v. Greenwood, 2020-Ohio-2768, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.). "A petition

requesting the issuance of a DVCPO against the respondent is governed by R.C.

3113.31." Hankinson v. Cooper, 2022-Ohio-1896, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). "Pursuant to that

statute, for the petitioner to obtain a DVCPO against the respondent, 'the petitioner must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent has engaged in an act of

domestic violence against petitioner, petitioner's family, or petitioner's household

members.'" Id., quoting McBride v. McBride, 2012-Ohio-2146, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.). R.C.

3113.31(A)(1)(a)(iii) defines the phrase "domestic violence" to include the commission of

any act with respect to a child that would result in the child being an "abused child" as

that term is defined by R.C. 2151.031.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} The parties have a son, Adam, born on March 19, 2013. Adam is non-verbal

and autistic. On February 23, 2021, the parties entered into a shared parenting plan that

set forth their respective parental rights and responsibilities with respect to Adam. The

plan designated Mother as Adam's residential parent for school purposes and awarded

Father parenting time. More recently, in the spring of 2024, Father moved for sole legal

1. To protect the child's privacy, we have provided the child with a fictitious name.

2. Pursuant to Loc.R. 6(A), we sua sponte remove this appeal from the accelerated calendar for purposes of issuing this opinion. -2- Warren CA2025-06-045

custody of Adam, a request that, if granted, would terminate the shared parenting plan.

Father also petitioned at least two courts for a civil protection order against Mother. This

appeal addresses one of those two petitions.

{¶ 4} On October 10, 2024, Father filed a petition seeking a DVCPO against

Mother, naming both himself and Adam as persons in need of protection. To support the

petition, Father argued that, over the preceding few months, Adam had been acting out

in an apparent attempt to communicate his "dread" when confronted with the possibility

of staying in Mother's custody rather than Father's. Father also alleged that Adam was

"terrified" of Mother and that the "anxiety that she causes him destabilizes his mind."

Father further alleged that Mother was the likely cause of the bruising recently discovered

on Adam's body, noting that Mother had supposedly not been "taking her meds for mental

health." The domestic relations court granted Father a temporary ex parte DVCPO

against Mother later that same day.

{¶ 5} On March 5 and April 2, 2025, a full hearing was held on Father's petition.

A magistrate presided over the hearing. Shortly after the hearing concluded, the

magistrate issued an order denying Father's DVCPO petition and vacating the temporary

ex parte DVCPO previously imposed on Mother. The magistrate found the evidence

insufficient to support Father's allegations that Mother had committed an act of domestic

violence against their son, Adam, that would necessitate the issuance of a DVCPO. In

reaching this decision, the magistrate noted his belief that Father's efforts to obtain a

DVCPO against Mother were nothing more than an attempt to influence the decision on

Father's then still-pending motion for sole legal custody of Adam. The domestic relations

court adopted the magistrate's order later that same day.

{¶ 6} On April 16, 2025, Father filed his initial objections to the domestic relations

court's decision adopting the magistrate's order. He supplemented those objections on

-3- Warren CA2025-06-045

May 8, 2025. However, Father never filed with the domestic relations court a transcript of

the hearing held on his petition for a DVCPO against Mother. This was a requirement

imposed upon Father by Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iv). Pursuant to that rule, "[o]bjections based

upon evidence of record shall be supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitted

to the magistrate or an affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available."

{¶ 7} On May 20, 2025, the domestic relations court issued a decision overruling

Father's objections to its adoption of the magistrate's order. In so ruling, the court noted

that Father had not provided it with a transcript of the full hearing held on his DVCPO

petition, as required by Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iv). The court determined that the lack of a

transcript made it impossible to know "what evidence was presented to the magistrate"

and "no way of knowing whether the magistrate made the proper ruling based on the

evidence submitted." The court thereafter concluded that, given Father's failure to provide

the necessary transcript, "Father's objections must be overruled for that reason alone."

{¶ 8} Notwithstanding the lack of a transcript, the domestic relations court then

addressed—to the extent that it could—the merits of Father's objections. This included

the domestic relations court's initial statement regarding Father's argument that the

magistrate's order was against the manifest weight of the evidence, as follows:

In his initial objection, Father argued that the Magistrate's finding was erroneous because it was against the manifest weight of the evidence and failed to adequately consider the totality of the circumstances, including new evidence Father had. In his supplemental memorandum, Father added that it was unclear what evidence and exhibits were admitted, creating "substantial ambiguity" and "potentially obscuring key information."

{¶ 9} Continuing, the domestic relations court then stated:

Upon consideration of this objection, the Court notes that this is exactly why Father should have followed the law and provided a transcript of the proceedings. Without it, the Court is unable to know what Father testified to and whether the

-4- Warren CA2025-06-045

Magistrate was wrong in not believing it. Accordingly, Father's first objection is overruled.

The domestic relations court ruled in a substantially similar manner on each of Father's

other objections.

{¶ 10} On June 20, 2025, Father filed a notice of appeal. Father's appeal was

submitted to this court for consideration on January 14, 2025.

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