Flextronics International USA v. Panasonic Holdings Corporation

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·Decided July 21, 2023·No. 22-15231·Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 21 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FLEXTRONICS INTERNATIONAL USA, No. 22-15231 INC., D.C. Nos. 5:19-cv-00078-EJD Plaintiff-Appellant, 5:18-cv-00198-EJD

v.

MEMORANDUM*

PANASONIC HOLDINGS CORPORATION; PANASONIC CORPORATION OF NORTH AMERICA,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

MURATA MANUFACTURING CO., LTD.; MURATA ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA, INC.; MURATA POWER SOLUTIONS, INC.; TAIYO YUDEN CO., LTD.; TAIYO YUDEN (U.S.A.) INC.; TDK CORPORATION; TDK-EPC CORPORATION; TDK CORPORATION OF AMERICA; TDK U.S.A. CORPORATION; TOKIN CORPORATION; TOKIN AMERICA, INC.; SAITAMA MURATA MANUFACTURING CO., LTD.; SAGAMI ELEC CO., LTD.; SAGAMI AMERICA LTD.; SUMIDA CORP.; SUMIDA ELECTRIC CO., LTD; SUMIDA

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

AMERICA COMPONENTS, INC., Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 16, 2023 San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS,** NGUYEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Flextronics International USA, Inc., and its affiliates (collectively, “Flex”)

appeal the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of its Fourth Amended Complaint against Panasonic Holdings Corp. and Panasonic Corp. of North America (collectively, “Panasonic”).1 Flex alleges that, from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2017 (“Conspiracy Period”), Panasonic and six other inductor producers (collectively, “Defendants”)2 conspired to fix supra-competitive prices

**

Pursuant to General Order 3.2(h), Judge S.R. Thomas has been drawn to replace Judge Wardlaw in this matter. Judge S.R. Thomas has reviewed the briefs and the record and viewed the recording of the oral argument hearing in this case. 1 After we heard oral argument and took the case under submission, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of Sumida Corp.; Sumida Electric Co., Ltd.; and Sumida America Components, Inc. (collectively, “Sumida”) Sagami Elec Co., Ltd. and Sagami America Ltd. (collectively, “Sagami”). Panasonic is the only appellee that remains. 2 The four other Defendants include Murata Electronics North America, Inc.; Murata Power Solutions, Inc.; and Saitama Murata Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (collectively “Murata”); Taiyo Yuden Co., Ltd. and Taiyo Yuden (U.S.A.) Inc.

for inductors in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

1. The district court erred in concluding that Flex failed to adequately allege parallel pricing. See In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Parallel pricing is a relevant factor to be considered along with the evidence as a whole; if there are sufficient other ‘plus’ factors, an inference of conspiracy can be reasonable.”). Parallel pricing need not be identical so long as it is similar and reasonably contemporaneous. See In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2015).

Flex’s allegation of parallel pricing is based on an analysis of its own purchases of $750 million in inductors from Defendants during the Conspiracy Period. Dr. Russell Lamb conducted a statistical price analysis of Flex’s purchases from Murata, Taiyo Yuden, and TDK, and found that the three companies’ prices for certain inductors always moved in parallel, and prices remained stubbornly stable throughout the Conspiracy Period. Although Flex acknowledges that it did not purchase enough obviously comparable products over a long enough time frame from Panasonic, Sagami, Sumida, or Tokin to permit a statistical analysis, Flex provides factual allegations supporting a reasonable inference that

(collectively, “Taiyo Yuden”); TDK Corp.; TDK-EPC Corp.; TDK Corp. of America; and TDK U.S.A. Corp. (collectively, “TDK”); and Tokin Corp. and Tokin America, Inc. (collectively, “Tokin”).

Panasonic’s, Sagami’s, Sumida’s, and Tokin’s prices moved in parallel with Murata’s, Taiyo Yuden’s, and TDK’s prices. For example, Flex alleges that Panasonic and Sagami’s monthly median prices for certain popular inductors exhibited similar trend lines over time and were nearly identical by 2012. Flex also identifies fourteen specific examples of price comparisons in which Panasonic, Sagami, Sumida, and Tokin had substantially similar prices to Murata, Taiyo Yuden, and TDK for the same type of inductor during a particular month. Finally, Flex alleges that when TDK submitted proposed prices to an original equipment manufacturer customer in December 2012, January 2013, and July 2013, TDK knew Panasonic’s price and pricing strategy for similar inductors such that in all three cases, TDK never submitted a price lower than Panasonic.

Construing the pleadings in Flex’s favor, this alleged conduct is sufficient to plausibly allege parallel pricing. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” (internal citation omitted)).

2. When considering Flex’s plus factors, the district court erred two ways. First, it erred by focusing only on Defendants’ participation in the Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association (“JEITA”) meetings and failing to consider the Fourth Amended Complaint holistically. The

correct analysis requires us to “consider each purported plus factor in turn and cumulatively to determine whether [Flex] ha[s] alleged nonconclusory facts sufficient to state a claim under § 1.” Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1194; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (explaining that “courts must consider the complaint in its entirety”). Second, the district court erred by requiring Flex to plead facts “tending to exclude the possibility that defendants acted independently.” However, the requirement that a plaintiff offer “‘evidence that tends to exclude the possibility’ of lawful independent conduct” is more appropriate at summary judgment, rather than on a motion to dismiss. SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Tippins, 31 F.4th 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)). The proper standard is that which “applies to all § 1 complaints: a plaintiff must plausibly allege an agreement that is unreasonable ‘per se’ or under the ‘rule of reason.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018)).

Flex adequately alleges five plus factors that weigh in favor of finding conspiracy.

A. Flex alleges instances which are plausibly understood as invitations to collude in a price-fixing conspiracy. For example, at a November 2008 meeting, the then-chairman of JEITA stated to the Passive Components Committee

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