Fleming v. Medicare Freedom of Information Group

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: June 30, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2015-1135
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RHONDA FLEMING,

Plaintiff, v. Civ. Action No. 15-1135 MEDICARE FREEDOM OF (EGS/GMH) INFORMATION GROUP, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Ms. Rhonda Fleming (“Ms. Fleming” or “Plaintiff”), who

proceeds pro se, brought this action pursuant to the Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq., seeking to

obtain records related to her criminal conviction. See Compl.,

ECF No. 1 at 1-3. 1 On November 26, 2019, the Court entered final

judgment for the Medicare Freedom of Information Group 2 and

against Ms. Fleming. See Fleming v. Medicare Freedom of Info.

Grp., No. CV 15-1135 (EGS), 2019 WL 6329262, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov.

26, 2019).

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of the filed documents. 2 Defendants have treated this suit as against the Centers for

Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”). Fleming, 2019 WL 2462814, at *1. 1 Ms. Fleming has since filed several motions seeking relief

from that judgment. See generally Docket for Civ. Action No. 15-

1135. Now pending before the Court are the following: Ms.

Fleming’s Motion for Relief Pursuant to Federal Rule[] of Civil

Procedure, Rule 60(d)(1), see Pl.’s Mot. Relief Pursuant Fed. R.

Civ. P., R. 60(d)(1) (“Pl.’s Rule 60 Mot.”), ECF No. 208; Ms.

Fleming’s Motion for Relief Which is Unopposed by the

Government, see Pl.’s Mot. Relief Unopposed by Government

(“Pl.’s Mot. Relief”), ECF No. 212; Ms. Fleming’s Motion for

Leave to File Objections to Further Extensions and a Request for

Discovery, see Pl.’s Mot. Leave File Attached Mots. (“Pl.’s Mot.

Leave”), ECF No. 224; Ms. Fleming’s Motion for Leave to File a

Response, see Pl.’s Mot. Leave File Resp. (“Pl.’s Mot. Leave”),

ECF No. 229; Ms. Fleming’s Motion for Leave to File Additional

Documents, see Pl.’s Mot. Leave File Additional Docs. (“Pl.’s

Mot. Leave”), ECF No. 230; and Ms. Fleming’s Motion for

Additional Equitable Relief, see Pl.’s Mot. Additional Equitable

Relief (“Pl.’s Mot. Additional Relief”), ECF No. 232.

Upon careful consideration of the motions, oppositions, and

any replies; the applicable law; and the entire record herein,

the Court hereby DENIES Ms. Fleming’s motions.

2 II. Background

A. Factual

The Court will assume the parties’ familiarity with the

factual background of this case, which is set forth in

Magistrate Judge G. Michael Harvey’s previous Report and

Recommendation (“R. & R.”) and adopted in this Court’s

subsequent Memorandum Opinion. See R. & R., ECF No. 122 at 2-5;

Mem. Op., ECF No. 152 at 2-3. In short, in 2010, Ms. Fleming was

convicted by the District Court for the Southern District of

Texas on sixty-seven counts of Medicare-related health care

fraud and related offenses in connection with her submission of

fraudulent claims to Medicare. Fleming v. Medicare Freedom of

Info. Grp., 310 F. Supp. 3d 50, 51–52 (D.D.C. 2018). She was

later sentenced to 360 months in prison and ordered to pay $6.3

million in restitution. See Ex. 2, ECF No. 227-1 at 119, 122.

Ms. Fleming filed this Complaint in the District Court for

the District of Minnesota in 2015. Fleming, 310 F. Supp. 3d at

52. That court dismissed most of her claims and transferred the

case to this Court for resolution of her FOIA claim. See Notice

of Transfer, ECF No. 56. This Court thereafter dismissed Ms.

Fleming’s motions, see Mem. Op., ECF No. 152; and entered final

judgment against her, see Fleming, 2019 WL 6329262, at *1.

3 B. Procedural

Ms. Fleming filed this Rule 60 Motion on August 5, 2021.

See Pl.’s Rule 60 Mot., ECF No. 208. Defendants submitted their

brief in opposition on May 17, 2022. See Defs.’ Opp’n Pl.’s Mot.

Relief Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1) (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), ECF

No. 227. Ms. Fleming has since filed several other motions

objecting to extensions of time and requesting discovery and

other equitable relief. See Pl.’s Mot. Relief, ECF No. 212;

Pl.’s Mot. Leave, ECF No. 224; Pl.’s Mot. Leave, ECF No. 229;

Pl.’s Mot. Leave, ECF No. 230; Pl.’s Mot. Additional Relief, ECF

No. 232. The motions are now ripe and ready for adjudication.

III. Legal Standard

A. Rule 60(d)(1) Motion

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d), a court may

“entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a

judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1). This

independent action is “available only to prevent a grave

miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38,

47 (1998). The moving party must show the following:

(1) the judgment should not, in equity and good conscience, be enforced; (2) a good defense exists; (3) fraud, accident, or mistake prevented him from obtaining the benefit of his defense; (4) the absence of fault or negligence on his part; and (5) the absence of any adequate remedy at law.

4 Sieverding v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 2d 111, 114 n.1

(D.D.C. 2006) (citing Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423

F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970)).

This standard is demanding. Rimi v. Obama, 60 F. Supp. 3d 52, 57

(D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 608 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

B. Pro Se Litigants

“[P]ro se litigants are not held to the same standards in

all respects as are lawyers.” Roosevelt Land, LP v. Childress,

No. CIV.A. 05-1292(RWR), 2006 WL 1877014, at *2 (D.D.C. July 5,

2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). The

pleadings of pro se parties therefore “[are] to be liberally

construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even

so, “[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658

F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch, 656

F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987)). Pro se litigants must comply

with federal and local rules. See Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239;

Roosevelt Land, 2006 WL 1877014, at *2.

III. Analysis

Ms. Fleming “moves the Court to reopen the case and grant

the requested relief pursuant to” Rule 60(d)(1). Pl.’s Rule 60

Mot., ECF No. 208 at 1. She argues that this remedy is

appropriate because “[r]ecently, [she] became aware” that Albert

5 Balboni (“Mr. Balboni”), the lead prosecutor in her criminal

case, is no longer licensed to practice law and was ordered to

resign from his position as an Assistant United States Attorney

(“AUSA”). Id. at 2. She contends that Mr. Balboni was not

mentally fit to practice law due to a “cognitive disability.”

Id. at 5. She argues that, because of this impairment, Mr.

Balboni violated her due process rights and “other

constitutional norms,” failed to produce exculpatory evidence,

and committed “fraud on the court.” Id. at 3-4.

Ms. Fleming seeks sweeping relief to account for these

violations. See generally id. at 1-6. Specifically, she argues

that judgments in cases prosecuted by Mr. Balboni should not be

enforced. See id. at 4. For authority, she cites Committee for

Public Counsel Services v. Attorney General, 108 N.E.3d 966

(Mass. 2018), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

ordered that thousands of convictions involving evidence from a

drug lab scandal be vacated and dismissed with prejudice. See

id. at 2, 5 (citing 108 N.E.3d at 993). Ms. Fleming argues that

she and other defendants in cases assigned to Mr. Balboni merit

the same remedy. See id. at 2, 5 (also noting that this relief

“requires the approval of the Attorney General or a court order

from a district judge with jurisdiction over AG Merrick

Garland”).

6 Defendants first argue that the Court should deny Ms.

Fleming’s Rule 60(d)(1) Motion because she “has not complied

with the plain language of” the Rule. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 227

at 5. The Court agrees with this argument. Rule 60(d)(1) “does

not limit a court’s power to entertain an independent action to

relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(d)(1). Ms. Fleming has not filed an independent

action but has instead filed another motion in her closed civil

case. See Pl.’s Rule 60 Mot., ECF No. 208; see generally Docket

for Civ. Action No. 15-1135. The failure to file a separate

action is fatal to her motion. Cf. Rimi, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 54

(plaintiff brought “independent action” under Rule 60(d)(1)).

Moreover, even if Ms. Fleming had filed the Motion in an

independent action, she has not met the high bar necessary for

relief under Rule 60(d)(1). “[A]n independent action [under this

Rule] should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of

justice.” Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 47. However, “[a] party cannot

use an independent action as a vehicle for the relitigation of

issues.” Klayman v. Jud. Watch, Inc., No. 19-2604 (TSC), 2021 WL

602900, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting In re Salas, No. 18-00260, 2020 WL 6054783, at

*22 (Bankr. D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2020)), aff’d, 851 F. App’x 222

(D.C. Cir. 2021).

7 Ms. Fleming has not met the demanding standard to bring an

independent action because the issues she raises in the instant

motion are the same as the issues she raised in previous

motions. As Defendants state in their Opposition, Ms. Fleming

raised the issue of Mr. Balboni’s “mental impairment” in her

2014 Motion to Vacate in the District Court for the Southern

District of Texas. See Ex. 3, ECF No. 227-1 at 126 (Motion to

Vacate). There, she argued that Mr. Balboni “knew he suffered

with memory loss, yet continued to practice law, thus making

false or inaccurate statements defrauding the Court.” Id. She

made the same argument again in her 2014 Motion for a New Trial,

contending that “[f]rom preindictment to the present, a

government attorney with a serious mental impairment has

represented the Government in a manner which has violated [her]

right to a fair trial.” Ex. 4, ECF No. 227-1 at 133 (Motion for

a New Trial and other relief). That court rejected her argument

both times. See Ex. 4, ECF No. 227-1 at 146-48 (Order).

Ms. Fleming has also raised the issue of Mr. Balboni’s

mental fitness to this Court. Most recently, in 2018, she moved

the Court to set aside her criminal conviction and the civil

judgment against her because “these two judgments were procured

through fraud on the court.” Fleming v. Medicare Freedom of

Info. Grp., No. 1:15-CV-01135 (EGS/GMH), 2018 WL 8577960, at *2

(D.D.C. July 24, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No.

8 CV 15-1135 (EGS), 2019 WL 2462814 (D.D.C. June 13, 2019). The

Court rejected this argument. See 2019 WL 2462814, at *3. And in

the R. & R. later adopted by the Court, Magistrate Judge Harvey

noted that Ms. Fleming made this same argument in her Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and that the Court had already rejected

her claims. See id.

In sum, Ms. Fleming now presents an argument 3 that she has

raised repeatedly and unsuccessfully since 2014. The history of

this litigation and the underlying cases against Ms. Fleming

show that she “had adequate remedies at law, and indeed took

advantage of them.” Klayman, 2021 WL 602900, at *6. She

therefore is barred from bringing an independent action under

Rule 60(d)(1). Id. at *5-6. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Ms.

Fleming’s Rule 60(d)(1) Motion. 4

The remainder of Ms. Fleming’s motions all relate to her

Rule 60 Motion. See Pl.’s Mot. Relief, ECF No. 212; Pl.’s Mot.

Leave, ECF No. 224; Pl.’s Mot. Leave, ECF No. 229; Pl.’s Mot.

Leave, ECF No. 230; Pl.’s Mot. Additional Relief, ECF No. 232.

As such, the Court DENIES these motions as moot. See Jackson v.

3 Ms. Fleming’s request that the judgments against her and all others prosecuted by Mr. Balboni be vacated does not change the nature of her argument—namely, that Mr. Balboni’s mental impairment deprived her of a fair trial and constituted fraud on the court. See Pl.’s Rule 60 Mot., ECF No. 208 at 3-5. 4 The Court need not reach Defendants’ arguments that it should

construe Ms. Fleming’s Rule 60(d)(1) Motion as a Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 227 at 9-11. 9 Ivens, No. CV 01-559-LPS, 2019 WL 4604027, at *5 (D. Del. Sept.

23, 2019) (denying as moot motions for discovery and relief upon

denying Rule 60(d)(3) motion); United States v. Raifsnider, No.

CRIM.A. 04-10255-01, 2013 WL 1137479, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 7,

2013) (denying as moot motion for discovery upon denying Rule

60(d)(1) motion), aff’d, 533 F. App’x 862 (10th Cir. 2013).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Ms. Fleming’s

motions. See Pl.’s Rule 60 Mot., ECF No. 208; Pl.’s Mot. Relief,

ECF No. 212; Pl.’s Mot. Leave, ECF No. 224; Pl.’s Mot. Leave,

ECF No. 229; Pl.’s Mot. Leave, ECF No. 230; Pl.’s Mot.

Additional Relief, ECF No. 232. An appropriate Order accompanies

this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge June 30, 2023