Fleming v. Fidelity Management Trust Company

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedMay 3, 2018
Docket1:16-cv-10918
StatusUnknown

This text of Fleming v. Fidelity Management Trust Company (Fleming v. Fidelity Management Trust Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fleming v. Fidelity Management Trust Company, (D. Mass. 2018).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

KATHERINE FLEMING, EDWARD R. * HADUCK, and VICTORIA WENDEL, * * Plaintiffs, * * v. * * Civil Action No. 16-cv-10918-ADB FIDELITY MANAGEMENT TRUST * COMPANY and FIDELITY INVESTMENTS * INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS * COMPANY, INC., * * Defendants. * *

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION TO VACATE AND AMEND JUDGMENT AND FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

BURROUGHS, D.J. On September 22, 2017, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ putative class action asserting violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) for failure to state a claim. See Fleming v. Fidelity Mgmt. Trust Co., No. 16-cv- 10918-ADB, 2017 WL 4225624 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 2017), ECF No. 54 (“MTD Order”). On October 20, 2017, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), 59(e), and/or 60(b) to vacate and amend the judgment and for leave to file an amended complaint. [ECF No. 56]. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the MTD Order and therefore provides only a brief summary of that decision. Plaintiffs are individual participants within the meaning of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7), in the Delta Family-Care Savings Plan (“Plan”). The Plan qualifies under ERISA as both an employee pension benefit plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A), and an individual account plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34). Defendants Fidelity Management Trust Company (“FMTC”) and Fidelity Investments Institutional Operations Company, Inc. (“FIIOC”) were hired to provide certain services to the Plan. As trustee of the Plan, FMTC holds the Plan’s investment assets and executes investment transactions, whereas FIIOC, a wholly owned

subsidiary of FMTC, provides trust services, record-keeping, and information management services to the Plan. The assets of the Plan are held in and invested through a Master Trust, which is controlled in all material respects by a Master Trust Agreement involving the Plan sponsor (Delta Air Lines, Inc.), the named fiduciary (the Delta Air Lines, Inc., Benefit Funds Investment Committee), the Plan administrator (the Administrative Committee of Delta Air Lines, Inc.), and the trustee (FMTC). The original complaint essentially asserted two theories of wrongdoing with respect to the Plan. First, it challenged the relationship between Defendants and a third party, Financial Engines Advisors, LLC (“FE”), which provides investment advice services to individual Plan

participants for a fee. Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants and FE have agreed to an improper “pay to play” arrangement in that FE, in exchange for being included as the Plan’s investment advisor, agreed to pay Defendants a significant percentage of the fees that FE collects from individual Plan investors. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants hired FE and controlled the negotiation of the terms and conditions under which FE would provide its services to the Plan participants, including the fee-sharing arrangement. This arrangement was alleged to be unrelated to any substantial services performed by Defendants and purportedly inflated the cost of investment advice for Plan participants in violation of the fiduciary responsibility and prohibited transaction provisions of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1106. The Court recognized that Plaintiffs’ theory was premised on the notion that Defendants, rather than Delta, hired or selected FE, but concluded that the Master Trust Agreement “compels the conclusion that Delta, not Defendants, exercised final authority or control over the selection or hiring of FE.” MTD Order at 14. Moreover, if Delta believed that the fee-sharing arrangement between Defendants and FE wrongfully inflated the cost of investment advice services, the Court determined that Delta was free to decline to hire FE or to terminate its relationship with both Defendants and FE. Insofar as the original complaint challenged the amount of the fees that Defendants collect from FE, the Court held that Defendants were not acting in a fiduciary capacity when they negotiated with plan sponsors for their own compensation, finding it “difficult to see how a service provider could be an ERISA fiduciary when it negotiates a fixed rate of compensation from an entity other than the Plan, as Plaintiffs allege here,” particularly given that the Complaint did not allege that “once FE was hired, Defendants retained any authority or control over the rate of compensation it would receive from FE.” Id. at 15-16. Second, the original complaint attacked the portal, “BrokerageLink,” through which individual Plan participants may invest their savings on a self-directed basis. BrokerageLink allowed individuals to purchase an array of securities, including a selection of mutual funds that are not included among the Plan’s designated investment alternatives. Plaintiffs took issue with the specific classes of mutual fund shares made available for purchase through BrokerageLink. The original complaint alleged that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the Plan by selecting only higher-cost share classes (which typically include revenue-sharing payments made to parties who distribute the shares or provide other services) to be available through BrokerageLink, while excluding lower-cost share classes, thereby maximizing their revenue- sharing payments at the expense of Plan participants.

The Court accepted as true Plaintiffs’ assertion that Defendants were responsible for deciding which share classes of mutual funds would be made available through BrokerageLink but found this “product design” decision to be wholly distinct from the decision to make BrokerageLink available to individual Plan participants, which the Master Trust Agreement showed rested solely with Delta. Id. at 10. The Master Trust Agreement made clear that the Delta entities, not Defendants, retained control over whether BrokerageLink—and by extension the classes of mutual fund shares offered through it—was available to Plan participants. The Court further noted that there was no suggestion in the original complaint that Delta lacked the authority or ability exclude BrokerageLink as an offering if it determined that the share classes available through BrokerageLink were unsuitable for Plan participants. Accordingly, Defendants did not exercise the type of authority or control over the decision to include BrokerageLink in the Plan that would give rise to ERISA liability." Il. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs now move to vacate the order of dismissal and to alter it to be without prejudice, such that Plaintiffs may file their proposed amended complaint [ECF Nos. 56, 57-1]. Defendants oppose the motion on the grounds that Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to vacate and amend the judgment and that their new allegations do not cure the deficiencies of the original complaint.

' The Court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendants violated ERISA by receiving excessive and unreasonable compensation from fees collected from the mutual funds that Plan participants acquired through BrokerageLink and the fees that FE shares with Defendants through the revenue-sharing arrangement. MTD Order at 16-18. Plaintiffs’ request for equitable relief was likewise dismissed, because none of the underlying claims of ERISA violations were found to be viable. Id. at 19.

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Fleming v. Fidelity Management Trust Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fleming-v-fidelity-management-trust-company-mad-2018.