Fleming 694964 v. Washington

• Court: District Court, W.D. Michigan
• Decided: August 20, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00202
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION ______

TYREE COPELAND FLEMING,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-202

v. Honorable Paul L. Maloney

HEIDI WASHINGTON et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a separate order, the Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues MDOC Director Heidi Washington, and the following IBC staff: Warden Matt MaCauley, Assistant Deputy Warden Unknown Hadden, Assistant Deputy Warden Unknown Jones, Housing Unit Management Unknown Lambart, Manager Unknown Page, Supervisor Unknown Reed, Captain Unknown Rowland, and Front Office Staff Scott Klein and Elaine Klein.

Plaintiff alleges that there exists an “air vents/bottom food slot problem” within IBC. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) He claims that, on June 17, 2025, non-party Officer Ige closed the food slots during a heat advisory. (Id.) Plaintiff attempted to explain to Officer Ige that the food slots should remain open but was unsuccessful. (Id.) Plaintiff also attempted to speak with non-party Sergeant Dora regarding the “problem,” but Sergeant Dora told Plaintiff, “I don’t have anything coming. This problem is still on going [sic].” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he has tried to speak with the “maintenance staff/team” about the “air vents/bottom food slot problem” but was told by a “mid-age maintenance guy” that “it[’]s broken” and that he is unable to fix the issue without Defendant Washington’s permission. (Id.) Plaintiff

wrote letters to Defendant Washington but did not receive any response. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he “fear[s] for [his] life behind the poor air circulation [and] the retaliation by staff.” (Id.) As a result of the events described in Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff brings claims for violation of his First and Eighth Amendment rights (id.)1 and requests injunctive relief (id., PageID.5).

1 In the complaint, Plaintiff specifically states that he is bringing claims under the First and Eighth Amendments. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Because Plaintiff specifically identifies the claims that he intends to bring in this suit, the Court does not construe Plaintiff’s complaint to raise any other claims. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels

and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A. Claims Against Defendants MaCauley, Hadden, Jones, Lambart, Page, Reed, S. Klein, E. Klein, and Rowland Plaintiff names Defendants MaCauley, Hadden, Jones, Lambart, Page, Reed, S. Klein, E. Klein, and Rowland in his list of Defendants (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2–3), but does not make any factual allegations against these Defendants anywhere in the body of his complaint. Where a person or entity is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege

with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights). While Plaintiff references his attempts to speak with the “maintenance staff/team” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4), this allegation is insufficient to implicate any named Defendant as “[s]ummary reference to a single, five-headed ‘Defendants’ [or officers or staff] does not support a reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable . . . .” Boxill v. O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants MaCauley, Hadden, Jones, Lambart, Page, Reed, S. Klein, E. Klein, and Rowland fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are subject to dismissal. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring claims against any one of these Defendants because of a supervisory role, Plaintiff’s claims would similarly fail. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir.

2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. The Sixth Circuit has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official:

“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300, and citing Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375–76 (1976), and Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993); Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that would plausibly suggest that Defendants MaCauley, Hadden, Jones, Lambart, Page, Reed, S. Klein, E. Klein, and Rowland authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in any unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, for each of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants MaCauley, Hadden, Jones, Lambart, Page, Reed, S. Klein, E. Klein, and Rowland and his claims against them will be

dismissed. B. First Amendment Retaliation Claims Plaintiff indicates that he fears retaliation by “staff” and seeks to bring claims for violation of his First Amendment rights. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). To set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to show that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial

or motivating factor in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). To the extent that Plaintiff merely alleges that he fears that unknown persons may retaliate against him at some unknown future date, his allegations do not constitute “adverse action” sufficient to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of First Amendment retaliation premised upon anticipated future harm. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that any of the actions described within the complaint were retaliatory, Plaintiff provides no factual support for his claims and as described above, does not implicate any named Defendant in those actions. Plaintiff’s only factual allegation against any named Defendant is that Defendant Washington did not respond to Plaintiff’s correspondence. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)

Plaintiff does not describe the content of his correspondence. However, even assuming that Plaintiff’s correspondence concerned the “poor circulation” and “air vents/bottom food slot problem” at IBC (id.), Plaintiff fails to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation against Defendant Washington. An inmate has a right to file “non-frivolous” grievances against prison officials on his own behalf, whether written or oral. Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 265 (6th Cir. 2018). Therefore, the Court will assume without deciding that Plaintiff’s correspondence to Defendant Washington constituted protected conduct. However, the only potentially adverse action that Plaintiff describes is Defendant Washington’s failure to respond. The Court concludes that Defendant Washington’s

failure to respond to Plaintiff’s correspondence would not constitute “adverse action” sufficient to deter a person from asking for help. Indeed, if failing to respond to a request for help or a grievance was considered adverse action, every denial would give rise to liability for retaliation under the First Amendment. As discussed above, however, the Sixth Circuit has clearly held that the denial of grievances does not give rise to liability under § 1983. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008). And, many courts, including this one, have held that the denial or refusal to process a grievance is not adverse action. See, e.g., Cameron v. Gurnoe, No. 2:19-cv-71, 2019 WL 2281333, at *4–5 (W.D. Mich. May 29, 2019) (citing cases); Branch v. Houtz, No. 1:16-cv-77, 2016 WL 737779, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 2016); Ross v. Westchester Cnty. Jail, No. 10 Civ. 3937(DLC), 2012 WL 86467, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2012) (discussing that the refusal to file a grievance is, without more, insufficient to constitute an adverse action); Stone v. Curtin, No. 1:11- cv-820, 2011 WL 3879505, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2011) (concluding that the failure to process a prison grievance would not deter a prisoner of ordinary firmness from exercising his right to file a grievance); Green v. Caruso, No. 1:10-cv-958, 2011 WL 1113392, at *10 (W.D.

Mich. Mar. 24, 2011) (finding that the denial of a prisoner’s grievances was not sufficiently adverse to support a retaliation claim); Burgos v. Canino, 641 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 358 F. App’x 302 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing that the rejection or denial of prison grievances does not constitute an adverse action for purposes of a retaliation claim). Therefore, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Washington fails at the second step and will, therefore, be dismissed. C. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claim Plaintiff states that he also brings an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Washington. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be

“barbarous,” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. “Routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). Consequently, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of- confinement claim.” Id.

For a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (applying deliberate indifference standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims). The deliberate-indifference standard includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the

subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.” Id. at 836. Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that would plausibly suggest that the “poor circulation” and “air vents/bottom food slot problem” posed a sufficiently serious risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Indeed, Plaintiff describes the alleged problem only vaguely. He does not describe the extent of the issue, how the issue manifested within Plaintiff’s unit, or any impact on the health of IBC prisoners. In relying solely upon conclusory allegations and legal conclusions without any supporting facts, Plaintiff asks the Court to fabricate plausibility to his claim from mere ambiguity; but ambiguity does not support a claim. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678– 79.

Moreover, Plaintiff does not set forth facts that would indicate that Defendant Washington was personally aware of an excessive risk to prisoner safety such that her disregard of that risk could be said to amount to deliberate indifference. As noted above, Plaintiff does not describe the content of his correspondence to Defendant Washington or her knowledge of the problems described in Plaintiff’s complaint. Accordingly, for each of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Washington upon which relief may be granted. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: August 20, 2025 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge