OPINION
FABE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Monica Fleegel sought compensatory and punitive damages from a drunk driver, Michael Boyles,1 who injured her in a car accident. The jury awarded Fleegel compensatory damages, but although it found that punitive damages were warranted, it made no monetary award for punitive damages. On appeal Fleegel appeals a number of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, and Boyles cross-appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Fleegel. Because the trial court did .not abuse its discretion in its evi-dentiary rulings and because it appropriately concluded that although Fleegel was not the prevailing party, she was entitled to attorney’s fees under the crime victims’ statute, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
Shortly after 5:00 p.m. on September 1, 1995, Monica Fleegel sat in her car waiting for the light to turn green at the intersection of 36th Avenue and Denali Street in Anchorage. Before the light changed, Fleegel’s car was hit by a pick-up truck driven by Michael Boyles. Boyles failed to stop at the accident scene.
After the collision Fleegel felt pain in her nose, head, neck, chest, back, and hand. All of the injuries ultimately healed except for the injury to Fleegel’s left hand. As a result of the collision, the tendon of Fleegel’s left wrist pulled off its attachment to the thumb, taking bone with it and causing an avulsion fracture. Fleegel’s orthopedic surgeon testified that such injuries can result in long-term pain associated with certain activities. In the intervening years since the collision, Fleegel has undergone a variety of treatments for her injury. She has received injections of anti-inflammatory medication, had a cast on her arm for three weeks, and has worn splints for varying periods of time almost every day since the accident. Long-[1269]*1269term treatment of the injury involves wearing a splint and taking anti-inflammatory medication. Fleegel has also been advised that the injury leaves her at increased risk for premature arthritis in the joint.
Fleegel used approximately forty-two hours of sick leave during her initial recovery from the collision. The parties stipulated that she incurred $5,417 in medical expenses, which State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, insurer of both Fleegel and Boyles, paid.
Boyles admitted that he was under the influence of alcohol and Valium at the time of the collision. Boyles participated in alcohol treatment programs in the years both before and after the collision. He also had a medical history that included an anxiety disorder, panic attacks, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and various gastrointestinal disorders related to alcoholism.
After the accident, the Municipality of Anchorage charged Boyles with leaving the scene of an injury accident and reckless driving. Boyles pleaded no contest to the charges. As part of his sentence, Boyles was required to complete treatment recommended by the Anchorage Alcohol Safety Action Program (ASAP). Seven months after the collision with Fleegel, Boyles was again charged with driving while intoxicated. He claimed to have stopped driving after that incident.
B. Proceedings
Fleegel filed suit against Boyles seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Boyles admitted liability and acknowledged that “consumption of alcohol was one of the causes of this accident.”
Fleegel filed a motion in limine requesting that all references to insurance “be deleted” from the evidence at trial, or, in the alternative, that all potential jurors insured by State Farm Insurance be excused for cause. The superior court ruled that because Boyles’s insurance coverage had relevance to punitive damages it could be discussed, but that the name of the company providing the insurance could not be mentioned.
Fleegel ■ also sought to introduce as evidence at trial an outstanding warrant against Boyles for failure to comply with ASAP requirements. The trial court deemed the warrant inadmissible.
Boyles planned to present at trial a videotaped deposition of Dr. James Peach, a gas-troenterologist who treated Boyles in the two years prior to trial. Fleegel sought to exclude Dr. Peach’s testimony on the ground that it was irrelevant. Fleegel also sought to exclude medical records relied upon and discussed by Dr. Peach during his testimony. The trial court overruled Fleegel’s objections to Dr. Peach’s testimony, finding Dr. Peach’s discussion of Boyles’s alcoholism relevant to social standing and financial condition as they related to the punitive damages claim. Moreover, the trial court determined that Dr. Peach’s reference to the medical records of other doctors was permissible because these records formed the foundation for Dr. Peach’s opinion. But the trial court agreed with Fleegel that the “actual packet of records that were included in the deposition” should not be admitted. Fleegel later sought to present-two records of other physicians who had treated Boyles, which were contained in Dr. Peach’s file. The trial court denied that request.
The case was tried before a jury on December 14-17,1998. Other than a statement by Boyles’s attorney during voir dire that he had been retained by Boyles’s insurance carrier to represent Boyles, no mention or evidence of Boyles’s insurance coverage was made during trial. On the stipulation of the parties, the trial court did give a jury instruction stating that Boyles “has insurance coverage.”
Prior to beginning deliberations, a juror asked: “are ... punitive damages directed] to Mr. Boyles or to the insurance company?” The court responded: “I cannot give you a direct answer to that question. No evidence [of insurance] was presented regarding what items of damage may be covered by Mr. Boyles’s insurance. Therefore, you may not speculate whether any particular item of damage is covered by insurance.”
The jury returned a special verdict finding that (1) the negligence of Boyles was a legal [1270]*1270cause of injury to Fleegel; (2) Fleegel suffered damages in these amounts: $1,140 in past economic loss, $7,500 in past non-economic loss, $1,000 in future economic loss, and $3,500 in future non-economic loss — for a total of $13,140 in damages; (3) punitive damages should be awarded against Boyles; and (4) the amount of punitive damages awarded against Boyles should be zero.
Because Boyles made a Rule 68 offer of judgment that substantially exceeded the jury award, the trial court determined that Boyles was the prevailing party, and awarded him $6,000 in attorney’s fees, $1,990.71 in costs, and $50 in expert witness fees. After subtracting Boyles’s award of $8,040.71 from Fleegel’s compensatory damages award of $14,703.40, the trial court entered judgment for Fleegel for $6,662.29.
Fleegel moved for Civil Rule 60(b)2 relief from the judgment on the basis of AS 09.60.070, which awards “full reasonable attorney fees” to victims of certain crimes, including driving while intoxicated.3 The trial court granted Fleegel’s motion and ultimately determined that both parties were entitled to attorney’s fees-Boyles for making a pretrial settlement offer more generous than the jury award,4 and Fleegel as the victim of a serious crime. Accordingly, the trial court added one-third of Fleegel’s net recovery of $6,662.29 ($2,220.90) to compensate Fleegel for her attorney’s fees5 under the crime victims’ statute, AS 09.60.070, yielding a total judgment in favor of Fleegel of $8,883.59 ($6,662.29 plus $2,220.90). The trial court entered amended judgments on September 27, 1999 and January 31, 2000.
Fleegel appeals a number of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. Boyles cross-appeals the attorney’s fees award to Fleegel under the crime victims’ statute, AS 09.60.070.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.6 Decisions about the admissibility of evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.7 We will only reverse evidentiary rulings if upon review of the record as a whole we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred in its ruling and the error affected the substantial rights of a party.8
Boyles’s cross-appeal requires this court to interpret AS 09.60.070. As we have stated, “[t]he independent judgment standard of review is exercised by this court when the interpretation and application of a statute is at issue,”9 and “[t]he interpretation of a statutory provision ... is a question of law [that we resolve] by adopting ‘the rule of [1271]*1271law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.’ ”10
IV. ARGUMENT
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Its Evidentiary Rulings.
1. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of insurance coverage without reference to the insurance carrier’s name.
Fleegel’s motion in limine requested that the trial court either direct that no references to insurance be made in exhibits and evidence, or excuse for cause all potential jurors who were insured by Boyles’s insurance carrier, State Farm. Fleegel cited concern that evidence of insurance would improperly influence jurors, who might fear that a high punitive damages award would raise their own insurance rates.
The superior court declined both of Flee-gel’s requests. However, the court did rule that the parties could not mention the name of Boyles’s insurance carrier, State Farm. Fleegel appeals the denial of both of her requests.
a. The superior court did not err in denying the motion to exclude evidence of insurance coverage.
The trial court ruled that insurance had relevance to Boyles’s financial condition as it related to punitive damages and declined to prohibit evidence of insurance coverage. The trial court explained its reasoning: “[E]ven if the insurance ... only covers the compensatory damages, it goes to the issue of the defendant’s financial condition.” 11 The trial court further determined that evidence of insurance coverage would not improperly influence the jurors: “I disagree ... that jurors will speculate as to whether it’s their insurance or not and whether their rates will be affected by what they do.” The trial court also ruled that the parties could not mention the name of the insurance carrier, State Farm. Fleegel argues on appeal that these rulings constituted prejudicial error.
The financial condition of a party is a relevant factor in considering a claim for punitive damages. In Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, we recognized that the wealth of a defendant is an important factor that bears on the amount of punitive damages.12 We also applied this factor in our analysis of the appropriateness of the punitive damages award in Norpon v. Kotowski.13 Furthermore, the Alaska Legislature established in a subsequently enacted statute, not applicable to this case but still informative, that the trier of fact may consider the financial condition of the defendant when determining the amount of punitive damages.14
In Shane v. Rhines, all five justices of this court, in majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions, agreed that insurance coverage in particular was relevant to a determination of a punitive damages award.15 Two members of the majority stated that “evidence of insurance arguably is relevant to the appropriate measure of punitive damages,” but concluded that the trial judge’s decision to exclude insurance evidence was harmless error because the jury ultimately found no liability for punitive damages.16 Justice Compton, in a concurring opinion, advocated for the use of bifurcated trials in cases involving a claim for punitive damages.17 He
[1272]*1272noted that at the second phase of the trial, “the needed evidence of the defendant’s wealth, including evidence of any insurance coverage, could be presented.”18 And Justices Burke and Matthews noted in then-dissent that “[a] defendant’s insurance policy is a part of his financial resources and will obviously affect the degree to which a defendant is punished by a punitive damage award.”19
A number of courts permit insurance evidence to rebut a defendant’s attempt to portray himself as too poor to pay an award of punitive damages.20 These cases stem from the plaintiffs attempt to introduce the defendant’s ability to pay because of his insurance.21 In this case, defendant Boyles wanted evidence admitted of his insurance coverage. A review of decisions in other jurisdictions indicates that no court has held that introduction of insurance evidence is reversible error because it is prejudicial to a plaintiff, as Fleegel argues.
Also, Alaska Evidence Rule 411 does not require reversal of the superior court’s ruling. Fleegel argues that evidence of liability insurance, even if it is relevant, is generally inadmissible under Evidence Rule 411. But Rule 411 establishes that evidence of liability insurance “is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.” (Emphasis added.) Rule 411 “does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose.”22 Liability was not contested in this case; Boyles admitted liability. The trial court focused on the relevance of insurance to Boyles’s financial condition, a purpose not excluded under Rule 411. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to exclude evidence of insurance coverage.
b. The superior court did not err in refusing to exclude all jurors who carried State Farm insurance.
Fleegel alternatively sought, if the court permitted evidence of insurance, to exclude all jurors who carried State Farm insurance. The trial court denied Fleegel’s request and ruled that “there won’t be any mention of the name of the company providing the coverage, and you can voir dire on insurance questions, but no one can mention State Farm.” Fleegel appeals this ruling, arguing that even if an award has little or no actual effect on insurance rates, the jurors’ perception that they have a financial interest in the outcome of the case unfairly prejudiced them against an award of punitive damages.
On appeal Fleegel suggests that at least four members of the jury demonstrated during voir dire concern about insurance rates rising because of lawsuit verdicts. Fleegel did not, however, challenge these jurors for cause on the grounds of either bias23 or preexisting opinions as to what the outcome should be.24 Fleegel also did not use a peremptory challenge to remove any of these four jurors.
Whether a juror is dismissed for cause is within the discretion of the trial [1273]*1273court.25 The trial court here carefully considered whether a potential juror’s insurance carrier had relevance to any conflict of interest. .It noted that most jurors know that there is insurance in liability cases, but that common practice dictates that “we don’t inquire ... who the carrier is and excuse those jurors.” Moreover, Fleegel has not shown that any prejudice occurred as a result of the ruling.26 We therefore find no error.
The dissent argues that our holding today contradicts our rulings in Malvo v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc.27 and Reich v. Cominco Alaska, Inc.28 These cases stand for the proposition that jurors who fall within certain Civil Rule .47(c) categories must be dismissed for cause. Specifically, in Reich, we recently held that there is a “per se rule allowing challenges for cause of prospective jurors with a financial interest in the litigation.”29 The dissent posits that State Farm insureds have a financial interest in. the present case. We disagree for two reasons: (1) the jurors who had State Farm insurance only had an indirect financial interest in the litigation, and (2) they were unaware of any possible financial interest in the litigation.
In Reich, we discussed whether indirect financial interest was sufficient to disqualify jurors under Civil Rule 47(c). Reich held that a trial court must dismiss from the jury pool stockholders of companies that have direct financial interests in the outcome of the litigation, even if the companies are not actual parties to the litigation.30 Reich also discussed Harmotta v. Bender.31 The challenged jurors in Harmotta were members of the Roman Catholic Church, and the case involved a Roman Catholic parish in the same diocese as the potential jurors.32 We distinguished Harmotta from Reich by stating that “there was only a possibility church members would be called on to reimburse the church.”33 The same is true in this case.
If the jury returned a punitive damages award against Boyles, State Farm insureds would only have a possibility of bearing a cost, and that cost would be minimal. Insurance premiums already take into account that trials will subject some insureds to significant damages awards, so a damages award would not automatically raise all insureds’ premiums. The financial interest that State Farm insured jurors have in this case is speculative at best. Furthermore, unlike the situations in Reich and J.C. Penney, where the jurors knew that J.C. Penney and NANA were parties affected by the suits, State Farm insureds did not know that State Farm was involved or might be affected by this lawsuit. As a result, we cannot agree with the dissent’s assessment that Civil Rule 47(c) required State Farm insureds to be dismissed for cause from the jury pool.
The dissent also contends that if Civil Rule 47(c) requires the exclusion from juries of persons with financial interest, then the trial court must inquire into those financial interests. We agree that a trial court must inquire about any financial interest known to a juror. We. do not agree, however, that the trial judge must make known to-a juror an unknown financial interest in the litigation.
[1274]*1274We note that the dissent cites no authority to support the contention that courts must inform jurors of potential financial interests of which the jurors are unaware.
2. The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of Boyles’s outstanding arrest warrant.
The district court issued a warrant on July 16, 1998, to arrest Boyles for failure to comply with ASAP requirements. Fleegel sought to introduce this warrant as evidence at trial. Fleegel’s offer of proof provided the following reasons for seeking admission of the warrant: (1) to impeach Boyles by showing that his probation had in fact been revoked, and (2) to demonstrate why Boyles was not in court at trial on December 16, 1998. The trial court ruled that evidence of the warrant was not admissible, reasoning that the evidence had only a tenuous connection with material issues in this case and was not probative of why Boyles was not present at trial. The court also determined that even if the evidence was minimally probative, it would waste time and generate confusion about the details of enforcing alcohol treatment orders.
Even without evidence of the ■ warrant, Fleegel was able to adduce evidence and make the arguments that no evidence existed that Boyles actually was in a recovery program; that Boyles had lied in the past about his participation in a treatment program; and that Boyles had engaged in manipulation to avoid having the full brunt of his criminal sanctions imposed.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion; and the ruling did not substantially impair FleegeFs rights. We therefore find no error.
3. The trial court did not err by admitting the testimony of Boyles’s gas-troenterologist.
At trial Boyles presented the videotaped deposition of Dr. David Peach, a doctor who specializes in gastroenterology-diseases of the stomach, intestines, and liver. Dr. Peach testified about his treatment of Boyles and the medical records that he received from other physicians and alcohol treatment facilities regarding Boyles.
Fleegel objected to the foundation of Dr. Peach’s testimony, its relevance, and Dr. Peach’s competency to testify regarding issues of the case, particularly given that he specializes in gastroenterology rather than psychiatry or psychology. The trial court overruled Fleegel’s objections, determining that the testimony had relevance and that an adequate foundation had been provided. It explained its reasons for this ruling:
This is a punitive' damage case and the defendant’s social standing and financial condition are relevant to a punitive damage case. All of Dr. Peach’s testimony regarding the defendant’s alcoholism is relevant to those issues, social standing and financial condition. There’s an adequate foundation for Dr. Peach to testify regarding those issues: he treated the defendant for alcoholism and he participated in proceedings to have the defendant committed to a hospital for further treatment.
The trial court also allowed Dr. Peach’s references to Boyles’s other medical providers because these records formed a partial basis for Dr. Peach’s opinions.
In addition to the relevancy, foundation, and competency arguments made at trial, on appeal Fleegel argues that this evidence had an unfair effect by distracting the jurors and generating undue sympathy for Boyles. She alleges that Boyles used Dr. Peach’s testimony improperly to present inadmissible hearsay and other inappropriate-information to the jury.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Dr. Peach’s testimony was relevant to the issues of Boyles’s social standing and financial condition. Dr. Peach testified regarding Boyles’s “inability to function as a reasonable human in society” as a health consequence of his alcoholism. Moreover, Dr. Peach presented some evidence related to Boyles’s financial condition, including a hospital admission form that listed Boyles’s occupation as “disabled” and the nature of Boyles’s medical problems from which the jury could reasonably infer that Boyles could not work. The trial court did not err in determining that Dr. Peach’s testimony was relevant to Boyles’s social standing [1275]*1275and financial condition as they related to the punitive damages claim.
4. The trial court did not commit reversible error by excluding from evidence other medical records contained in Dr. Peach’s file.
Fleegel successfully prevented the admission at trial of Boyles’s actual medical records, even though these records were used as exhibits during Dr. Peach’s video deposition. But later during trial, Fleegel sought to supplement her exhibits with other of Boyles’s medical records contained in Dr. Peach’s file, which the doctor had not referred to during the deposition. The documents that Fleegel wished to admit concerned Boyles’s medical condition near the time of the collision and his refusal to enter alcohol treatment programs.
The trial court ruled that Fleegel could not supplement her exhibits with the medical records in the absence of a witness providing an explanation and foundation for the records. It also found that “[t]hose records could have been discussed during Dr. Peach’s deposition and, had they been discussed, they likely would have been ... admitted.” Additionally, it determined that Fleegel was not significantly prejudiced by the exclusion of these records because other evidence in the record supported the points for which Flee-gel wanted the records presented.
Any error in excluding the medical records was harmless because, as the trial court observed, Fleegel was able to show through other evidence that Boyles did not cooperate in his treatment. The trial court explained: “There’s significant other evidence in the record regarding Mr. Boyles[’s] failure to comply with treatment recommendation which is the subject matter addressed by those records.” Indeed, Dr. Peach’s testimony provided evidence of repeated substance abuse treatment attempts, subsequent relapses, and non-compliance with treatment recommendations. Moreover, Fleegel did not avail herself of the opportunity to call Dr. Peach as a live witness to discuss the desired records or to call the doctors and other medical personnel who prepared the disputed records as witnesses. Therefore, this ruling does not warrant reversal.34
5. The trial court’s evidentiary decisions do not constitute cumulative error requiring reversal.
Fleegel has presented on appeal challenges to several evidentiary decisions of the trial court. She urges this court to apply the doctrine of “cumulative error” to find that even if each individual error was harmless, the impact of the errors have deprived her of a fair trial. In this case, the record included evidence from which Fleegel could make all of the arguments consonant with her theory of the case. Therefore, the trial court’s rulings did not violate Fleegel’s right to a fair trial, and reversal is not warranted.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Awarding Attorney’s Fees to a Criminal Victim Who Was Not the ‘‘Prevailing Party” Under Civil Rules 68 and 82.
Although Boyles was the prevailing party under Rule 68 and thus entitled to an award for attorney’s fees under Rule 82,35 the trial [1276]*1276court concluded that it was proper to offset that fee award against a separate award to Fleegel as the victim of a serious crime.
Alaska Statute 09.60.070(a) provides that a person who has been injured may recover from the tortfeasor fall reasonable attorney’s fees in a civil action if the injury resulted from an attempt on the part of the offender to commit a serious criminal offense.36 A “serious criminal offense” includes driving while intoxicated.37 We have never before addressed the interaction of this statute with other statutes and rules regarding attorney’s fees.
1. A crime victim need not be the “prevailing party” as defined by Rule 68 to be awarded attorney’s fees under AS 09.60.070.
Boyles argues that Fleegel should not have received an award of attorney’s fees because Boyles was the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees. Boyles contends that he is the prevailing party based on his Rule 68 offer that exceeded the jury award of damages against him. He argues that as the prevailing party, his right to attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82 preempts Flee-gel’s right to receive attorney’s fees under the crime victims’ statute, AS 09.60.070.
The superior court attempted to reconcile the provisions that separately provide attorney’s fees for victims of serious crimes and for parties who make a pretrial settlement offer more generous than the jury award. It determined that “[bjecause each statute can be applied here without doing harm to the purposes behind the other ... each party is entitled to an award of fees.”
Boyles argues that the crime victims’ statute, AS 09.60.070, “incorporates the prevailing party restriction of Rule 82,” the rule providing attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a civil case.38 However, AS 09.60.070 contains no prevailing party requirement and appears to have been intended to apply independently of Civil Rule 82.
Cases prior to the 1997 amendment of AS 09.30.065 (the offer-of-judgment statute) and Rule 68 (the offer-of-judgment rule) defined “prevailing party” as the party “successful with regard to the main issues in the action.” 39 When in 1991 the legislature adopted AS 09.60.070,40 the crime victims’ statute, Rule 82 provided for attorney’s fees for the “prevailing party” in a civil case without defining that term. The act enacting the crime victims’ statute amended Rule 82 “by requiring an award of full reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing victims of certain crimes.”41 This amendment therefore directed that the provision allowing full attorney’s fees for crime victims replace the partial attorney’s fees award that the crime victim could otherwise recover under Rule 82 had she prevailed in the civil action. This is consistent with the legislative intent, as expressed by then-Representative Dave Don-ley, a sponsor of the victims’ rights bill, to “readjust[ ] the .balance between victims and the perpetrators in the system by making the experience of being involved in a crime a little less burdensome” and “allowing victims of violent crimes to recover ... full attorneys fees in civil cases brought against the person who committed th[e] crime.”42
[1277]*1277It was not until 1997, six years after the crime victims’ statute was enacted, that the legislature established that the offeror of a settlement that met certain standards “shall be considered the prevailing party for the purposes of an award of attorney’s fees under the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.”43 Therefore, at the time it enacted the provision awarding attorney’s fees to crime victims, the legislature could not have contemplated that the 1997 offer-of-judgment definition of prevailing party would apply. And when the legislature enacted amendments to the offer-of-judgment rule in 1997, it did not specifically address the crime victims’ statute.
We have determined that the “prevailing party” requirement of Rule 82 does not limit the ability to award attorney’s fees under other statutory provisions that use standards separate from Rule 82. For example, a spouse may seek attorney’s fees during a divorce or annulment proceeding under AS 25.24.140.44 Considerations other than “prevailing party” dictate whether such fees are awarded: “Cost and fee awards in a divorce
are not to be based on the prevailing party concept, but primarily on the relative economic situations and earning powers of the parties.”45
Moreover, the interpretation of federal fee-shifting statutes by federal courts indicates that an offer-of-judgment rule and statutory fee-shifting coexist. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 differs from Alaska Civil Rule 68 in that the federal rule allows the recovery of “costs” and does not specify whether “costs” includes attorney’s fees.46 Where attorney’s fees are statutorily awarded, in cases under the Clean Air Act and Fair Labor Standards Act, for example, rejection of a Federal Rule 68 offer does not preclude an award for post-offer fees.47 Professors Wright, Miller, and Marcus also indicate that an offset of attorney’s fees could be appropriate, in warning that “courts must be careful to avoid the sort of automatic prohibition on post-offer fees imposed by Rule 68.”48
We therefore affirm the trial court’s award of fees on the basis that a crime victim need not be a “prevailing party” to be awarded [1278]*1278attorney’s fees under AS 09.60.070, the crime victims’ statute. Apart from questioning the hypothetical propriety of requesting full fees in the context of a contingent fee arrangement, Boyles does not challenge the propriety of hybrid fees or the specific calculation method used by the trial court. Because these issues were not briefed, we decline to reach them.
2. Timing of motion for attorney ⅛ fees
Boyles also argues that the trial court should not have awarded Fleegel attorney’s fees under AS 09.60.070, the crime victims’ statute, because a motion for these fees was not filed within ten days after the date of judgment. Civil Rule 82(c) establishes the time period in which attorney’s fees must be requested: “Failure to move for attorney’s fees within 10 days, or such additional time as the court may allow, shall be construed as a waiver of the party’s right to recover attorney’s fees.”
The initial judgment order was distributed on January 29, 1999. On May 14, 1999, Fleegel filed a motion requesting that the superior court vacate the initial judgment and enter a new judgment that conformed with AS 09.60.070, the crime victims’ statute. Fleegel sought relief under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b), which permits the court to relieve a party from a judgment for reasons of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect where a motion seeking such relief is filed “within a reasonable time.”49 The superior court granted the motion for relief from judgment on June 14, 1999, finding that such relief served “the interests of justice.”50 Because Fleegel sought relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b), rather than attorney’s fees under Civil Rule 82(c), the limitations period for Civil Rule 82(c) does not apply.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Fleegel did not waive her request for attorney’s fees.51 We therefore affirm the attorney’s fee award on its merits.
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. We also AFFIRM the attorney’s fee awards.
BRYNER, Justice, with whom CARPENETI, Justice, joins, dissenting.