[563]*563Grimson, J.
This is an action for divorce. Plaintiff asks for a divorce from her husband on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment and for support and division of property. The defendant denies the cruel and inhuman treatment generally and filed a cross complaint asking for a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment on the part of the plaintiff. Plaintiff makes reply denying defendant’s cross complaint generally. The district court denied divorce to both parties .and denied support to the plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals, and asks for a trial de noAm.
The plaintiff and defendant were married at Wibaux, Montana, on Jan. 25, 1947. Both are citizens of. the United .States and bona fide residents of the State of North Dakota for more-than one year next preceding the commencement of the action. Both had been married and divorced. No children Avere born' to this marriage.
At the time of the marriage the defendant owned a building located on West Main. St., Mandan,-North Dakota, in which he conducted a bar. After the marriage the main room of that building AAras divided along the center and. a restaurant, established on one side while the bar was maintained on the other.- The plaintiff operated the restaurant Avhile the defendant, operated the bar. The plaintiff kept the books. In 1948 defendant bought lots on East Main St., in Mandan . and the parties cooperated in the construction and operation of a motel, court thereon.
The testimony by the plaintiff and in her behalf shows that trouble soon arose between them. In September 1947 plain-tiff’s father was ill in a Minneapolis Hospital:.. The family de-[564]*564cided to go down to see Mm. Plaintiff wanted to go along. The defendant, refused to give her permission. She went anyhow. When she, in 1949, wanted to go to see her father who was again in the hospital, defendant again refused and said: “If you go, don’t come back.” She went anyhow and when she came back he said: “What do you want ... I told you not to come back.*’ He accused her mother of immoral conduct and called her bad and indecent names. The defendant forbade the plaintiff to associate with her people. He called them “hillbillies” and other derogatory names. He did not want her to allow them to come to their home and at one time after defendant had seen her mother coming from their home he said: “If I ever catch her up here I will throw her down the stairway and break her — -— neck.” He repeatedly told plaintiff when she was going with her people: “If you go, don’t come back.” He made her wash the telephone when her sister had used it. He refused to let her go home for Father’s Day until a friend intervened. At the time of one of the Minneapolis trips when her sister, Mrs. Chadwick, was urging defendant to let her go and on his- refusal called him a “slave driver” he got mad, called her a bad name and said: “Are you going to get out of here?” This attitude of the defendant towards plaintiff’s people seems to have continued throughout their entire married life. This is not only the plaintiff’s testimony but is corroborated by her sisters and by a maid who ■worked in the motor court. Defendant’s own testimony is somewhat of an indirect admission along that line. He says: “We didn’t quarrel so much about them but what I wanted was reasonable visiting. . . . Q— Now you heard Mrs. Chadwick testify that you told your' wife that she could not go up to the bars to slut around or words to that effect ? Ans.— I did- not say that, not that word.”
It is clear that the defendant had a strong antipathy towards plaintiff’s relatives and used every effort to keep her from any association with them. Plaintiff, on the other hand, seems to have had a strong attachment for her relatives and desired their company. The conduct of the defendant in that regard was unreasonable; In Gratz v. Gratz, 137 Fla 709, 188 So 580, it is said: “There seems to have been an abundance of testimony to [565]*565¿how repeated declarations by the appellant execrating appellee’s parents and applying to them humiliating and profane epithets. These expressions, at a time when the domestic atmosphere was far-from tranquil, were obviously intended-to.injure her sensibilities and cause her mental distress.” The court held such conduct warranted granting the wife a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. In Donald v. Donald, 21 Fla 571, it is said that abuse and mistreatment of her relatives far exceed the effect of a blow in their damaging effect upon the health and happiness of a woman. See also 17 Am Jur Divorce and Separation, Sec 71, p 185.
Apparently defendant was jealous of her. "When she went out alone he admits he watched her to see where she went and what she did. . He frequently accused her of being with other men. He claimed she continually flirted with the customers at the restaurant and visited barrooms with some of them. Of defendant’s testimony on these claims the trial court found that “The evidence discloses that it is based mostly on conjecture and suspicion and is not corroborated in any manner.” Plaintiff claims defendant accused her of infidelity, which he admits, and that he called her the most indecent names possible indicating infidelity. Her sisters and a maid testify they heard him do that. Defendant admits calling her a “chippy.” Defendant offered no evidence to justify such charges.
“Unfounded accusations of infidelity may inflict such grievous mental suffering as to amount to extreme cruelty.” Ruff v. Ruff, 78 ND 775, 52 NW2d 107 and cases cited.
“As a general rule, unfounded accusations of misconduct, tending to degrade and humiliate the accused spouse may waiv rant a divorce for cruelty.” 27 CJS, Divorce, Sec 28 b p 555. See also 17 Am Jur, Divorce and Separation, See 66, p 183.
The handling of their finances and her management of the restaurant seem to have been matters of continual bickering between them. Plaintiff claims she could never do anything to please him. Both drank some intoxicating liquor which made matters worse. Plaintiff claims defendant abused her for wanting to go to church. When she at one time went anyhow he became so angry over it that he pounded his. desk,- broke a glass [566]*566and threw á shoe at her. Another time when she came back from'Bismarck with some friends and was drinking beer with them in her home' he slapped her in the face, leaving a little mark and pushed her off the chair. Her glasses were knocked off.
In a proposed written agreement for a condonation, which defendant signed and unsuccessfully sought' to have plaintiff sign, it is stated:
“Whereas, the parties hereto have had some serious marital difficulties during the time of their marriage, which have been occasioned by and'are due: “(1) to occasional quarrels during which the party of the second part (the defendant) called the party of the first part, (the plaintiff) vile and insulting names; (2) to conduct towards each other which at times has been unkind, unfair and cruel; (3) to the use of force by the party of the second part (the defendant) on the party of the first part (the plaintiff) on one occasion when he slapped her in the face.”
Thus defendant admits calling plaintiff names and slapping her. On his part he admits unkind, unfair and cruel treatment towards plaintiff. She refused to sign this document.
“It is generally held that where occasional acts of physical violence áre resorted to by a spouse in connection with the continued use of vile and offensive language, the entire course of conduct will'constitute cruelty although the physical violence is not sufficient standing alone to warrant a divorce.” 17 Am Jur, Divorce and Separation, Sec 62, p 181; Doolittle v. Doolittle, 78 Iowa 691, 43 NW 616, 6 LRA 187. See also annotation in Ann Cas 1918B 489 and cases cited.
Plaintiff claims this conduct on the part of the defendant continually upset her, caused her mental worry and distress; that it made her nervous and that she suffered continual headaches therefrom for which she had to take medicine. She claims to have been in fear of him and was corroborated on that by a maid. All this conduct on defendant’s part would naturally tend to affect plaintiff’s health and happiness. Plaintiff’s evidence establishes a cause for divorce.
Defendant argues that there is not sufficient corroboration of plaintiff’s evidence. This court has held that the statute requiring corroboration must be interpreted in the light of its [567]*567purpose. The reason for that statute is said to be for. the prevention of collusion. Clopton v. Clopton, 11 ND 212, 219, 91 NW 46. In Tuttle v. Tuttle, 21 ND 503, 518, 131 NW 460, Ann Cas 1913B 1, this court approves that conclusion in-Clopton v. Clopton and holds that: “Where the whole case precludes any possibility of collusion, the corroboration need be slight.” See also Thompson v. Thompson, 32 ND 530, 156 NW 492. Clearly there was no collusion in the case at bar. ’ We find.the evidence sufficiently corroborates plaintiff’s testimony.
Plaintiff had left, defendant three of four times. In spite of his injunction to her on such occasions not to come back she had come back. The, last of these occasions was in December 1950. She went to her folks. In a few days defendant' persuaded her to come back. She - then lived with him as. his wife until August 24, 1951. It is. claimed and the district-.court found'that this amounted to condonation of all past causes for - divorce.
■ Section 14-0513 NDRC 1943 provides:
‘‘Condonation is the conditional forgiveness of a matrimonial offense constituting a cause of -divorce. The following requirements are necessary to condonation:
1. A knowledge on the part.of the condoner of the facts constituting the cause of divorce; . .
2. Reconciliation and remission .of the, offense- by the injured person; and .. . .
3. Restoration of the offending party to all marital rights.
.. “Condonation implies a condition subsequent that the'- forgiving party must be treated with conjugal kindnesái When the cause, of divorce consists of a.course of'-offensive dots of ill treatment, which aggregately may constitute the offense, -cohabitation or passive endurance, or conjugal Tcindness shall not be evidence of condonation of any of the acts constituting such cause, unless accompanied by an express agreement to■ condone. In such cases, condonation can be made only after -the cause of divorce has become complete as to -the acts complained -of. A fraudulent concealment by the eondonee of facts ■constituting a different cause of divorce -from the one condoned"sand existing at the time of condonation.avoids such condonation.” '"(Italics supplied..) - :.....
[568]*568This statute was considered in Taylor v. Taylor, 5 ND 58, 63 NW 893, and the court reached this conclusion, stated in the syllabus:
“In an action for divorce on the ground of cruelty, cohabitation after-'-such cruelty does not establish condonation, in the absence of an express agreement to condone.”
In this case the evidence establishes a ground for divorce on behalf of the plaintiff that comes squarely within the italicized portion of the above statute. The defendant over a period of several years pursued a course of cruel and offensive conduct toward the plaintiff which constituted grounds for.divorce under Sections 14-0503 and 14-0505 NDRC 1943.
The trial court found as a fact:
“That the defendant upon cross-examination of the plaintiff established- the fact that the plaintiff -had left the defendant just before Christmas in 1950, that she returned to him during the holidays, and lived and co-habited with him from January 1st, 1951 to August '24th, 1951, when she left him and lived separate and apart from him; that from January 1st, 1951 up to the time she left him on August 24th of the said year, the parties did not have any serious trouble, and the Court finds that during said time the plaintiff with knowledge of the defendant’s conduct towards her and all of the acts and things which she has complained of condoned such acts and conduct of the defendant committed prior thereto, upon which she has relied for divorce upon the ground of extreme cruelty, and that the plaintiff and the defendant became reconciled and thereafter lived and co-habited together from January 1st, 1951 to August 24, of said year when she left him to live separate and apart from him.”
The court then reached this conclusion of law:
, “That the conduct and acts of the defendant upon which the plaintiff'relied for a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty were condoned by the plaintiff with full knowledge of all of the material facts and attending circumstances, that the parties became reconciled during the Christmas holidays of December, 1950, and that they lived and co-habited together as husband and wife from January 1st, 1951, to August 24th, of the same [569]*569year when plaintiff left the defendant,. and has lived separate and .apart from him since said time.”
In reaching his conclusion, it is apparent that the trial court overlooked our statutory declaration with respect to condonation in cruelty cases. There is no evidence of an express agreement to condone. Under cross-examination to which the court refers, the plaintiff testified that shortly before Christmas in 1950 she went to' the home of her parents after the defendant had told her to get out. Shortly thereafter the defendant came out to see her. On one occasion he was alone and on the other he. was accompanied by his attorney. On the first visit she refused to return with the defendant. On the second visit she returned after the defendant and his attorney made a lot of promises. She does not say what the promises were, but says: “I didn’t believe it but I thought I would try it.” After the holidays she came back to live with the defendant and lived with him up until August 24, 1951. During, that time they had a “lot of arguments” over-her relatives. She left again after a quarrel on August 24, 1951, as a climax of repeated arguments and continual nagging all that summer.
Condonation of cruelty resulting from a course of conduct over a considerable period of time stands on a different basis than condonation of grounds for divorce consisting of a single act, as, for instance, adultery. 17 Am Jur, Divorce and Separation, Sec 210, p 257; Annotation in 14 ALR 933. A number of states have statutes the same or similar to our Section 14-0513 NDRC 1943 requiring an express agreement to establish condonation in certain cases of cruelty. Under a California statute very similar to ours an express agreement to condone is held necessary to support a finding of condonation. Shaingold v. Shaingold, 191 Cal 438, 216 Pac 603; Whinnery v. Whinnery, 21 Cal App 59, 130 Pac 1065; Hunter v. Hunter, 132 Cal 473, 64 Pac 772; Smith v. Smith, 119 Cal 183, 48 Pac 730, 51 Pac 183; Morton v. Morton, 117 Cal 443, 49 Pac 557; Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Cal Unrep 446, 35 Pac 637. “In an action for divorce on the ground of cruelty- there can be no condonation unless there is a reconciliation between the parties, a remission of the matrimonial [570]*570offenses, and an express agreement to-condone.” Morton v. Morton, supra.
In Saville v. Saville, 103 Ore 117, 203 Pac 584, it is said:
In this state condonation of a matrimonial offense, - except adultery, cannot be established by-implication from the voluntary co-habitation-of the parties after, knowledge thereof. To constitute a bar for any of the causes of divorce named in the statute, except adultery, the offense must have been expressly forgiven. ...
“The defendant did not allege, or attempt to prove, that plaintiff had expressly forgiven the acts of cruel and inhuman treatment, which he admitted he inflicted upon her; he relied en? tirely upon forgiveness which he urged the court to- imply from the fact of marital cohabitation continuing for some time after the acts of cruelty were committed. This the court is not permitted to do in view of the statute, and accordingly plaintiff' was not barred from obtaining a decree of divorce based on the-acts claimed by defendant to have been condoned.”
That case was later cited with approval in Claude v. Claude, 180 Ore 62,174 Pac2d 179; Brennan v.-Brennan, 183 Ore 269,192 Pac2d 858; and Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 191 Ore 374, 229 Pac2d 956.
Without referring to statutory provisions, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Cudahy v. Cudahy, 217 Wis 355, 258 NW 168, has this to say:
“While cruel and inhuman treatment may be condoned, there is quite a difference between cruel and inhuman treatment consisting of a long succession of relatively trivial'incidents, the whole pattern of which may constitute a ground for divorce, and single acts such as adultery or assault which, taken alone, may constitute grounds for divorce. By hypothesis, the conduct of defendant would not in any of its single instances constitute á ground for divorce. It was the continuity and the persistenc-é of this conduct that ultimately gave plaintiff a cause.of action. If marital intercourse or' continued living together is to be treat" ed as condonation, then a spouse who hopes for improvement in conduct, and continues marital relations in the hope, that things may eventually- straighten out, is, by the very act of toler[571]*571anee, "barred from securing a divorce. On the other hand; should the spouse, after one or two instances of such conduct, sue for divorce, he or she would be met with the argument that one or two instances of this sort do'-not constitute grounds for divorce. The doctrine of • condonation was not intended to create such ¿ dilemma. It has no application here. ' Even if it did have, it would- be a conditional forgiveness and subject to the implied condition that the conduct shall not be repeated and that the causé of action shall be revived by conduct much slighter than that which preceded it.” See also Bickford v. Bickford, 94 Mont 314, 22 Pac2d 306; Quient v. Quient, 105 Wash 315, 177 Pac 779; McCarthy v. McCarthy, 123 Conn 409, 195 Atl 607.
In the case at bar condonation was not pleaded and does not seem to have been relied upon as a defense. The defendant gave no testimony tending to establish an express agreement in compliance with our statute and no such agreement is established by the testimony of the plaintiff, either on direct or cross-examination, or by any other evidence. The trial court was clearly in error in disregarding the requirements of the statute and in finding that plaintiff’s cause of action for a divorce was destroyed by condonation which was neither pleaded nor established by the evidence.
We have concluded that the plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she has suffered continued cruel and inhuman treatment at the hands of the defendant. The legitimate- ends and objects of this marriage have been destroyed. . This is indicated by the fact that both are seeking divorce upon identical grounds, towit: cruel and inhuman treatment. It is further shown by clauses 4 and 5 in the proposed agreement of condonation, heretofore referred to, which said the difficulties existing between them were occasioned by and due: “(4) to mutua] accusations and.distrust of each other’s intentions; (5) to the fact-that the party of the first part has left the home of the parties on several occasions for a short period of time by reason of' the difficulties they had, after which she returned again to assume the marriage relationship.” Here defendant' admitted, by signing this document, his accusations and-distrust of. plaintiff’s intentions and that the occasions when [572]*572plaintiff liad left home were caused “by reason of the difficulties they had.” While in the instant case violence was resorted to only once, defendant’s conduct with the plaintiff in regard to her family, his use of abusive and vulgar language, his continual criticism of plaintiff’s actions and his -unfounded accusations of infidelity- on her part were such that would necessarily cause any woman grievous suffering. While- the plaintiff may not have been free from all fault the evidence'does not justify defendant’s conduct towards her. In Thompson v. Thompson, 32 ND 530, 156 NW 492, this court held that:
“Any unjustifiable conduct on the part of either husband or wife which so grievously wounds the mental feelings of the other as to seriously impair bodily health, or utterly destroy the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony, constitutes extreme cruelty within the meaning of the statute, although no physical or personal violence may be inflicted.” See also Ruff v. Ruff, supra.
Plaintiff in her complaint asked that the defendant be required to pay “a suitable sum for plaintiff’s support and that the property of plaintiff and defendant be divided into an amount to be decreed by the court ... to be the property of this plaintiff.” The defendant in his answer prayed “that the court determine the amount which the defendant, (1) should pay to the plaintiff as permanent alimony or for her support and -maintenance and fix the time of payment, or (2) the amount which plaintiff should pay, in a lump sum, in full discharge of all his obligations arising out of the marriage relationship.’.’ These prayers were after each party had asked for a divorce. The district court ma.de an order for the defendant to pay the plaintiff for her support during the pendency of the action, $25.00 per week. During the trial both parties fully submitted their evidence on the property owned by the parties at the time of their marriage and up to the time of the trial. After consideration of the whole case the court in its conclusions and order for judgment directed that this- order for support be “in all things, annulled, vacated and set aside” and made no.allowance whatever for the support of the plaintiff although she was then living separate and apart from the defendant. The appeal was taken [573]*573from the judgment and the whole thereof. In the hriefs and on the argument the matter of property division was fully argued and submitted to this court; Plaintiff’s request to this court is “that the plaintiff be awarded . . . division of the property.’-’
In his brief the defendant states:
“The defendant concedes that if the court grants a divorce that then it has the power to make an equitable division of the property under the provisions of Section 14-0524 RC 1943. On this issue the defendant contends: (1) That the property which the defendant owned prior to his marriage to plaintiff is his own separate property and is not community property or subject to equitable distribution. (2) That the rents and profits or income derived from the rental of the property that he owned prior to his marriage to the plaintiff are not community property nor subject to distribution in this action. (3) That the income and money earned by the defendant since August 24, 1951 when plaintiff left him and during which time the parties have lived separate and apart is the separate property of the defendant and not subject to distribution. (4) That only the Motel Court, furnishings and appliances and Buick automobile constitute community property. (5) That only the equity in the community property: (a) after deducting the debts and obligations chargeable .against it, and (b) after deducting the contribution Avhich the defendant made from his separate property to the acquisition thereof, is subject to the equitable distribution by the court should a divorce be granted.”
This court has under someAvhat similar circumstances passed upon property rights in a divorce action. Henry v. Henry, 77 ND 845, 46 NW2d 701. See also Christianson v. Warehouse Association, 5 ND 438, 67 NW 300, 32 LRA 730.
In Ruff v. Ruff, supra, this court says:
“When a divorce is granted the court is required to make such equitable distribution of the real and personal property of the parties as may seem just and proper. Sec 14-0542 NDRC 1943, the distribution to be made depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Agrest v. Agrest, 75 ND 318, 27 NW2d 697. There is no rigid rule for the division of [574]*574property but the ultimate object to-be sought is an equitable distribution. Byrne v. Byrne, 315 Mich 441, 24 NW2d 173; Casciola v. Casciola, 317 Mich 485, 27 NW2d 65; Jensen v. Jensen, 144 Neb 857, 15 NW2d 57; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 58 SD 472, 237 NW 568.”
The evidence shows that-at-the time of the marriage of the parties the defendant was the owner of the.property described as Lot 10 in Block 10 of the original townsite-'of Mandan, upon which was located a building in which he conducted a liquor business.
This building, the bar and the furnishings as' well as the income therefrom are entirely the property of the defendant. The plaintiff did nothing in reference thereto to give her a share in that property or its income. Except for necessary support the wife has no interest in the property of her husband. Sec 14-0704 NDRC 1943. In Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal App2d 682, 187 Pac2d 28, the Supreme Court of California held, in effect, that the property which the husband acquired before his marriage remained his separate property, and since the wife had made no contribution thereto she was not entitled to receive a part thereof. In Burch v. Rice, 37 Wash2d 185, 222 Pac2d 847, the Supreme Court of Washington said:
“The rule is well settled in this state that the status of property as community or separate is to be determined as of the date of its acquisition, and that if it is separate property at that time it will remain separate property through all of its changes and transitions as long as it can be traced and identified; and, further, that its rents, issues and profits remain separate property.” (And cases cited.) See also Schlak v. Schlak, 51, ND 897, 201 NW 832; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 69 NB 208, 285 NW 75; McLean v. McLean, 69 ND 665, 290 NW 913.
After their marriage defendant’s barroom was divided so that plaintiff operated the restaurant on one side and he operated the bar on the other. The defendant sold the bar and fixtures for $11,000.00 and then rented the barroom to the purchaser for $125.00 per month. The fixtures and furniture of the restaurant were purchased and paid for out of the proceeds of the business. Plaintiff claims the cost thereof to have been $5000,00, [575]*575When the plaintiff ceased to operate the restaurant it was rented, together with furniture and fixtures, for $250.00 per month. There is no testimony as to what portion of that rent was for the building and what was for the furnishings. Defendant can, therefore, not claim any of that rent as separate property and it will all be treated as going into the building of their joint property — the motel court. The barroom rental is the property of the defendant without any right therein by the plaintiff.
In 1948, the parties jointly planned and constructed the motel court on East Main St. in the City of Mandan. Except what was contributed by the defendant as proceeds from the increase in the mortgage on the bar building and proceeds from the sale of the bar business and income from the rental of the barroom, the building of the motel court was mainly financed by loans and the credit of the defendant.
The evidence as to the value of the motel court is not very definite. The plaintiff claims that it' cost $76,000.00 and basing the value on the net income in 1950, defendant claims that it was worth more than $100,000.00 at the time of the trial. Defendant claims that it cost about $64,000.00 and presented a statement in the evidence claimed to have been made from defendant’s books to support that. He, however, admits that it was worth $70,000.00 at the time of the trial. We have come to the conclusion that the reasonable value of the motel court was $75,000.00. Another item on which there is a dispute in the evidence was on the value of the furniture and -fixtures of the restaurant.. Defendant claims that plaintiff’s estimate of $5000.-00 is too high. Moreover, the property had been used almost four years at the time of the trial and such property depreciates fast. ‘ The court, therefore, finds the value of that property to be $2500.00 at the time of the trial.
On that basis the evidence shows the following as the value of the joint property of the parties at the time of the trial:
[576]*576Value of the Motel Court, $75,000.00
Indebtedness and deductions:
Bal. due on first mortgage, $18,833.00
Bal. due on second mortgage, 5,000.00
Due Kennelly Furniture Co. 1.650.00
Due Montgomery Ward Co. 195.00
Beal estate taxes due, 1,708.10
Personal property taxes, 222.60
U. S. Government, tax liens, 8.181.00
Interest on income taxes, 228.30
Proceeds from increase in mortgage on bar building, 7.500.00
Proceeds from sale of bar business, 11,000.00
Income from barroom rental, 1.190.00
■ Total, $55,708.00 55,708.00
Net value of Motel Court, $19,292.00
Furniture and fixtures of restaurant, $2,500.00
Other joint property, 1,410.00 3,910.00
Total, $23,202.00
On this basis the net value of plaintiff and defendant in their joint property is $23,202.00. The question then arises what is an equitable division thereof according to the facts and circumstances in this case ?
As to the plaintiff the evidence showed that she is a young woman of 36 years of age; that since her separation from the defendant she has recovered her good health; that she is .a good cook and trained’for the management of a restaurant, of fair earning ability and is capable of earning her- own living; that she has been working in a restaurant since the commencement of this action; that there are no children; that although about 30 years, of age at the time of this marriage she had nothing to contribute to the accumulation of the property except her labor [577]*577and help in planning and management. There is also the fact that this marriage has lasted less than five years and that the plaintiff is not entirely blameless for its failure.
On the other hand the evidence shows that defendant is a middle aged man in good health; that he owned property at the time of the marriage from the proceeds of which, together with defendant’s credit the parties were enabled to construct this motel court; that his work and his credit standing have been worth considerable more in the building of the motel court then everything plaintiff contributed; that the motel court is heavily encumbered on which indebtedness there are installments of over $1100.00 due each month; that the project still needs his credit standing to succeed; that for his actions against plaintiff he had some provocation on her part.
All these matters enter into a determination of what is an equitable division of the property. See Ruff v. Ruff, supra; Agrest v. Agrest, 75 ND 318, 27 NW2d 697; Holmes v. Holmes, 152 Neb 556, 41 NW2d 919; Ristow v. Ristow, 152 Neb 615, 41 NW2d 924.
The court is of the opinion that under the circumstances of this case the division of the joint property of the plaintiff and defendant should be made on the basis of one-third to the plaintiff and two-thirds to the defendant. The property cannot be divided so that it is the conclusion of this court that the defendant in lieu of all support and alimony pay to the plaintiff the sum of $7,734.00, being one-third of the net value of the joint property, with interest at 4 per cent from the date of the final judgment herein and payable, $534.00 within thirty days of the date of the final judgment, $1200.00 on or before Oct. 1, 1953, $2000.00 on or before Oct. 1, 1954, $2000.00 on or before Oct. 1, 1955, and $2000.00 on or before Oct. 1, 1956, with interest at 4 per cent on all deferred payments. It is further directed that said sum be a lien on all the property of the defendant including the motel court and his bar property. Sec 28-2013 NDRC 1943. Upon payment of said sum plaintiff shall have no further interest in this property.
The trial court awarded plaintiff the sum of $100.00 as attor[578]*578ney fee at the’ beginning of this action. The trial in district court occupied three days and on appeal two appearances have been made in the Supreme Court. We are of the opinion that the defendant should pay .to the plaintiff an additional $500.00 for attorney fees and the taxable costs of this action in district court and on appeal.
The judgment of the district court is reversed arid the case is remanded with direction to render judgment in accordance herewith.
Morris, C. J., and Sathre, J., concur.