Flaherty v. Amigos Del Mar LTD.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: July 8, 2026
• Docket: 25-1735
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 25-1735

SUSAN FLAHERTY; ROBERT FLAHERTY; DANIEL FLAHERTY,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

AMIGOS DEL MAR LTD., d/b/a Amigos Del Mar Dive Shop, as owners of the vessel M/V Papa Changa,

Defendant, Appellant,

MAVERICK AVARELLO; ALBINO "CHANGA" PAZ; SCUBA DIVING INTERNATIONAL; SCUBA SCHOOLS INTERNATIONAL; JOHN ROMERO; JOHN DOE,

Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Howard, and Dunlap, Circuit Judges.

John J. Bromley and Jeanne M. Donohue, with whom Morrison Mahoney LLP and Holbrook & Murphy, were on brief, for appellant. J. Mark Dickison, with whom Brendan P. Slean and Lawson & Weitzen, LLP, were on brief, for appellees.

July 8, 2026 DUNLAP, Circuit Judge. About two years after the United

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered a

default judgment against Defendant-Appellant Amigos Del Mar

Unlimited, Ltd. ("Amigos"), and nineteen months after

Plaintiff-Appellee Susan Flaherty ("Flaherty")1 sought to enforce

the judgment in Belize, Amigos appeared for the first time in

United States court to attempt to vacate the judgment under Rule

60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as void for want

of jurisdiction. Because we agree with the district court that

Amigos did not bring its Rule 60(b) challenge within a reasonable

time, we affirm.

I.

Flaherty suffered severe injuries to her lower body

during a May 2019 scuba vacation in Belize, after an Amigos

employee who was not a certified dive master pushed her off a boat

owned and operated by Amigos. As she went into the water, she was

pulled under the boat by the vessel’s engaged propellers, which

seriously mutilated her foot, ankle, and knee. She filed suit in

the District of Massachusetts in August 2020, bringing maritime

law claims and alleging subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1333, which vests the federal courts with original jurisdiction

1 Flaherty's husband and son are also plaintiffs-appellees, but for ease of reference, and because the case concerns her injury, we refer to Mrs. Flaherty in this opinion.

-2- over maritime law claims. She filed an amended complaint in

September 2020, and, because Amigos is a Belizean company, served

Amigos pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 4(f)(1), (h)(2), (l)(2). The founder, director, and controlling

shareholder of Amigos, Jose Paz, signed the proof of service,

indicating that it was received voluntarily. Amigos did not appear

in the case. On June 21, 2021, the court entered a default

judgment against Amigos, and in October 2021, after providing

Amigos with notice, held an evidentiary hearing to determine

damages. Again, Amigos did not appear. On February 23, 2022, the

court entered an amended judgment awarding Flaherty over six

million U.S. dollars in damages, plus interest.

Flaherty sought to enforce the judgment in Belize on

July 6, 2022, and served Amigos with Belizean process on July 12,

2022. The Belizean court also granted Flaherty a default judgment

against Amigos on January 11, 2023; following a hearing on

April 26, 2023, the court issued an order on September 29, 2023,

directing Amigos to pay over seven million U.S. dollars as a debt

due and owing to Flaherty, plus interest. In November 2023, Amigos

appeared in Belizean court to contest the Belizean default

judgment. A month later, the Belizean court authorized Flaherty

to seize Amigos' vessels and assets, although it later, in April

2024, set aside its own default judgment.

-3- On February 27, 2024, two years after the District of

Massachusetts entered its amended judgment, and nineteen months

after Flaherty sought enforcement in Belize, Amigos made its first

appearance in the District of Massachusetts action and filed a

motion to vacate the district court's default judgment. The

District of Massachusetts set a hearing on the motion, ordered

limited discovery, considered additional briefing, and finally

rejected Amigos' arguments that the default judgment was void.

Amigos then brought this appeal.

II.

The procedural vehicle by which Amigos seeks relief is

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The rule allows a court to "relieve a party

or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or

proceeding" for several reasons, including, under

subsection (b)(4), because "the judgment is void" and, under

subsection (b)(6), for "any other reason that justifies relief."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), (6). Amigos focuses its argument on

Rule 60(b)(4), reasoning that the judgment against it is void

because the district court lacked both subject matter jurisdiction

and personal jurisdiction.2

2 Amigos also argues in the alternative that it is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because the Covid-19 pandemic left Amigos "powerless to defend itself in Massachusetts." However, Amigos never raised this argument in the district court below, and it may not do so for the first time on appeal. Carrozza v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 992 F.3d 44, 59 (1st Cir. 2021) ("[A]ppellants

-4- We need not reach the merits of Amigos' arguments because

we conclude that its Rule 60(b) motion is barred by subsection

(c)(1) of the same rule, which serves as a gatekeeper for Rule

60(b) motions. Rule 60(c)(1) preserves finality and prevents

protracted litigation over final orders and judgments by requiring

motions under Rule 60(b) to be made "within a reasonable time."3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1); see generally Farm Credit Bank of Balt.

v. Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 2003) ("As a general

matter, Rule 60(b) . . . seeks to balance the importance of

finality against the desirability of resolving disputes on the

merits."); Paul Revere Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Zang, 248 F.3d

1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Rule 60(b) relief is 'extraordinary relief'

reserved for 'exceptional circumstances,' given the countervailing

interest in the finality of such orders." (quoting United States

v. One Urban Lot, 882 F.2d 582, 585 (1st Cir. 1989))).

We have not always read Rule 60(c)(1)'s "reasonable

time" limitation to apply to Rule 60(b)(4). At the time of Amigos'

motion below, the rule in our circuit was that Rule 60(b)(4)

cannot raise an argument on appeal that was not 'squarely and timely raised in the trial court.'" (quoting Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 949 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation modified))). 3 Rule 60(c)(1) states that "[a] motion under Rule 60(b) must

be made within a reasonable time -- and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Amigos has not brought a motion under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3), so the one-year maximum is not relevant.

-5- motions were excepted from the "reasonable time" limitation, and

such motions could be filed "at any time." Sea-Land Serv., Inc.

v. Ceramica Europa II, Inc., 160 F.3d 849, 852 (1st Cir. 1998)

(citing Precision Etchings & Findings, Inc. v. LGP Gem, Ltd., 953

F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1992), and United States v. Boch Oldsmobile,

Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990)). That rule is no longer

good law. The Supreme Court recently held -- during the pendency

of this appeal -- that "[l]itigants seeking relief under Rule

60(b)(4) must comply with Rule 60(c)(1) and file a motion within

a reasonable time." Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v.

Burton, 607 U.S. 155, 162 (2026). Amigos therefore cannot proceed

on its arguments under Rule 60(b)(4) unless it can establish that

it filed its motion within a reasonable time.

Although this change in law arose between the district

court's decision on Amigos' Rule 60(b) motion and our consideration

of this issue, we do not write on a blank slate. The district

court recognized that Coney Island Auto Parts was pending at the

Supreme Court, and, anticipating that the law of our circuit could

be overruled, held that "[i]f [the reasonable time requirement]

were the rule here" it "would find the time that has elapsed

renders Amigos' motion to vacate untimely." "We typically review

decisions of that sort only for abuse of discretion" because

"[d]istrict courts enjoy considerable discretion in resolving

[Rule 60(b)] motions." Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d at 65. And we

-6- generally only find abuse of discretion where the district court

"made an error of law or has reached a plainly erroneous decision."

Id. at 66. The district court's conclusion is neither based on an

error of law nor plainly erroneous.

Amigos raises two arguments in the wake of Coney Island

Auto Parts. First, it notes that the delay between the attempted

enforcement of the judgment and the filing of the 60(b) motion in

Coney Island Auto Parts was six years, while the delay in this

case was just under two years. Second, it notes that whether a

delay is "reasonable" turns on its justification -- the purported

justification here being that counsel advised Amigos not to appear,

believing the court to lack jurisdiction. In assessing these

arguments, we note that "the determination of what is 'reasonable'

depends upon the circumstances of each case." Bouret-Echevarría

v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 784 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir.

2015).

As an initial matter, because the reasonableness

determination is case dependent, id., the fact that the delay in

Coney Island Auto Parts was six years is of limited help to Amigos'

position. Nothing in the Court's opinion indicates that only

delays lasting six years or more are unreasonable; indeed, the

Court declined to "expound on whether Coney Island's timing was

reasonable" because Coney Island "d[id] not contend that it

complied with this requirement." 607 U.S. at 162. Our own

-7- precedent indicates that a delay of "sixteen months" is "overlong

in virtually any event." Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274,

280 (1st Cir. 1993). Amigos therefore faces a significant

challenge in showing that its delay was reasonable, although we do

not moor our analysis on a bright-line timing rule nor anchor it

in any particular factual showing. Instead, we

"consider[] . . . the length of the delay" together with "the

justification for it, and the prejudice (if any) associated with

the granting of relief." Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d at 66. On the

facts of this case, we conclude that Amigos' "protracted delay

scuttles any claim that [its] motion was 'made within a reasonable

time.'" Cotto, 993 F.2d at 280.

Amigos' proffered justification for its delay is that

Belizean counsel advised it that the U.S. courts had no

jurisdiction over Flaherty's claims. This argument holds no water.

The district court provided notice to Amigos after it found

jurisdiction and entered a default judgment, and before it

conducted a hearing to determine damages. Amigos has expressly

waived any challenge as to notice. Amigos does not explain why,

after the district court had found jurisdiction and notified Amigos

of the same, Amigos thought it unnecessary to appear to dispute

the court's finding for over two years. It gestures generally

toward the Covid-19 pandemic, but the pandemic does not explain

its failure to make any electronic filing with the district court.

-8- Disagreement with a federal court's finding is no justification to

ignore it. "Rule 60(b)(4) does not provide a license for litigants

to sleep on their rights." United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.

Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 275 (2010). The timeline supports the

conclusion that Amigos made a knowing choice not to appear in U.S.

court.

We would not reach a different conclusion even if the

relevant timeline were to be measured from the time of enforcement,

rather than the entry of judgment.4 Though "in the context of a

default judgment, it might be reasonable for a defendant not to

seek relief before learning about a plaintiff's attempted

enforcement," Coney Island Auto Parts, 607 U.S. at 160, Flaherty

We observe that our circuit has arguably been inconsistent 4

on when the clock begins to tick for motions made under Rule 60(b)(4)-(6). Compare Ungar v. Pal. Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79, 85 n.4 (1st Cir. 2010) (tethering the reasonable time calculus for not only a Rule 60(b)(1) motion but also a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to the "entry of the judgment"), with Bouret-Echevarría v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 784 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2015) (measuring the reasonableness of appellants' delay in filing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion from the time that appellants first learned of potential juror misconduct). The Sixth Circuit, in the decision affirmed by Coney Island Auto Parts, took the view that the clock for filing Rule 60(b)(4)-(6) motions "generally begins ticking when the movant is or should be aware of the factual basis for the motion," and acknowledged, without deciding, that in the context of Rule 60(b)(4) specifically, the clock may "not start running until enforcement is first attempted." In re Vista-Pro Auto., LLC, 109 F.4th 438, 445-46 (6th Cir. 2024), aff'd sub nom., Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 607 U.S. 155 (2026) (citation modified). We need not address this issue further because, even taking the most favorable view for Amigos, its delay was unreasonable.

-9- sought to enforce the judgment in Belize in early July 2022 and

served notice on Amigos less than a week later. Amigos does not

purport to have been ignorant of the enforcement action. So, as

Amigos acknowledges, even if we start the "reasonable time" clock

at the time of Flaherty's attempted enforcement, Amigos still

waited nineteen months to appear in federal court to contest the

judgment -- with no valid justification. See Cotto, 993 F.2d at

280 (indicating that a motion filed sixteen months after the entry

of judgment was not filed within a reasonable time); see also A & F

Bahamas LLC v. World Venture Grp., Inc., 796 F. App'x 657, 661

(11th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) ("[B]y failing to pursue relief

under Rule 60(b)(4) until . . . 11 months after [the defendant]

admits he was made aware of the judgment, [the defendant] sat on

his rights." (emphasis added)).

In Bouret-Echevarría, we concluded that a roughly

three-and-a-half-month period of delay after the appellants first

learned of the basis for a 60(b) motion was justified because the

appellants' attorney (1) "was actively attempting to

obtain . . . admission" in the jurisdiction, (2) was "seeking

local counsel to assist him" after existing counsel resigned, and

(3) encountered several major roadblocks to communication with

relevant parties. 784 F.3d at 44. Further, during the delay of

three-and-a-half months, the appellants were consistently making

"diligent efforts" towards "strengthen[ing] the basis for their

-10- motion." Id. By stark contrast, Amigos lay idle for a much longer

period after Flaherty attempted enforcement and did not "act[]

promptly when put on notice" nor make "diligent efforts" to file

any motion. Id. And we see no other extenuating circumstances to

explain the delay. Cf. United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1123

(1st Cir. 1987) (finding a Rule 60(b)(6) motion timely despite a

five-year delay because "the government lulled the [movant] into

delaying through its promises, . . . itself delayed [several]

years . . . in demanding payment, and [then] . . . breached its

obligations under the settlement agreement"). Put simply, Amigos

waited too long and without good cause.

Finally, we note that the parties disputed below whether

Flaherty was prejudiced by Amigos' delay in bringing its Rule

60(b)(4) motion. Flaherty argued that she would be prejudiced by

the revival of this litigation since critical evidence went

"missing" from Amigos' office, namely, an incident file Amigos had

generated about the underlying events of this case. Amigos argued

that Flaherty would not be prejudiced by reviving the U.S.

litigation since the litigation in Belize is still live. We need

not resolve this issue because, even assuming the prejudice to

Flaherty is minimal and consists primarily of delay and litigation

costs, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding

Amigos' delay unreasonable. The prejudice to the non-moving party

is but one part of the Rule 60(c)(1) analysis, and not the

-11- lodestar. See Boch Oldsmobile, 909 F.2d at 660-61 (describing

prejudice as one "relevant consideration[]," along with "whether

a good reason has been presented for failing to take action

sooner," while stating that what ultimately "constitutes

reasonable time . . . depends on the facts of [the] case"). Here,

where Amigos failed to provide any meaningful justification for

its delay, the district court could reasonably find the motion to

be untimely.

III.

For these reasons, we affirm.

-12-