Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Keiter, Stephens, Hurst, Gary & Shreaves

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedJanuary 13, 2022
Docket3:21-cv-00568
StatusUnknown

This text of Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Keiter, Stephens, Hurst, Gary & Shreaves (Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Keiter, Stephens, Hurst, Gary & Shreaves) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Keiter, Stephens, Hurst, Gary & Shreaves, (E.D. Va. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB, Plaintiff, Vv. Civil No. 3:21cv568 (DJN) KEITER, STEPHENS, HURST, GARY & SHREAVES, A Professional Corporation d/b/a Keiter CPA Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Flagstar Bank, FSB (‘‘Flagstar’”) brings this action against Defendant Keiter, Stephens, Hurst, Gary & Shreaves, A Professional Corporation d/b/a Keiter CPA (“Keiter’) alleging fraud, aiding and abetting fraud, and negligent misrepresentation arising from Keiter’s audits of non-party Live Well Financial, Inc. (“Live Well”) from 2015 to 2019. This matter now comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion” (ECF No. 9)) filed by Keiter. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion. Specifically, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion as to Count One of the Complaint (ECF No. 1). However, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion as to Counts Two and Three. I. BACKGROUND At this stage, the Court must accept as true the facts set forth in the Complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Against this backdrop, the Court accepts the following facts as alleged for purposes of resolving Defendant’s Motion.

A. Factual Background Plaintiff Flagstar’s claims arise out of non-party Live Well’s long-running fraud, and Defendant Keiter’s failure, as Live Well’s auditor, to detect that fraud over a period of almost five years. (Compl. J 1.) Before its collapse, Live Well, a Virginia-based corporation, originated and serviced reverse mortgages. (Compl. | 18.) From 2015 until 2019, Live Well portrayed itself as a thriving business when, in fact, it proved deeply insolvent. (Compl. { 1.) Live Well misrepresented its financial standing by fraudulently inflating the value of its largest asset, an illiquid bond portfolio. (Compl. { 1.) Each year in its annual audits, Keiter, a Virginia Professional Corporation, signed off on Live Well’s manufactured financial statements without detecting the fraud. (Compl. 2.) Keiter made those statements despite conducting “woefully deficient” audits with knowledge that third parties would rely on them. (Compl. ff 4, 12.) Indeed, Flagstar, a federally chartered bank based in Michigan, relied on those statements and loaned Live Well $70 million. (Compl. §§ 9-10.) When the underlying fraud came to light, resulting in the criminal convictions of three of its officers, Live Well went into bankruptcy, and Flagstar lost $30 million. (Compl. ff 1, 9-10.) 1. Live Well’s Underlying Fraud In 2014, Live Well began to acquire a large portfolio of illiquid bonds (the “Bonds”) that it used to raise money, including by pledging them as collateral for loans. (Compl. {J 19-20.) The Bonds did not have readily available market prices, because they constituted thinly traded assets. (Compl. { 21.) Thus, to represent their worth to lenders as collateral, Live Well hired a third-party pricing service to value the Bonds. (Compl. { 21.) However, instead of independently calculating the Bonds’ value, the pricing service agreed to publish Live Well’s own higher quotes verbatim. (Compl. ¥ 22.)

Live Well then grossly inflated the value of its Bonds portfolio, allowing it to borrow more money collateralized by the fraudulently inflated collateral. (Compl. J 23.) Occasionally, Live Well committed these frauds brazenly, including at least two occasions when it sent the pricing service enlarged valuations of “round number increases across a group of bonds, untethered to any analysis.” (Compl. J 24.) Live Well inflated the Bonds apart from market conditions to generate immediate cash as a “self-generating money machine.” (Compl. { 25.) 2. Flagstar’s Loan to Live Well In March 2017, Flagstar entered into a Loan and Security Agreement (the “Credit Facility” (ECF No. 10-5)) with Live Well collateralized by select bonds (the “Collateral Bonds”) from within the Bonds portfolio. (Compl. 27.) While Flagstar initially lent Live Well $50 million, the amount increased to $70 million by October 2017. (Compl. ff] 27-28.) The Credit Facility protected Flagstar from the risk of default by providing that the amount outstanding on the loan could not exceed 80% of the Collateral Bonds’ “market value.” (Compl. { 29.) Additionally, Flagstar would adjust the loan downward if the market value of the Collateral Bonds declined by 15%. (Credit Facility § 1.1 at 7.) The Credit Facility defined “market value” as the amount determined by Interactive Data Corporation (“IDC”) “or other independent third party reasonably acceptable to [Flagstar.]” (Compl. § 30; Credit Facility § 1.1 at 13.) U.S. Bank served as custodian of the Collateral Bonds and held them in a custodial account over which Flagstar had exclusive control. (Credit Facility § 1.1 at 9.) Flagstar had online access to the custodial account, including daily valuations of the Collateral Bonds in that account, and the right to demand additional documents and information on the Collateral Bonds

as a condition of closing, advances, or perfecting Flagstar’s security interest. (Credit Facility §§ 4.1.5, 4.1.6, 5.6.) As a condition of entering into the Credit Facility, Flagstar required Live Well to provide audited Financial Statements for 2015 and 2016, as well as annually thereafter. (Compl. 4] 31-32.) These statements for 2015 through 2018 (the “Financial Statements”) falsely represented that Live Well was solvent and held substantial shareholders’ equity. (Compl. { 33.) The Financial Statements also represented that the Bonds constituted Live Well’s largest asset and that their valuation came from a third-party pricing service. (Compl. { 34.) Additionally, each of the Financial Statements included a Report of Independent Accountants (the “Reports” (ECF Nos. 10-1 through 10-4)), prepared by Keiter, that gave Keiter’s “clean” opinion of Live Well’s Financial Statements. (Compl. { 37-41.) Keiter’s Reports represented that, in evaluating the Financial Statements, it reviewed Live Well’s internal controls and followed generally accepted accounting standards to ensure that the Financial Statements proved free from material misstatements. (Compl. ff 37, 39-40.) Flagstar relied on both the Financial Statements and the Reports in entering into and maintaining the Credit Facility with Live Well. (Compl. J] 30, 41.) 3. Keiter’s Deficient Audits However, Keiter’s audits violated the applicable standards and industry practices by simply rubber-stamping the valuations reported by Live Well management. (Compl. {{ 54-60.) When auditing illiquid assets such as the Bonds, the auditing standards set forth by the American Institute of CPAs require an auditor to exercise “professional skepticism.” (Compl. {{ 45-53 (citing American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Clarified Statements on Auditing Standards § 540).) The standards require that an auditor understand the entity and its

environment “to identify and assess the risks of material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error,” including by paying special attention to the entity’s internal controls. (Compl. 46.) Where the entity has employed a specialist, the auditor should analyze the specialist’s work, and consider hiring its own specialist if it does not have the expertise to evaluate the entity’s specialist’s work. (Compl. {§ 48-49, 52.) Accordingly, the standards did not allow Keiter to simply rely on IDC’s pricing valuations. (Compl. { 50.) Instead, they required Keiter to understand IDC’s work and assess whether ample evidence supported its valuations. (Compl. § 50.) Keiter violated these standards by failing to actually review the work conducted by IDC, the evidence underlying the Bonds’ valuations, or their pricings over time. (Compl.

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Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Keiter, Stephens, Hurst, Gary & Shreaves, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/flagstar-bank-fsb-v-keiter-stephens-hurst-gary-shreaves-vaed-2022.