8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11 GLENN FITE, et al., No. 2:21-CV-01633-DJC-AC
12 Plaintiffs, v. 13 ORDER SYSCO SACRAMENTO, INC., et al., 14 Defendants. 15
17 Plaintiffs bring this action against their former employer alleging Defendant’s
18 policies caused them to forgo legally mandated meal and rest breaks without
19 compensation. Plaintiffs allege various claims under the California Labor Code arising
20 from this unpaid off-the-clock work. Defendant now seeks judgment on the
21 pleadings, arguing Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted under section 301 of the Labor
22 Management Rela tions Act (“LMRA”) because they challenge, invoke, and require 23 interpretation of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that governed the terms 24 of Plaintiffs’ employment. Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed as 25 they have not yet exhausted the grievance procedures for these claims in the CBA. 26 As discussed further below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims do not require 27 any interpretation of the CBA’s terms and are thus not preempted by the LRMA. 28 Accordingly, the Court will deny judgment in Defendant’s favor. 1 BACKGROUND
2 Plaintiffs Glenn Fite and David Garcia allege they were employed by Defendant
3 Sysco Sacramento, Inc. from September 2017 to March 2018 and June 2015 to March
4 2022 respectively as “non-exempt, hourly workers entitled to all benefits of
5 employment under California law, including meal and rest breaks and minimum
6 wages.” (Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) (ECF No. 78) ¶¶ 3, 17–18.) Plaintiffs were
7 “responsible for filling orders by selecting product from within [Defendant’s]
8 warehouse, assembling and packing orders, and scanning those packaged orders for
9 distribution to [Defendant’s] customers.” (Id. ¶ 3.)
10 During their employment, Plaintiffs allege they and other employees were
11 subject to Defendant’s “common, company-wide minimum productivity and accuracy
12 standards” pursuant to which their “productivity was measured by the number of
13 packages they processed/scanned, and the extent to which they made errors.” (Id.
14 ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs allege that they “worked under the threat of discipline for failing to
15 meet those productivity and/or accuracy standards, and were thus pressured to work
16 off-the-clock and/or during meal and rest periods.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs allege that
17 Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of this unpaid work. (Id.)
18 Plaintiffs filed this class action on September 10, 2021, alleging six causes of
19 action in their operative Third Amended Complaint for (1) unfair competition under
20 California Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq.; (2) failure to pay
21 minimum wages under California Labor Code sections 1194, 1194.2, and 1197, and
22 Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order 7-2001; (3) failure to provide rest
23 periods under Labor Code section 226.7 and IWC Wage Order 7-2001; (4) failure to
24 provide meal periods under Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512, and IWC Wage
25 Order 7-2001; (5) failure to timely pay wages due at termination under Labor Code 26 sections 201, 202, and 203; and (6) failure to issue itemized employee wage 27 statements under Labor Code sections 226, 1174, and 1175. (Id. ¶¶ 39–86.) The 28 Court subsequently dismissed Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action pursuant to a stipulation 1 by the Parties. (ECF Nos. 88–89.) Thus, Plaintiffs proceed on their claims for unfair
2 competition, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to provide meal and rest periods,
3 and waiting time penalties only.
4 Defendant brought the pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on
5 February 14, 2025, seeking judgment as to each of Plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that
6 they are preempted by section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. (Mot. J. Pleadings
7 (ECF No. 91) at 1–2.) The Court held a hearing on April 3, 2025, with Daniel Keller
8 appearing for Plaintiffs, and James Holt appearing for Defendant. The Court took the
9 matter under submission.
10 LEGAL STANDARD
11 Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]fter the
12 pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for
13 judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion is evaluated
14 under the same legal standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Dworkin v. Hustler Mag.,
15 Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, the allegations of the non-moving
16 party must be accepted as true, while any allegations made by the moving party that
17 have been denied or contradicted are assumed to be false. MacDonald v. Grace
18 Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006). The facts are viewed in the light
19 most favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences are drawn in
20 favor of that party. Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353,
21 360 (9th Cir. 2005). “[J]udgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all
22 the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving party is
23 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Marshall Naify Revocable Tr. v. United States,
24 672 F.3d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fajardo v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d
25 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999)). Courts have discretion in appropriate cases to grant a Rule 26 12(c) motion with leave to amend, or to simply grant dismissal of the action instead of 27 entry of judgment. See Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 300 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (C.D. 28 Cal. 2004). 1 DISCUSSION
2 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s productivity and accuracy standards created a
3 work environment whereby Plaintiffs were forced to work off-the-clock and through
4 their meal and rest periods to avoid discipline. Defendants argue that each of
5 Plaintiffs’ claims arising from these allegations is preempted by section 301 of the
6 LMRA because Defendant is a party to a CBA with the International Brotherhood of
7 Teamsters Local No. 137 that governs the employment of all warehouse associates at
8 Defendant’s distribution center where Plaintiffs were employed. (Mot. J. Pleadings at
9 1.) Defendant argues that the CBA explicitly addresses meal and rest periods, wages,
10 discipline, and grievance and arbitration procedures, and that Plaintiffs’ claims require
11 the Court to interpret those CBA terms to resolve the claims, triggering preemption.
12 (Id. at 1–2.) Defendant further argues that, because the claims are preempted by the
13 LMRA, Plaintiffs are required to exhaust the grievance procedures provided in the
14 CBA prior to bringing suit. (Id. at 12.) However, “[g]iven that Plaintiffs have not
15 alleged [] that they exhausted the contractual remedies provided by the CBA . . . the
16 claims preempted by Section 301 must be dismissed as a matter of law because
17 Plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements of a viable Court action under
18 Section 301.” (Id. at 13.) Thus, Defendant asks that the Court grant judgment on
19 Plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety.
20 Section 301 of the LMRA provides that “[s]uits for violation of contracts between
21 an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the
22 United States.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). “Although [section] 301 contains no express
23 language of preemption, the Supreme Court has long interpreted the LMRA as
24 authorizing federal courts to create a uniform body of federal common law to
25 adjudicate disputes that arise out of labor contracts.” Curtis v. Irwin Indus., 913 F.3d 26 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019). “Thus, any suit ‘alleging a violation of a provision of a labor 27 contract must be brought under [section] 301 and be resolved by reference to federal 28 law.’” Id. at 1151–52 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985)). 1 The preemptive effect of section 301 extends to all “state law claims grounded in the
2 provisions of a CBA or requiring interpretation of a CBA.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan
3 Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016). “[I]f a state law claim ‘is either
4 grounded in the provisions of the labor contract or requires interpretation of it,’ the
5 dispute must be resolved through grievance and arbitration,” as defined in the CBA
6 governing the employment. Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 920 (9th Cir.
7 2018) (quoting Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007)).
8 Despite the strong preemptive force of section 301, “not every dispute
9 concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-
10 bargaining agreement, is preempted by [it].” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211. The Supreme
11 Court has stressed that section 301 cannot be “read broadly to pre-empt
12 nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law . . . .”
13 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994). Thus, claims alleging violations of
14 statutory rights to minimum wage, work hours, pay periods, and paid or unpaid leave
15 “will not necessarily be preempted, even when a plaintiff is covered by a CBA”
16 because those areas are “well within the traditional police power of the states.” Curtis,
17 913 F.3d at 1152.
18 “The demarcation between preempted claims and those that survive [section]
19 301’s reach is not . . . a line that lends itself to analytical precision.” Cramer v. Consol.
20 Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). However, the Ninth
21 Circuit has identified a two-part test to determine whether a plaintiff’s state law claims
22 are preempted by the LMRA. Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152. A defendant need only satisfy
23 one of the elements for preemption under the LMRA to apply. Burnside, 491 F.3d at
24 1059.
25 First, the state law claims are preempted by the LMRA if the asserted cause of 26 action involves a “right [that] exists solely as a result of the CBA . . . .” Id. The essential 27 inquiry is whether the claim seeks “purely to vindicate a right or duty created by the 28 CBA itself.” Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152 (citation omitted). 1 Second, LMRA preemption applies if a plaintiff’s state law claim is “substantially
2 dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at
3 1059. Claims are substantially dependent on a CBA when litigating the state law claim
4 requires interpretation of the CBA. Alaska Airlines, 898 F.3d at 920. Construed
5 narrowly, “requiring interpretation” includes only claims “where there is an active
6 dispute over the ‘meaning of the contract terms.’” Id. at 921 (quoting Livadas, 512 U.S.
7 at 124). “When the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare
8 fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law
9 litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at
10 124 (citation omitted). For example, “[a] collective-bargaining agreement may . . .
11 contain information such as rate of pay . . . that might be helpful in determining the
12 damages to which a worker prevailing in a state-law suit is entitled,” but that would not
13 mean the claim is preempted. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,
14 413 n.12 (1988). “Accordingly, a state law claim may avoid preemption if it does not
15 raise questions about the scope, meaning, or application of the CBA.” Curtis, 913
16 F.3d at 1153.
17 As discussed further below, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to satisfy
18 either step of the Burnside test, as Defendant neither argues Plaintiffs’ claims arise
19 from a right created solely by the CBA, nor persuasively demonstrates any of the
20 claims require interpretation of the CBA’s terms. Accordingly, the Court will not enter
21 judgment on any of Plaintiffs’ claims at this stage.
22 I. Meal and Rest Period Claims
23 Plaintiffs allege Defendant failed to provide rest and meal periods or
24 compensation in lieu thereof under Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512 and IWC
25 Wage Order 7-2001. (TAC ¶¶ 14, 53–70.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant 26 failed to provide Plaintiffs and other employees with rest periods of at least 10 minutes 27 per 4 hours worked and required Plaintiffs and other employees to work at least 5 28 hours without a 30-minute, uninterrupted meal period. (Id.) Defendant argues that 1 these claims are preempted by the LMRA because resolution of these claims requires
2 “substantial interpretation of Article 6, Section 2 of the CBA, which includes provisions
3 establishing the meal periods and rest breaks to which each represented job
4 classification is entitled and provisions establishing when such meal periods and rest
5 breaks are compensable.” (Mot. J. Pleadings at 7; see also Req. Judicial Notice, Ex. A
6 (“2015 CBA”) (ECF No. 92); Req. Judicial Notice, Ex. B (“2019 CBA”) (ECF No. 92).1)
7 The Court finds that these claims are not preempted. With respect to Plaintiffs’
8 meal break claim, the CBA provides that warehouse associates who work a shift in
9 excess of 6 hours shall be provided one 30-minute meal break, and associates who
10 work a shift in excess of 12 hours shall be provided a second 30-minute meal break.
11 (2015 CBA at 6; 2019 CBA at 7.) The CBA further provides that “[a]ll warehouse
12 associates agree to waive their unpaid meal period for any shifts between five hours
13 and no more than six hours” and “agree to waive their second unpaid meal period for
14 any shifts that are in excess of ten (10) hours and no more than twelve (12) hours.” (Id.)
15 Defendant argues that this claim is preempted as resolution of the claim will require
16 substantial interpretation “to determine whether the Teamsters and [Defendant]
17 negotiated a California-compliant meal break waiver or whether Plaintiffs and the
18 putative class were entitled to the claimed meal breaks.” (Mot. J. Pleadings at 7–8.)
20 1 Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of: (1) a CBA by and between Defendant and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 137, effective November 21, 2015, through 21 November 23, 2019 (“2015 CBA”); and (2) a CBA by and between Defendant and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 137, effective November 24, 2019, through November 22, 2025 22 (“2019 CBA”). (Req. Judicial Notice (ECF No. 92) at 2.) The Court will grant this request. If a court “goes beyond the pleadings to resolve an issue,” a judgment on the pleadings is not appropriate and 23 “such a proceeding must properly be treated as a motion for summary judgment.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, a 24 district court may “consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by referen ce in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion 25 . . . into a motion for summary judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts regularly take judicial notice of collective bargaining agreements when the documents are “not 26 subject to reasonable dispute.” See, e.g., Densmore v. Mission Linen Supply, 164 F. Supp. 3d 1180, 1187 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Here, Plaintiffs 27 do not challenge the authenticity of the CBAs or that these agreements governed their employment with Defendant. (See generally Opp’n Mot. J. Pleadings (ECF No. 93).) Thus, the Court takes judicial 28 notice of both the 2015 and 2019 CBAs. 1 The Court disagrees. First, Plaintiffs base their meal break claim on California
2 law, not the provisions of the CBA. In particular, Labor Code section 512(a) provides:
3 An employer shall not employ an employee for a work period of more than five hours per day without providing the 4 employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total work period per day of the employee 5 is no more than six hours, the meal period may be waived by
6 mutual consent of both the employer and employee. An employer shall not employ an employee for a work period of 7 more than 10 hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes, 8 except that if the total hours worked is no more than 12
9 hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee only if the first 10 meal period was not waived.
12 Lab. Code § 512(a). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d
13 1071 (9th Cir. 2005),
14 The right to meal periods applies to signatories of collective bargaining ag reements and constitutes a nonnegotiable 15 right under California state law. Because the employees
16 have based their meal period claim “on the protection afforded them by California state law, without any reference 17 to expectations or duties created by the[ir] collective bargaining agreement,” . . . the claim is not subject to 18 preemption.
20 Id. at 1082 (citation omitted). That same logic applies here. That the CBA also
21 includes provisions that entitle employees to meal periods is of no import. As the
22 Supreme Court explained in Lingle, even if “dispute resolution pursuant to a [CBA], on
23 one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same
24 set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the
25 agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for [section] 301 26 preemption purposes.” 486 U.S. at 409–10. The Parties do not argue that there is any 27 dispute over the meaning or terms of the meal break schedule set forth in the CBA, 28 apart from the meal break waiver for 6- and 12-hour shifts, and the schedule appears 1 clear on its face. Thus, while the Court may need to reference the schedule in the CBA
2 while resolving Plaintiffs’ claims, it is not clear that the Court will need to interpret any
3 aspect of the schedule to do so.
4 Second, while the Parties dispute whether the CBA contains a valid meal break
5 waiver for 6- and 12-hour shifts, resolution of that dispute turns on analysis of
6 California law, not on any interpretation of the CBA provisions. Such waiver is
7 permitted under section 512(a). See Lab. Code § 512(a) (“[I]f the total work period per
8 day of the employee is no more than six hours, the meal period may be waived by
9 mutual consent of both the employer and employee.”); id. (“[I]f the total hours worked
10 is no more than 12 hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent
11 of the employer and the employee only if the first meal period was not waived.”).
12 Plaintiffs contend there was no valid meal break waiver here because “there is no
13 statutory exemption allowing for waiver of such rights through collective bargaining.”
14 (Opp’n Mot. J. Pleadings (ECF No. 93) at 2; see also TAC ¶ 67 (“[T] there was no
15 mutual waiver of meal periods and employees worked for periods of more than five
16 hours without an off-duty meal period of at least 30 minutes.”).) Defendant argues
17 Plaintiffs’ position is incorrect because “[i]t is well settled that a union may lawfully
18 waive statutory rights of represented employees in a collective bargaining
19 agreement.” Ehret v. WinCo Foods, LLC, 26 Cal. App. 5th 1, 5 (2018) (quoting Am.
20 Freight Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Rels. Bd., 722 F.2d 828, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1983)) (holding
21 that a CBA lawfully waived the employees’ statutory right under section 512(a) to a
22 meal period when working more than five hours but not more than six hours on
23 grounds that the waiver was clear and unmistakable, as required by federal law).
24 Thus, the Parties do not dispute the language of the CBA waiver provision, only that a
25 union may lawfully waive meal breaks. However, under the second prong of the 26 Burnside test, “claims are only preempted to the extent there is an active dispute over 27 the meaning of contract terms.” Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1153 (internal quotation marks 28 1 and citation omitted). Defendant has failed to demonstrate there is an active dispute
2 over the terms of the CBA sufficient to meet the Burnside standard.
3 Similarly, with respect to Plaintiffs’ rest break claim, the CBA provides for 15-
4 minute rest periods based on whether the employee had a “5–8 Hour Schedule” or a
5 “4–10 Hour Schedule.” (2015 CBA at 6; 2019 CBA at 7.) For example, an employee
6 on the 5–8 Hour Schedule would be entitled to one 15-minute break after 3.5 hours
7 worked, two 15-minute breaks after 6 hours work, and three 15-minute breaks after
8 9.75 hours worked, etc., while an employee on the 4–10 Hour Schedule would be
9 entitled to one 15-minute break after 3.5 hours worked, two 15-minute breaks after 6
10 hours work, and three 15-minute breaks after 10 hours worked, etc. (Id.) Defendant
11 argues that Plaintiffs’ claim is premised on an entitlement to different rest breaks than
12 those negotiated in the CBA, resolution of which “necessarily requires interpretation
13 of the agreement” as the Court will need to analyze “whether the CBA’s rest break
14 provisions were followed, whether they comply with California law, and whether any
15 deviations from those provisions were contractually permissible,” questions which
16 “trigger preemption under Section 301 of the LMRA.” (Mot. J. Pleadings at 8.)
17 The Court is unpersuaded. First, as with Plaintiffs’ meal break claim, Plaintiffs’
18 claimed entitlement to rest periods of at least 10 minutes per 4 hours worked derives
19 from nonnegotiable rights provided under California law, not the CBA. See IWC
20 Wage Order 7-2001 § 12(A) (“Every employer shall authorize and permit all
21 employees to take rest periods, which . . . shall be based on the total hours worked
22 daily at the rate of ten (10) minutes net rest time per four (4) hours or major fraction
23 thereof.”); see also Zavala v. Scott Bros. Dairy, 143 Cal. App. 4th 585, 594 (2006) (rest
24 breaks are a non-waivable state-mandated “minimum labor standard”).
25 Second, Defendant does not suggest that there is any dispute regarding the 26 rest break schedule set forth in the CBA. At most, Defendant argues that because the 27 CBA guarantees employees more rest periods than provided for under California law, 28 the Court will have to refer to the CBA’s rest break schedule in resolving Plaintiffs’ 1 claims. This falls short of the requisite showing to find interpretation is necessary to
2 resolve the claims; “a court’s need to ‘review’ or ‘analyze’ a CBA is not the same as
3 ‘interpreting’ its text, as interpretation implies discordance over the meaning of a term
4 that requires authoritative explication.” Cuellar-Ramirez v. US Foods, Inc., No. 16-cv-
5 00085-RS, 2016 WL 1238603, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2016). Defendant does not
6 point to any specific terms that are undefined, disputed, ambiguous, or otherwise
7 require some interpretation. Cf., e.g., Marquez v. Toll Glob. Forwarding, 804 F. App’x
8 679, 681 (9th Cir. 2020) (plaintiff’s rest break claims were preempted under step two
9 of the Burnside test because the parties disputed the meaning of the terms “permit,”
10 “load,” “unattended,” and “leave a load” in a CBA, and "[d]etermining the meaning of
11 industry terms is a form of interpretation”). That Defendant may be required under
12 the CBA to provide more or longer rest breaks than required by California law does
13 not impact the Court’s consideration of whether Defendant has provided Plaintiffs with
14 the legally mandated minimum. In short, Defendant has failed to show anything more
15 than a “hypothetical connection between the claim and the terms of the CBA.”
16 Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691.
17 At the hearing, Defendant also argued that, because Plaintiffs allege they were
18 forced to miss meal and rest breaks due to Defendant’s onerous productivity and
19 accuracy standards, resolution of those claims will necessarily turn on interpretation of
20 Article 4 of the CBA, which sets forth Defendant’s management rights, including their
21 right to set performance standards for employees. The Court disagrees. First,
22 Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendant was legally permitted to set performance
23 standards for its employees under the CBA. Rather, they allege those standards
24 caused them and other employees to miss their meal and rest breaks. Defendant
25 does not argue that Article 4 of the CBA excused Defendant’s compliance with the 26 meal and rest break provisions of California law. Second, while Article 4 states that 27 Defendant may set performance standards for its employees, it does not detail what 28 those standards are. The Parties will presumably need to reference documents and 1 testimony other than the CBA to establish what, exactly, Defendant’s objectionable
2 standards were. Therefore, it appears unlikely the Court will need to reference, let
3 alone interpret, Article 4 in adjudicating Plaintiffs’ claims.
4 Finally, Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ meal and rest break claims are subject to
5 preemption because the CBA contains a grievance procedure for disputes concerning
6 the CBA’s provisions. (Mot. J. Pleadings at 8–9.) However, as held above, Plaintiffs’
7 claims arise under California law, not the CBA. Further, in order for a grievance or
8 arbitration provision to implicate preemption, the “union-negotiated waiver of
9 employees’ statutory right to a judicial forum” must be “clear and unmistakable” and
10 directly reference the relevant statutes at issue. Munoz v. Atl. Express of L.A., Inc., No.
11 CV 12–6074–GHK (FMOx), 2012 WL 5349408, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2012). Here,
12 the CBA grievance provision clearly states that “[t]his provision shall not constitute a
13 waiver of any Associate’s right, under federal or state law, to pursue . . . statutory
14 claims for violation of federal or state wage and hour law through the judicial system
15 or other available means.” (2015 CBA at 13; 2019 CBA at 14.) Thus, there has been
16 no waiver of Plaintiffs’ right to litigate their claims.
17 Plaintiffs’ meal and rest break claims are not preempted by the LMRA.
18 II. Minimum Wage Claim
19 Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant failed to pay them their minimum wages for
20 all hours worked, as Defendant’s productivity and accuracy standards caused Plaintiffs
21 “to work ‘off the clock’ time, including during meal periods, without compensation.”
22 (TAC ¶¶ 43–52.) Defendant argues that this claim is preempted by the LMRA as it is
23 predicated on Plaintiffs’ claims they were not provided meal and rest breaks which are
24 preempted. (Mot. J. Pleadings at 9.) Defendant also argues that the CBA establishes
25 the wage rates for warehouse associates, setting base hourly wage rates above the 26 state mandated minimum wage, which “reinforces the need to reference the 27 agreement because any challenge to the adequacy of wages necessarily requires 28 interpretation of the CBA, reinforcing LMRA preemption.” (Id. at 10.) 1 As held above, Plaintiffs’ meal and rest break claims are not preempted by the
2 LRMA. See Section I supra. Thus, to the extent Defendant contends the minimum
3 wage claim is preempted based on those claims, Defendant’s argument falls flat.
4 Further, Defendant has failed to demonstrate there is any dispute over the
5 minimum wage scale set forth in the CBA sufficient to preempt that claim. While the
6 Court may need to reference the wages established by the CBA while resolving
7 Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendant has not shown the Court will need to interpret those wage
8 terms when determining whether Plaintiffs were paid a minimum wage under
9 California law. See Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108
10 (9th Cir. 2000) (a right is “substantially dependent” on analyzing a CBA when the court
11 must “interpret” terms of a CBA to resolve the dispute; merely “referring” or “looking”
12 to the CBA is insufficient to trigger preemption under step two of the Burnside test).
13 To the extent the CBA may eventually need to be interpreted for Plaintiffs’ damages
14 computation, that is no reason to hold that Plaintiffs’ claim is preempted now. As
15 explained in Burnside, if “some dispute we cannot now foresee will arise in the course
16 of computing damages that will require the interpretation of the CBAs,” then “the
17 district court will be able to devise processes to preserve the preeminent role of the
18 CBAs’ dispute resolution processes to address the discrete dispute then arising.” 491
19 F.3d at 1074 n.19.
20 Thus, Plaintiffs’ minimum wage claim is not preempted under the LMRA.
21 III. Failure to Timely Pay Wages Upon Termination and Unfair Competition
22 Claims
23 Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to timely pay wages
24 upon termination and unfair competition are preempted by the LMRA as they are
25 predicated on Plaintiffs’ meal period, rest period, and minimum wage claims. (Mot. J. 26 Pleadings at 11–12.) As held above, Plaintiffs’ underlying claims are not preempted. 27 See Sections I–II supra. Therefore, the waiting time and unfair competition claims are 28 also not preempted. 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant Sysco 3 | Sacramento, Inc.'s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 91). 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 | Dated: _ April 23, 2025 Donel J CDbnetto Hon. Daniel alabretta / UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 2 | DJC4 - Fite21¢v1633.MotJudgmentPleadings 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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