Fite v. Sysco Sacramento, Inc.

Opinion

GLENN FITE, et al., No. 2:21-CV-01633-DJC-AC

Plaintiffs, v. SYSCO SACRAMENTO, INC., et al., Defendants.

Plaintiffs bring this action against their former employer alleging Defendant’s

policies caused them to forgo legally mandated meal and rest breaks without

compensation. Plaintiffs allege various claims under the California Labor Code arising

from this unpaid off-the-clock work. Defendant now seeks judgment on the

pleadings, arguing Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted under section 301 of the Labor

Management Rela tions Act (“LMRA”) because they challenge, invoke, and require interpretation of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that governed the terms of Plaintiffs’ employment. Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed as they have not yet exhausted the grievance procedures for these claims in the CBA. As discussed further below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims do not require any interpretation of the CBA’s terms and are thus not preempted by the LRMA. Accordingly, the Court will deny judgment in Defendant’s favor.

Plaintiffs Glenn Fite and David Garcia allege they were employed by Defendant

Sysco Sacramento, Inc. from September 2017 to March 2018 and June 2015 to March

2022 respectively as “non-exempt, hourly workers entitled to all benefits of

employment under California law, including meal and rest breaks and minimum

wages.” (Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) (ECF No. 78) ¶¶ 3, 17–18.) Plaintiffs were

“responsible for filling orders by selecting product from within [Defendant’s]

warehouse, assembling and packing orders, and scanning those packaged orders for

distribution to [Defendant’s] customers.” (Id. ¶ 3.)

During their employment, Plaintiffs allege they and other employees were

subject to Defendant’s “common, company-wide minimum productivity and accuracy

standards” pursuant to which their “productivity was measured by the number of

packages they processed/scanned, and the extent to which they made errors.” (Id.

¶ 4.) Plaintiffs allege that they “worked under the threat of discipline for failing to

meet those productivity and/or accuracy standards, and were thus pressured to work

off-the-clock and/or during meal and rest periods.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs allege that

Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of this unpaid work. (Id.)

Plaintiffs filed this class action on September 10, 2021, alleging six causes of

action in their operative Third Amended Complaint for (1) unfair competition under

California Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq.; (2) failure to pay

minimum wages under California Labor Code sections 1194, 1194.2, and 1197, and

Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order 7-2001; (3) failure to provide rest

periods under Labor Code section 226.7 and IWC Wage Order 7-2001; (4) failure to

provide meal periods under Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512, and IWC Wage

Order 7-2001; (5) failure to timely pay wages due at termination under Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 203; and (6) failure to issue itemized employee wage statements under Labor Code sections 226, 1174, and 1175. (Id. ¶¶ 39–86.) The Court subsequently dismissed Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action pursuant to a stipulation by the Parties. (ECF Nos. 88–89.) Thus, Plaintiffs proceed on their claims for unfair

competition, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to provide meal and rest periods,

and waiting time penalties only.

Defendant brought the pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on

February 14, 2025, seeking judgment as to each of Plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that

they are preempted by section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. (Mot. J. Pleadings

(ECF No. 91) at 1–2.) The Court held a hearing on April 3, 2025, with Daniel Keller

appearing for Plaintiffs, and James Holt appearing for Defendant. The Court took the

matter under submission.

Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]fter the

pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for

judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion is evaluated

under the same legal standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Dworkin v. Hustler Mag.,

Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, the allegations of the non-moving

party must be accepted as true, while any allegations made by the moving party that

have been denied or contradicted are assumed to be false. MacDonald v. Grace

Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006). The facts are viewed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences are drawn in

favor of that party. Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353,

360 (9th Cir. 2005). “[J]udgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all

the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Marshall Naify Revocable Tr. v. United States,

672 F.3d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fajardo v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d

698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999)). Courts have discretion in appropriate cases to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend, or to simply grant dismissal of the action instead of entry of judgment. See Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 300 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s productivity and accuracy standards created a

work environment whereby Plaintiffs were forced to work off-the-clock and through

their meal and rest periods to avoid discipline. Defendants argue that each of

Plaintiffs’ claims arising from these allegations is preempted by section 301 of the

LMRA because Defendant is a party to a CBA with the International Brotherhood of

Teamsters Local No. 137 that governs the employment of all warehouse associates at

Defendant’s distribution center where Plaintiffs were employed. (Mot. J. Pleadings at

1.) Defendant argues that the CBA explicitly addresses meal and rest periods, wages,

discipline, and grievance and arbitration procedures, and that Plaintiffs’ claims require

the Court to interpret those CBA terms to resolve the claims, triggering preemption.

(Id. at 1–2.) Defendant further argues that, because the claims are preempted by the

LMRA, Plaintiffs are required to exhaust the grievance procedures provided in the

CBA prior to bringing suit. (Id. at 12.) However, “[g]iven that Plaintiffs have not

alleged [] that they exhausted the contractual remedies provided by the CBA . . . the

claims preempted by Section 301 must be dismissed as a matter of law because

Plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements of a viable Court action under

Section 301.” (Id. at 13.) Thus, Defendant asks that the Court grant judgment on

Plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety.

Section 301 of the LMRA provides that “[s]uits for violation of contracts between

an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the

United States.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). “Although [section] 301 contains no express

language of preemption, the Supreme Court has long interpreted the LMRA as

authorizing federal courts to create a uniform body of federal common law to

adjudicate disputes that arise out of labor contracts.” Curtis v. Irwin Indus., 913 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019). “Thus, any suit ‘alleging a violation of a provision of a labor contract must be brought under [section] 301 and be resolved by reference to federal law.’” Id. at 1151–52 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985)). The preemptive effect of section 301 extends to all “state law claims grounded in the

provisions of a CBA or requiring interpretation of a CBA.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan

Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016). “[I]f a state law claim ‘is either

grounded in the provisions of the labor contract or requires interpretation of it,’ the

dispute must be resolved through grievance and arbitration,” as defined in the CBA

governing the employment. Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 920 (9th Cir.

2018) (quoting Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007)).

Despite the strong preemptive force of section 301, “not every dispute

concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-

bargaining agreement, is preempted by [it].” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211. The Supreme

Court has stressed that section 301 cannot be “read broadly to pre-empt

nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law . . . .”

Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994). Thus, claims alleging violations of

statutory rights to minimum wage, work hours, pay periods, and paid or unpaid leave

“will not necessarily be preempted, even when a plaintiff is covered by a CBA”

because those areas are “well within the traditional police power of the states.” Curtis,

913 F.3d at 1152.

“The demarcation between preempted claims and those that survive [section]

301’s reach is not . . . a line that lends itself to analytical precision.” Cramer v. Consol.

Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). However, the Ninth

Circuit has identified a two-part test to determine whether a plaintiff’s state law claims

are preempted by the LMRA. Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152. A defendant need only satisfy

one of the elements for preemption under the LMRA to apply. Burnside, 491 F.3d at

1059.

First, the state law claims are preempted by the LMRA if the asserted cause of action involves a “right [that] exists solely as a result of the CBA . . . .” Id. The essential inquiry is whether the claim seeks “purely to vindicate a right or duty created by the CBA itself.” Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152 (citation omitted). Second, LMRA preemption applies if a plaintiff’s state law claim is “substantially

dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at

1059. Claims are substantially dependent on a CBA when litigating the state law claim

requires interpretation of the CBA. Alaska Airlines, 898 F.3d at 920. Construed

narrowly, “requiring interpretation” includes only claims “where there is an active

dispute over the ‘meaning of the contract terms.’” Id. at 921 (quoting Livadas, 512 U.S.

at 124). “When the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare

fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law

litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at

124 (citation omitted). For example, “[a] collective-bargaining agreement may . . .

contain information such as rate of pay . . . that might be helpful in determining the

damages to which a worker prevailing in a state-law suit is entitled,” but that would not

mean the claim is preempted. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,

413 n.12 (1988). “Accordingly, a state law claim may avoid preemption if it does not

raise questions about the scope, meaning, or application of the CBA.” Curtis, 913

F.3d at 1153.

As discussed further below, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to satisfy

either step of the Burnside test, as Defendant neither argues Plaintiffs’ claims arise

from a right created solely by the CBA, nor persuasively demonstrates any of the

claims require interpretation of the CBA’s terms. Accordingly, the Court will not enter

judgment on any of Plaintiffs’ claims at this stage.

I. Meal and Rest Period Claims

Plaintiffs allege Defendant failed to provide rest and meal periods or

compensation in lieu thereof under Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512 and IWC

Wage Order 7-2001. (TAC ¶¶ 14, 53–70.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to provide Plaintiffs and other employees with rest periods of at least 10 minutes per 4 hours worked and required Plaintiffs and other employees to work at least 5 hours without a 30-minute, uninterrupted meal period. (Id.) Defendant argues that these claims are preempted by the LMRA because resolution of these claims requires

“substantial interpretation of Article 6, Section 2 of the CBA, which includes provisions

establishing the meal periods and rest breaks to which each represented job

classification is entitled and provisions establishing when such meal periods and rest

breaks are compensable.” (Mot. J. Pleadings at 7; see also Req. Judicial Notice, Ex. A

(“2015 CBA”) (ECF No. 92); Req. Judicial Notice, Ex. B (“2019 CBA”) (ECF No. 92).1)

The Court finds that these claims are not preempted. With respect to Plaintiffs’

meal break claim, the CBA provides that warehouse associates who work a shift in

excess of 6 hours shall be provided one 30-minute meal break, and associates who

work a shift in excess of 12 hours shall be provided a second 30-minute meal break.

(2015 CBA at 6; 2019 CBA at 7.) The CBA further provides that “[a]ll warehouse

associates agree to waive their unpaid meal period for any shifts between five hours

and no more than six hours” and “agree to waive their second unpaid meal period for

any shifts that are in excess of ten (10) hours and no more than twelve (12) hours.” (Id.)

Defendant argues that this claim is preempted as resolution of the claim will require

substantial interpretation “to determine whether the Teamsters and [Defendant]

negotiated a California-compliant meal break waiver or whether Plaintiffs and the

putative class were entitled to the claimed meal breaks.” (Mot. J. Pleadings at 7–8.)

1 Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of: (1) a CBA by and between Defendant and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 137, effective November 21, 2015, through November 23, 2019 (“2015 CBA”); and (2) a CBA by and between Defendant and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 137, effective November 24, 2019, through November 22, 2025 (“2019 CBA”). (Req. Judicial Notice (ECF No. 92) at 2.) The Court will grant this request. If a court “goes beyond the pleadings to resolve an issue,” a judgment on the pleadings is not appropriate and “such a proceeding must properly be treated as a motion for summary judgment.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, a district court may “consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by referen ce in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion . . . into a motion for summary judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts regularly take judicial notice of collective bargaining agreements when the documents are “not subject to reasonable dispute.” See, e.g., Densmore v. Mission Linen Supply, 164 F. Supp. 3d 1180, 1187 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Here, Plaintiffs do not challenge the authenticity of the CBAs or that these agreements governed their employment with Defendant. (See generally Opp’n Mot. J. Pleadings (ECF No. 93).) Thus, the Court takes judicial notice of both the 2015 and 2019 CBAs. The Court disagrees. First, Plaintiffs base their meal break claim on California

law, not the provisions of the CBA. In particular, Labor Code section 512(a) provides:

An employer shall not employ an employee for a work period of more than five hours per day without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total work period per day of the employee is no more than six hours, the meal period may be waived by

mutual consent of both the employer and employee. An employer shall not employ an employee for a work period of more than 10 hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total hours worked is no more than 12

hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee only if the first meal period was not waived.

Lab. Code § 512(a). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d

1071 (9th Cir. 2005),

The right to meal periods applies to signatories of collective bargaining ag reements and constitutes a nonnegotiable right under California state law. Because the employees

have based their meal period claim “on the protection afforded them by California state law, without any reference to expectations or duties created by the[ir] collective bargaining agreement,” . . . the claim is not subject to preemption.

Id. at 1082 (citation omitted). That same logic applies here. That the CBA also

includes provisions that entitle employees to meal periods is of no import. As the

Supreme Court explained in Lingle, even if “dispute resolution pursuant to a [CBA], on

one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same

set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the

agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for [section] 301 preemption purposes.” 486 U.S. at 409–10. The Parties do not argue that there is any dispute over the meaning or terms of the meal break schedule set forth in the CBA, apart from the meal break waiver for 6- and 12-hour shifts, and the schedule appears clear on its face. Thus, while the Court may need to reference the schedule in the CBA

while resolving Plaintiffs’ claims, it is not clear that the Court will need to interpret any

aspect of the schedule to do so.

Second, while the Parties dispute whether the CBA contains a valid meal break

waiver for 6- and 12-hour shifts, resolution of that dispute turns on analysis of

California law, not on any interpretation of the CBA provisions. Such waiver is

permitted under section 512(a). See Lab. Code § 512(a) (“[I]f the total work period per

day of the employee is no more than six hours, the meal period may be waived by

mutual consent of both the employer and employee.”); id. (“[I]f the total hours worked

is no more than 12 hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent

of the employer and the employee only if the first meal period was not waived.”).

Plaintiffs contend there was no valid meal break waiver here because “there is no

statutory exemption allowing for waiver of such rights through collective bargaining.”

(Opp’n Mot. J. Pleadings (ECF No. 93) at 2; see also TAC ¶ 67 (“[T] there was no

mutual waiver of meal periods and employees worked for periods of more than five

hours without an off-duty meal period of at least 30 minutes.”).) Defendant argues

Plaintiffs’ position is incorrect because “[i]t is well settled that a union may lawfully

waive statutory rights of represented employees in a collective bargaining

agreement.” Ehret v. WinCo Foods, LLC, 26 Cal. App. 5th 1, 5 (2018) (quoting Am.

Freight Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Rels. Bd., 722 F.2d 828, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1983)) (holding

that a CBA lawfully waived the employees’ statutory right under section 512(a) to a

meal period when working more than five hours but not more than six hours on

grounds that the waiver was clear and unmistakable, as required by federal law).

Thus, the Parties do not dispute the language of the CBA waiver provision, only that a

union may lawfully waive meal breaks. However, under the second prong of the Burnside test, “claims are only preempted to the extent there is an active dispute over the meaning of contract terms.” Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1153 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant has failed to demonstrate there is an active dispute

over the terms of the CBA sufficient to meet the Burnside standard.

Similarly, with respect to Plaintiffs’ rest break claim, the CBA provides for 15-

minute rest periods based on whether the employee had a “5–8 Hour Schedule” or a

“4–10 Hour Schedule.” (2015 CBA at 6; 2019 CBA at 7.) For example, an employee

on the 5–8 Hour Schedule would be entitled to one 15-minute break after 3.5 hours

worked, two 15-minute breaks after 6 hours work, and three 15-minute breaks after

9.75 hours worked, etc., while an employee on the 4–10 Hour Schedule would be

entitled to one 15-minute break after 3.5 hours worked, two 15-minute breaks after 6

hours work, and three 15-minute breaks after 10 hours worked, etc. (Id.) Defendant

argues that Plaintiffs’ claim is premised on an entitlement to different rest breaks than

those negotiated in the CBA, resolution of which “necessarily requires interpretation

of the agreement” as the Court will need to analyze “whether the CBA’s rest break

provisions were followed, whether they comply with California law, and whether any

deviations from those provisions were contractually permissible,” questions which

“trigger preemption under Section 301 of the LMRA.” (Mot. J. Pleadings at 8.)

The Court is unpersuaded. First, as with Plaintiffs’ meal break claim, Plaintiffs’

claimed entitlement to rest periods of at least 10 minutes per 4 hours worked derives

from nonnegotiable rights provided under California law, not the CBA. See IWC

Wage Order 7-2001 § 12(A) (“Every employer shall authorize and permit all

employees to take rest periods, which . . . shall be based on the total hours worked

daily at the rate of ten (10) minutes net rest time per four (4) hours or major fraction

thereof.”); see also Zavala v. Scott Bros. Dairy, 143 Cal. App. 4th 585, 594 (2006) (rest

breaks are a non-waivable state-mandated “minimum labor standard”).

Second, Defendant does not suggest that there is any dispute regarding the rest break schedule set forth in the CBA. At most, Defendant argues that because the CBA guarantees employees more rest periods than provided for under California law, the Court will have to refer to the CBA’s rest break schedule in resolving Plaintiffs’ claims. This falls short of the requisite showing to find interpretation is necessary to

resolve the claims; “a court’s need to ‘review’ or ‘analyze’ a CBA is not the same as

‘interpreting’ its text, as interpretation implies discordance over the meaning of a term

that requires authoritative explication.” Cuellar-Ramirez v. US Foods, Inc., No. 16-cv-

00085-RS, 2016 WL 1238603, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2016). Defendant does not

point to any specific terms that are undefined, disputed, ambiguous, or otherwise

require some interpretation. Cf., e.g., Marquez v. Toll Glob. Forwarding, 804 F. App’x

679, 681 (9th Cir. 2020) (plaintiff’s rest break claims were preempted under step two

of the Burnside test because the parties disputed the meaning of the terms “permit,”

“load,” “unattended,” and “leave a load” in a CBA, and "[d]etermining the meaning of

industry terms is a form of interpretation”). That Defendant may be required under

the CBA to provide more or longer rest breaks than required by California law does

not impact the Court’s consideration of whether Defendant has provided Plaintiffs with

the legally mandated minimum. In short, Defendant has failed to show anything more

than a “hypothetical connection between the claim and the terms of the CBA.”

Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691.

At the hearing, Defendant also argued that, because Plaintiffs allege they were

forced to miss meal and rest breaks due to Defendant’s onerous productivity and

accuracy standards, resolution of those claims will necessarily turn on interpretation of

Article 4 of the CBA, which sets forth Defendant’s management rights, including their

right to set performance standards for employees. The Court disagrees. First,

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendant was legally permitted to set performance

standards for its employees under the CBA. Rather, they allege those standards

caused them and other employees to miss their meal and rest breaks. Defendant

does not argue that Article 4 of the CBA excused Defendant’s compliance with the meal and rest break provisions of California law. Second, while Article 4 states that Defendant may set performance standards for its employees, it does not detail what those standards are. The Parties will presumably need to reference documents and testimony other than the CBA to establish what, exactly, Defendant’s objectionable

standards were. Therefore, it appears unlikely the Court will need to reference, let

alone interpret, Article 4 in adjudicating Plaintiffs’ claims.

Finally, Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ meal and rest break claims are subject to

preemption because the CBA contains a grievance procedure for disputes concerning

the CBA’s provisions. (Mot. J. Pleadings at 8–9.) However, as held above, Plaintiffs’

claims arise under California law, not the CBA. Further, in order for a grievance or

arbitration provision to implicate preemption, the “union-negotiated waiver of

employees’ statutory right to a judicial forum” must be “clear and unmistakable” and

directly reference the relevant statutes at issue. Munoz v. Atl. Express of L.A., Inc., No.

CV 12–6074–GHK (FMOx), 2012 WL 5349408, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2012). Here,

the CBA grievance provision clearly states that “[t]his provision shall not constitute a

waiver of any Associate’s right, under federal or state law, to pursue . . . statutory

claims for violation of federal or state wage and hour law through the judicial system

or other available means.” (2015 CBA at 13; 2019 CBA at 14.) Thus, there has been

no waiver of Plaintiffs’ right to litigate their claims.

Plaintiffs’ meal and rest break claims are not preempted by the LMRA.

II. Minimum Wage Claim

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant failed to pay them their minimum wages for

all hours worked, as Defendant’s productivity and accuracy standards caused Plaintiffs

“to work ‘off the clock’ time, including during meal periods, without compensation.”

(TAC ¶¶ 43–52.) Defendant argues that this claim is preempted by the LMRA as it is

predicated on Plaintiffs’ claims they were not provided meal and rest breaks which are

preempted. (Mot. J. Pleadings at 9.) Defendant also argues that the CBA establishes

the wage rates for warehouse associates, setting base hourly wage rates above the state mandated minimum wage, which “reinforces the need to reference the agreement because any challenge to the adequacy of wages necessarily requires interpretation of the CBA, reinforcing LMRA preemption.” (Id. at 10.) As held above, Plaintiffs’ meal and rest break claims are not preempted by the

LRMA. See Section I supra. Thus, to the extent Defendant contends the minimum

wage claim is preempted based on those claims, Defendant’s argument falls flat.

Further, Defendant has failed to demonstrate there is any dispute over the

minimum wage scale set forth in the CBA sufficient to preempt that claim. While the

Court may need to reference the wages established by the CBA while resolving

Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendant has not shown the Court will need to interpret those wage

terms when determining whether Plaintiffs were paid a minimum wage under

California law. See Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108

(9th Cir. 2000) (a right is “substantially dependent” on analyzing a CBA when the court

must “interpret” terms of a CBA to resolve the dispute; merely “referring” or “looking”

to the CBA is insufficient to trigger preemption under step two of the Burnside test).

To the extent the CBA may eventually need to be interpreted for Plaintiffs’ damages

computation, that is no reason to hold that Plaintiffs’ claim is preempted now. As

explained in Burnside, if “some dispute we cannot now foresee will arise in the course

of computing damages that will require the interpretation of the CBAs,” then “the

district court will be able to devise processes to preserve the preeminent role of the

CBAs’ dispute resolution processes to address the discrete dispute then arising.” 491

F.3d at 1074 n.19.

Thus, Plaintiffs’ minimum wage claim is not preempted under the LMRA.

III. Failure to Timely Pay Wages Upon Termination and Unfair Competition

Claims

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to timely pay wages

upon termination and unfair competition are preempted by the LMRA as they are

predicated on Plaintiffs’ meal period, rest period, and minimum wage claims. (Mot. J. Pleadings at 11–12.) As held above, Plaintiffs’ underlying claims are not preempted. See Sections I–II supra. Therefore, the waiting time and unfair competition claims are also not preempted. For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant Sysco Sacramento, Inc.'s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 91). Dated: _ April 23, 2025 Donel J CDbnetto Hon. Daniel alabretta / UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE DJC4 - Fite21¢v1633.MotJudgmentPleadings

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