Fitchett Bros. v. Freeman

241 F. Supp. 181, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6324
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 3, 1965
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 241 F. Supp. 181 (Fitchett Bros. v. Freeman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fitchett Bros. v. Freeman, 241 F. Supp. 181, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6324 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).

Opinion

FREDERICK van PELT BRYAN, District Judge.

This is a statutory action pursuant to Sec. 8c(15) (B) of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 as amended (the Act), 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15) (B), to review a decision and order of the judicial officer of the Department of Agriculture acting for the Secretary of Agriculture. The decision and order under review involve the interpretation and application of a compensatory payment provision, ¶ (b) (1) of § 927.83 of Milk Market Order No. 27,1 promulgated by the Secretary under the Act (7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.), which regulates the handling of milk in the New York-New Jersey marketing area.

In Crowley’s Milk Co. v. Brannan, 198 F.2d 861, 862 (2 Cir. 1952), Judge Clark said “It is now no secret that governmental regulation of the distribution of milk is complex and mystifying.” The subject has not grown any less so since that time.

The general scheme of federal milk regulation, compensatory payment provisions thereunder and their purpose and effect, is described in detail in Lehigh Valley Co-op Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 76, 78-91, 82 S.Ct. 1168, 8 L.Ed.2d 345 (1962). See generally United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 59 S.Ct. 993, 83 L.Ed. 1446 (1939); Kass v. Brannan, 196 F.2d 791 (2 Cir.), cert. den. 344 U S. 891, 73 S.Ct. 210, 97 L.Ed. 689 (1952). The specific problem in the case at bar will be discussed against that background.

The Lehigh case held that paragraphs (b) (2), (b) (3) and (b) (4) of § 927.83 of Marketing Order No. 27, the order involved here, were invalid as inconsistent with the policy expressed by Congress in § 8c(5) (G) of the Act under which Order 27 was issued by the Secretary. The case at bar involves paragraph (b) (1) of § 927.83 of the Order which was not passed upon in the Lehigh case. The issue here is different from that in Le-high and involves the application rather than the validity of paragraph (b) (1).

Plaintiff Fitchett is a milk distributor with a processing plant at Poughkeepsie, New York, in the New York-New Jersey marketing area covered by Marketing Order No. 27. Fitchett purchased quan[183]*183tities of milk from suppliers in the Connecticut milk marketing area who were not covered by Order No. 27 but by the Connecticut Marketing Order No. 119.2

The present controversy concerns the amount which the market administrator determined was owing by Fitchett to the so-called Producer Settlement Fund because of these purchases from Connecticut sources. The Producer Settlement Fund is one of the mechanisms by which the price of milk in the New York-New Jersey marketing area is regulated.

Specifically, Fitchett’s complaint is that a “direct delivery differential” of $.10 per ewt. was included by the administrator in calculating the value of the Connecticut milk purchased, which calculation in turn was used in arriving at the amount owing by Fitchett to the Producer Settlement Fund. The inclusion of the $.10 per cwt. differential increased the amount owing by Fitchett to the Settlement Fund to that extent. The administrator proceeded on the theory that the inclusion of the direct delivery differential was authorized by paragraph (b) (1) of § 927.83 of Order 27. Fitchett contends that such inclusion was not so authorized and was improper.

Fitchett filed a petition with the Secretary challenging this action of the administrator. Hearings on the petition were held before a hearing examiner who made findings and conclusions and recommended dismissal of the petition. Exceptions to the hearing examiner’s report were filed with the judicial officer of the Department who denied the relief requested and dismissed the petition. This action for review followed.

Both parties have moved for judgment under Rule 12 (c)., F.R.Civ.P., on the pleadings and on the certified record. There are no issues of fact and the case can be decided on the pleadings and the record of the proceedings under review.

The mechanisms of price regulation under Marketing Order 27.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the specific problem presented a brief description of the price regulatory scheme provided in Order 27 is necessary.

Speaking in broad terms, the primary purpose of the scheme of regulation in Order 27 is to enable dairy farmers to receive a minimal price for their milk. To accomplish this the order employs two different categories of price calculation. One is a “class price” based on the value of the milk to the wholesaler or processor in terms of the end use to which it is put. The other is a “uniform price” to be paid directly to most dairy farmers for milk delivered to processors or wholesalers.

Under § 927.7 of the Order Fitchett is a milk processor who is denominated as a “handler”. Fitchett’s plant is classified as a “pool plant” under § 927.9. Fitchett, as a handler operating a pool plant is subject to the regulatory provisions of Order 27.

Handlers purchase milk either from “producers”, as defined in Order No. 27, or from other suppliers who are not so defined. Under § 927.6 producers include dairy farmers within the New York marketing area whose milk is delivered direct from farm to a handler’s pool plant. In general all milk delivered by producers to a pool plant is considered as “pool milk,” —that is to say, part of the pool of milk regulated by Order 27.

1. Class or minimum price: Under §§ 927.30 through 927.37 of Order No. 27 milk acquired by a handler from a producer is classified according to its ultimate use. There are three general classes of utilization. For example, milk of specified butterfat content used for fluid consumption is in Class I while milk used for various manufactured food products is in Class III. Each classification of milk is assigned monthly a “minimum” or “class” price computed according to complex formulae set out in [184]*184§ 927.40. Among other things, the formulae reflect a variety of economic factors and take into account the volume of milk received from producers which falls into the various use classifications. Also included in the calculations are so-called butterfat differentials, transportation differentials reflecting hauling costs of milk to centers of consumption, and other specified differentials.

The class prices so arrived at are used (a) in calculating the uniform price to be paid by handlers to producers, and (b) to determine the obligations of handlers to a so-called Producers Settlement Fund designed to offset differences between the value to handlers of milk in terms of its ultimate use and the uniform price at which it must be purchased.

2. “Uniform price”: The uniform price required to be paid by a handler to a producer for milk received at the handler’s plant, regardless of classification, is .determined under another complex formula set forth in § 927.66.

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Related

Sunny Hill Farms Dairy Co. v. Freeman
307 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. Missouri, 1969)
Freeman v. BROWN BROTHERS HARRIMAN AND COMPANY
250 F. Supp. 32 (S.D. New York, 1966)

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Bluebook (online)
241 F. Supp. 181, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6324, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fitchett-bros-v-freeman-nysd-1965.