Fisher v. Independent School District No. 118

215 N.W.2d 65, 298 Minn. 238, 1974 Minn. LEXIS 1468
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedFebruary 1, 1974
Docket43987
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 215 N.W.2d 65 (Fisher v. Independent School District No. 118) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fisher v. Independent School District No. 118, 215 N.W.2d 65, 298 Minn. 238, 1974 Minn. LEXIS 1468 (Mich. 1974).

Opinions

Todd, Justice.

Relator appeals from an order discharging a writ of certiorari issued by the district court to review the action of respondent school district in terminating relator’s position as a tenured teacher. She challenges the sufficiency of the notice of termination and the reasonableness of the notice of the hearing held pursuant to statute. We reverse.

Relator was employed as a full-time special education teacher by respondent school district and had attained tenure in her position. She was certified in her field for grades kindergarten through 12. In the school year 1971-1972, relator taught eight children with an age span of 8 to 13.

On April 13, 1971, A1 Baas, then special education regional consultant, sent Reuben Grossmann, superintendent of respondent school district, a summary of Baas’ 2-day visit to the school to review the district’s special education group. A copy of the report was sent to relator. A portion of the report recommended that the district develop a separate special education program in the junior-senior high school with a shifting of emphasis to [240]*240the vocational area. Relator testified that no discussion regarding this communication was held in the spring of 1971, but in the fall of 1971, she met with George Cassell, special education director of the Tri-County Special Education Cooperative, and her school principal to review this report and implement its recommendations. Mr. Cassell at that time stated: “These men are higher than I am. Of course we will go ahead with it and attempt to implement this program.” However, it was not until sometime during the week prior to March 14, 1972, that Mr. Cassell recommended the school district special education program be expanded to the junior high school. Under his proposal the elementary division would consist of four children, ages 9 through 12, and the junior high division would include four 13- and 14-year-olds and would be vocationally oriented. He advised that state funding would only be continued if the division of age groups was made to comply with state guidelines. The program was presented to the school board at its March 14, 1972, meeting. The board adopted the program and included with the adoption the elimination of relator’s full-time tenured position, substituting two part-time special education teaching positions.

On March 15, 1972, relator was notified orally of the school board’s intention to terminate her full-time contract and on March 16, 1972, was given a formal notice of her termination. The notice stated as follows:

“In order that a Group Supplemental Special Education program may be put into effect for the 1972-73 school term, with two (2) part-time special education teachers — not to exceed three (3) hours per day per teacher — it is the intent of the Board of Education to terminate your full-time contract as a special education teacher at the end of the 1971-72 school term and issue to you for the 1972-73 school term a contract for part-time work as a special education teacher not to exceed three (3) hours per day.
“It is the belief of the Board of Education and the Director [241]*241of Special Education that a Group Supplemental Special Education Program will better meet the needs of the students.
“Under the statute you are entitled to a hearing before the Board of Education and you must request a hearing within fourteen (14) days of this notice. Failure to request a hearing within the allotted time will forfeit your right for such a hearing.”

Relator acknowledged receipt of the written notice on March 16, 1972, and thereafter contacted the Minnesota Educational Association, to which she belonged. Apparently through their efforts, she was placed in contact with her present counsel. The attorney’s first contact with relator was a phone call on March 25. Following this phone conversation, a notice was directed to the school board by the attorney under date of March 27, 1972, demanding a hearing pursuant to the statute. The school board acknowledged that this demand was received on March 29, 1972. On the same day, at 4:15 p. m., the school board dispatched telegrams to relator and her counsel advising that a hearing would be held at 4 p. m. on March 30, 1972. The telegram was received by relator at 9:45 p. m. and by her counsel on the following morning. Relator’s attorney, after meeting with her for about one hour prior to the meeting, formally objected on the record to holding the hearing that day. He challenged the timeliness and reasonableness of the notice of hearing and stated that he was inadequately prepared to proceed. The school board, however, voted to proceed with the hearing.

The hearing was held and testimony taken from Mr. Cassell, Mr. Grossman, the superintendent of schools, some other witnesses, and from relator. A careful examination of the record discloses that the school board was relying on Mr. Cassell’s statement that state funding would be unavailable unless the age groups were divided. This is not disputed by relator. However, the record contains no competent evidence whatsoever that state guidelines required that the two age groups be taught by separate teachers. At the hearing the school board raised scheduling difficulties for the first time. This claim could not be met by re[242]*242lator, as she had no advance knowledge of this alleged problem. No testimony was received as to the nature of the so-called scheduling difficulties. At the close of testimony, the school board prepared and entered its order terminating relator’s contract for the school year 1971-1972.

Relator is a tenured teacher within the contemplation of Minn. St. 125.12. The parties hereto are governed by the legislative pronouncements contained in that section regarding termination of teachers’ contracts. Grounds for termination are provided for in § 125.12, subd. 6, including discontinuance of position under paragraph (e).

This court has held that school boards must strictly comply with the procedural provisions of similar statutes which preceded § 125.12. Zeller v. Prior Lake Public Schools, 259 Minn. 487, 108 N. W. 2d 602 (1961). See, also, Hueman v. Independent School Dist. No. 77, 243 Minn. 190, 67 N. W. 2d 38 (1954).

Section 125.12, subd. 4, requires that the board notify the teacher in writing, stating its grounds for the proposed termination in reasonable detail. At the time the board notified relator of the termination of her contract, § 125.12, subd. 4, further provided that any termination must be completed prior to April l.1

Relator contends that the notice of March 16 failed to advise her of any statutory ground for termination. We cannot accept this contention since, although the notice does not specifically use the words “discontinuance of position,” a fair reading of the notice clearly conveys to relator that her position as a full-time special education teacher was being discontinued.

Relator, acting through her counsel, filed the required statutory written request for hearing with the board within the proper time period. Section 125.12, subd. 9, requires that such a hearing shall be held upon appropriate and timely notice to the [243]*243teacher and further provides that the teacher may be represented by counsel at such hearing.

The leading case in Minnesota on the interpretation of the statutory procedure for termination of a teacher’s position based on discontinuance of position is State ex rel. Ging v.

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Fisher v. Independent School District No. 118
215 N.W.2d 65 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1974)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
215 N.W.2d 65, 298 Minn. 238, 1974 Minn. LEXIS 1468, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fisher-v-independent-school-district-no-118-minn-1974.