Fishback v. Buchanon

District Court, W.D. Kentucky·Decided October 22, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-00142·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY BOWLING GREEN DIVISION

BRIAN FISHBACK PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-CV-142-GNS

JUDGE-EXECUTIVE MIKE BUCHANON/ WARREN COUNTY FISCAL COURT et al. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This is a pro se civil action filed by Plaintiff Brian Fishback. Plaintiff has filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees. Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff makes the financial showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the application to proceed without prepayment of fees (DN 2) is GRANTED. Because Plaintiff is proceeding without the prepayment of fees, or in forma pauperis, the Court must review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Upon review, this Court must dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Additionally, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a non-prisoner complaint form for a civil case. On the form, he indicates that he resides in Bowling Green, Kentucky. He sues Judge-Executive Mike Buchanon, Warren County Fiscal Court; Ron Bunch, Bowling Green Chamber of Commerce; Doug Gorman, Warren County Downtown Redevelopment Association; the Bowling Green, Kentucky, Board of Commissioners; and the City-County Planning Commission Board of Warren County. Plaintiff checked the box which indicates that this Court has jurisdiction over this action because a “federal question” is presented. In the section of the complaint form which asks him to list the federal statutes, federal treaties, and/or provisions of the United States Constitution that are at issue in this case, Plaintiff writes “KRS 100.271- zoning regulations,” “KRS 68.210 – county budgeting,” and “voter suppression.” The complaint contains no other information. In a ten-page, typed, single-spaced attachment to the complaint, Plaintiff makes claims very similar to the ones he has made in previous lawsuits filed in this Court. For example, he again makes claims regarding the Bowling Green “TIF District” and the “Shake Rag Community.” He again states that Bowling Green residents were not allowed to vote regarding the “TIF” and there has been an

“illegal intrusion” in the Shake Rag Community. He also again alleges that there is a conflict of interest regarding the “TIF” that involves Warren County Fiscal Court members. Plaintiff also reasserts claims regarding the building of a “Transpark” without allowing taxpayers to vote on the project. Plaintiff asks the Court to “grant a Stay, for the halting of any new addition to the TIF in [Bowling Green] and also halt any new addition to the Transpark in [Warren County], until a ‘new voting regulation’ is enacted by the [Bowling Green] City Commission Board members in terms of having the [Warren County] residents get to vote . . . about any issue concerning this TIF or Transpark . . . .” In the next section of the attachment Plaintiff raises concerns about the Fiscal Court’s decision to purchase the “Sugar Maple Square shopping center building.” He points to what he characterizes as various “conflicts of interest” regarding this decision. Plaintiff then asks the Court to “grant a stay concerning the [] Fiscal Court and a majority of the [] City Commissioners Board, from changing any property in the TIF area, . . ., of or near the Transpark area, until this Federal Court implements having a ‘new regulation’ created that creates local Warren County neighborhood councils for Warren County’s residents . . . .” and to require the Fiscal Court and City Commissioners Board “to have to get a 100% approval vote from the residents of that particular area, neighborhood, or community . . .” before they decide that “they will change, or take away, a part of these areas or neighborhoods to suit their whims. . . .” Finally, Plaintiff includes a list of the of the “conflicts of interest” he believes exist regarding the Sugar Maple Square Project and a list of the Warren County Fiscal Court’s “projects during the last 15 years that failed to reach the standards that [] Fiscal Court’s members promoted for these projects.” II. Plaintiff indicates that the Court has federal-question jurisdiction over this action. Under the federal-question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” “The presence or absence

of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Plaintiff fails to cite to any federal statute, federal treaty, and/or provision of the United States Constitution which would provide this Court with federal-question jurisdiction.1 Moreover, even if the Court could discern some basis for a federal claim in Plaintiff’s allegations, he has failed to establish that he has standing to bring this action. Lack of standing implicates the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), and, therefore, is a threshold issue in every federal case. Midwest Media Prop. L.L.C. v. Symmes Twp., Ohio, 503 F.3d 456, 469-70 (6th Cir. 2007). To establish standing, a plaintiff must show the following “three key elements”: (1) the plaintiff suffered an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) the injury must be “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant”; and (3) “it must be likely . . . that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision”

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