Firth Sterling, Inc. v. United States

48 C.C.P.A. 130, 1961 CCPA LEXIS 191
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJuly 14, 1961
DocketNo. 5055
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 48 C.C.P.A. 130 (Firth Sterling, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Firth Sterling, Inc. v. United States, 48 C.C.P.A. 130, 1961 CCPA LEXIS 191 (ccpa 1961).

Opinions

Eich, Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of tbe court:

This appeal is from a judgment of the United States Customs Court, Second Division (C.D. 2176), overruling appellant’s protest to the classification of imported merebandise invoiced as “Artificial Tungsten Scheelite Concentrates.” Tbe invoice states that these concentrates contain 75.25% W03, wbicb is tungsten trioxide. This would appear to be a statement of tbe W03 equivalent of the calcium tungstate content, of wbicb tbe imported concentrates were principally composed.

The collector classified the merchandise as a compound of tungsten under paragraph 302(g) of tbe Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by GATT, T.D. 51802. The importer claims that tbe proper classification is as a tungsten concentrate under paragraph 302(c), Tariff Act of 1930. These statutory provisions are:

Paragraph 302(c):

Tungsten ore or concentrates, 50 cents per pound on the metallic tungsten contained therein.

[131]*131Paragraph 302(g), as modified:

Tungstic acid, and all other compounds of tungsten, not specially proyided for_42$ per lb. on the tungsten
contained therein and 20% ad val.

The facts are not in dispute. The sole issue is one of law and is whether, considering the processes by which the imported merchandise was made, it is entitled to be considered a “concentrate.” It seems to have been assumed throughout the case that if it is a “concentrate,” then the protest should be sustained as paragraph 302(c) would then be a specific provision for the material which would take it out of 302(g). In the ensuing discussion it will be useful to know that another name for tungsten is wolfram, that its chemical symbol is W, and that scheelite is a tungsten compound which, in the pure form, is calcium tungstate (CaW04).

The stipulation, which provides almost the entire factual background of the case, reads as follows:

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the attorneys for the respective parties hereto that the merchandise the subject of the above protest was produced by the following method of production: Crude low grade scheelite ore containing calcium tungstate equivalent to 2 to 10% WOs is ground in a ball mill to a fineness of 100 mesh per square inch. The ground ore is then concentrated by the use of a magnetic separator and by flotation in oils to remove iron and other impurities. It is then roasted in a rotary furnace to remove sulfur and arsenic. At other times, depending upon market conditions, low grade scheelite tungsten concentrates containing calcium tungstate equivalent to approximately 20% WOs are used instead of the roasted concentrate. Either the crude low grade scheelite ore, ground and concentrated by magnetic separator and by flotation in oils and roasted, as previously described, or the secondary scheelite tungsten concentrates are then mixed with soda and the mixture is then calcined in a rotary furnace. The calcined product is then leached with water to obtain sodium wolframite liquor. Lime is then added to the liquor causing calcium tungstate to precipitate out. The calcium tungstate is then separated and dried to remove the water. Most of the impurities not previously removed by magnetic separation, flotation in oils and roasting, or in the preparation of the low grade concentrates, are in the residue from the leaching process in obtaining sodium wolframite liquor. The calcium tungstate, together with any impurities not removed in the leaching process, is the imported artificial scheelite tungsten concentrates.

In tbis stipulation the parties appear to be in agreement, according to tbe last word of the stipulation, that the imports are “concentrates” in some sense or other, but they are completely at odds as to whether they are “concentrates” within the meaning of the tariff act provision for “Tungsten * * * concentrates.” The sole question is whether by common meaning the material produced by the processes set forth in the stipulation is tungsten concentrates.

Appellant introduced certain exhibits, asked the court to take judicial notice of certain other matters, and adduced the testimony of four witnesses for the purpose of showing that the merchandise is, by [132]*132common meaning, a tungsten concentrate. The Customs Court seems to have been greatly impressed by the plaintiff’s case, particularly, to quote from the opinion below, “exhibit 3, a letter from the Bureau of Customs of the United States Treasury Department, wherein reference is made to a statement by the Bureau of Mines of the United States Department of Interior ‘that synthetic scheelite statistics are included in the tungsten concentrate class.’ ” (The evidence shows that “synthetic” scheelite is another name for “artificial” scheelite. The witness Huemme said the former was the term usually used.) This Exhibit 3 is a ruling by the Bureau of Customs that artificial twngsten scheelite concentrates, which is what the merchandise at tar is, are properly classifiable under paragraph 308(c) as tungsten concentrates, which ruling is predicated on documentary information shown to have been provided to Congress before that body, in the Tariff Act of 1922, for the first time inserted a provision for “tungsten ore or concentrates.” The Bureau of Customs said, in Exhibit 3, dated J une 3,1955:

The evidence of record shows it was within the knowledge of the Congress at the time of the passage of the Tariff Act of 1922 that certain chemical processing of tungsten concentrates produced by mechanical means was known as “concentration.” It appears, therefore, that the Congress in the 1922 act in providing for “tungsten ore or concentrates” actually intended to include not only mechanical concentrates of tungsten ores but also concentrates produced by chemical means. [Emphasis ours.]

This passage brings us to the very center of the controversy here.

It is the position of the Government, and the lower court adopted it with seeming reluctance, that this court in United States v. C. J. Tower & Sons, 43 CCPA 49, C.A.D. 608, judicially defined “concentrate” so as to exclude concentrates produced chemically. Ancillary contentions are that “chemical concentration” is a misnomer and that the term “concentrate” by common meaning refers only to “physical” processing.

Appellant argues that common meaning of “concentrate” when determined by more complete authorities than those considered by the court in the Tower case includes chemical concentration, that the Tower case is distinguishable in that it dealt with different statutory provisions and different materials differently made, and that Congress intended to include artificial or synthetic scheelite concentrates in the “Tungsten ore or concentrates” provision of paragraph 302(c) notwithstanding the fact that they result from a process of production from the original ore in which “chemical” as well as “mechanical” processes are involved.

While it seems somewhat arbitrary and unrealistic to assume the technical validity of the clearcut, mutually exclusive dichotomy of “mechanical” or “physical” versus “chemical” process steps in which [133]*133the discussion has been cast, we will assume its validity, arguendo, as the parties seem to do and discuss the issue in those terms.

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Related

Philipp Bros. Ore v. United States
49 Cust. Ct. 194 (U.S. Customs Court, 1962)

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Bluebook (online)
48 C.C.P.A. 130, 1961 CCPA LEXIS 191, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/firth-sterling-inc-v-united-states-ccpa-1961.