ORDER
ERICKSON, United States Magistrate Judge.
I.
Introduction
This matter came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to the consent of the parties as authorized by Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), upon the Plaintiffs’ Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law, for a New Trial as to Damages, and for attorneys’ fees.
A Motion on the Hearings was conducted on June 2, 1994, at which the Plaintiffs appeared by John F. Bonner, III, and Bradley A. Kletscher, Esqs., and the Defendants appeared by Keith M. Brownell, Esq. Post-Hearing filings were submitted by both parties.
For reasons which follow, we deny the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and for a New Trial as to Damages, and we grant the Motion for attorneys’ fees.
II.
Factual and Procedural Background
In the year or more that preceded August 8, 1988, the Plaintiffs and the Defendants engaged in extensive negotiations concerning the Plaintiffs’ purchase of the common stock of the First State Bank of Floodwood (“Bank”) from the Defendants.
The parties’ preliminary negotiations led to an initial Purchase Agreement, which the parties entered on October 9, 1987. Reflective of the deep financial distress that the Bank was experiencing, the Purchase Agreement afforded the Plaintiffs an expansive opportunity to examine the books, records and accounts of the Bank. The Record reflects that the Plaintiffs, who are experienced businessmen and Certified Public Accountants, accepted the opportunity afforded by surveying the Bank’s accounts and, in holding two positions on the Bank’s then existing Board of Directors, the Plaintiffs had occasion to micro-analyze the Bank’s financial state.
The Bank was not merely experiencing financial difficulties, however, as the Bank’s Officers and Directors were under investigation by Federal and State banking regulators — an investigation that had proceeded for the two-year period prior to the Bank’s ultimate purchase by the Plaintiffs. As a result of that investigation, on January 4, 1988, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), issued an Order which prohibited the Defendant Jerry J. Jubie (“Jubie”), who had been the President, Chairman of the Board and the principal shareholder of the Bank, from “serving as an officer or director of, or in participating in any manner in the conduct of the affairs of, any bank insured by the FDIC,” without prior written approval of the appropriate Federal Banking Agency.
On February 1, 1988, the FDIC also issued a Cease and Desist Order which directed the Bank’s Officers and Board to follow a series of remedial means to rectify the Bank’s prior “unsafe and unsound banking practices and violations of law and regulations.” The Plaintiffs admit to being informed about the Cease and Desist Order, but they deny any knowledge of the FDIC’s Order precluding Jubie from Federal banking activities — at least at any time prior to the date on which the sale of the Bank was consummated. The Defendants have vehemently contended that the Plaintiffs were fully informed of all of the activities of the FDIC, and that they had contractually authorized the Plaintiffs’ “ac
cess to all State and Federal regulatory agency records, studies, audits and other information, including those performed by or on behalf of FDIC.”
For a number of reasons, including the ongoing Federal regulatory investigation and the need to secure the regulator’s approval of any change in the Bank’s ownership and management, the initial date for the sale of the Bank was continued, from October of 1987, until August of 1988. During that period of delay, the parties continued in their negotiations and, on July 28, 1988, they entered an “Addendum to Purchase Agreement,” which modified a number of the terms and conditions of their prior Agreement. Among other changes, the Addendum established the purchase price of the Bank at $528,582.00, which was 95% of the book value of the Bank, as disclosed by the Bank’s financial statements for the period ending as of June 30, 1988. This purchase price was subject to certain “usual and customary month-end adjustments,” which were to be made by the Defendants’ accountant. The Plaintiffs have contended that the Defendants manipulated a number of the month-end adjustments so as to over-value the worth of the Bank and, resultantly, its purchase price. The Defendants have denied any such wrongdoing and they have presented evidence to that effect.
In addition, the Addendum required the Defendants to pay-off, pay-down, or to guarantee the payment of a series of loans to the Jubie family members, so as to assure the repayment of a series of reputed “bad debts.” As security for these guarantees, the Defendants pledged the proceeds from a Retirement Agreement that the Bank had extended to Jubie in March 10, 1987, in consideration for his 21 years of “faithful service” to the Bank. Athough the parties’ original Purchase Agreement, and its Addendum, are rife with references to this Retirement Agreement and, particularly, its status as security for the Defendants’ pledges, the Plaintiffs have contended, after the Bank was purchased, that the Retirement Agreement either had not received the approval of the Bank’s Board of Directors and/or of the pertinent- regulatory authorities, or that any such approval was
ultra vires.
Aong with nearly every other factual issue at trial, the legitimacy of the Retirement Agreement was hotly contested, and was the subject of substantial, conflicting testimony. For the Defendants, and in particular Mr. and Mrs. Jubie, who were the immediate beneficiaries of the Retirement Agreement, the continuation of monthly pension payments from the Bank was a critical component in ascertaining the purchase price of the Bank. As the evidence, albeit contested, at trial reflected, the value of the Retirement Agreement to the Jubies was in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Following the closure of the Bank’s sale, which occurred on August 9, 1988, the Plaintiff’s began to uncover what they regarded as anomalies in the Bank’s financial accounts. According to the parties’ Agreements, the Bank’s books were to be maintained according to “generally accepted accounting practices.” The Plaintiffs have asserted that the Defendants did not merely violate the terms of the Purchase Agreements, but that they engaged in a pattern of fraud that was accomplished “through insider loans, under col-lateralization of loans [which were] not in conformance with generally accepted banking practices, and [by] not properly recording information on the Bank’s financial statement.” As a result of the Defendants purported wrongdoing, the Plaintiffs presented evidence that they were required to invest in the Bank some $424,000 in additional capital in order to satisfy the applicable regulatory requirements, and that they had suffered losses in the amount of $349,745.47. These claims of loss were fervently challenged by the Defendants’ evidence.
Subsequently, the Plaintiffs commenced this action which alleges, in a lengthy Amended Complaint, that the Defendants
breached their contractual agreements with the Plaintiffs, breached their fiduciary duties to the Bank, committed common law and statutory fraud, under both State and Federal enactments, and violated the provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Title 18 U.S.C. § 1961
et seq.
(“RICO”).
In responding to this Complaint, the Defendants have not only denied any wrongdoing, but they have also asserted counterclaims which allege that the Plaintiffs have breached the terms and conditions of the Purchase Agreements and, more particularly, the Jubies’ Retirement Agreement.
The matter came on for trial before a Jury on April 4, 1994, and consumed a total of 17 days of trial time, in which 23 witnesses were called to testify, and a total of 326 exhibits were received. By way of an understatement, the animosity of the parties was a constant presence before the Jury. Following the charge to the Jury, and the arguments of counsel, the Jury retired for their deliberations, with a written copy of the Jury Instructions. After 5 full days of deliberations, the Jury returned its Special Verdict which found that the Defendants had breached their contract with the Plaintiffs, had breached their fiduciary duties to the Bank, had violated Minnesota Statutes Sections 80A.01 and 325F.69, and had caused the Plaintiffs to suffer damage in the total amount of $106,218.00. The Jury rejected the Plaintiffs’ claims that the Defendants had violated Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission or had committed common law fraud
and, while the Jury found that the Defendants had violated RICO, they concluded that the Plaintiffs had not suffered any damages from that violation. With respect to the Defendants’ counterclaim, the Jury determined that the Plaintiffs had breached the terms and conditions of their agreement to purchase the Bank, and that the Defendants — namely Mr. and Mrs. Jubie — had suffered damages, as a result of that breach, in the amount of $292,947.00.
Upon this Verdict, the Court issued its Order for Judgment, on May 4, 1994, and Judgment was entered by the Clerk of Court on that same day. On May 11, 1994, the Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the alternative, for a New Trial as to Damages, together with
their Motion for Attorneys’ Fees pursuant to Minnesota Statutes Sections 8.31, Subdivision 3a, 80A.23, Subdivision 1, and 325F.69. No Post-Trial Motions were filed by the Defendants.
III.
Discussion
At the outset we note that the Plaintiffs have cast these Motions in a somewhat simplistic framework. In essence, the Plaintiffs contend that they would not represent anything that they did not believe to be true and, therefore, that the Court must believe all that they have represented. Indeed, their presentations to the Jury employed much of the same framework and, in large measure, the Jury rejected the Plaintiffs’ evidence as unconvincing. While we do not question the earnestness with which the Plaintiffs hold their beliefs as to the true facts of this matter, we are not at liberty, absent compelling reason, to reject the Jury’s resolution of contested facts. See,
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd.,
369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 786, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962).
At the parties’ urging, and consistent with our obligations under the law, we have carefully examined the Record before us and we find no basis, in fact or law, to disturb the Jury’s resolution of the factual issues. As a consequence, we find no merit to the Plaintiffs’ contention that they are entitled to the entry of Judgment or a new trial on the RICO issue, that they are deserving of a new trial on the issue of their damages, or that the Defendants are not entitled to the damages that were assessed by the Jury. Although we do find merit to the Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees, we award only those fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. We turn, therefore, to an examination of the contentions raised in the Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Motions.
A.
The Plaintiffs’ Contention that they are Entitled to the Entry of Judgment or, Alternatively, to a New Trial on the RICO Issues.
Relying upon the Court’s holding in
Rosario v. Livaditis,
963 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied,—U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 972, 122 L.Ed.2d 127 (1993), the Plaintiffs urge the Court to alter the Jury’s responses to Interrogatories 28, 30, and 32, on the Special Verdict form, and to conclude, as a matter of law, that the Plaintiffs are entitled to $318,644 in RICO damages; i.e., three times their actual damages of $106,218. Simply put, the Plaintiffs’ argument is unconvincing.
Here, unlike in
Rosario,
the Jury expressly exonerated the Defendants from liability under RICO by finding that the Plaintiffs did not suffer any damage as a proximate result of the Defendants’ RICO violations. Wisely, the Plaintiffs do
not
assert that the law requires no causal connection between a violation of RICO and resultant damage, because the authority to the contrary is compelling. See,
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1961(c)
(“[A] person injured in his business or property
by reason of
a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor * * * and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains * * *” [emphasis supplied]);
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,
503 U.S. 258, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992) (“by reason of’ language construed to incorporate traditional requirements of proximate or legal cause);
Bieter Co. v. Blomquist,
987 F.2d 1319, 1325 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied,—U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 81, 126 L.Ed.2d 50 (1993). Rather, the Plaintiffs would have us overlook the Court’s observation in
Rosario
that, there, the Jury found the Defendants to be liable on two Counts of RICO violations. This we may not do, since causation is uniquely an issue for the Jury particularly where, as here, “several damage causing factors” were presented for the Jury’s determination.
See,
H. Enter
prises International Inc. v. General Electric Capital Corp.,
833 F.Supp. 1405, 1418 (D.Minn.1993), citing
Cashman v. Allied Products Corp.,
761 F.2d 1250, 1254 (8th Cir.1985).
Moreover, during the Charge Conference, the Court and counsel for the parties considered the potential that, if the RICO claims were submitted to the Jury, some mechanism would have to be devised in order to determine what portion of the damages found, if any, the Jury would attribute to a RICO violation, if a violation were found. After much consideration and drafting, Interrogatory 34 was developed. In answering this Interrogatory with an inexorable “0”, the Jury was reconfirming its earlier finding that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove any causation between the Defendants’ RICO violations and the damages they claimed.
Accordingly, we find no basis to modify the Jury’s resolution of the RICO claim — a resolution that we believe is amply supported by the evidence at trial.
Therefore the Plaintiffs’ Motion for the entry of Judgment or for a New Trial on this basis is denied.
B.
The Plaintiffs’ Contention that they are Entitled to a New Trial as to the Damages that they Sustained.
The Plaintiffs claim that the Jury’s award of damages to them, in the amount of $106,218, was grossly inadequate given the testimony of their witnesses that they were obligated to invest an additional sum of $424,000 in order to properly fund the Bank’s reserves, and that they had suffered damages, in the amount of $349,745.47, as a direct result of the Defendants’ wrongdoing. Unfortunately, that testimony was challenged and the Jury had the responsibility of determining the true amount of damages that the Plaintiffs had sustained, if any. Having heard and seen the same evidence that the Jury necessarily had to appraise in resolving the damage claim, we are unable to say that the Jury’s determination is without adequate support in the Record. Dependent upon the Jury’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the Plaintiffs’ damage award could have been far greater or far less than the amount ultimately found.
Beckman v. Mayo Foundation,
804 F.2d 435, 439 (8th Cir.1986);
Samuelson v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation Dist.,
125 F.2d 838, 840 (8th Cir.1942). In short, we are unable to find any error in the Jury’s determination of the Plaintiffs’ damages, and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for a new trial, on this ground, is denied.
C.
The Plaintiffs’ Contention that Jerry and Irene Jubie are Not Entitled to the Damages Found by the Jury.
The Plaintiffs argue that a number of factors should vitiate the Defendants’ entitle
ment to damages. First, they contend that the Jury’s finding of fraud should void the Retirement Agreement and obviate any obligation on the part of the Plaintiffs to make any payments in furtherance of that Agreement. This argument, however, makes no sense. The Plaintiffs have not sought a rescission of their contract, have not demanded a return of the purchase price of the Bank and, insofar as the Jury was concerned, have been made whole for any wrongful conduct that the Defendants perpetrated. The Jury considered all of the Plaintiffs’ arguments— to the effect that the Retirement Agreement was void
ab initio
— but the Jury rejected, we think soundly, the Plaintiffs’ claims in that respect. We are aware of no authority, and the Plaintiffs have drawn none to our attention, in which a disappointed litigant may parse through an extensive bargaining process and pick and choose those aspects of the bargain with which they wish to abide, and reject the remainder. The Jury awarded the Plaintiffs all of the damages, as a result of the Defendants’ wrongful conduct, to which the Plaintiffs are entitled, and we will not augment those damages as some form of penalty arising from a state statutory violation.
Second, the Plaintiffs contend that, since the Defendants breached their obligations under the Purchase Agreement, the Plaintiffs’ performance of their own obligations, under the Retirement Agreement, should be excused as a matter of law.
Once again, the Plaintiffs urge a novel theory— now of contract law — but without the benefit of any cogent authority. However else the Plaintiffs may wish to cast the matter, the Jury found them to be in breach of their obligations under the Purchase Agreement and, that being the case, they are in no better position than the Defendants to be excused from the performance of their remaining contractual obligations.
Next, the Plaintiffs assert that they did not breach their contract with the Defendants as a matter of law. As is the case with so many of their arguments, however, the Plaintiffs premise their contention on the assumption that the Jury’s findings were in error because the Jury rejected the Plaintiffs’ proof. We do not start from the same premise. The evidence does not compel a finding that the Plaintiffs had the right, as an absolute matter of law, to setoff the Defendants’ payments under the Retirement Agreement as to any loan or guarantee that the Plaintiffs felt was appropriate. The Jury heard all that the Plaintiffs had to say in explaining their refusal to make payments under the terms of the Retirement Agreement, and the Jury could, and did, reject those explanations. We find no inadequacy in the evidence on this score.
Fourth, the Plaintiffs contend that the Court erred in permitting the Jury to assess the Defendants’ damages in a lump sum amount. In this respect, the Plaintiffs argue that the Retirement Agreement was in the nature of an installment contract and, since there was no express agreement between the parties that would permit the Defendants to accelerate the installment payments, the Defendants’ damages should be limited to the amount of the installments that
were past due at the time of trial. We disagree.
The Plaintiffs’ objection to the measure of the Defendants’ damages came late in the trial; indeed, just moments before the Defendants’ economist was about to testify.
In contesting the Plaintiffs’ objection, counsel for the Defendants noted that, on the first day of the trial — some sixteen days previously — he had requested and obtained the Court’s Order that compelled the Plaintiffs to provide an accounting of their allocation of the Defendants’ Retirement Agreement proceeds. While the Plaintiffs maintained that they were applying those proceeds to one “bad debt” or another, the Defendants had no means of knowing where those funds had actually been applied. Insofar as the Court is aware, the specific accounting, that was requested, was not forthcoming. Indeed, the Plaintiffs appeared to have been content to have the Jury determine the propriety of offsets, if any, based on the evidence that the parties adduced at trial. In any event, we denied the Plaintiffs’ Motion to preclude the Defendants from presenting evidence as to the future damages which, they claimed, would be attributable to the Plaintiffs’ repudiation of the Retirement Agreement.
We revisited the issue of the proper measure of the Defendants’ contractual damages, during the course of the Charge Conference and, finding no change in the authorities upon which the Plaintiffs were relying, we again denied their effort to restrict the Defendants’ claim for damages. The Plaintiffs have contended that, being an installment contract, the Retirement Agreement should be interpreted according to the general rule espoused in
Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 76 v. Hufnagle,
295 N.W.2d 259, 264 (Minn.1980), that where an acceleration is not clearly required by the terms of an installment payment contract, the Court will not presume that such an acceleration was intended. In addition, the Plaintiffs rely on the Court’s holding in
Rishmiller v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
192 Minn. 348, 256 N.W. 187 (1934).
We distinguish the Court’s holding in
Rishmiller
— and inferentially in Hufnagle— for the same reasons that our Court of Appeals expressed in
Minnesota Amusement Company v. Larkin,
299 F.2d 142, 152-53 (8th Cir.1962), a ease that involved a retirement program not unlike that involved here. The Defendants’ entitlement to future payments under the Retirement Agreement was not subject to any contingency, such as a disability or some other qualification, with the exception of the potential use of those proceeds as security for loan guarantees — a contingency which the Jury’s determination would eliminate by its determination of what debts were truly “bad” and which were not. Moreover, we conclude, on the basis of all of the evidence adduced at trial, that the Plaintiffs absolutely and unqualifiedly repudiated their obligations under the Retirement contract. We do not suggest that they did so malevolently but, nonetheless, their actions were unilateral and resolute. Given the Plaintiffs’ ostensible inability to specifically trace how the proceeds from the Retirement Agreement were applied, the Jury was relegated with the responsibility of determining what offsets should be applied — a task which the Jury fulfilled on the basis of the Record before it. Notably, by the time of trial, the Defendants had satisfied all of their obligations under the Retirement Agreement and their entitlement to the proceeds from that Agreement was unqualified except to the extent that the proceeds should be properly allocated to honor a “bad debt.” Given the salutary purposes
of a retirement benefit— which is essentially in the nature of an annuity — and the unique state of the evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs as to their treatment of the Retirement Agreement proceeds, we find no error in our submission of the Defendants’ damages to the Jury.
Lastly, the Plaintiffs urge that a new trial is necessary on the issue of the Defendants’ damages since the Jury awarded more damages than the evidence warranted. Arguing that the Defendants’ economist had testified that the present value of the Retirement Agreement was approximately $268,000,
the Plaintiffs question how the Jury could ever calculate the damage award at $292,947. The answer, of course, is simple. Although the Plaintiffs have correctly identified the substance of the Defendants’ evidence on the future value of the Retirement Agreement, they have overlooked his testimony as to the value of the past payments under the Agreement that the Plaintiffs have adamantly refused to pay — namely, $75,640.06 — a figure that was, again, expressed in present dollars. When both past and future damages are combined, the total award — if the Jury chose to accept the testimony of the Defendants’ economist — would be in the amount of $345,-326.09. Obviously, the Jury did not accept that figure as their award of damages, but we are without any basis to conclude that the award they chose was in error.
Finding no error in the Jury’s calculation of the Defendants’ damages, we deny the
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a new trial on that issue.
D.
The Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.
The Plaintiffs request an award of their attorneys’ fees of $159,820.25, and a reimbursement of their costs in the amount of $13,888.69. Such an award of fees is permissible under Minnesota Statutes Section 325F.69, but is required, so long as the award is reasonable, under Minnesota Statutes Section 80A.23, Subdivision 2. See,
Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen,
392 N.W.2d 520, 539 (Minn.1986). The Plaintiffs rely upon the fee-shifting provisions of each of these statutes as authorization for their fee request.
In contrast, the Defendants note that the Plaintiffs’ fee request exceeds then-award of damages by fully one-third and that, therefore, their fee request should be substantially reduced. In the Defendants’ estimation, the Court should apply a percentage of the recovery approach, and reduce the Plaintiffs’ fee request to $22,831. While appealing in its simplicity, we think that such a “mathematical approach [of] comparing the total number of issues in the case with those actually prevailed upon,” produces a ratio that “provides little aid in determining what is a reasonable fee.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 435-36 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1940 n. 11, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).
Where, as here, the plaintiff is only partially successful on the claims that he has litigated, the plaintiffs fee request can be reduced accordingly.
Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen,
supra at 542, quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart,
supra at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. In such circumstances the “most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.”
Id.
Here, of course, the success of the Plaintiffs was substantially below their expectations and their testimony, for the Plaintiffs claimed to have suffered damages of $349,745.47. Even in accepting — as we do — that the claims on which the Plaintiffs were unsuccessful, “were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith,” the results achieved cogently evince the excessiveness of the Plaintiffs’ fee request.
Id.
Here, our effort to determine a reasonable fee has been frustrated by a number of factors. First, the billing records of counsel for the Plaintiff are cryptic and of no particular assistance in meting out those billable hours which should properly be included in a fee award from those which should not.
Here, that difficulty has been exacerbated to the insurmountable because of the dual role that Plaintiffs’ counsel played in this litigation. In addition to prosecuting the Plaintiffs’ civil claims, the same counsel were defending against the Defendants’ counterclaims. Given the relative substantiality of the Defendants’ damage award in comparison to that awarded to the Plaintiffs, we may reasonably infer that a sizable proportion of the time and expense of Plaintiffs’ counsel was exerted on the defensive rather than on the offensive. Our most careful review of the time entries of the Plaintiffs’ counsel provides no
enlightenment, however, in ascribing the time expended to either role that counsel played.
When faced with such obstacles, the Courts have accepted the practical reality that fee awards depend, in large part, on the capacity of the Trial Court to measure the worth of the services provided, taking into account the experience of trial counsel, the complexity of the litigation, the prevailing hourly rates for similar legal services, the desirability of encouraging attorneys to engage in socially beneficial, yet sometimes expensive litigation, and the efficiency with which counsel address the issues in contention. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court has recognized:
There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations. The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success. The court necessarily has discretion in making this equitable judgment.
Hensley v. Eckerhart,
supra at 436-37, 103 S.Ct. at 1941.
With respect to the Minnesota Statutes which undergird the Plaintiffs’ fee request, the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the same pragmatic approach.
Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen,
supra at 542.
Here, given the obscurity of the Plaintiffs’ time records, we are unable to “identify specific hours that should be eliminated” and, in fairness to counsel, an accurate division of Ms time, according to Ms defensive or prosecutorial function, would surely escape Ms capacity to be more definitive.
Cf.,
H.J. Inc. v. Flygt Corp.,
925 F.2d 257, 260 (8th Cir.1991) (suggesting the feasibility of a recommittal to remedy inadequate documentation). In view of these considerations, we conclude that the Plaintiffs’ fee request warrants a substantial reduction. Fully as much, or more, of the trial of this matter was consumed by the Plaintiffs’ effort to shield themselves from the Defendants’ counterclaims as was expended in the advancement of their own causes of action. Since the full panorama of the parties’ discovery is not before us, we reasonably infer that the same apportionment would apply to the pretrial processing of the case. Accordmgly, we conclude that a reasonable fee for the time that was properly expended, in securing the limited success that the Plaintiffs achieved, is in the amount of $45,000. Such a fee award reflects the predommant effort that the Plaintiffs’ counsel devoted to defending claims, whose damages exceeded those that the Plamtiffs’ were found to have suffered, by threefold, and it further accounts for the savings in trial and pretrial time that would have been saved through a more focused prosecution of the Plaintiffs’ claims.
In all, we consider this award to properly and accurately reflect “the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart,
supra at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941.
NOW, THEREFORE, It is—
ORDERED:
1. That the Plaintiffs’ Motion for the entry of Judgment or, in the alternative, for a New Trial [Docket No. 133], is DENIED.
2. That the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [Docket No. 135], is GRANTED, and that the Defendants are directed to pay the Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees in the amount of $45,000.
3. That the Clerk of Court is directed to enter Judgment accordingly.