First Star Logistics, LLC v. Cuthbertson

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedJanuary 10, 2025
Docket1:23-cv-00152
StatusUnknown

This text of First Star Logistics, LLC v. Cuthbertson (First Star Logistics, LLC v. Cuthbertson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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First Star Logistics, LLC v. Cuthbertson, (S.D. Ohio 2025).

Opinion

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

FIRST STAR LOGISTICS, LLC, Case No. 1:23-cv-152

Plaintiff, Judge Timothy S. Black

v.

ERICA CUTHBERTSON,

Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’ FIRST STAR’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

This civil case is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19) and Plaintiff’s Proposed Undisputed Facts (Doc. 20). Defendant has not responded to either of these pleadings, and the time for doing so has long since passed. OVERVIEW

Defendant Erica Cuthbertson (“Defendant”) was an agent and freight broker, from August 29, 2018 to on or about March 20, 2020, for First Star Logistics, LLC (“First Star” or “Plaintiff”), a federally registered freight broker that provides third-party logistics services throughout the United States, First Star agreed to provide Defendant with access to its confidential and proprietary information, in exchange for Defendant agreeing to certain restrictive covenants that prohibited Defendant from competing with First Star. Defendant signed a Sales Agent Agreement (the “SAA”) and a Non-Disclosure and Restrictive Covenant Agreement (“NDA”) (referred to collectively the “Agreement”) prohibiting her from using, outside her work for First Star, certain types of confidential and proprietary information such as detailed customer lists, proprietary company processes and techniques, and other sensitive types of information. The term of the Sales

Agent Agreement ran during the time of Defendant’s association with First Star, and for a further period of 365 days following the termination of Sales Agent Agreement for any reason. However, Defendant admitted in sworn deposition testimony (in unrelated litigation) that shortly after her work started with First Star, and continuing after her separation from First Star to the present, she independently worked as a freight broker for several competitors of First Star in direct violation of the restrictions. Plaintiff seeks

$110,000.00 in damages, plus costs, pre- and post- judgment interest, and $33,855.05 in attorney’s fees.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE First Star sued Defendant in state court (Doc. 1). Defendant timely removed the case to this Court and timely filed her Answer (Doc. 4), represented by counsel. Judge Dlott of this Court denied First Star’s motion to remand the case to state court (Doc. 9) and ordered that:

“On or before 11/21/2023 at 5:00 p.m., Plaintiff's counsel shall send an email to Chambers, copying Mr. Imm, simply stating whether the parties intend to move forward with settling the case; otherwise the Court will rule on the two pending motions as reflected during the 11/20/23 conference.”

After being advised that the parties were unable to reach a settlement, the Court resolved Defendant's motion to stay discovery (Doc. 15 ) and granted Defense counsel’s motion to -- withdraw as counsel for Defendant, provided that he serve Defendant with a copy of the Court’s Order, along with copies of Plaintiff's discovery requests, and file a notice indicating when such service was complete, whereupon Mr. Imm would be terminated as

counsel for Defendant. This occurred. (Doc. -16- ). Moreover, the Court specifically warned Defendant that: “Absent an agreement by the parties or further order by the Court, Defendant is put on notice that failure to timely respond may result in unfavorable actions, such as waiver of objections and requests for admission being deemed admitted. Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 33, 34, and 36.”

On 05/24/2024, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.19), including as Exhibit 7, a Supplement Pro Se Notice advising her that her failure to respond could result in judgment being entered against her. Plaintiff also contemporaneously filed its Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc.20), per this Court’ standing Order. Defendant has failed to respond to Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts and has failed to respond to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and the time for doing has long passed. STANDARD OF REVIEW Courts hold pro se pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Thus, a “pro se document is to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Nevertheless, “the lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991)). “Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with [] easily understood court-imposed [procedures], there is no basis for treating that

party more generously than a represented litigant.” Littlefield, 92 F.3d at 416. (emphasis supplied). As here, a motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to the court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. All facts and inferences must be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

When considering an unopposed motion for summary judgment, “a district court must review carefully the portions of the record submitted by the moving party to determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists.” F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 630 (6th Cir. 2014). This is because it is the moving party's “burden of establishing the nonexistence of a material factual dispute.” Id.

(quoting Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 64 (6th Cir. 1979)). However, the Court may rely on the moving party’s facts when a motion for summary judgment goes unopposed because “‘[n]either the trial nor appellate court…will sua sponte comb the record from the partisan perspective of an advocate for the non-moving party.’” Id. 630, n.11 (quoting Guarino v. Brookfield Tp. Trs., 980 F.2d 399, 410 (6th Cir. 1992)).

The Sixth Circuit has explained that although a summary judgment motion is considered “unopposed” when no response is filed, “[t]his d[oes] not, however, end the district court’s analysis.” Nationwide, 767 F.3d at 629-30 (6th Cir. 2014). Indeed, granting summary judgment simply because the motion is unopposed amounts to an abuse of the Court’s discretion. E.g., Miller v. Shore Fin. Servs., Inc., 141 F. App’x 417, 419 (6th Cir. 2005); Stough v. Mayville Cmty. Sch., 138 F.3d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1998);

Carver v.

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