DYER, Circuit Judge:
This appeal involves the construction of a life insurance policy to determine whether the policy’s conversion option may be elected, subsequent to the lapse of the policy, while coverage continues as extended term insurance under the automatic non-forfeiture provision of the policy. The district court ruled that it could not. We agree and affirm.
Robinson, the deceased, purchased a $100,000 life insurance policy in May, 1965, and subsequently transferred title in trust to plaintiff First National Bank of Midland, Texas, retaining the obligation to pay premiums. He failed to pay the 1971 premium when due or within the 31-day grace period and the policy lapsed.
Robinson had become afflicted with Parkinson’s disease, was uninsurable, and his application for reinstatement was denied.
Upon lapse, the coverage continued under the automatic operation of the extended term insurance non-forfeiture provision of the policy.
The Bank attempted to exercise the policy’s conversion option, asserting the election to be appropriate during the extended coverage.
Upon refusal by defendant
Protective Life to permit the conversion, the Bank elected to receive paid-up insurance in the reduced amount of $10,-100 under the non-forfeiture provision of Option 2.
Robinson subsequently died, and the trustee brought this suit to collect the $100,000 face amount of the policy rather than the $10,100 paid-up insurance on the theory that the insurance company breached its contract by refusing to allow the Bank to exercise a conversion option.
We recognize the general rule that policies of insurance are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer, Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Proffitt, 1951, 150 Tex. 207, 239 S.W.2d 379, and that the construction urged by the insured “has to be no more than one which is not itself unreasonable.” Continental Casualty Co. v. Warren, 1953, 152 Tex. 164, 254 S.W.2d 762, 763; nevertheless, “there should be a fair and reasonable construction of the language of a policy, rather than a strained, unnatural or technical interpretation . . ..” State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Walker, Tex.Civ.App.1960, 334 S.W.2d 458, 462. We find that construction urged by the Bank, that under the extended term insurance the exercise of the conversion option remained viable, to be strained and unreasonable.
The conversion option provides that it may be elected “while it [the policy] is in force.” The grace period provision of the policy continues the policy “in force” for a 31-day period past the due date of an unpaid premium and states that “[i]f any premiums shall not be paid when due or within the grace period this policy shall terminate except as provided in the Non-Forfeiture Provisions.” Consequently, the policy lapses upon expiration of the grace period without payment of the premium due, and new life can be breathed into the policy only to the extent provided in the non-forfeiture provisions.
See e. g.,
Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Peddy, 1942, 139 Tex. 245, 162 S.W.2d 652 (double indemnity provision terminates when coverage continues under extended insurance non-forfeiture provision), and Armstrong v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., N.D.Tex.1935, 12 F.Supp. 817 (waiver of premium provision not included under extended insurance).
Cf.
Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 1932, 284 U.S. 489, 52 S.Ct. 230, 76 L.Ed. 416.
The reason for the non-forfeiture provision is quite apparent. It gives the insured those values which should not and cannot be forfeited with justice. In this case the policy had accumulated a cash value of $1,700 which rightfully belonged to the Bank. This cash value
inures to the benefit of the owner of the policy and not to the company and permits the owner to either 1) receive the net cash value; 2) receive paid up insurance in the amount that the net cash value will purchase or 3) obtain extended term insurance for such period as the net cash value will purchase. Importantly, each option in the non-forfeiture provision is premised upon the use by the owner of the then net cash value of the policy.
On the other hand the conversion options may be exercised only
while the policy is in force.
The literal terms of the policy thus leave no life in the conversion options after lapse. The non-forfeiture provision cannot be said to resurrect the entire policy. On the contrary, it continues only the face value of the life insurance as extended term insurance. Were we to uphold the construction of the policy urged by the Bank, it would be tantamount to saying that the parties intended that upon termination of the policy for failure to timely pay a premium, the defaulting party loses no rights. It would follow that an insured, denied reinstatement because of uninsurability, would nevertheless be entitled to reinstatement through the exercise of the conversion option. The reinstatement provision would be rendered virtually meaningless. We must avoid a construction that does not give all portions of the policy meaning and effect. Jame-son v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 5 Cir. 1969, 415 F.2d 1017, 1020.
The Bank refers to two provisions in the policy, which by their terms are excluded under the extended term insurance, to argue that the absence of an express exception in the “Conversion Options” provision keeps it operative under the non-forfeiture provision. It first points to the “Loans” provision, under which the company will loan up to the cash value “[w]hile this policy is in force, except as extended term insurance.” The Bank argues that had the Company desired to limit the conversion options it should have incorporated the “except as extended term insurance” language there as it did under the “Loans” provision. But this is a semantical extrapolation that can be made only by overlooking the reason that the exceptive language was included in the Loans provision. A policy of “paid-up insurance” acquired under paragraph 2 of the non-forfeiture provisions may have a loan value, but “extended term insurance” acquired under' paragraph 3 “will continue for such period as the net cash value will purchase at the net single premium rate at the then attained age of the insured” and as
term
insurance has no loan value.
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DYER, Circuit Judge:
This appeal involves the construction of a life insurance policy to determine whether the policy’s conversion option may be elected, subsequent to the lapse of the policy, while coverage continues as extended term insurance under the automatic non-forfeiture provision of the policy. The district court ruled that it could not. We agree and affirm.
Robinson, the deceased, purchased a $100,000 life insurance policy in May, 1965, and subsequently transferred title in trust to plaintiff First National Bank of Midland, Texas, retaining the obligation to pay premiums. He failed to pay the 1971 premium when due or within the 31-day grace period and the policy lapsed.
Robinson had become afflicted with Parkinson’s disease, was uninsurable, and his application for reinstatement was denied.
Upon lapse, the coverage continued under the automatic operation of the extended term insurance non-forfeiture provision of the policy.
The Bank attempted to exercise the policy’s conversion option, asserting the election to be appropriate during the extended coverage.
Upon refusal by defendant
Protective Life to permit the conversion, the Bank elected to receive paid-up insurance in the reduced amount of $10,-100 under the non-forfeiture provision of Option 2.
Robinson subsequently died, and the trustee brought this suit to collect the $100,000 face amount of the policy rather than the $10,100 paid-up insurance on the theory that the insurance company breached its contract by refusing to allow the Bank to exercise a conversion option.
We recognize the general rule that policies of insurance are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer, Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Proffitt, 1951, 150 Tex. 207, 239 S.W.2d 379, and that the construction urged by the insured “has to be no more than one which is not itself unreasonable.” Continental Casualty Co. v. Warren, 1953, 152 Tex. 164, 254 S.W.2d 762, 763; nevertheless, “there should be a fair and reasonable construction of the language of a policy, rather than a strained, unnatural or technical interpretation . . ..” State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Walker, Tex.Civ.App.1960, 334 S.W.2d 458, 462. We find that construction urged by the Bank, that under the extended term insurance the exercise of the conversion option remained viable, to be strained and unreasonable.
The conversion option provides that it may be elected “while it [the policy] is in force.” The grace period provision of the policy continues the policy “in force” for a 31-day period past the due date of an unpaid premium and states that “[i]f any premiums shall not be paid when due or within the grace period this policy shall terminate except as provided in the Non-Forfeiture Provisions.” Consequently, the policy lapses upon expiration of the grace period without payment of the premium due, and new life can be breathed into the policy only to the extent provided in the non-forfeiture provisions.
See e. g.,
Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Peddy, 1942, 139 Tex. 245, 162 S.W.2d 652 (double indemnity provision terminates when coverage continues under extended insurance non-forfeiture provision), and Armstrong v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., N.D.Tex.1935, 12 F.Supp. 817 (waiver of premium provision not included under extended insurance).
Cf.
Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 1932, 284 U.S. 489, 52 S.Ct. 230, 76 L.Ed. 416.
The reason for the non-forfeiture provision is quite apparent. It gives the insured those values which should not and cannot be forfeited with justice. In this case the policy had accumulated a cash value of $1,700 which rightfully belonged to the Bank. This cash value
inures to the benefit of the owner of the policy and not to the company and permits the owner to either 1) receive the net cash value; 2) receive paid up insurance in the amount that the net cash value will purchase or 3) obtain extended term insurance for such period as the net cash value will purchase. Importantly, each option in the non-forfeiture provision is premised upon the use by the owner of the then net cash value of the policy.
On the other hand the conversion options may be exercised only
while the policy is in force.
The literal terms of the policy thus leave no life in the conversion options after lapse. The non-forfeiture provision cannot be said to resurrect the entire policy. On the contrary, it continues only the face value of the life insurance as extended term insurance. Were we to uphold the construction of the policy urged by the Bank, it would be tantamount to saying that the parties intended that upon termination of the policy for failure to timely pay a premium, the defaulting party loses no rights. It would follow that an insured, denied reinstatement because of uninsurability, would nevertheless be entitled to reinstatement through the exercise of the conversion option. The reinstatement provision would be rendered virtually meaningless. We must avoid a construction that does not give all portions of the policy meaning and effect. Jame-son v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 5 Cir. 1969, 415 F.2d 1017, 1020.
The Bank refers to two provisions in the policy, which by their terms are excluded under the extended term insurance, to argue that the absence of an express exception in the “Conversion Options” provision keeps it operative under the non-forfeiture provision. It first points to the “Loans” provision, under which the company will loan up to the cash value “[w]hile this policy is in force, except as extended term insurance.” The Bank argues that had the Company desired to limit the conversion options it should have incorporated the “except as extended term insurance” language there as it did under the “Loans” provision. But this is a semantical extrapolation that can be made only by overlooking the reason that the exceptive language was included in the Loans provision. A policy of “paid-up insurance” acquired under paragraph 2 of the non-forfeiture provisions may have a loan value, but “extended term insurance” acquired under' paragraph 3 “will continue for such period as the net cash value will purchase at the net single premium rate at the then attained age of the insured” and as
term
insurance has no loan value. It was to avoid confusion with respect to the types of coverage upon which loans were available that the exceptive language was used in the Loans provision and obviously there was no reason to utilize the exceptive language in the con
version options. The Bank next points to the language excluding additional benefits provided by any riders in the extended term insurance provision. It argues that a similar exclusion does not appear in the conversion options. Rather than reflecting an intention to keep the entire policy in force under the non-forfeiture provision, the rider exclusion was clearly inserted to prevent an insured from arguing that a particular rider (e.
g.
double indemnity coverage) is so tied in with the extended term insurance as to constitute a part thereof. It would be a strained and unreasonable construction indeed, particularly in light of the exceptionally clear language of the non-forfeiture provision, to read these two policy provisions to mandate the availability of the conversion option under the extended term insurance.
The policy lapsed for failure of the insured to pay the premiums on or before the due date or within the grace period. Reinstatement was properly refused because the insured did not and could not furnish evidence of insurability satisfactory to the company. The non-forfeiture provisions in unambiguous terms spelled out what and only what disposition was to be made of any cash values which remained to the credit of the insured after the policy lapsed. Obviously the entire policy was not to continue in effect under these provisions. It would be a perversion of the clear meaning and intent of the non-forfeiture clause to suggest that it may be read to permit the insured to elect a conversion option. Since the company had $1,700 (cash value) which it was not entitled to retain, the company agreed, under the non-forfeiture provisions, to give three options to the Bank,
i. e.
1) to return the $1,700; 2) to use the $1,700 to continue the policy in the reduced amount of $10,-100 as paid-up insurance; or 3) to use the $1,700 for extended term insurance for one year and 167 days. The Bank elected to receive paid-up insurance under option 2 and a rider to the policy carrying this into effect was issued to the Bank. This then constituted the contract between the parties and gave the Bank all that it was entitled to get.
Affirmed.