First National Bank of Midland, Trustee v. Protective Life Insurance Company

511 F.2d 731, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15043
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedApril 21, 1975
Docket74--1944
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 511 F.2d 731 (First National Bank of Midland, Trustee v. Protective Life Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
First National Bank of Midland, Trustee v. Protective Life Insurance Company, 511 F.2d 731, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15043 (1st Cir. 1975).

Opinion

DYER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal involves the construction of a life insurance policy to determine whether the policy’s conversion option may be elected, subsequent to the lapse of the policy, while coverage continues as extended term insurance under the automatic non-forfeiture provision of the policy. The district court ruled that it could not. We agree and affirm.

Robinson, the deceased, purchased a $100,000 life insurance policy in May, 1965, and subsequently transferred title in trust to plaintiff First National Bank of Midland, Texas, retaining the obligation to pay premiums. He failed to pay the 1971 premium when due or within the 31-day grace period and the policy lapsed. 1 Robinson had become afflicted with Parkinson’s disease, was uninsurable, and his application for reinstatement was denied. 2 Upon lapse, the coverage continued under the automatic operation of the extended term insurance non-forfeiture provision of the policy. 3 The Bank attempted to exercise the policy’s conversion option, asserting the election to be appropriate during the extended coverage. 4 Upon refusal by defendant *733 Protective Life to permit the conversion, the Bank elected to receive paid-up insurance in the reduced amount of $10,-100 under the non-forfeiture provision of Option 2. 5 Robinson subsequently died, and the trustee brought this suit to collect the $100,000 face amount of the policy rather than the $10,100 paid-up insurance on the theory that the insurance company breached its contract by refusing to allow the Bank to exercise a conversion option.

We recognize the general rule that policies of insurance are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer, Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Proffitt, 1951, 150 Tex. 207, 239 S.W.2d 379, and that the construction urged by the insured “has to be no more than one which is not itself unreasonable.” Continental Casualty Co. v. Warren, 1953, 152 Tex. 164, 254 S.W.2d 762, 763; nevertheless, “there should be a fair and reasonable construction of the language of a policy, rather than a strained, unnatural or technical interpretation . . ..” State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Walker, Tex.Civ.App.1960, 334 S.W.2d 458, 462. We find that construction urged by the Bank, that under the extended term insurance the exercise of the conversion option remained viable, to be strained and unreasonable.

The conversion option provides that it may be elected “while it [the policy] is in force.” The grace period provision of the policy continues the policy “in force” for a 31-day period past the due date of an unpaid premium and states that “[i]f any premiums shall not be paid when due or within the grace period this policy shall terminate except as provided in the Non-Forfeiture Provisions.” Consequently, the policy lapses upon expiration of the grace period without payment of the premium due, and new life can be breathed into the policy only to the extent provided in the non-forfeiture provisions. See e. g., Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Peddy, 1942, 139 Tex. 245, 162 S.W.2d 652 (double indemnity provision terminates when coverage continues under extended insurance non-forfeiture provision), and Armstrong v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., N.D.Tex.1935, 12 F.Supp. 817 (waiver of premium provision not included under extended insurance). Cf. Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 1932, 284 U.S. 489, 52 S.Ct. 230, 76 L.Ed. 416.

The reason for the non-forfeiture provision is quite apparent. It gives the insured those values which should not and cannot be forfeited with justice. In this case the policy had accumulated a cash value of $1,700 which rightfully belonged to the Bank. This cash value *734 inures to the benefit of the owner of the policy and not to the company and permits the owner to either 1) receive the net cash value; 2) receive paid up insurance in the amount that the net cash value will purchase or 3) obtain extended term insurance for such period as the net cash value will purchase. Importantly, each option in the non-forfeiture provision is premised upon the use by the owner of the then net cash value of the policy. 6

On the other hand the conversion options may be exercised only while the policy is in force. The literal terms of the policy thus leave no life in the conversion options after lapse. The non-forfeiture provision cannot be said to resurrect the entire policy. On the contrary, it continues only the face value of the life insurance as extended term insurance. Were we to uphold the construction of the policy urged by the Bank, it would be tantamount to saying that the parties intended that upon termination of the policy for failure to timely pay a premium, the defaulting party loses no rights. It would follow that an insured, denied reinstatement because of uninsurability, would nevertheless be entitled to reinstatement through the exercise of the conversion option. The reinstatement provision would be rendered virtually meaningless. We must avoid a construction that does not give all portions of the policy meaning and effect. Jame-son v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 5 Cir. 1969, 415 F.2d 1017, 1020.

The Bank refers to two provisions in the policy, which by their terms are excluded under the extended term insurance, to argue that the absence of an express exception in the “Conversion Options” provision keeps it operative under the non-forfeiture provision. It first points to the “Loans” provision, under which the company will loan up to the cash value “[w]hile this policy is in force, except as extended term insurance.” The Bank argues that had the Company desired to limit the conversion options it should have incorporated the “except as extended term insurance” language there as it did under the “Loans” provision. But this is a semantical extrapolation that can be made only by overlooking the reason that the exceptive language was included in the Loans provision. A policy of “paid-up insurance” acquired under paragraph 2 of the non-forfeiture provisions may have a loan value, but “extended term insurance” acquired under' paragraph 3 “will continue for such period as the net cash value will purchase at the net single premium rate at the then attained age of the insured” and as term insurance has no loan value.

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Bluebook (online)
511 F.2d 731, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15043, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/first-national-bank-of-midland-trustee-v-protective-life-insurance-ca1-1975.