MILLER, Associate Justice.
Petitioner applied to the Federal Power Commission for a license to construct a power project on Cedar River in the State of Iowa. The Commission dismissed the application for the reason that, “The applicant has not presented satisfactory evidence, pursuant to Section 9(b) of the Federal Power Act,1 of compliance with the requirements of applicable laws of the State of Iowa requiring a permit from the State Executive Council to effect the purposes of a license under the Federal Power Act * *
On this appeal petitioner admits that it failed to secure a permit from Iowa and contends that it would have been futile to apply for one. The general rule is that administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial review can be availed of.2 “One who is required to take out a license will not be heard to complain, in advance of application, that there is danger of refusal. * * * He should apply and see what happens.”3
To escape the operation of this rule, petitioner argues, in the alternative, that: [1] no applicable Iowa law requires one in its position to secure a permit; [2] if the Iowa law4 means what its officials. [23] contend, then the law is unconstitutional, and compliance cannot be required. In support of its first proposition, petitioner says that the Iowa Code Sections relied upon by the Commission are not state laws contemplated by Section 9 (b) of the Power Act, because by their very terms the authority of the State Executive Council is limited to waters of the State; and because they do not prohibit diversion of water for power purposes, but only for industrial purposes. Conceivably, Iowa might say that its Legislature intended to speak only of waters navigable according to state classification, although not navigable under Federal classification.5 While this is a possible interpretation and one which the State might adopt concerning the streams here involved — especially if it were necessary to do so in order to avoid the challenge of unconstitutionality — we are unable to adopt it, in the absence of a decision to that effect by the Iowa courts. Each of the disputed Sections speaks in terms of navigable waters. In view of the fact that both State and Federal governments may legislate concerning such waters — each in its own appropriate sphere— we see no reason to give to Chapter 363 the narrow interpretation for which petitioner contends. Again, Section 7771 makes no distinction between power projects and industrial purposes. Its reference to diversion is general rather than special; in fact, it could be just as well argued that the State Legislature was speaking, in this Section, primarily of diversion for power production. Moreover, it can hardly be seriously urged that the State Legislature was concerned over industrial pollution of its streams — because of the probable injurious effect upon public health and destruction of fish and other wild life — while, at the same time, unconcerned over the possible results of complete diversion of water from its streams. The reference to pollution is, in fact, secondary to the primary requirement concerning diversion; and some diversion usually occurs in connection with power projects. Neither is it reasonable to suppose that the State was concerned only with pollution of streams navigable under state classification as distinguished from other navigable streams. We conclude that the Commission properly rejected this contention.
Petitioner’s second, alternative contention challenges the Iowa law upon the ground of unconstitutionality. It assumes that the jurisdiction of the Federal government over navigable streams, in so far as the licensing of power projects is concerned must be exclusive in nature, requiring a uniform rule of regulation and excluding, altogether, state regulatory legislation. We conclude that this contention and the assumption upon which it is based are unsound. Where Congress, while regulating related matters, has purposely left untouched a distinctive part of a subject which is peculiarly adapted to local regulation, the state may legislate concerning such local matters which Congress could have covered but did not.6 The fact that particular phases of an interstate activity have long been regulated by states, has been recognized as a strong reason why, in the continued absence of conflicting Congressional action, the state regulatory laws should be declared valid.7 The same reasoning should apply where Congress, having newly decided to enter a particular field of interstate commerce, leaves un[24] touched regulatory state laws concerning part of the area. Where the Federal law authorises state action, such action is permissible even as to matters which could otherwise be regulated only by uniform national enactments.8
In enacting the Federal Power Act, it was not the intention of Congress that the Federal government should occupy the field completely, or that the states should be excluded. On the contrary, the Act contemplates a dual system of control and the exercise of appropriate powers by the State, as well as by the Federal government.9 This is the plain purpose of Section 9 (b). It is revealed, also, by other sections of the Act.10
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MILLER, Associate Justice.
Petitioner applied to the Federal Power Commission for a license to construct a power project on Cedar River in the State of Iowa. The Commission dismissed the application for the reason that, “The applicant has not presented satisfactory evidence, pursuant to Section 9(b) of the Federal Power Act,1 of compliance with the requirements of applicable laws of the State of Iowa requiring a permit from the State Executive Council to effect the purposes of a license under the Federal Power Act * *
On this appeal petitioner admits that it failed to secure a permit from Iowa and contends that it would have been futile to apply for one. The general rule is that administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial review can be availed of.2 “One who is required to take out a license will not be heard to complain, in advance of application, that there is danger of refusal. * * * He should apply and see what happens.”3
To escape the operation of this rule, petitioner argues, in the alternative, that: [1] no applicable Iowa law requires one in its position to secure a permit; [2] if the Iowa law4 means what its officials. [23] contend, then the law is unconstitutional, and compliance cannot be required. In support of its first proposition, petitioner says that the Iowa Code Sections relied upon by the Commission are not state laws contemplated by Section 9 (b) of the Power Act, because by their very terms the authority of the State Executive Council is limited to waters of the State; and because they do not prohibit diversion of water for power purposes, but only for industrial purposes. Conceivably, Iowa might say that its Legislature intended to speak only of waters navigable according to state classification, although not navigable under Federal classification.5 While this is a possible interpretation and one which the State might adopt concerning the streams here involved — especially if it were necessary to do so in order to avoid the challenge of unconstitutionality — we are unable to adopt it, in the absence of a decision to that effect by the Iowa courts. Each of the disputed Sections speaks in terms of navigable waters. In view of the fact that both State and Federal governments may legislate concerning such waters — each in its own appropriate sphere— we see no reason to give to Chapter 363 the narrow interpretation for which petitioner contends. Again, Section 7771 makes no distinction between power projects and industrial purposes. Its reference to diversion is general rather than special; in fact, it could be just as well argued that the State Legislature was speaking, in this Section, primarily of diversion for power production. Moreover, it can hardly be seriously urged that the State Legislature was concerned over industrial pollution of its streams — because of the probable injurious effect upon public health and destruction of fish and other wild life — while, at the same time, unconcerned over the possible results of complete diversion of water from its streams. The reference to pollution is, in fact, secondary to the primary requirement concerning diversion; and some diversion usually occurs in connection with power projects. Neither is it reasonable to suppose that the State was concerned only with pollution of streams navigable under state classification as distinguished from other navigable streams. We conclude that the Commission properly rejected this contention.
Petitioner’s second, alternative contention challenges the Iowa law upon the ground of unconstitutionality. It assumes that the jurisdiction of the Federal government over navigable streams, in so far as the licensing of power projects is concerned must be exclusive in nature, requiring a uniform rule of regulation and excluding, altogether, state regulatory legislation. We conclude that this contention and the assumption upon which it is based are unsound. Where Congress, while regulating related matters, has purposely left untouched a distinctive part of a subject which is peculiarly adapted to local regulation, the state may legislate concerning such local matters which Congress could have covered but did not.6 The fact that particular phases of an interstate activity have long been regulated by states, has been recognized as a strong reason why, in the continued absence of conflicting Congressional action, the state regulatory laws should be declared valid.7 The same reasoning should apply where Congress, having newly decided to enter a particular field of interstate commerce, leaves un[24] touched regulatory state laws concerning part of the area. Where the Federal law authorises state action, such action is permissible even as to matters which could otherwise be regulated only by uniform national enactments.8
In enacting the Federal Power Act, it was not the intention of Congress that the Federal government should occupy the field completely, or that the states should be excluded. On the contrary, the Act contemplates a dual system of control and the exercise of appropriate powers by the State, as well as by the Federal government.9 This is the plain purpose of Section 9 (b). It is revealed, also, by other sections of the Act.10
Petitioner’s contention — upon the ground of unconstitutionality — depends also upon the assumption that the disputed Iowa Code Sections constitute an absolute bar to its project, hence that their effect is to defeat the jurisdiction of the Federal government and the purposes of the Power Act. This contention must be rejected, also. It is the duty of courts to avoid the issue of constitutionality if the statute which is being interpreted is susceptible of any reasonable interpretation consistent with constitutionality.11 All parties agree that Iowa’s courts have not, so far, been faced with this issue. We see several possible interpretations of the disputed Sections which would avoid the issue. For example, upon application properly made to it, the Executive Council might find the “nearest practicable place,” 12 at which the water which is to be diverted for petitioner’s project can be returned, is the point at which petitioner proposes to return it; or, perhaps, it might adopt petitioner’s suggested interpretation that Chapter 363 has no application to navigable waters of the United States. Again, it will be noted that Section 7771 is so phrased as to vest large discretion in the Executive Council. The next succeeding Section, 7772,13 is phrased in negative terms: “No permit shall be granted * * Evidently the Legislature intended that failure to secure a certificate of the State Department of Health should bar the issuance of a permit. The contrast between the two Sections is striking. While no -departure from the requirements of the second is permissible, it is entirely within the range of probability that a court would so interpret the first Section as to allow the issuance of a permit without strict compliance with all its terms; especially if it were necessary to do so in order to avoid unconstitutionality.14 In any event, as the Power Act places upon petitioner the affirmative duty of showing compliance with state laws, it must assume their constitutionality, make its application for a permit and pursue such remedies as may be available in the state, to establish its right to issuance of the permit. Until it has done so, it is in no position to challenge an order of the Commission, which is based upon its failure to do so.
On this appeal the Commission argues that the Iowa statute is invalid.15 It does so, [25] however, not on petitioner’s theory that Iowa invaded, or continued to occupy, an area absolutely prohibited to it by the Constitution, but rather that Congress, having elected to exercise, in part, the power delegated by the Commerce Clause, excluded the states from the area, proportionately to its exercise of power. It says, specifically, that the disputed Code Sections conflicted with the Power Act and were superseded by it;16 that to require petitioner’s compliance with Chapter 363 of the Iowa Code would oust the United States of jurisdiction and defeat the primary objectives of the Power Act.17
The question thus presented is a difficult one. On the one hand, it is necessary that full scope shall be given to the Power Act in order that its beneficent purposes may be achieved in the expansion of our national economic life.18 On the other hand, the established interests of the states and of their citizens must be protected and preserved so far as is possible,19 in accommodating the one to the other. To answer the question, we are required to enter an area of controversy to which the Supreme Court has referred as “the wide range of possible disagreement between Nation and state in the functioning of the Federal Power Act.” 20
The best we can do, under the circumstances, is to apply the standards which have been used by the Supreme [26] Court, in analogous cases. Summarized briefly, the generally applicable principles are as follows: [1] When the question is whether a Federal act — within admitted Federal authority — overrides a state law, the rule is clear that state action may be excluded by clear implication or inconsistency,21 just as well as by express language. In answering the question, however, the entire scheme of the statute must be considered.22 [2] The expression of a purpose to limit the exertion of state power in some respects strongly suggests that Congress intended not otherwise to trammel the exercise of state power, in the same area.23 [3] When the prohibition of state action is not specific but merely inferable from the scope and purpose of the Federal legislation, it must be clear that the Federal provisions are inconsistent with those of the state to justify the thwarting of state regulation.24 [4] Congressional intention to displace local laws in the exercise of the commerce power is not, in general, to be inferred unless clearly indicated by considerations which are persuasive of the statutory purpose.25 [5] In ascertaining the scope of such legislation, a proper adjustment of the local and national interests must be, always, in the background26 To this end the primary test to be applied is not the mechanical one of whether the particular activity affected by the state law is part of interstate commerce, or the arbitrary one of whether the Federal legislation can be stretched to cover a particular project, but, rather, whether the over-all, competing demands of the state and national interests involved can be accommodated.27 [6] The interest of the state in securing compliance with its statutes must be balanced against the effect of such control on interstate commerce in its national aspect.28
Absorption of state authority is, necessarily, a delicate exercise of legislative policy to achieve a wise adjustment between the needs of central control and the maintenance of strong local institutions.29
Where a Federal agency is authorized to invoke an overriding Federal power, except in certain prescribed situations, and then to leave the problem to traditional state control, the existence of Federal authority to act should appear affirmatively and not rest on inference alone.30 This rule is applicable to the Federal Power Commission.31
Sometimes it is the purpose of Congress, in enacting legislation for the regulation of interstate commerce, to strengthen and assist state control and regulation, rather than to impair or diminish it.32 The legislative history of the Federal Power Act reveals such an inten[27] tion.33 Consequently, we should not find in it contrary radiations, beyond the obvious meaning of its language, unless otherwise its major purpose would be defeated.34
The licensing authority of the Commission is broadly stated in the Power Act to cover projects which are “best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of waterpower development, and for other beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes; * * *” 35 To ^he extent that a state law places any obstacle in the way of that broad objective it may be said to conflict with the Power Act. But that is not enough to show that the state law has been superseded. The Commission recognizes that the Act limits its powers in some respects; that by express limitation the Act “saves” some state laws from supersedure. Its theory may be summarized as follows: [1] In enacting the Power Act, Congress assumed that the usual rules as to supersedure would apply to state laws; [2] accordingly, it was necessary to include in the Act explicit provisions to “save” those state laws which Congress wanted to leave in effect; [3] thus, Section 27 specifically provided that nothing in the Act “shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses * * *.» [Italics supplied]; [4] in contrast, Section 9 (b) of the Act merely provides for the submission of information to the Commission by an applicant for a license, i.e., satisfactory evidence that it has complied with the requirements of state laws “with respect to bed and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes * * [Italics supplied]; [5] accordingly, Section 9 (b) does not indicate any Congressional intention to “save” a state law which would otherwise be superseded by the Federal Power Act because in conflict with the objectives of the Act.
We cannot agree with the Commission’s conclusion as to the effect of Section 9 (b). This Section is the one which expresses the major intention of Congress that the States and the National Government shall participate jointly in the development and regulation of water power projects. It just as effectively “saves” state laws “with respect to bed and banks [of streams] and [with respect] to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes” as does Section 27 with respect to laws “relating to the control, appropriation, use, o’r distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses.”36 Any other interpreta[28] tion would lead to unjust, if not absurd, results.37
In recognizing and safeguarding the concurrent interest of the states in hydroelectric developments, it was not the purpose of Congress to require their consent to the construction and operation of such projects, or to give, to the states, a veto power over them. The Federal Power Act contemplates cooperative action toward a common, beneficial end. There is no reason — revealed in the Act or otherwise- — why states in which water is used primarily for irrigation should stand in any different relation to the National Government, in this respect, than states in which water is used primarily for other purposes. Consequently, if one state should, under the title of irrigation laws, provide, arbitrarily, that no Federal water power project could be constructed or operated within its boundaries, that law would be just as fatally inconsistent with the Federal Power Act as would a similar enactment, in any other state, under any -other title. On the other hand, it was not the purpose of Congress that the Commission should ride roughshod over any state, whatever the nature of its water laws, or give to a private corporation, licensed by it, the plenary power of eminent domain,38 unless that corporation had first subjected itself to the state controls which protect the rights, powers, privileges and immunities of its other citizens. Carrying petitioner’s argument to its logical conclusion, it would follow that if the Commission could be persuaded to make appropriate findings, a licensee might, by so specifying in its application, take over the State House for its headquarters office or flood the capital city for a storage basin.39
[29] In this connection the intervenor calls to our attention, as an additional reason for upholding the Commission’s order, Section 7796 of the Iowa Code which reads as follows: “Whenever the erection of any such dam will affect highways or state-owned lands, the applicant shall as a condition precedent secure a permit from the board, commission, or other official body charged with jurisdiction over and control of said highways or state-owned lands.” The intervenor says, and petitioner does not deny, that as shown in the descriptive statement of the proposed project submitted to the Power Commission, many portions of the United States and State primary highways will be flooded; that, in the event the project is constructed, those highways will have to be rerouted and reconstructed; that petitioner admits it has made no application’ for the permit required by Section 7796.40 Nothing appears in the record to excuse petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 7796. For this reason alone, therefore, the Commission’s order must stand.
But apart from Section 7796, and considering only the two Sections upon which appellant and appellee have made the case to turn, Sections 7767 and 7771, we conclude that the area of law covered thereby is so obviously within the domain of the state’s power that Congressional intention, to supersede the disputed state laws, must much more clearly appear 41 than it does in the Power Act. The maintenance of running streams, the preservation of wildlife, the rights of riparian owners, long-established land titles,42 drainage, sewage and industrial waste disposal; these and many other problems of public health and public policy are involved. These are problems which should be worked out by diplomatic adjustment of state and national interests.43 The Commission’s licensee should be an agent toward this end, rather than an [30] antagonist of the state and its other citizens.
It may be noted in passing that we are not concerned in this case with a situation in which Congress has elected to exercise the full power delegated by the Constitution.44 The present case involves no more than the expressly limited powers of a government agency to license a private corporation which seeks to operate under the restrictive provisions of the Power Act. Needless to say, no findings or decision of the Commission could enlarge the scope of the Act or increase the Commission’s power under it. It would serve no useful purpose, for example, to produce electric power — thus carrying out the beneficent objective of the Federal Power Act — if by so doing the community to be served with electricity were turned into a barren, unpopulated waste. Again, if the result of constructing a power project were to strip one state of its water in order to serve the needs of another, it would require convincing evidence of legislative intention to justify it. If Congress wished to produce such results it would speak clearly and unmistakably. On the contrary, it has required an applicant to show that he has complied with the state laws. We think it meant compliance, not information that he has failed to comply.
A situation closely analogous to that of the present case may be found in Maurer v. Hamilton45 where the Supreme Court was required to reconcile or strike down a Pennsylvania law whose purpose was to protect its people and its highways. It chose the former alternative. That case involved the Federal Motor Carrier Act46 which, in Section 204, conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to regulate “safety of operation and equipment” of motor vehicles used by carriers in interstate commerce. Section 225 of that Act reserved to the states power to regulate “sizes and weight” of motor vehicles. It was contended that the Pennsylvania statute, which prohibited the operation over its highways of any motor vehicle carrying any other vehicle over the head of the operator of such carrier vehicle, was superseded by rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission under the Motor Carrier Act. The Interstate Commerce Commission had interpreted the law in such manner as to permit such carriage. The Pennsylvania law constituted an insurmountable obstacle to it. The Supreme Court held there was no supersedure.47 The test, then, is not whether a state law happens to block action which a Federal agency may chance to approve. Instead, it is whether the [31] state law frustrates the operation of the Federal law, prevents accomplishment of its purpose, refuses to its provisions their natural effect;48 whether, in short, the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.49 If it does, then it must yield. We conclude that no such showing has been made in the present case. The Commission, properly, insisted upon a good faith effort, by its applicant, to comply with the state law.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice ARNOLD sat during the argument of this case; concurred in the result reached in this opinion, but resigned from the Court before the opinion was completed.