First Golden Bancorporation v. Weiszmann

942 F.2d 726, 1991 WL 153449
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedAugust 15, 1991
DocketNo. 89-1377
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 942 F.2d 726 (First Golden Bancorporation v. Weiszmann) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
First Golden Bancorporation v. Weiszmann, 942 F.2d 726, 1991 WL 153449 (10th Cir. 1991).

Opinion

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the appellees, third-party defendants in the action below. The third-party defendants were impleaded under Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a) after the appellant, the third-party plaintiff, was made a defendant in a suit to recover short-swing profits under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)). The primary case settled. The district court than granted summary judgment in favor of the third-party defendants on all the third-party claims. This appeal followed. We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

FACTS

Appellant in this case, Ronald Weisz-mann, was the third party-plaintiff in the action below. He had acquired stock in First Golden Bancorporation, the original [728]*728plaintiff, as a result of a tender offer he had made for First Golden Stock. He ultimately sold his First Golden stock, and First Golden alleged that the sale was within six months of the time he acquired it, thus, making Weiszmann liable under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the profits from the sale. First Golden sued Weiszmann to recover the resultant short-swing profit. Weiszmann, in turn, brought counterclaims against First Golden and initiated a third-party complaint against the appellees: Morgan Stanley and its representative Timothy Taebel, who acted as Weiszmann’s financial advisor during the course of the section 16(b) violation, and Lindner Management, the eventual purchaser of the stock. His third-party complaint was based on seven different claims: 1) indemnity; 2) outrageous conduct; 3) breach of contract; 4) fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 5) controlling person liability; 6) principal-agent liability; and 7) negligent misrepresentation. The relief he sought in the third-party complaint was, inter alia, indemnification for any liability he may have to First Golden, reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred to defend that lawsuit, and a recovery of commissions and profit realized by Morgan Stanley from the sale of the stock.

Claims two and three of the third-party complaint — claims for outrageous conduct and breach of contract — were eventually dismissed by the district court,1 and the case was set for trial. Thereafter, First Golden and Weiszmann settled the primary lawsuit on terms that Weiszmann did not pay any money to First Golden but he was required to dismiss his counterclaims against First Golden. The third-party defendants then moved for summary judgment on all of Weiszmann’s remaining third-party claims. The district court granted the summary judgment motion and dismissed all the third-party claims with prejudice. The court dismissed Weisz-mann’s first claim for indemnity because it held, as a matter of law, that there was no right to indemnity for liability under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The court dismissed the remaining third-party claims because it held that We-iszmann had settled First Golden’s claims against him without incurring any liability or paying any damages to First Golden, and thus, there was no underlying liability upon which Weiszmann could predicate third-party claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a). The court indicated that a third-party action can be maintained under Rule 14(a) only for claims where the third-party defendant is asserted to be secondarily liable to the third-party plaintiff for the third-party plaintiff’s liability to the plaintiff.

ANALYSIS

I. No Indemnity For Section 16(b) Violations

We agree with the district court that the third-party defendants were “entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Weiszmann’s first claim for indemnity.” Courts have rejected indemnity for a variety of securities violations because indemnity contravened “the public policy enunciated by the federal securities laws.” A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, 2 Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud, § 5.7 (277), at 5:82:78. See also King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1281-82 (7th Cir.1989); Stewart v. American Int’l. Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir.1988); Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Inv. Servs., 641 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir.1981); Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, sub nom., Frank v. U.S. Trust Co. of New York, 452 U.S. 963, 101 S.Ct. 3114, 69 L.Ed.2d 975 (1981); Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288-89 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913, 90 S.Ct. 913, 25 L.Ed.2d 93 (1970); Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F.Supp. 540, 549 (D.Colo.1989), dismissed without opinion, 936 F.2d 582, (10th Cir.) (appeal dismissed as moot). Thus, one court has explained that

“Congress did not promulgate the 1933 and 1934 Acts to protect the parties who violate the Acts' provisions. In fact, the immediate concern of Congress was not [729]*729to insure that parties injured by fraudulent activities were reimbursed but rather was to prevent future fraudulent activity. The United States in 1933 and 1934 was in the midst of a prolonged period of depression which Congress believed was caused in large part by excessive stock market speculation. Congress imposed civil liability on offenders of the Acts because experience had shown that criminal liability alone was insufficient to deter further wrongdoing. Some courts that have interpreted the 1933 and 1934 Acts have already concluded that providing a right to indemnity would undermine the deterrent purpose of the Acts.”

In re Olympia Brewing Co. Securities Litig., 674 F.Supp. 597, 612-13 (N.D.Ill.1987) (citations omitted).

We find that these general concerns are also applicable to indemnification in section 16(b) cases, even though section 16(b) does not require proof of fraudulent intent. Section 16(b) is a prophylactic anti-fraud statute. The policy behind section 16(b) was to deter transactions which have a high potential for fraud. However, Congress determined that it was not practical to require proof of improper intent or scienter in cases of insider trading, and thus, section 16(b) was written to impose strict liability. That Congress felt the most effective way to deter fraud in this area was through use of strict liability does not, however, minimize the purpose behind the statute to prevent fraudulent trading based upon improper insider information or manipulation.

In relevant part, section 16(b) reads:

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