First Carolina Financial Corp. v. Trustee of Estate of Caron (In Re Caron)

50 B.R. 27, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1137, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 4546
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedNovember 24, 1984
Docket16-70141
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 50 B.R. 27 (First Carolina Financial Corp. v. Trustee of Estate of Caron (In Re Caron)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
First Carolina Financial Corp. v. Trustee of Estate of Caron (In Re Caron), 50 B.R. 27, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1137, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 4546 (Ga. 1984).

Opinion

*28 OPINION

WILLIAM L. NORTON, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is a “Motion for Entry of Consent Order” and a proposed consent order to direct the trustee to abandon property, in this situation a mobile home. The motion for consent order and consent order have been filed by the First Carolina Financial Corporation, an alleged secured creditor of the debtor, allegedly holding a valid and perfected first priority security interest in the amount of $19,000 on a 1983 Horton Mobile Home in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. The proposed consent order is signed by the attorney for the movant creditor and the trustee-and also signed by the attorney for the debtor.

There are some procedural problems with the motion and order. The erroneous procedure proposed here by the movant is a recurring one despite the instructions of 11 U.S.C. § 554 and Bankruptcy Rule 6007.

First, the proposed order makes a finding that the movant has a valid security interest in debtor’s personal property in “approximately” the amount of $19,000 and the property is to be abandoned to that lien holder. Besides being vague and imprecise, such a judicial finding of the proper lien holder and creditor entitled to possession is not allowed in an abandonment motion under Bankruptcy Rule 6007(b). The procedure under Rule 6007 does not permit a judicial determination of validity and extent of a lien which procedure is governed by Rule 7001(2) adversary proceeding pro *29 cedure. Nor can abandonment procedure be used to determine legal posession of the abandoned property. Abandonment of property may not be made to a particular creditor.

Second, the “Motion for Entry of Consent Order” has not been served upon all creditors as required by Rule 6007.

Third, no motion been made to the Court for an order specifying a limited number of parties in interest to whom this motion to abandon should be served.

NOTIFICATION TO PARTIES IN INTEREST

This motion is one illustration of the many filings in this Court of motions by secured creditors to require the trustee to abandon property where the proposed consent order shows the consent of both the debtor and the creditor and the motion for the proposed consent order is not served on anyone else. Thus, only the debtor, trustee and alleged secured creditor know about the abandonment. Such cooperative consent between the creditor, the debtor, and the trustee actually short circuits the required procedure of notifying “all creditors, indenture trustees and committees” and allowing such parties in interest sufficient time to file an objection as is required under Rule 6007(a), (b) and (c). 1 The fact that Subdivision (b) of the rule permits a creditor to file a motion 2 for abandonment does not cancel the notification requirement specified in Subdivision (a). Even where the trustee determines that the property is of inconsequential value or burdensome to the estate, the trustee is required under Subdivision (a) to give notice of the proposed abandonment to all creditors. Although the Advisory Committee Notes on Subdivision (b) states that “The rule specifies that the request be by motion and, pursuant to the Code, lists the parties who should receive notice” (emphasis supplied), the only reference in the rule to specifying persons who should receive the Rule 6007(b) motion is in Subdivisions (a) and (c).

Here both the trustee and the debtor agreed in advance to the motion of the party in interest for abandonment. Does that mean that no other parties in interest need be given notice of this Motion for Abandonment? This Court answers in the negative. The Court holds that the consent of the creditor, the trustee and the debtor together in the motion cannot be used to circumvent the notification to all creditors as provided in the rule. A Rule 6007(b) motion by a party in interest agreed to by the trustee (and the debtor) is the equivalent of the trustee making a motion under Subdivision (a) of Rule 6007 to abandon the property. Subdivision (a) specifically requires notice to all parties in interest. Subdivision (c) gives the judge discretion upon a proper separate motion in respect to a Subdivision (b) motion to limit and designate which parties in interest *30 shall receive notification of the motion. There is no less reason that all parties in interest should receive notification of the Rule 6007(b) motion of a party in interest to require the trustee to abandon property than there is for all parties in interest to receive notification of the Rule 6007(a) notice of the trustee to abandon property. The purpose of the notification to parties in interest is to provide an opportunity for any potential opposition to the abandonment of such property to file objections and be heard by the Court. Subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 6007 seem to assume that a party in interest out there somewhere may argue that the property is not of inconsequential value or burdensome to the estate, although the trustee and the debtor may have agreed to that conclusion by endorsing the motion of a creditor to abandon. Those hypothetical parties in interest must have an opportunity to object and be heard. Hence, a reading of Subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of Bankruptcy Rule 6007 persuades this Court that a motion by a party in interest to require the trustee to abandon property requires notification to all parties in interest or to such parties in interest that the Court may direct.

There is a fundamental distinction between Subsection (a) of 554, implemented by Rule 6007(a), and Subsection (b) of 554, implemented by Rule 6007(b). Subdivision (a) involves a conclusion of fact by the trustee that the property has no realizable value to the estate. Thus, the notice procedure of Rule 6007(a) presumes and contemplates that there will be no opposition to require judicial consideration. Only if a timely objection is filed within the period provided in the Notice will a hearing be held and judicial consideration be applied to the issue raised in the objection. An analysis of the rules package reveals that the trustee Notice procedure of Rule 6007(a) initiates a non-judicial proceeding. This non-judicial proceeding, which perhaps should be called an administrative proceeding, continues as such to consummation of the proposed sale unless an objection is timely filed. 3

While neither the rules package nor the Advisory Committee Notes to the August 1, 1983 Bankruptcy Rules explain the philosophy or policy of the procedures established by the several rules, an analysis of the package reveals that there are two fundamental different classifications of proceedings within a Title 11 case. We know that everything which occurs in a Title 11 case is a proceeding. See Senate Report and House Report quoted in the Annual Survey of Bankruptcy Law 1984, P. 5.

One class of proceeding is judicial proceedings. There are several kinds of judicial proceedings headed by: i.e. (1) adversary proceeding 3a

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cook v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
520 F. App'x 697 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)
Powers v. Dankof
2011 Ohio 6180 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2011)
McLynas v. Karr, Unpublished Decision (7-8-2004)
2004 Ohio 3597 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2004)
In Re Kasper
309 B.R. 82 (District of Columbia, 2004)
First Georgia Bank v. FNB South (In Re Moody)
277 B.R. 858 (S.D. Georgia, 2001)
In Re Pilz Compact Disc, Inc.
229 B.R. 630 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1999)
In Re Manchester Heights Associates, L.P.
165 B.R. 42 (W.D. Missouri, 1994)
In Re Argiannis
156 B.R. 683 (M.D. Florida, 1993)
In Re Gain Electronics Corp.
117 B.R. 805 (D. New Jersey, 1990)
In Re Jandous Electric Construction Corp.
96 B.R. 462 (S.D. New York, 1989)
In Re Gantt
98 B.R. 770 (S.D. Ohio, 1989)
In Re Wideman
84 B.R. 97 (W.D. Texas, 1988)
In Re RB-Co., Inc. of Bossier
59 B.R. 43 (W.D. Louisiana, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
50 B.R. 27, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1137, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 4546, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/first-carolina-financial-corp-v-trustee-of-estate-of-caron-in-re-caron-ganb-1984.