First American Title Co. v. Design Builders, Inc. (In Re Design Builders, Inc.)

18 B.R. 392, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2812, 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 793
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Idaho
DecidedOctober 8, 1981
Docket19-40171
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 18 B.R. 392 (First American Title Co. v. Design Builders, Inc. (In Re Design Builders, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
First American Title Co. v. Design Builders, Inc. (In Re Design Builders, Inc.), 18 B.R. 392, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2812, 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 793 (Idaho 1981).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

MERLIN S. YOUNG, Bankruptcy Judge.

Design Builders, Inc. filed a petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Code on November 28, 1979; this proceeding was converted to a chapter 7 in October, 1980. First American Title Company, as plaintiff, filed the instant interpleader action on May 19, 1981. See Rule 722, FRCP 22(1). The corpus interpleaded consists of the proceeds of the sale of three parcels of land: Lot 5, Block 1, Stone Tree Subdivision, Mountain Home, Idaho; Lot 3, Block 3, Summerwind # 2 Subdivision, Mountain Home, Idaho; and Lot 4, Block 1, En Casa Villa Subdivision, Mountain Home, Idaho. A fourth parcel was sold but from which no proceeds are available for distribution through this proceeding.

The matter is before the court upon the trustee’s motion for summary judgment declaring certain mechanic’s and material-men’s liens against the subject property, and hence the proceeds from their sale, to be avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 545. The question was submitted upon briefs by agreement of the parties at pretrial conference.

The trustee’s motion seeks to avoid the following claimed liens under Section 545:

1. A to Z Lumber & Coal Company, Inc.
2. Redford Electric, Inc.
3. Intermountain West Insulation
4. Overhead Door Co. of S.W. Idaho, Inc.
5. Robert Baum dba Baum’s Heating and Air Conditioning.
6. Boise Cascade Corporation (James W. Carrie and E. Sharlene Carrie, substituted parties).

The contested lien claims are for material supplied and labor furnished and are “statutory liens” as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(38). Specifically, the trustee contends that they are unperfected or unenforceable against him. Section 545 provides:

“The trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor to the extent that such lien—
... (2) is not perfected or enforceable on the date of the filing of the petition against a bona fide purchaser that purchases such property on the date of the filing of the petition, whether or not such a purchaser exists; ...”

In Idaho such statutory liens arise in the following manner. A right to lien is established by statute in I.C. § 45-501. 1 This *394 lien becomes enforceable by subsequent judicial foreclosure after the filing of a notice of claim of lien with the county recorder for the county in which the property supplied labor or material is situated. This claim of lien must be filed within a specified statutory period. I.C. § 45-507 2 ; Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 539 P.2d 590 (1975); Weeter Lumber Company v. Fales, 20 Idaho 255, 118 P. 289 (1911). Accord, Nohrnberg v. Boley, 42 Idaho 48, 246 P. 12 (1925) (re: farm laborers’ liens). The effective date of the lien is the date on which the lienor commenced to work or furnish materials. 1.C. § 45-506; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. First Security Bank, 94 Idaho 489, 491 P.2d 1261 (1971).

Section 545 is limited in its operation by § 546(b), which provides:

“The rights and powers of the trustee under section 544, 545, or 549 of this title are subject to any generally applicable law that permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of such perfection. If such law requires seizure of such property or commencement of an action to accomplish such perfection, and such property has not been seized or such action has not been commenced before the date of the filing of the petition, such interest in such property shall be perfected by notice within the time fixed by such law for such seizure or commencement.”

Here all contested liens were filed for record in November and December, 1979, within the statutory filing period. Though some such filings were subsequent to the petition for relief under chapter 11, the first sentence of § 546(b) allows such filing as against the trustee’s avoiding powers since that filing causes the lien to relate back in time to the date of commencement of supplying of labor or material. Such lien claimants could file and perfect their liens without violating the automatic stay. See § 362(b)(3). The contested liens are thus perfected and valid as against the trustee under § 545 unless Idaho law requires an additional act for perfection, which would require the notice provided for in the second sentence of § 546(b).

The trustee contends that such notice is required because I.C. § 45-510 3 requires the commencement of proceedings to enforce the lien in a proper court within six months after the lien claim has been filed or the lien is lost. Although the Idaho *395 Supreme Court has held in Willes v. Palmer, 78 Idaho 104, 298 P.2d 972 (1956) that this statute is something more than an ordinary statute of limitation, I conclude that commencement of an action under I.C. § 45-510 is not an element of “perfection” as that term is used in §§ 545 and 546, but is merely a time limitation on enforcement which is tolled by 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) of the Code, which provides:

“(c) Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if applicable law, an order entered in a proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor, or against an individual with respect to which such individual is protected under section 1301 of this title, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period does not expire until the later of—
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; and
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay under section 362, 922, or 1301 of this title, as the case may be, with respect to such claim.” (Emphasis Added).

Section 362(c) establishes that the stay operates until closing, dismissal, or discharge.

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Bluebook (online)
18 B.R. 392, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2812, 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 793, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/first-american-title-co-v-design-builders-inc-in-re-design-builders-idb-1981.