Firestone v. Rice

38 N.W. 885, 71 Mich. 377, 1888 Mich. LEXIS 626
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 11, 1888
StatusPublished
Cited by41 cases

This text of 38 N.W. 885 (Firestone v. Rice) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Firestone v. Rice, 38 N.W. 885, 71 Mich. 377, 1888 Mich. LEXIS 626 (Mich. 1888).

Opinion

Morse, J.

This suit was brought to recover damages for false imprisonment and assault and battery upon the plaintiff, alleged to have taken place on the night of August 6, 1885. Eice, at the time, was sheriff of Allegan county, and Fenn was night-watch of the village of Allegan. The arrest , occurred in the township of Monterey, in that county. Upon the trial it appeared that Fenn was requested by the sheriff to aid him in the arrest, and did nothing except as ordered by the sheriff. The chief indignity complained of was the handcuffing of plaintiff. Fenn put the handcuffs upon him by direction of the sheriff, who had in his charge at the time one Zeigler, who was arrested at the same time and place as the, plaintiff.

^The court instructed the jury that if Fenn knew that Eice was sheriff, and acted in obedience to his orders, and only upon his orders, in what he did touching the arrest, he would be justified in so doing, even though the acts of Eice were without authority, and their verdict, as to Fenn, should be no cause of action.

Under the laws of this State, a private citizen is bound, upon the order of the sheriff, to assist in the arrest, and he is not authorized to wait to ascertain the authority of the officer before acting; and unless his act in itself is in some way wanton, and beyond what he is required to do, and thereby a trespass is committed, he will not be liable, and for that reason I give you this request.”

The jury rendered a verdict in favor of both defendants.

[The plaintiff alleges error in the charge of the court as above given. There was no error in this direction. It is admitted that Fenn did nothing in wantonness. or in [380]*380njalice. He went to the house of Zeigler, where the arrest was made, at the request of the sheriff, and while there, under his direction, placed handcuffs upon plaintiff, and rode beside him in a buggy to Allegan. The ■court would have been warranted in directing a verdict in Fenn’s favor.

The sheriff is authorized to call upon citizens to aid him in apprehending or securing any person for felony or breach of the peace (How. Stat. § 591); and, if any person so required to assist the sheriff neglect or refuse to ■do so, he is liable to punishment by fine or imprisonment (How. Stat. § 9250).

We do not think that' a man called upon by the sheriff is required, at his peril, to ascertain whether the sheriff has a proper warrant, or whether the offense charged ■against the- person to be arrested is a felony, or that he may refuse to act until he is satisfied that the sheriff is acting legally, or within the scope of his office, in a criminal case. If he were allowed to do this, the object of the law would be defeated, and the statute rendered nugatory in many cases. There is often no time for inquiry, as action must be immediate. The necessity of the case will not. permit the person thus summoned to stop to examine papers, or take counsel as to the legality of the process in the officer’s hands, or to inquire whether any process is necessary in the particular case where his aid is required.

.Therefore the person who responds to the call of one whom he knows to be an officer is protected by the call from being sued for rendering the requisite assistance. The officer may not be acting legally,' and therefore a trespasser;.but the person assisting him, at his request or command, and who relies upon his official character and call, is protected by the law, and must necessarily be, against suits for trespass and false imprisonment, if in [381]*381his acts he confines himself to the order and direction of the sheriff. McMahan v. Green, 34 Vt. 69; Reed v. Rice, 2 J. J. Marsh. 44.

The plaintiff and Zeigler were arrested for the commission of a statutory offense, under section 9168, How. Stat., which reads as follows:

“Every person who shall willfully and maliciously break down, injure, remove, or destroy any dam, reservoir, canal, or trench, or any gate, flume, flash-boards, or other appurtenances thereof, or,any levee or structure for the purpose of conveying water to any such dam or reservoir, or any of the wheels, mill-gear, or machinery of any mill, or shall willfully or wantonly, without color of right,' draw off the water contained in any mill-pond, reservoir, canal, or trench, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison not more than five years, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars and imprisonment in the county jail not more than one year."

The sheriff had a warrant against Zeigler, but none against the plaintiff.

It is claimed by the counsel for the plaintiff that this statutory crime is not a felony, but a misdemeanor, and the circuit judge was requested to so instruct the jury, and to further direct them that, therefore, the arrest of plaintiff was unwarranted and illegal, as no lawful arrest could be made without process. The court refused to comply with this request, and charged the jury that the offense was a felony under the laws of this State. Under the statute and the previous decisions of this Court, we think that whenever a statute punishes an offense by imprisonment in the State prison, unless it is expressly declared by the statute to be a misdemeanor, such offense must be considered and treated as a felony, as regards the right of an officer to arrest without process. See How. Stat. § 9430; People v. Brigham, 2 Mich. 550; Shannon v. People, 5 Id. 71; People v. Bristol, 23 Id. 118; People v. Sweeney, 55 Id. 589 (22 N. W. Rep. 50); Drennan v. [382]*382People, 10 Id. 169; People v. Donald, 48 Id. 493 (12 N. W. Rep. 669).

The counsel for the plaintiff also claim that the sheriff, under the circumstances, had no right to handcuff the prisoners; that the same was an unnecessary indignity and an outrage; and that the plaintiff, by reason of riding handcuffed in a buggy for several miles over a rough and jolting road in the night-time, received injuries to his health and person, from which he suffered for a long space of time. And they complain of the charge of the court in this respect.

The court was requested to direct the jury as follows:

“If you find, from the evidence in this case, that the defendants put handcuffs on the plaintiff, and compelled him to go a long distance with them on, and that plaintiff in no way attempted to escape when arrested, and offered no resistance at any time, then I charge you that defendants would be guilty of assault and battery on the plaintiff, and would be liable to him for such an amount in damages as, under all the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff ought to recover.
“When a person is arrested for the commission of a supposed crime, and is taken and held for trial or examination, as the case may be, the prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity, and at the time -of arrest, and during his being taken to prison, should not be fettered or handcuffed, nor subjected to any other hardships than such as are absolutely necessary for the purpose of safe-keeping and confinement under the arrest; and an officer is not justified in handcuffing a prisoner unless he is unruly, or attempts to escape, or is a notoriously bad character, or does something indicating a necessity on the part of the officer to restrain him by handcuffing.

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Bluebook (online)
38 N.W. 885, 71 Mich. 377, 1888 Mich. LEXIS 626, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/firestone-v-rice-mich-1888.