Firefighters Inc. for Racial Equality v. Bach

731 F.2d 664, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1005, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 23901, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,297
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedApril 3, 1984
DocketNos. 82-1612, 82-1613 and 82-1687
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 731 F.2d 664 (Firefighters Inc. for Racial Equality v. Bach) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Firefighters Inc. for Racial Equality v. Bach, 731 F.2d 664, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1005, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 23901, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,297 (10th Cir. 1984).

Opinion

McKAY, Circuit Judge.

This is an employment discrimination action. Defendants 1 appeal the trial court’s judgment, 522 F.Supp. 1120, that the promotion practices of the Denver City Fire Department have a discriminatory impact on minority firefighters. The trial court, without determining whether the com[666]*666plained practices were part of a bona fide seniority or merit system, found that the seniority and day-to-day employment practices of the Department violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). Because we find that the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard, we reverse its judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

This case concerns allegations of racially motivated discriminatory practices by the Denver City and County Fire Department. Plaintiffs, Firefighters Incorporated for Racial Equality (F.I.R.E.), a not for profit organization, and several Denver firefighters of Mexican-American and Black descent brought this class action on behalf of all Mexican-American and Black firefighters in the Department. They alleged that defendants’ maintained racially discriminatory promotion practices in the promotion of journeymen to higher positions such as engineer, lieutenant, captain, secretary, and assistant chief and that these practices have an impermissibly disparate impact on minorities. Hence, they alleged, the Department was in violation of Section 703(a) of Title VII.2 Particularly, plaintiffs challenged the requirement that a firefighter have four years experience before becoming eligible to apply for a lieutenant position, and, also, the Department’s practice of awarding credit for seniority in rating applicants for promotion. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that such practices were illegal and an injunction ordering various changes in defendants’ promotion practices. The trial court granted plaintiffs’ requested relief.

II. Title VII Claim

Title VII was designed “to assure equality of employment opportunities.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Additionally, in enacting Title VII Congress sought to “remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30, 91 S.Ct. 849, 852-53, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). To achieve these goals Congress “proscrib[ed] not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” Id. at 431, 91 S.Ct. at 853. In Griggs, the Court expanded the definition of discrimination in Title VII cases beyond the accepted notions of purposeful or intentional conduct. The Court held that “practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory practices.” Id. at 430, 91 S.Ct. at 853. Thus, Griggs established a difference in judicial treatment be[667]*667tween discriminatory “impact” and discriminatory “treatment” cases.3

The trial court sub judice recognized the distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. Record, vol. 1, at 34-35. However, it erroneously held that “the seniority credits and benefits must be analyzed under the disparate impact theory while the employment practices must be analyzed under the disparate treatment theory.” Id. at 35. While the record is ambiguous4 as to whether the trial court found any, all, or some of the alleged discriminatory acts before it to be part of a seniority system, it is clear that the court never determined whether the Department’s alleged discriminatory promotion practices were part of a bona fide seniority or merit system which would require a different standard of proof under Title VII. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355-56, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1864-65, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). The trial court failed to apply the doctrine of Teamsters, as clarified by the Supreme Court in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982), and Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982), discussed hereafter.

III. Section 703(h)

A. A Defense to a Section 703(a) Action.

Title VII’s treatment of seniority systems carves out an exception to the general principle that facially neutral employment practices require no proof of a discriminatory motive in order to fall as violative of the Act. Section 703(h) provides in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, ... provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the re-[668]*668suits is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis added). The Court in Teamsters recognized that “an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 353-54, 97 S.Ct. at 1863-64. The legislative history of Title VII illustrates that Congress made it clear that a seniority system is not unlawful because it honors employees’ existing rights, even where the employer has engaged in pre-Act discriminatory promotion practices. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 72-75, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1539-41, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982). The Court in Teamsters held that the plaintiffs could only attack the seniority system upon proof that the system was adopted with the intent to discriminate. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 354-56, 97 S.Ct. at 1864-65. Teamsters stands for the proposition that section 703(h) protects a seniority system which would have otherwise fallen under Griggs if that system is bona fide.

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731 F.2d 664, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1005, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 23901, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,297, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/firefighters-inc-for-racial-equality-v-bach-ca10-1984.