Finfrock v. Yuma Regional Medical Center

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: August 28, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00998
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Mariah Finfrock, No. CV-23-00998-PHX-KML

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Yuma Regional Medical Center,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Defendant Yuma Regional Medical Center (“YRMC”) fired plaintiff Mariah 16 Finfrock after denying her a religious exemption to its vaccine mandate. (Doc. 1-3 at 3–4.) 17 In March 2023, Finfrock filed this suit in state court alleging state and federal claims. (Doc. 18 1-3 at 4–6.) The case was removed to federal court and, in November 2024, dismissed for 19 failure to prosecute. (Doc. 32.) Approximately six months later, Finfrock filed a motion to 20 reopen arguing the dismissal was due to her former lawyer’s health issues in the fall of 21 2024. Based on the arguments Finfrock presents, she is not entitled to relief. 22 I. Background 23 This lawsuit was removed from state court on June 2, 2023, and the court later set 24 August 16, 2024, as the deadline for all discovery. (Doc. 12.) YRMC issued discovery 25 requests but Finfrock failed to respond to those requests for months and, when responses 26 were provided months late, they were incomplete. The court issued multiple orders 27 beginning in early September, attempting to spur Finfrock into participating in discovery 28 and prosecuting her case. (Docs. 23, 27, 30.) One of these, issued October 1, 2024, noted 1 Finfrock’s failure to participate in discovery and gave her “a limited time to establish she 2 wishes to pursue her claims” to avoid dismissal by providing complete discovery responses 3 and sitting for her deposition. (Doc. 27 at 1-2.) Finfrock’s last response occurred September 4 13, 2024, and by November 2024, it was clear she was no longer responding to court orders. 5 On November 20, 2024, the court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. (Doc. 32.) 6 On May 8, 2025, Finfrock filed a motion to reopen arguing her counsel’s health problems 7 at the time the case was dismissed qualified as “extraordinary circumstances” that merit 8 reopening the case. 9 According to the motion to reopen, “beginning in early October 2024,” Finfrock’s 10 counsel Lynn Goar “began suffering from an illness that affected both his physical health 11 and mental aptitude . . . that caused him to be bedridden and unable to work.” (Doc. 35 at 12 7.) Goar’s illness allegedly prevented him from complying with this court’s orders 13 requiring the production of documents and that he respond to YRMC’s final motion to 14 dismiss. Although Goar was allegedly too ill to take any actions in this case, he was still 15 participating—at least minimally—in other litigation during the fall and winter of 2024. 16 On October 3, 2024, Goar filed a complaint in the Pima County Superior Court on 17 behalf of a different plaintiff. See Marien v. City of Tucson, Case No. C20245948 (Pima 18 Cnty. Sup. Ct. 2024) (docket and settlement conference order) [https://perma.cc/UD66- 19 DQ9Z]. And on December 4, 2024, Goar attended a status conference in a different case 20 in this district. See Gauthier v. Whirlpool Corporation, 2:23-cv-02552-MTL, ECF No. 28. 21 Goar later participated in the filing of a joint status report in that case. See Gauthier v. 22 Whirlpool Corporation, 2:23-cv-02552-MTL, ECF No. 29. That joint status indicated Goar 23 was experiencing health difficulties, and a new attorney would be appearing for the 24 plaintiff. Gauthier v. Whirlpool Corporation, 2:23-cv-02552-MTL, ECF No. 29. Goar then 25 attended a second status conference on December 13. Gauthier v. Whirlpool Corporation, 26 2:23-cv-02552-MTL, ECF No. 30. Although he was able to perform at least these limited 27 actions in other cases, Goar did not take any actions regarding Finfrock’s case. 28 According to Goar, he worked a total of 39.75 hours between October 1, 2024, and 1 March 31, 2025, mostly “trying to get all active cases transferred to other attorneys.” (Doc. 2 35 at 25.) Goar does not specify when within that six-month timeframe he was able to work 3 those hours. Nor does he explain why Finfrock’s case was not one of those he tried to 4 transfer to another attorney or why he did not devote any of the limited hours he worked to 5 Finfrock’s case. On March 24, 2025, Goar resigned from the law firm that was representing 6 Finfrock at the time this case was dismissed and which continues to represent her today. 7 (Doc. 35 at 10.) That same day, a new attorney at the law firm learned of Finfrock’s case 8 and a few months later filed a motion to reopen. 9 II. Legal Standard 10 A party moving for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “must demonstrate both injury and 11 circumstances beyond [her] control that prevented [her] from proceeding with the action 12 in a proper fashion.” Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th 13 Cir. 2006). The rule “is to be ‘used sparingly . . . and is to be utilized only where 14 extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or 15 correct an erroneous judgment.” Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2008) 16 (quoting Latshaw, 452. F.3d at 1103). 17 III. Analysis 18 Finfrock’s briefing in connection with her motion to reopen is confusing, but her 19 motion explicitly states she “does not seek relief based on any of the enumerated reasons 20 in subsections (1) through (5) of Rule 60(b) as none apply to her set of facts.” (Doc. 35 at 21 12.) Having established she seeks relief only under Rule 60(b)(6), Finfrock then recognizes 22 such relief is merited in “extraordinary circumstances.” (Doc. 35 at 12.) Elsewhere, she 23 expressly disavows seeking relief “based on extraordinary circumstances created by 24 attorney gross negligence.” (Doc. 39 at 6.) Those concessions leave Finfrock only to argue 25 that “an attorney illness itself,” although not amounting to gross negligence or total 26 incapacity, “constitute[s] an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ for purposes of F.R.C.P. Rule 27 60(b)(6).” (Doc. 35 at 14.)1 In other words, Finfrock argues “[t]his is not a case of excusable

28 1 Finfrock states “attorney gross negligence is not excusable neglect and is therefore precluded from being offered as a reason for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).” (Doc. 39 at 8.) It 1 neglect nor gross negligence but one of extraordinary circumstances,” based solely on 2 Goar’s not-fully-incapacitating illness. (Doc. 39 at 8.) 3 Having waived or forfeited all arguments other than non-incapacitating “attorney 4 illness” under Rule 60(b)(6), Finfrock is not entitled to relief. See United States v. Scott, 5 705 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or 6 abandonment of a known right, whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion 7 of [that] right.”) (simplified); see also Lender v. Unum Life Insurance Company of 8 America, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1219 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (plaintiff “affirmatively waived 9 any argument of excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1)”). 10 “An attorney’s actions are typically chargeable to his or her client and do not 11 ordinarily constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting relief from judgment under 12 Rule 60(b)(6).” Lal, 610 F.3d at 524. Finfrock believes attorney illness that falls short of 13 gross negligence should be an exception to this general rule. In support of this position, she 14 cites federal district court cases from Florida and New York, as well as one opinion by the 15 Second Circuit.2 A review of those cases shows each either required the plaintiff personally 16 show diligence despite counsel’s failures—a showing Finfrock has not made—or analyzed 17 the motion under a “gross negligence” standard—which Finfrock explicitly does not wish 18 to pursue. 19 The three Florida district court cases Finfrock cites all involved attorney failures 20 that led to the dismissal of the cases or claims. (See Doc. 35 at 17.) All three recognized 21 the plaintiff needed to establish she had been diligent. In Lender, the plaintiff’s case had 22 been dismissed for failure to prosecute after plaintiff’s counsel—who was allegedly in poor 23 is not entirely clear what Finfrock is attempting to argue because the test under Rule 24 60(b)(6) is not for “excusable neglect” but for “extraordinary circumstances.” To the extent Finfrock is arguing gross negligence cannot support Rule 60(b)(6) relief, she is incorrect. 25 “[A]n attorney’s gross negligence resulting in dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute constitutes an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ under Rule 60(b)(6) warranting 26 relief from judgment.” Lal v. Cal., 610 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 2010). 2 Finfrock also cites numerous cases from Arizona state courts, relying particularly heavily 27 on Walker v. Kendig, 489 P.2d 849 (Ariz. 1971). (Doc. 35 at 15-16.) Walker addressed Arizona’s counterpart to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), allowing for relief based on “excusable 28 neglect.” Finfrock does not argue she is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1), making Walker’s discussion regarding illness establishing “excusable neglect” irrelevant. 1 health—had failed to participate in the case. 519 F. Supp. 2d at 1219. When the plaintiff 2 sought relief under Rule 60(b)(6), she explained that while the case was still pending, she 3 had attempted to phone her counsel “on several occasions, tried to obtain [counsel’s] home 4 telephone number, drove by [counsel’s] office, and spoke with [counsel] at church.” Id. at 5 1225. The court found those actions and others qualified as sufficient diligence and when 6 combined with the counsel’s illness, the plaintiff was entitled to relief. Id. 7 Similarly, in Rodriguez v. Best Candle, No. 04-20932-CIV, 2006 WL 8433130, at 8 *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2006), the case had been dismissed because the plaintiff’s counsel had 9 not participated due to being “gravely ill.” While the case was pending, the plaintiff made 10 numerous phone calls to his counsel’s office and received “reassurances . . . that the case 11 was moving along and that he would be called if his assistance was needed.” Id. at *4. In 12 the circumstances of that case, the attorney’s illness and the plaintiff’s “reasonable efforts 13 at keeping tabs on his case” led the court to grant Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Id. 14 Finally, in Dickens v. Pepperidge Farm Inc., No. 8:19-CV-2529-TPB-AEP, 2021 15 WL 2814903, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2021), the plaintiff’s counsel had failed to file an 16 amended complaint when it was due because counsel’s “life was literally falling apart.” In 17 later seeking relief, the plaintiff explained that after being unable to reach her counsel, she 18 twice “telephone[d] the Court’s chambers to advise that she could not reach her attorney 19 and she was concerned about [an upcoming] deadline.” Id. The plaintiff also “personally 20 appeared” at a hearing “to inform the Court that she had not been able to communicate 21 with her counsel.” Id. at *1. The court concluded these acts established plaintiff had “acted 22 diligently.” Id. at *2. That diligence combined with counsel’s illness meant the plaintiff 23 was entitled to relief. 24 Setting aside that Goar’s illness likely did not approach the level of incapacitation 25 described in any of these cases, Finfrock did not present any evidence of her personal 26 diligence in pursuing her claims. There is no evidence Finfrock monitored this case or 27 Goar’s activities at any time from when the case was filed in March 2023 through its 28 dismissal in November 2024. Under the approach used in the Florida cases on which 1 Finfrock relies, Goar’s near-incapacitation is not enough.3 Finfrock needed to establish she 2 was diligent, and she has not done so. 3 As for Finfrock’s reliance on district courts in New York and a Second Circuit 4 opinion, two of the district court orders stated relief depended on the plaintiff making a 5 showing of personal diligence. Those orders do not aid Finfrock for the same reasons the 6 orders from Florida do not help her. Prince of Peace Enters., Inc. v. Top Quality Food Mkt., 7 LLC, No. 07-CV-0349 LAP FM, 2012 WL 4471267, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2012); 8 Alvarado v. Manhattan Worker Career Ctr., No. 01 CIV. 9288 (CBM), 2003 WL 9 22462032, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2003). The remaining district court order from New 10 York, and the opinion from the Second Circuit, apply a “gross negligence” standard that 11 Finfrock has explicitly disclaimed. Amorosi v. Comp USA, No. 01-CV-4242 KMK, 2005 12 WL 66605, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2005); United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 35 (2d 13 Cir. 1977); see also Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1169 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002) 14 (Cirami granted relief based on “gross negligence”). 15 Finfrock’s only argument is that attorney illness that does not rise to the level of 16 total incapacitation or “gross negligence” can be a basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 17 Even assuming Finfrock is correct, her own authorities require the plaintiff provide 18 evidence of personal diligence. Finfrock did not submit such evidence, and the record 19 suggests the lack of diligence began long before Goar fell ill.4 Finfrock has not shown 20 “extraordinary circumstances” justifying relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). 21 Finfrock’s motion to reopen this case is denied. 22 3 To the extent Finfrock may be arguing an attorney’s total incapacitation alone could 23 establish extraordinary circumstances, she has not shown that Goar’s illness meets that standard. The October 3 Pima County complaint shows that Goar was able to work after 24 October 1 when the court issued its order warning dismissal could be appropriate if Finfrock did not start prosecuting her case or participating in discovery. (Doc. 27.) Goar 25 reported he was able to work 39.5 hours between October 1 and March 31, but did not specify when within that timeframe he worked those hours or why he did not devote them 26 (at least in part) to Finfrock’s case. 4 Months before his illness, Goar failed to conduct discovery to support Finfrock’s claims 27 and refused to respond to YRMC’s discovery requests. When he eventually responded to some of the discovery requests—again, before he fell ill—the responses were incomplete. 28 There is no argument from Finfrock that Goar’s behavior at that point should not be chargeable to her, meaning Finfrock was not diligent even before Goar’s illness. 1 Accordingly, 2 IT IS ORDERED Finfrock’s motion to reopen the case (Doc. 35) is DENIED. 3 Dated this 28th day of August, 2025. 4 5 AV/ 2 f ‘ CW la WBA Honorable Krissa M. Lanham 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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