Findley v. State Election Board of Oklahoma

1958 OK 137, 325 P.2d 1037, 1958 Okla. LEXIS 409
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedJune 2, 1958
Docket38291
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 1958 OK 137 (Findley v. State Election Board of Oklahoma) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Findley v. State Election Board of Oklahoma, 1958 OK 137, 325 P.2d 1037, 1958 Okla. LEXIS 409 (Okla. 1958).

Opinions

HALLEY, Justice.

This is an original proceeding in mandamus commenced by Max Findley to compel the State Election Board, consisting of George D. Key, Chairman, Leo Winters, Secretary and Stanley Neiswan-der, Member, to place his name on the ballot as a candidate for the Democratic party for the office of Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma at the primary election to be held on the first Tuesday in July, 1958.

Mac Q. Williamson was granted permission to intervene and in his petition in intervention alleges that he is a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the office of Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma and filed a protest with the State Election Board, challenging the notification and declaration and candidacy of Petitioner herein, Max Findley, for the Democratic nomination for that office, and his protest was sustained by the State Election Board on May 19, 1958.

We shall refer to Max Findley as Petitioner and to Mac Q. Williamson as In-tervenor.

Intervenor alleges that petitioner's application for this Court to assume original jurisdiction does not state facts sufficient to entitle him to any relief; denies that petitioner has been a legal resident of Oklahoma “for many years”, but alleges that petitioner has not been a qualified elector of this State for a period of ten (10) years next preceding his filing his notification and declaration of candidacy for the Democratic nomination for the office of Attorney General of Oklahoma with the State Election Board; that petitioner has not at this time, been a qualified elector of this State for a period of ten (10) years and cannot be such prior to October, 1958.

Intervenor alleges that petitioner was not 31 years of age at the time he filed his notification and declaration of candidacy, and is not at this time 31 years of age, and will not be 31 years of age at the time of the primary election in July, 1958, and will not be 31 years of age until August 6, 1958, and denied that petitioner is entitled to any relief under the existing facts, and that it was the duty of the State Election Board to sustain the protest of inter-venor and to strike petitioner’s filing as a candidate, and to order petitioner’s name not placed upon the ballot of the primary election to be held July 1, 1958, and that the action of the Board on May 19, 1958., was legal and proper, and prays that this Court uphold the action of the State Election Board in holding petitioner not qualified to have his name on the ballot as a candidate for Attorney General for the primary election to be held July 1, 1958.

Petitioner, Max Findley, admitted that he is not presently thirty-one (31) years of age, and has not presently been ten (10) years a qualified elector of this State but states that he was born August 6, 1927, and will be thirty-one years of age on August 6, 1958. He further alleges that he first became a registered voter in Oklahoma on October 15, 1948, when registered in Precinct No. 126, Tulsa County, and has been a qualified elector continuously since that date. He asserts that he will meet the constitutional requirements for Attorney General by November 4, 1958, the date of the General Election, and is now qualified to seek the nomination of the Democratic party as its candidate for Attorney General of Oklahoma; that the action of the State Election Board in striking his notification and declaration to become a candidate is contrary to law and deprives him of the valuable right to become a candidate for public office, and [1040]*1040having no adequate remedy at law, he seeks a writ of mandamus by this Court to require the State Election Board to reverse its action of May 19, 1958, and include his name as a candidate for Attorney General on the Democratic ticket at the primary election to be held July 1, 1958.

It is apparent that there is no dispute as to the principal facts before us. The issues on which the parties disagree involve a proper construction of the applicable provisions of our State Constitution and statutory provisions defining the qualifications ■ and eligibility of candidates for the office of Attorney General.

Article VI, Section 1 of our State Constitution creates the office of Attorney General and Article VI, Section 3, provides the qualifications of a candidate for such office, the material part of which is as follows:

“No person shall be eligible to the office of * * * Attorney General * * * except a citizen of the United States of the age of not less than thirty-one (31) years and who shall have been ten (10) years next preceding his or her election, a qualified elector of this State. * * * ”

The above provision provides that for one to be eligible for the office of Attorney General, he must be a citizen of not less than 31 years of age next preceding “ * * * his or her election, a qualified elector of this State.” Does this mean that such person must have met the above requirements, (thirty-one years of age and ten years next preceding his or her election, a qualified elector of this State) prior to his election or should he meet these dual requirements prior to any primary election? In a primary election one is only nominated, if successful, and not elected to the office he seeks. He can only be elected at the General Election.

Under the facts before us petitioner will meet the two necessary requirements prior to the General Election in November, 1958, when he or some other candidate will be “elected” and not merely "nominated.” We can only conclude that Article VI, Section 3, supra, means that the eligible qualifications provided therein mean that a candidate must meet these qualifications when elected at the General Election, and not at a primary election whereby a candidate may only be nominated as a candidate for election at the General Election.

Intervenor relies upon the decision of this Court in Stafford v. State Election Board, 203 Okl. 132, 218 P.2d 617, and states that while our Constitution does not prescribe the qualifications of a candidate in a primary election, Section 5 of Article III of our Constitution does provide in part as follows:

“The Legislature shall enact laws providing for a mandatory primary system, which shall provide for the nomination of all candidates in all elections for State * * * officers, for all political parties, * *

The above provision does authorize the Legislature to prescribe qualifications for those desiring to become a candidate for nomination in a primary election as a candidate of his political party, and these requirements are in addition to the constitutional requirements as to eligibility. Intervenor says that the qualifications required by the Legislature as to eligibility in a primary election are in addition to the constitutional requirements in Article VI, Section 3, supra. Section 162, 26 O.S.1951, provides in part as follows:

“Any qualified elector, as defined in the Constitution and laws of the State of Oklahoma, who is a member of a political party, and who is now and has been affiliated with such legally recognized party at whose hands he seeks the nomination, shall have his name printed on the official ballot of his party for an office to which he is eligible in any primary election, upon filing with the proper officer, within the time provided by law, a Notification and Declaration of candidacy. ⅜ * * ”

[1041]*1041The ruling in the Stafford case, supra, is not applicable here.

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Findley v. State Election Board of Oklahoma
1958 OK 137 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1958)

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Bluebook (online)
1958 OK 137, 325 P.2d 1037, 1958 Okla. LEXIS 409, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/findley-v-state-election-board-of-oklahoma-okla-1958.