Opinion issued August 25, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
judgment in favor of Appellees voiding certain foreclosure sales conducted by the Kensington Park Homeowner’s Association, voiding certain foreclosure deeds in connection with those sales of certain condominiums, and establishing quiet title with respect to some condominiums in favor of Appellees Hector Garcia, Isaack Nti, Maria G. Hernandez, Salvador Najar, Olivia Martinez, Ricardo Martinez, Eva Onofre Violante, Isabel Mendoza-Barrientos, and Iris J. Arita.
In two issues, Appellant Kensington Park Homeowner’s Association argues the trial court erred in holding that its board elections conducted after May 24, 2016 were invalid and void because the jury was not asked to decide that issue, and the trial court erred in denying its motion to modify the judgment. In five issues, Appellants Filomena Garcia Chavarrieta and Mario Molina Rios argue the trial court erred in awarding title to the condominiums to Appellees under the Declaratory Judgment Act because the Act is not the proper vehicle to determine title disputes; the trial court erred in awarding title of one of the condominiums to Appellee Maria Hernandez because she elected to recover monetary damages in lieu of setting aside the trustee’s deed; the trial court erred in awarding title of three other condominiums because the jury found that Garcia and Molina were bona fide purchasers of those units; the trial court erred in awarding title to eight of the condominiums to Appellees because the court granted directed verdict as to the
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wrongful foreclosure claim of those units; and the trial court erred in denying Garcia’s and Molina’s motion for new trial and motion to reconsider.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
The Kensington Park Condominiums comprise thirty-six units in Houston, Texas.1 Some of the condominium owners live in their units and others rent them out to third parties. The Kensington Park Homeowners’ Association (“KPHOA”)—subject to its bylaws and declarations—has governed the housing complex since it was built in 1980. The board’s leadership is voted on by residents each year. Melanie Davis became the president of the board in 2013, and at trial, she remained the president.
KPHOA’s bylaws provide that a majority of the condominium owners must approve an amendment of the bylaws “in a duly-constituted meeting for such purpose[.]” The bylaws mandate that “[a]ll owners are obligated to pay monthly assessments imposed by the [KPHOA] to meet all the condominium project’s common expenses as determined by the board of directors[.]” Prior to March 15, 2016, the monthly assessment fees were $200 per unit.
On March 15, 2016, the bylaws were amended at a KPHOA meeting, permitting the board to increase the monthly assessment fees. After the increase—
1 The Third Amended Petition indicated the complex “originally comprise[d] fiftyfour units,” but testimony at trial indicated the other units “burned down.”
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which apparently became effective June 1, 2016—some appellees were charged more than $700 in monthly assessments.2 Appellees testified at trial that they could not afford the assessment increases and continued to pay the $200 assessments until KPHOA refused to accept them beginning in November 2016.
Between December 2016 and September 2018, KPHOA foreclosed on nine units owned by Appellees for failure to pay the increased assessments: Units 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, 39, and 43. During that period—on March 7, 2017—six appellees filed a lis pendens with respect to seven of the units: Units 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 43. Sometime later in 2020 and 2021—after foreclosing on the units and while the lis pendens remained on file—KPHOA sold several units to Appellants Garcia and Molina, who attempted to evict the remaining tenants.3 Garcia testified that she owned ten Kensington Park condominiums, several of which are involved in the present appeal.4 She testified that she paid $5,000 to $15,000 to KPHOA for the units, which she purchased in 2020 and 2021, spending a total of approximately $80,000. Garcia made the checks out to Kensington Park and handed the checks to Davis. Davis then gave Garcia a deed for the units which Garcia later filed.
2 The assessments varied for each unit. According to Davis, the increase was necessary because the condominium complex’s expenses had increased.
3 Garcia and Molina were married during the relevant time period.
4 The jury charge addressed nine units.
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A. Appellees’ Claims In July 2016, Appellees filed their original petition against KPHOA for declaratory judgment, application for temporary restraining order, and application for permanent injunction. By the time they filed their third amended petition in 2022—the live pleading at trial—they had added Garcia, Molina, Davis, and Ileana Roque5 as defendants. Appellees asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful foreclosure, slander of title/clear title, and civil conspiracy to interfere with Appellees’ quiet enjoyment of their homes. They also sought declaratory relief on several grounds. Appellants asserted several counterclaims but by the time of trial, the only counterclaim remaining was Garcia’s and Molina’s counterclaim to quiet title.6 During the four-day trial, Appellees testified similarly: they purchased units in the Kensington Park Condominiums and paid $200 monthly assessment fees; KPHOA raised the fees after a March 2016 KPHOA meeting; they could not afford the increased assessments; KPHOA tried to evict them for failure to pay the increased assessments; their units were foreclosed upon; and Garcia and Molina ultimately bought the condominiums from Kensington Park and evicted or
5 Roque was KPHOA’s secretary-treasurer when the foreclosures occurred.
6 It is not clear from the record how KPHOA’s counterclaims were resolved but they appear to have been resolved by the time of trial, and HPHOA does not appeal from the resolution of its counterclaims.
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attempted to evict Appellees. Only Appellee Maria G. Hernandez testified as to the value of her unit at the time of the foreclosure, estimating its worth in March 2017 as “at least 60,000.” Her unit sold at the foreclosure sale for $3,385.80.
The jury returned a verdict finding that KPHOA had wrongfully foreclosed on Hernandez’s condominium; that zero monetary damages had resulted from the wrongful foreclosure;7 that KPHOA had not provided proper notice to its members “for purposes of amending its bylaws” at the KPHOA March 15, 2016 meeting; that there was not a majority vote of the KPHOA members to approve the amendment to the bylaws; and that Garcia and Molina were bona fide purchasers of three of the nine condominiums at issue: Units 13, 27, and 39.8
7 Hernandez testified that she continued to receive rental payments through the time of trial for her unit, notwithstanding her claim that the unit was improperly foreclosed upon.
8 KPHOA, Davis, and Roque moved for directed verdict after Appellees completed their case in chief. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the wrongful foreclosure claims against KPHOA, except for the claim asserted by Hernandez, apparently because Hernandez was the only plaintiff who testified about the grossly inadequate selling price of her property—an element of a wrongful foreclosure claim. See Dunn v. Park Harbor Improvement Assn. Inc., No. 01-21-
00010-CV, 2022 WL 17813755, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Appellees voluntarily dismissed their claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conceded that they were not asserting wrongful foreclosure claims against Garcia and Molina. The trial court denied Garcia’s and Molina’s motion for directed verdict on their claims involving quiet title of the properties.
By the time of trial, no claims remained against Davis and Roque.
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The Final Judgment
The trial court’s final judgment declared that the attempted amendment of the KPHOA bylaws on May 24, 2016—pursuant to which the assessment fees were raised and the properties foreclosed upon—was invalid and that all KPHOA elections for board members and officers conducted after May 24, 2016 were “invalid and void.” The court ordered that the foreclosure sales conducted by KPHOA were void as to Appellees Hector Garcia, Isaack Nti, Hernandez, Salvador Najar, Olivia Martinez, Ricardo Martinez, Eva Onofre Violante, Isabel Mendoza- Barrientos, and Iris J. Arita.9, 10 The final judgment further ordered that all foreclosure deeds filed in the Harris County Real Property records were void and quiet title was established in Appellees as to units 13, 11, 17, 18, 20, 21, 39, and 27 (owned by Hector Garcia, Isaack Nti, Hernandez, Salvador Najar, Ricardo Martinez, Eva Onofre Violante, Isabel Mendoza-Barrientos, and Iris J. Arita, respectively).11 Finally, the judgment enjoined Garcia and Molina “from initiating any forcible detainer, forcible entry or
9 Margarita Viera was a plaintiff in the lower court and she is identified in the style of the final judgment. However, she did not testify at trial, and her claim was not addressed in the final judgment. It appears the court implicitly granted a directed verdict in favor of Appellants on Viera’s claim.
10 The final judgment identifies Isaack Nti’s first name as “Isaac,” but the appellate briefs and the live petition identify his name as “Isaack.”
11 Appellee Olivia Martinez is Ricardo Martinez’s wife. The final judgment quiets title in their unit to Ricardo Martinez only.
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eviction action against [Appellees] based on any deed executed by [KPHOA]” prior to the date of the judgment.
KPHOA filed a motion to modify the judgment, asking the court to strike the paragraph that declared that all KPHOA elections conducted after May 24, 2016 were invalid. Garcia and Molina filed a motion for new trial and motion to reconsider, arguing there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the judgment quieting title as to the eight condominium units and there was no determination the foreclosures were wrongful for those units; that Hernandez should not be awarded title to her unit; and that Garcia and Molina “were precluded from arguing title claims” because they believed the Court had in its directed verdict “ruled definitively on the matter, thereby precluding the need for further litigation on the same issue.”12 The trial court signed an order denying the motion to modify judgment and the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. This appeal ensued.
KPHOA’s Appeal
In its first and second issues, KPHOA complains about the portion of the final judgment ordering that all KPHOA elections for board members and officers conducted after May 24, 2016, are “invalid and void.” KPHOA argues that this
12 In their motion for new trial, Garcia and Molina argued that the directed verdict granted by the trial court was tantamount to a “determination that the foreclosures were not wrongful,” making the final judgment “wholly invalid and inconsistent with the court’s determination[.]”
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portion of the final judgment should be reversed because it does not conform to the jury’s verdict, the case proved, or the pleadings. It argues that the trial court thus erred in denying its motion to reform the judgment in that respect. Appellees argue that the trial court was justified in finding that board elections conducted after May 2016 were invalid in light of the jury’s findings that KPHOA had not “provide[d] proper notice for purpose of amending its bylaws at the HOA meeting [on] March 15, 2016,” and that there was not a majority member vote to approve the new bylaws. A. Standard of Review Because determining the effects of the jury’s answers is a question of law, we review a trial court’s entry of judgment on a jury verdict de novo. Castille v. Serv. Datsun, Inc., No. 01-16-00082-CV, 2017 WL 3910918, at *3 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Arbor Windsor Court, Ltd. v. Weekley Homes, LP, 463 S.W.3d 131, 136 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied); see also In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. 1994) (“[Q]uestions of law are always subject to de novo review.”).
B. The Judgment Conforms to the Jury Verdict, the Evidence, and the Pleadings.
KPHOA argues that the issue of electing KPHOA board members was not presented to the jury, was not requested to be submitted to the jury, and was not ruled upon in response to any party’s motion. In addition, KPHOA argues that no
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evidence at trial established that it had not properly conducted board member elections after May 2016. Finally, KPHOA argues that “[t]here is nothing, aside from conclusory statements” made in Appellees’ third amended petition that “even makes reference to KPHOA Board elections after May 201[6].”
Because they overlap, we address the first two components of KPHOA’s argument—that the jury verdict and the evidence did not support the trial court’s final judgment with respect to the conduct of board elections—together. In response to Question No. 3, the jury found that KPHOA did not provide proper notice to its members “for purpose of amending its bylaws at the KPHOA homeowners’ meeting on March 15, 2016.” And the jury found in response to Question No. 4 that a majority of KPHOA’s members did not vote “to approve the amendment to the bylaws.”13 No other jury questions were pertinent to KPHOA’s meetings.
Appellees argue that given the jury’s answers to Question Nos. 3 and 4, and the evidence14 proffered during trial, “the [c]ourt was justified in finding that subsequent elections based on the procedures in the new bylaws were invalid.” Indeed, the evidence showed that on May 24, 2016, the KPHOA’s secretary certified the amendments to KPHOA’s bylaws. Included in the amendments were
13 KPHOA does not complain about the jury’s answers to Question Nos. 3 or 4.
14 Appellees do not identify which evidence at trial supports their argument.
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sections on electing members of the board of directors and voting on board matters.
“[I]n a declaratory judgment action, a trial court may render declarations based not only on the jury’s resolution of disputed facts but also on the undisputed evidence adduced at trial.” Shadow Dance Ranch P’ship, Ltd. v. Weiner, No. 04- 03-00926-CV, 2005 WL 3295664, at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 7, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). A “trial court is not required to submit jury questions on uncontroverted issues of fact.” Id. (citing Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Tex. 1971)). It is uncontroverted that the KPHOA bylaws adopted at the March 2016 meeting set forth the procedures to conduct KPHOA board elections. Given this undisputed fact, coupled with the jury’s findings in Question Nos. 3 and 4 that KPHOA did not provide proper notice to its members “for purpose of amending its bylaws” on March 15, 2016 and that a majority of KPHOA’s members did not vote “to approve the amendment to the bylaws,” we conclude the trial court did not err in rendering declaratory relief with respect to the board elections.
KPHOA argues that the final judgment does not conform to the pleadings.
“[A] judgment must be supported by the pleadings, and a party may not be granted relief in the absence of pleadings to support such relief.” Bouknight v. Llanelly Enters., ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 01-22-00863-CV, 2026 WL 872698, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2026, no pet. h.) (citing Salomon v. Lesay, 369
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S.W.3d 540, 553 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.)). A judgment that grants more relief than a party requested in the pleadings is “erroneous” and must be set aside. Id. (citing Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813–14 (Tex. 1983)).
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301 provides in relevant part:
The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings, the nature of the case proved and the verdict, if any, and shall be so framed as to give the party all the relief to which he may be entitled either in law or equity. Provided, that upon motion and reasonable notice the court may render judgment non obstante veredicto if a directed verdict would have been proper, and provided further that the court may, upon like motion and notice, disregard any jury finding on a question that has no support in the evidence.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 301. “In determining whether the judgment conform[s] to the pleadings, an appellate court should view the pleadings as a whole.” Bouknight, 2026 WL 872698, at *4 (quoting Khalaf v. Williams, 814 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ)). A trial court is “not constrained to enter judgment only in a form specified by one of the parties, because in addition to conforming to the pleadings, the judgment must also reflect a correct application of the law.” Id. (quoting Salomon, 369 S.W.3d at 553–54).
Contrary to KPHOA’s argument that nothing in the pleadings makes reference to the KPHOA board elections, the trial court’s challenged declaration is declaratory relief Appellees requested in their pleadings. In their third amended petition, Appellees alleged that beginning in May 2015, “the Board failed to follow
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basic legal procedures, failed to conduct valid meetings, failed to conduct valid voting of the Board and failed to properly exercise any policy or action.” Appellees alleged that the “purported action[s] of the Board, from May 2015 to the present [were] invalid and [were] simply Melanie Davis[’] personal actions against [Appellees]” and that “[a]ll elections held from May 2015 to the present were invalid in that they failed to comply with the Declarations, Bylaws, and failed to notify and/or allow voting by [Appellees].” In seeking declaratory relief, Appellees specifically sought declarations that “the purported actions of the Board, from May 2015 to the present are invalid” and “[a]ll elections held from May 2015 to the present were invalid in that they failed to comply with the Declarations, Bylaws, and failed to notify and/or allow voting by [Appellees].” The final judgment thus conforms to the pleadings.
We overrule KPHOA’s first issue.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying KPHOA’s Motion to Modify Final Judgment
In its second issue, KPHOA argues the trial court erred in denying its motion to modify the final judgment.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to modify a final judgment for abuse of discretion. Brooks v. Kirkendall Dwyer, LLP, No. 01-23-00624-CV, 2025 WL 2248568, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 7, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Ramirez v. JJ & EG, LLC, No. 14-22-00715-CV, 2023 WL
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6561230, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 10, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or without reference to guiding legal principles. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004).
KPHOA’s argument with respect to its motion to modify simply echoes the arguments in its first issue. KPHOA states, “as described above, the Final Judgment improperly fails to conform to (1) the pleadings, (2) the case proved, and (3) the verdict.” There is no additional discussion or new authorities, and we need not engage in a second analysis of the same issues. For the reasons discussed above, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying KPHOA’s motion to modify judgment.
We overrule KPHOA’s second issue.
Garcia’s and Molina’s Appeal A. The Declaratory Relief Claims Garcia and Molina argue the Declaratory Judgment Act was not the proper vehicle to determine the disputes at issue. They argue that a claim for trespass to try title is the proper method to determine title to real property. Because they did not make this argument in the trial court, it is not preserved for our review. See McAlester Fuel Co. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 257 S.W.3d 732, 737 n.2 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (“If a party does not specially except or
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otherwise make the trial court aware of a complaint that a declaratory judgment action is improper prior to the trial judge signing the judgment, the party fails to preserve that complaint for appeal.”) (citing Harlingen Irrigation Dist. Cameron Cnty. No. 1 v. Caprock Commc’ns Corp., 49 S.W.3d 520, 534 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, pet. denied)); TEX. R. CIV. P. 90 (stating that party waives appeal for “[e]very defect, omission or fault in a pleading either of form or of substance, which is not specifically pointed out by exception in writing and brought to the attention of the judge in the trial court before the instruction or charge to the jury or, in a non-jury case, before the judgment is signed”); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (stating that to preserve complaint for appellate review, appellant must make specific complaint to trial court by timely request, objection or motion and trial court must rule on request or refuse to rule on request).15 We overrule Garcia’s and Molina’s first issue.
B. Maria Hernandez’s Election of Remedies In response to Questions No. 1 and 2, the jury found that KPHOA wrongfully foreclosed on Hernandez’s unit and that Hernandez had suffered no
15 Garcia and Molina rely on Mundy v. ENE, Inc., No. 14-21-00146-CV, 2022 WL 7278288 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) in arguing that a declaratory judgment is not the proper cause of action in a dispute over title to real property. But in Mundy, the appellants argued in the trial court in response to the appellee’s summary judgment motion that a declaratory judgment action was “not the proper cause of action in a dispute over title to real property.”
Id. at *2. Thus, unlike the present case, the issue was preserved.
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monetary damages as a result of the wrongful foreclosure.16 In its final judgment, the trial court “[o]rdered and [d]eclared that title to Unit 17 . . . is established and quieted in Maria G. Hernandez, and any deed or other claim of title filed [of] record prior to the date of this Judgment purporting to establish title in [KPHOA, Garcia or Rios] is set aside and declared void.”
In their second issue, Garcia and Molina argue that the trial court erred in quieting title of Unit 17 to Hernandez because she elected to recover monetary damages in lieu of setting aside the trustee’s deed. Relying on Diversified, Inc. v. Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n, Garcia and Molina correctly argue that there are two mutually exclusive remedies a debtor may elect in a wrongful foreclosure suit. 762 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied). “[F]ollowing a wrongful foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to a power of sale contained within a deed of trust, the mortgagor may seek two alternative remedies. The mortgagor may elect to: (1) set aside the void trustee’s deed; or (2) recover damages in the amount of the value of the property less indebtedness.” Id. (citing cases) (emphasis in original).
16 In answering the damages question, the jury was instructed to “[c]onsider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other. The difference, if any, between the value of the property at the date of the foreclosure and the remaining balance due on the indebtedness. Answer separately in dollar and cents for damages, if any.” The jury answered: “Zero.”
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However, Diversified did not involve a jury verdict—it was an appeal from a summary judgment—and it does not hold that a plaintiff must elect his remedies before the jury returns a verdict. Indeed, Texas law is clear that election of remedies is not required before a jury’s verdict.17 Hernandez was therefore not precluded from seeking and obtaining the relief the trial court afforded her in the final judgment. See Boyce Iron Works, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 747 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. 1988) (“When a party tries a case on alternative theories of recovery and a jury returns favorable findings on two or more theories, the party has a right to a judgment on the theory entitling him to the greatest or most favorable relief.”) (citing Hargrove v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 152 Tex. 243, 256 S.W.2d 73 (1953)); State v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 233 S.W.3d 50, 56 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (“[U]nder the doctrine of election of remedies, if a plaintiff pleads more than one theory of recovery, he need not make an election between them until after the verdict.”) (citing cases).18
17 Garcia and Molina rely on a quote from Houston Sash & Door Co., Inc. v.
Davidson, 509 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.) in noting that a plaintiff must be bound by an election of remedies. But that case also states, “Plaintiff was entitled to plead and prove inconsistent causes of action and seek alternative relief. Thus, his plea to overturn the foreclosure sale and his alternate prayer for damages caused by the alleged wrongful foreclosure were properly combined in a single suit.” Id.
18 See also Commercial Music Co. v. Klag, 288 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1955, no writ) (“The trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to require such election of remedy before the charge was submitted to the jury.”);
see generally Drury Sw., Inc. v. Louie Ledeaux #1, Inc., 350 S.W.3d 287, 293
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We overrule Garcia’s and Molina’s second issue.
C. Units 13, 27, and 39 Garcia and Molina argue in their third issue that the trial court erred in awarding quiet title of Units 13, 27, and 39 to Hector Garcia, Iris J. Arita, and Isabel Mendoza-Barrientos, respectively, because the jury found that Garcia and Molina were bona fide purchasers of those units.
Appellees argue that Garcia and Molina were not bona fide purchasers of the units because a lis pendens was on file in the Harris County Real Property records when the foreclosure sales occurred and thus, they had notice of their claims to the units. The lis pendens did not concern Units 27 or 39. Garcia’s and Molina’s argument with respect to those units thus lacks merit. There was a lis pendens on file with respect to Unit 13, however.
A bona fide purchaser is one who “acquire[s] property in good faith, for value, and without notice of any third-party claim or interest.” Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001) (citations omitted). “Status as a bona fide purchaser is an affirmative defense to a title dispute.” Saravia v. Benson, 433 S.W.3d 658, 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing Madison,
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (“A party prevailing on two or more theories need not formally waive all other alternative theories of recovery in electing a remedy, and where the prevailing party fails to elect a remedy, the trial court ‘should utilize the findings affording the greater recovery and render judgment accordingly.’”) (quoting Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem’l Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tex. 1987)).
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39 S.W.3d at 606). A bona fide purchaser acquires real property in good faith, for value, and without actual or constructive notice of any third-party claim or interest in the property. Id. (citing Madison, 39 S.W.3d at 606). “A properly filed lis pendens operates as constructive notice ‘to the world of its contents.’” Id. (quoting In re Cohen, 340 S.W.3d 889, 892 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding)); see TEX. PROP. CODE § 13.004(a) (“A recorded lis pendens is notice to the world of its contents.”).19 Given that Hector Garcia’s lis pendens was in place with respect to Unit 13, Garcia and Molina could not have been bona fide purchasers of that unit. See Saravia, 433 S.W.3d at 666 (“Because Saravia had constructive notice [through a lis pendens], Saravia is not a bona fide purchaser.”). Thus, the trial court did not err in awarding quiet title of that unit to Hector Garcia.
The record does not reflect that a lis pendens was filed on Units 27 or 39.
And the jury found in Question No. 5 that Garcia and Rios were bona fide purchasers of Units 27 and 39. Garcia and Molina argue that because the jury found they were bona fide purchasers of Units 27 and 39, the trial court erred in quieting title in those units to Iris J. Arita and Isabel Mendoza-Barrientos.
An appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. 19 Garcia and Molina do not argue on appeal that the lis pendens was improperly filed or otherwise invalid.
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R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellant’s failure to provide substantive analysis of an issue or cite appropriate authority waives the complaint. Kozera v. Velemir, No. 01-17- 00290-CV, 2018 WL 6542584, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 13, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). When an appellate issue lacks citation to the record or legal authority and is not supported by argument, nothing is presented for review. Zhu v. Zhang, No. 01-21-00699-CV, 2022 WL 16841697, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (discussing “long-standing rule” that inadequate briefing waives issue on appeal)); see also Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015) (“Failure to provide citations or argument and analysis as to an appellate issue may waive it.”) (citing ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 880 (Tex. 2010)).
The entirety of Garcia’s and Molina’s argument in support of their third issue is that “the trial court’s judgment does not account for this finding, and instead, quiets title to Units 13, 39, and 27 to Appellees; a decision inconsistent with the finding that [Garcia and Molina] were bona fide purchases of these properties.” Garcia and Molina do not cite to any authorities, nor do they cite to the record. They also do not explain how they are entitled to their requested relief given that the trial court also granted declaratory judgment declaring the foreclosure of Units 27 and 39 void and ordering that all foreclosure deeds filed as
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those properties are void based on the trial court’s additional finding—premised on the jury’s finding on this point—that the amendment to the KPHOA bylaws— pursuant to which the fees were raised and the units were foreclosed upon—are invalid. We have already affirmed the trial court’s final judgment awarding declaratory relief as to the validity of KPHOA’s bylaws, and Garcia and Molina did not properly challenge the trial court’s declaratory relief voiding the foreclosures of these units, because as we held in response to their first issue, they failed to raise their challenge to the court’s declaratory relief on appeal and thus waived the issue for our review. And they do not explain how we otherwise can set aside the jury’s finding and the trial court’s final declaratory judgment as to these issues.
To the extent that Garcia and Molina argue that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the jury’s findings and the trial court’s final judgment, they have waived the issue due to inadequate briefing.
We overrule Garcia’s and Molina’s third issue.
D. Units 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, and 39 In their fourth issue, Garcia and Molina argue that the trial court erred in awarding quiet title of the units to Appellees. In a single paragraph, without any citation to authorities or controlling law, Garcia and Molina argue only that even though the trial court granted KPHOA’s directed verdict on Appellees’ wrongful
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foreclosure claim against KPHOA except as to Hernandez, “a final judgment was entered awarding Appellees title to Units 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27 and 39.”20 Here again, Garcia and Molina failed to cite any authorities in support of their argument and they do not engage in any meaningful analysis explaining how they are entitled to their requested relief given the trial court’s declaratory judgment declaring the foreclosure of the relevant units void and ordering that all foreclosure deeds filed as those properties are void. We have already affirmed the trial court’s final judgment awarding declaratory relief as to the validity of the KPHOA bylaws, and Garcia and Molina did not properly challenge the trial court’s declaratory relief voiding the foreclosures of these units, because as we held in response to their first issue, they failed to raise their challenge to the court’s declaratory relief on appeal and thus waived the issue for our review.
To the extent that Garcia and Molina argue that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the jury’s findings and the trial court’s final judgment, they have waived the issue due to inadequate briefing. See Kozera, 2018 WL 6542584, at *4 (stating appellant’s brief must contain clear and concise argument with appropriate citations to authority); Zhu, 2022 WL 16841697, at *2 (holding appellate issue that lacked citation to legal authority and was not supported by argument presented
20 Appellees did not pursue a wrongful foreclosure claim against Garcia and Molina.
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nothing for appellate review); Fredonia State Bank, 881 S.W.2d at 284 (explaining that inadequate briefing waives issue on appeal).
We overrule Garcia’s and Molina’s fourth issue.21 E. The Motion for New Trial Garcia and Molina argue in their final issue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for new trial and motion to reconsider. The motion for new trial comprises three arguments: that the final judgment is inconsistent with the jury’s findings that Garcia and Molina were bona fide purchasers of units 13, 27, and 29; that Hernandez is not entitled to ownership of unit 17 because she elected to recover monetary remedies in her wrongful foreclosure claim; and that the trial court previously determined that the foreclosures were not wrongful.
We have already addressed these arguments. We thus overrule Garcia’s and Molina’s fifth issue.
21 In their reply brief, Garcia and Molina argue that Appellees “did not assert superior title against [Garcia’s and Molina’s] claim of title.” But by filing their quiet title counterclaim, Garcia and Molina placed the question of title before the court. If the plaintiff who asserts a claim for quiet title fails to establish his title, “the effect of a judgment of take nothing against him is to vest title in the defendant.” Hejl v. Wirth, 161 Tex. 609, 610, 343 S.W.2d 226, 226 (1961); see also Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 371 S.W.3d 366, 388 (Tex. App.– Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (“The effect of a suit to quiet title is to declare invalid or ineffective the defendant’s claim to title.”). The plaintiff in a quiet-title suit “must prove, as a matter of law, that he has a right of ownership and that the adverse claim is a cloud on the title that equity will remove.” Lance v.
Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 739 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Essex Crane Rental Corp., 371 S.W.3d at 388)).
24
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Veronica Rivas-Molloy
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Rivas-Molloy and Guiney.