MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
SWEIGERT, District Judge.
This is a class action brought by a Filipino Veterans Association and certain named plaintiffs, formerly residents of the Philippines but all of them now residents of California and three of them now citizens of the United States, claiming to be World War II Veterans or spouses of World War II veterans, and as such entitled to veterans’ benefits provided under the laws of the United States.
The action is brought against the Director of the Veterans Administration and other officials of the United States for the purpose of enforcing plaintiffs’ claims and, as an incident thereto, to obtain a judgment declaring that a certain federal statute, Title 38 U.S.C. § 107, [1316]*1316which purportedly prohibits or restricts veterans’ benefits as to plaintiffs, is an unconstitutional denial of the law.
The case is now before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiffs’ motion for a partial summary judgment on the issue of constitutionality. The record consists of the Amended Complaint and an Agreed Statement of the Material Facts.
THE STATUTE
Title 38 U.S.C. § 107, provides (sub. (a)) that “service before July 1, 1946, in the organized military forces of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines while such forces were in the service of the Armed Forces of the United States pursuant to the military order of the President, dated July 26, 1941 . . . shall not be deemed to have been active military, naval or air service for the purposes of any law of the United States conferring rights, privileges, or benefits upon any person by reason of the service of such person or the service of any other person in the Armed Forces except benefits under “Chap. 11 (compensation for service-connected disability or death); except Sec. 412(a), Chap. 13 (compensation for dependents for service-connected disability or death); and Chap. 23 (burial benefits) ; also excepted were benefits under pre-1946 National Life Insurance contracts.
The statute also provides that payments of the allowed compensation for service-connected disability or death “shall be made at a rate in pesos as is equivalent to 0.50 for each dollar otherwise authorized.”1
This statute, Title 38 U.S.C. § 107, is essentially the same as certain 1946 predecessor legislation on the same subject matter (Title II of Public Law 301, 79th Congress, 60 Stat. 14, entitled First Supplemental Recision Act of 1946 (as to sub. (a)) and (as to sub. (b)) Public Law 391, 79th Congress, 60 Stat. 223, entitled Second Supplemental Recision Act of 1946)—to which 1946 legislation we will hereinafter make further reference.
The practical effect of the challenged legislation has been to limit the Filipino servicemen described in the legislation (and their beneficiaries) to compensation for service-connected disability or death (and payments under certain pre1946 National Life Insurance contracts) and, further, to limit the allowed compensation for service-connected disability to 50% of the monetary amount to which veterans in the United States have been entitled. Denied to the Filipino veterans were other, additional veteran benefits available in 1946 and since to veterans in the United States, e.g., certain life insurance, medical, hospitalization, educational, vocational rehabilitation, civil service credit, longevity pay, retirement, pension and annuity benefits.
BACKGROUND OF THE PHILIPPINES
In order to understand this legislation we must bear in mind that the Philippine Islands had been ceded by Spain to, and became a territory of, the United States under the 1898 Treaty of Paris.
On March 24, 1934, the Congress had passed the Philippine Independence Act, Public Law 73-127, 48 Stat. 456, providing for eventual Philippine independence and creating, meanwhile, a Commonwealth of the Philippines vested with certain powers over its own internal affairs.
It was not until July 4, 1946, however, that this interim Philippine Commonwealth received its grant of independence by a Presidential Proclamation of that date in fulfillment of the promise contained in the Act of 1934.
[1317]*1317During the 12-year interval between the Act of 1934 and final independence in 1946, the Philippines were in what has been described as a “unique” status. Although not in all respects a “foreign” territory, the Philippines were treated by the Act of 1934 as a foreign country for many purposes, e.g., Filipino citizens were treated as aliens for immigration purposes; also foreign service officers assigned to the Philippines were treated as if stationed in a foreign country; also the Act of 1934 defined “United States” as excluding the Philippines. See, Hooven v. Evatt, infra, 325 U.S. 677-8, 692, 65 S.Ct. 870.
Nevertheless, the United States retained plenary and unrestricted power over the Philippines until its sovereignty over them was formally withdrawn in 1946. (Id. p. 692, 65 S.Ct. 870).2 Among other things, the Act of 1934 reserved to the United States the power (Sec. 2(a)(12)) to maintain military bases and armed forces in the Philippines and, upon order of the President of the United States, the right “to call into the service of such armed forces all military organized by the Philippine government.”
It was under that authority that President Roosevelt, by an Executive Order of April 26, 1941, did call the then existing military of the Philippine government “into the service of the armed forces of the United States all military organized by the Philippine government” for the period of the imminent World War II emergency and placed that military under the command of general officers and commandants of the United States Army and Navy.
The named plaintiffs in this action, or their spouses, were among the Philippine military called into the service of our armed forces pursuant to that 1941 Executive Order and they served as such under United States generals and commandants in World War II.3
From April, 1941, the United States had assumed the responsibility for payment of the Philippine servicemen’s army pay as previously established by the Philippine Commonwealth. That scale of service pay was less than the rate of pay for regular United States enlistees or inductees. Legislation was introduced in the United States Congress to increase the Filipino service pay scale to United States Army levels but no such legislation was ever enacted.
Soon after President Roosevelt’s Executive Order of 1941 questions arose concerning the status of the Filipino veterans called up under that order with respect to their entitlement to veterans’ benefits. As early as May 5, 1942, the then Director of the Veterans Administration, Frank T. Hines, approved and promulgated an opinion of the Solicitor of the Veterans Administration holding that they were in “active service of the [1318]*1318land or naval forces of the United States” within the meaning of the Veterans National Life Insurance Act of 1940. (See, Hearings Before the SubCommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 79th Congress, 2d Session, “Attachment” to Agreed Statement herein, pp. 56-57). However, the Congress eventually determined otherwise, as will hereinafter appear.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In October, 1945, after the end of World War II and while Congress was considering a 200 million dollar appropriation for the support of the Philippine Army in accordance with its practice during the War, the Chairman of the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations sent a letter to General Bradley, then Director of the Veterans Administration, requesting information concerning the status of the Filipino servicemen and the potential cost of their veteran benefit coverage. (See, Attachment to Agreed Statement, p. 49).
In his response (Attachment, pp. 49-54), General Bradley again expressed the administrative view of the Veterans Administration that veterans, i.e., “those who served in the active military or naval forces of the United States,” did include “persons who were a part of the organized forces of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines called into service of the Armed Forces of the United States pursuant to military order of the President of the United States, July 26, 1941.”
In his same 1945 letter, General Bradley gave to the subcommittee his estimate that the total cost of paying veterans’ benefits to members of the Philippine Commonwealth Army and their dependents, under then existing veterans’ laws, would amount in the long run to about 3 billion dollars. (Attachment p. 54).
Upon receipt of this response, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee made an important statement bearing on the reasons of the Congress for the then pending 1946 legislation, (Attachment, pp. 55, 57-59), a statement which we set forth as a note because of its length.4 (See Footnotes).
[1319]*1319The Congress then enacted the 1946 legislation above set forth, appropriating 200 million dollars for the support of the Philippine Army but adding as a rider the 1946 legislation which plaintiffs now challenge.
When the appropriation, bearing this rider, came to President Truman, he approved it, stating that, although he believed the United States had a moral obligation to provide for the heroic Philippine veterans who sacrificed so much for the common cause during the war, he, nevertheless, recognized that there were certain “practical difficulties in making payments to Philippine Army veterans under the GI Bill of Rights” and that he was “preparing a plan to meet such practical difficulties and expected to request Congress to implement a plan when it is evolved.” (Attachment, p. 60).
Upon receipt of President Truman’s message, the Chairman of the SubCommittee made another important statement bearing on the Congressional rationale for the 1946 legislation (Attachment p. 61)—a statement which we set forth as a note because of its length.5 (See Footnotes)
[1320]*1320Since the enactment of this legislation in 1946, it has been the subject of continuing attention by the federal executive department and by the Congress.6
APPLICABILITY OF U. S. CONSTITUTION AND LAWS RE LEGISLATION AFFECTING RESIDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
In the pending case the question is whether Congress, having granted to the Philippine veterans and their dependents compensation for service-connected injury or death, was obliged by some constitutional provision, e. g., the Fifth Amendment, to also grant to them additional veterans’ benefits merely because the latter were made available to veterans resident in the United States; also whether some such constitutional provision prohibited the Congress from limiting the allowed service-connected compensation, as to Philippine veterans, to 50% of the amount paid to other veterans.
Under an early revised statute of 1878, section 1891, thereof, the Congress had provided generally that the Constitution (and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable), shall have the same force and effect within all of the organized territories, and in every territory thereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States.
The Treaty of Paris, however, under which the United States acquired the Philippines, provided (Article IX) that the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants “shall be determined by the Congress,” indicating an intent to give the Congress a free hand in dealing with the newly acquired possession. Dorr v. United States, infra, 195 U.S. p. 143, 24 S.Ct. 808.
Further, the original Organic Act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 691 (setting up a system of civil government for the Philippines and providing that all then residents of the Philippine Islands and their subsequently born children should be deemed to be “citizens of the Philippine Islands” entitled to the protection of the United States) expressly further provided, as noted in Dorr v. United States, infra, p. 143 of 195 U.S., 24 S.Ct. 808, that the above Section 1891 of the Re[1321]*1321vised Statutes of 1878, supra, should not apply to the Philippine Islands.
It has been long established that the United States may acquire territory by treaty and govern it through the exercise by Congress of its power under Art. IV, Sec. 3 to make rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.
It has also been long established that the United States Constitution does not automatically and wholly apply to newly acquired territory which merely belongs to the United States, but which has never been incorporated into the Union—even though such territory has been given an organized government —and that the Congress, when exercising its powers over such territory under Art. IV, Sec. 3, is not subject to the same constitutional limitations as when it is legislating for the United States. See, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S.Ct. 770, 45 L.Ed. 1088 (1901); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149, 24 S.Ct. 808, 49 L.Ed. 128 (1903); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627 (1922); Hooven v. Evatt, 325 U.S. 652, 672-678, 65 S.Ct. 870, 89 L.Ed. 1252 (1944); see also, United States v. Gancy, 54 F.Supp. 756 (D.C.Minn.1944); United States v. Farwell, 76. F.Supp. 35 (D.C.Alaska 1948); Virgin Islands v. Rijos, 285 F.Supp. 126 (V.I.1958).
It has also been long recognized by all of the above cases that dependencies of the United States, acquired as the result of our war with Spain, including the Philippines, are territories belonging to, but not incorporated as a part of the Union of States under the Constitution and that, therefore, the Philippines fall within the above stated rule. (Id.)
The rule, as hereinabove stated, does not mean that the power of the Congress over unincorporated territory is absolute and unrestrained. These cases recognize that there may be “fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights” e. g., deprivation “of life, liberty or property without due process of law” or “principles which are the basis of all free government which cannot with impunity be transcended” to which the Congress would be subject. It is conceivable, therefore, that a question may be presented under some circumstances as to whether certain constitutional limitations would be applicable to restrict the Congress. See, Downes, supra, 182 U.S. pp. 269, 280, 282, 292, 21 S.Ct. 770; Dorr, supra, 195 U.S. pp. 146, 147, 149, 24 S.Ct. 808; Balzac, supra, 312 of 258 U.S., 42 S.Ct. 343; see also, Hooven v. Evatt, supra, 325 U.S. p. 674, 65 S.Ct. 870.
Subject, however, to this implied humanitarian qualification, Constitutional guarantees extend to such unincorporated territories only as the Congress, exercising its Art. IV, Sec. 3 powers, makes them applicable and “large powers” and “the widest latitude of discretion” are entrusted to the Congress when dealing with territories which are not incorporated into the United States, e. g., the Philippines. Downes, supra, 182 U.S. p. 283, 21 S.Ct. 770; Dorr, supra, 195 U.S. p. 147, 24 S.Ct. 808; Hooven, supra, 325 U.S. p. 674, 65 S.Ct. 870.
Upon this legal basis it has been held, for example, in Dorr, supra, that the Constitutional guarantees of jury trial under Article III and under the 5th and 7th Amendments, do not apply to the Philippines; also, e. g., in Hooven, supra, and in Downes, supra, that Constitutional restrictions upon Congress in dealing with merchandise brought into the United States do not apply when dealing with merchandise brought from the Philippines. Also, e. g., in Virgin Islands, supra, that the 5th Amendment requirement of a Grand Jury indictment does not apply to the Philippines; also as in Gancy, supra, that Filipinos are aliens within the meaning of the Alien Registration Act.
Since even United States citizens and residents have no constitutional or fundamental right, as such, to receive veterans’ benefits at all, such a limited [1322]*1322exclusion of Filipino veterans certainly does not involve fundamental personal rights or principles, affecting life, liberty or property within the meaning of the above cases.
Having in mind, then, the unique and wide discretion long recognized as in the Congress when legislating under Art. IV, Sec. 3, for distant, non-incorporated territory, such as the Philippines, we cannot go so far as to say that Congress was required by some other provision of the Constitution to also provide Filipino veterans with the additional fringe benefits available to other veterans. Nor can we say that the Congress was prohibited by any constitutional provision from limiting the allowed pensions for Filipino veterans to 50% of the amount paid other veterans.
EQUAL PROTECTION—DUE PROCESS
It is not necessary, however, to rest the decision of this case solely upon the ground that constitutional limitations were not applicable to the Congress when exercising its broad discretion under Art. IV, Sec. 3, for making rules for unincorporated Territories.
Even if constitutional limitations upon the Congress be deemed applicable to this legislation affecting the Philippines, such a provision could be only the 5th Amendment7 and the question would still remain whether the Congressional differentiation between the two classes of veterans violated any equal protection right of plaintiffs, i. e., whether the classification was rationally based and, even if not, whether the resulting discrimination was so unjustifiable as to amount to denial of 5th Amendment due process within the meaning of Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954).
Plaintiffs broadly contend that there was no rational basis in fact for the differentiation; that there was no recognizable difference between the Filipino servicemen, on the one hand, and other enlisted or inducted servicemen; that both became “part” of the active armed forces of the United States and were the same in kind and of equal military value and that, therefore, the legislation was a denial of equal protection of the law and (inferentially) sufficiently unjustifiable to amount to a denial of due process.
The government, on the other hand, contends that members of the organized military of the Philippines were called “into the service of the armed forces of the United States” but that they did not thereby become “part” of the active military or naval forces of the United States in the same manner as other enlisted or inducted servicemen; that the differentiation between the two kinds of servicemen for purposes of allowance of veterans’ benefits was based, not upon ground of race or alienage, or merely to cut expenses, but, in.part, upon this difference in their military status within our armed forces; also in part upon “practical difficulties” involved in making certain kinds of veterans’ benefits available in the Philippines; also in part upon a difference in monetary and living standards between the United States and the Philippines.
Whatever may have been the technical status distinction between the Filipino servicemen component, on the one hand, and the other regularly inducted or enlisted servicemen component of our arm[1323]*1323ed forces in the Philippines, the record shows that there were “practical difficulties” recognized by both the Executive and the Congress which would be involved in any attempt to make available in the Philippines to Filipino veterans the additional GI benefits here in question, e. g., administration and facilities in the Philippines for handling such benefits as GI education, vocational, civil service, etc.
As to the 50% monetary limitation of allowed service-connected benefits for Filipino veterans, the Congressionally asserted reason for this differentiation was that standards of living and monetary purchasing power in the Philippines were wholly different from those in the United States-—so much so that, if compensation for service-connected death or injury were paid to veterans in the Philippines in the same monetary currency as paid to veterans living in the United States, the Philippine veterans might be receiving more (in buying power) than the former.
Upon this record we hold that the differentiation made by the Congress had a rational basis and, therefore, did not amount to a denial of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection or of Fifth Amendment due process. See, Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (March 4, 1974); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 92 S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971).8
Further, a reading of the Supreme Court cases above cited discloses that one of the main grounds for conceding wide discretion to the Congress when legislating under Art. IV, Sec. 3, for distant, unincorporated territories is the recognition that conditions in such Territories so widely differ from those in the United States that constitutional provisions should not wholly and automatically bind the Congress.
For the foregoing reasons we reach the conclusion that the legislation here in question is not unconstitutional.
This same conclusion has been recently reached in the District of Columbia Circuit in the recent case of Lagtapon v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 363, 481 F.2d 538 (1973) where the court, considering whether 38 U.S.C. § 107 and its 1946 predecessor legislation (the identical legislation here challenged) effectively excluded these 1941 Filipino veterans from a veterans’ benefit provision (42 U.S.C. § 417(a)(1) of the Social Security Act) designed to give to World War II veterans certain presumptive wage earnings during their military service in order to qualify them for eventual Social Security benefits—including so-called Parents’ Insurance Benefits created in 1950 by 42 U.S.C. § 402(h)(1).
The court held that 38 U.S.C. § 107 (and its predecessor 1946 legislation) did have such an exclusionary effect [1324]*1324and, further, rejected a contention that the legislation was unconstitutional.9
We have given careful consideration to the fact that, although all plaintiffs herein were Philippine residents during the period of their (or their spouses’) service for the Philippine Commonwealth, three of the plaintiffs have since become residents of the United States and three of them have since become citizens of the United States.
At argument plaintiffs expressed their willingness to limit their attack on constitutionality to this class of Filipino veterans, i.e., those who have since become citizens of or alien residents of the United States, thus impliedly conceding that the challenged legislation might be valid and enforceable as to other Filipino veterans or at least leaving any such question to future litigation.
In this way plaintiffs seek to bring themselves within the rule of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971), to the effect that Fourteenth Amendment due process applies even to aliens lawfully admitted into and resident within the United States.
The obvious difficulty with this argument is that plaintiffs were neither citizens nor residents of the United States, but were in a legal sense non-resident foreigners in 1946 when the Congress specifically and unqualifiedly provided that service of members of the Philippine Commonwealth armed forces, while in the service of the armed forces of the United States, shall not be deemed active military service for the purpose of any veteran benefit law of the United States —with the service-connected exception already noted.
Plaintiffs’ eligibility for veterans’ benefits stems solely from and depends upon the kind of military service thus described by the Congress as not being a basis for other veteran benefits.
If the challenged statute was constitutionally valid at the time of its passage in 1946 as to the class described (which we here hold) it could not suddenly become unconstitutional as to plaintiffs or others by the mere fact of their subsequent voluntary decision to travel and take residence in the United States. To so hold would amount to a rewriting of the statute and to legal bootstrapping that might prove to be an embarrassing judicial precedent.
Although it would be much more pleasant to rule in favor of plaintiffs, we are compelled by the law as above set forth to conclude that, if there is any change to be made in the law, that is a matter for the Congress, not for this Court. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of constitutionality is, therefore, denied.