Filho v. Chinatown Community Development Center, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 ROBERTO FILHO, Case No. 21-cv-05664-WHO

7 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 8 v. ENTRY OF PARTIAL FINAL JUDGMENT 9 CHINATOWN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Re: Dkt. No. 58 10 Defendant.

11 12 Jason Bermak moves for entry of partial final judgment in his favor after I dismissed with 13 prejudice the sole claim asserted against him by plaintiff Roberto Filho. The motion is DENIED. 14 This is not an unusual case warranting entry of partial judgment; Bermak will not be prejudiced by 15 waiting for judgment. 16 BACKGROUND 17 Filho filed suit on July 23, 2021, alleging that Bermak and Chinatown Community 18 Development Center (“CCDC”) violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) by denying Filho’s 19 request to move to an apartment that better accommodates Filho’s disabilities. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 20 6, 19-21. I granted Bermak’s motion to dismiss the claim against him, finding that Filho failed to 21 show that Bermak actually denied his request for a new apartment or had any authority to do so, or 22 that Bermak knew about his disability. See Dkt. No. 34 at 2-3. 23 Filho filed an amended complaint on December 9, 2021, which Bermak again moved to 24 dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 35, 38. I dismissed Filho’s claim against Bermak, this time with prejudice. 25 Dkt. No. 53 at 6. Filho made only a conclusory allegation that Bermak “was aware of a disability” 26 and did not allege that he had “any authority or role in CCDC’s decision-making process.” Id. at 27 5-6. I also granted CCDC’s motion to dismiss, but gave Filho leave to amend. Id. at 6. Filho 1 On May 25, 2022, Bermak file this motion for entry of a partial final judgment in his favor 2 and against Filho. Dkt. No. 58. Filho did not file an opposition. 3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), when an action involves more than one claim 5 for relief or when multiple parties are involved, “the court may direct entry of a final judgment as 6 to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that 7 there is no just reason for delay.” 8 There is a two-step framework in applying Rule 54(b). First, the court must determine that 9 it has rendered a “final judgment”—“that is, a judgment that is an ultimate disposition of an 10 individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.” Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 11 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Then it must decide 12 whether there is any just reason for delay. Id. To determine this, courts consider: “(1) the 13 interrelationship of the certified claims and the remaining claims in light of the policy against 14 piecemeal review; and (2) equitable factors such as prejudice and delay.” Tsyn v. Wells Fargo 15 Advisors, LLC, No. 14-CV-02552-LB, 2016 WL 7635883, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2016). 16 “The Ninth Circuit disfavors Rule 54(b) judgments,” stating that they “must be reserved 17 for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of 18 overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early 19 and separate judgment as to some claims or parties.” Sarmiento v. Fresh Harvest, Inc., No. 20- 20 CV-07974-BLF, 2022 WL 179685, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2022); Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. 21 Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981). 22 DISCUSSION 23 The dismissal of Filho’s claim against Bermak with prejudice constitutes a final judgment, 24 as it was the ultimate disposition of the claim. See Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 25 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The phrase ‘final judgment on the merits’ is often used interchangeably with 26 ‘dismissal with prejudice.’”). The question, then, is whether there is any just reason to delay entry 27 of judgment in Bermak’s favor. 1 FHA claim against Bermak differed substantially from those regarding the FHA claim still 2 || pending against the CDC, which Bermak contends “will not create a risk that an appellate court 3 will have to decide the same factual or legal issue more than one.” See Mot. [Dkt. No. 58] 4:28- 4 5:10. This is likely true. An appeal of my decision to dismiss the claim against Bermak would 5 || turn on whether Filho had adequately alleged that Bermak was aware of Filho’s disability or that 6 || he played any role in CCDC’s decision-making process. The pending claim against CCDC alleges 7 || that CCDC’s refusal to forward Filho’s request for a new apartment to another housing authority 8 constitutes a denial of a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. The claims implicate 9 || different factual allegations and different legal issues. 10 But Bermak has not shown any pressing need for judgment now or that he would be 11 prejudiced without it. He argues that he will “incur unnecessary burden and expense monitoring 12 || the case pending final resolution” and that without immediate judgment, Filho “could seek to 13 allege some new and different federal claim against Bermak between now and final disposition as 14 || toCCDC.” Mot. at 5:20-25. Of course, this theoretical possibility exists anytime one defendant is 3 15 dismissed from ongoing litigation. This is simply not an unusual case warranting piecemeal a 16 || judgment under Rule 54(b). There is no need for the Ninth Circuit to review two appeals 3 17 stemming from Filho’s disability claims. 18 CONCLUSION 19 Bermak’s motion is DENIED. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: July 14, 2022 . \f 22 . Wftliam H. Orrick 23 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28