NARICK, Senior Judge.
This is a real estate tax assessment appeal brought by Filbern Manor Apartments (Filbern) against the Board of Assessment Appeals (Board). The taxing authorities, West Newton Borough, Westmoreland County and Yough School District (together referred to as Municipalities), have intervened. The trial court did not reach the merits of the appeal because it believed Filbern had no standing to appeal to court. We reverse.
West Newton Borough is the owner in fee of certain real estate located in the borough which it leases to Claridge Properties, a New York partnership. The lease agreement (Lease) was executed by the parties on December 22, 1977, and provides for a 99-year term. Claridge Properties later assigned the Lease to Claridge Associates (Lessee), a Penn[662]*662sylvania limited partnership. Filbern Manor is an unregistered fictitious name used by Claridge Associates.
West Newton Borough leased the subject real estate with the understanding that the Lessee would build housing for elderly and other citizens on it in connection with state and federal housing programs. Lessee began building the apartment buildings on the premises shortly after the Lease was executed. For several years since the execution of the Lease and the construction of the buildings, the taxing authority issued tax assessments for the improved property in Filbern Manor’s name, and Filbern Manor paid the taxes.
For the year 1986, taxes were assessed against the improved property based on an assessed value of $1,643,-970.00. Filbern appealed that assessment to the Board. The Board upheld the assessment value, and Filbern appealed the decision to the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County.
In the court of common pleas, the Board and the Municipalities, as intervenors, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that Filbern is not a legal entity and is not the Lessee of the property (the successor to Claridge Properties’ interest is technically Claridge Associates, rather than Filbern), and therefore has no interest in the tax assessment. Further, the motion asserted that Filbern was not the “owner” of the property for local tax purposes, and therefore had no standing to appeal to a court under the General County Assessment Law (Law), Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 853, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 5020-1 to 5020-520.
The common pleas court found that Filbern Manor was a business name used by Claridge Associates and that the Board treated Filbern Manor as the taxpayer and dealt with it accordingly. Moreover, the court found that the issue of taxpayer status was not raised at the appeal before the Board. The court reasoned that the Board could not now complain that Filbern was not a legal entity, nor the alter ego of Lessee, able to challenge the appropriateness of the assessment. Standing to prosecute a tax appeal in court is another matter, however, and is governed by Section 518.1 [663]*663of the Law. The court granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds that Filbern was a mere lessee and not the “owner” of the property for tax appeal purposes.
Filbern appealed the dismissal of its appeal to this Court and the Board and Municipalities filed a cross-appeal continuing to argue that Filbern is not a legal entity and is not synonymous with the Lessee.
The issues raised in this appeal are: 1) whether the Lessee is the “owner” of the property in question, and as such is a proper party to appeal to the court of common pleas; and 2) whether Filbern is a legal person or is synonymous with the Lessee of the property.
The General County Assessment Law provides for appeals to court as follows:
Any owner of real estate or taxable property in this Commonwealth, who may feel aggrieved by the last or any future assessment or valuation of his real estate or taxable property, may appeal from the decision of the county commissioners, acting as a board of revision, or the board of revision of taxes, or the board for the assessment and revision of taxes,1 or the Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, in counties of the second class, as the case may be, to the court____
Section 5020-518.1 of the Law, as amended, 72 P.S. § 5020-518.1(a) (footnote added).2 This provision applies to taxes assessed by third class counties such as Westmoreland [664]*664County, as well as counties of other classes. Section 1 of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5020-1.
In Marcus Hook Development Park v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Delaware County, 68 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 229, 449 A.2d 70 (1982), we held that tax assessment appeals to court must be prosecuted by the “real owner.” Id., 68 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 233, 449 A.2d at 73. We determined that Marcus Hook was only the lessee of certain taxable real estate and was not the “real owner;” consequently we held it had no right to appeal a real estate tax assessment to court.3
The facts of the case now before us are distinguishable from those of Marcus Hook, and are in fact more closely analogous to other cases decided by us since our opinion in Marcus Hook. In Marcus Hook, the borough leased real estate to the development company, but there was no mention of taxable leasehold improvements owned by the lessee of the land. In the present case, while the land is leased from the borough, the buildings belong to Lessee.
Recently in Blue Knob Recreation, Inc. Appeal, 122 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 156, 551 A.2d 9 (1988) petition for allowance of appeal denied, 522 Pa. 597, 562 A.2d 321 (1989), we were asked to determine whether leasehold improvements built on land which the Commonwealth leased to Blue Knob were subject to taxation as real estate. The lease provided for thirty-five one-year terms and renewed automatically each year. We stated, “[i]n Pennsylvania, the general rule concerning a lessee’s tax liability is whether ‘there are indicia that the title to the improvements, as well as the leasehold itself, remains in the lessee during the term.’ ” Id., 122 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 158, 551 A.2d at 10 (quoting Venango Federal Savings and Loan Association v. County of Venango, 73 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 313, 315, 457 A.2d 1340, 1341 (1983)). In Blue Knob, the county did not assess the lessee for any of the buildings in existence prior to the execution of the lease, or on the land, but [665]*665only on a new lodge constructed by the lessee, and which the court held was owned by Blue Knob.
Our inquiry into ownership of the leasehold improvement in Blue Knob focused on the terms of the lease and the intentions of the parties as to ownership. See also, Venango Federal Savings and Loan. We held that the facts demonstrated that Blue Knob owned the particular improvements (buildings), and that the property was taxable. As the owner of the taxable property, Blue Knob clearly had standing to appeal under the provisions of the Law cited above.
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NARICK, Senior Judge.
This is a real estate tax assessment appeal brought by Filbern Manor Apartments (Filbern) against the Board of Assessment Appeals (Board). The taxing authorities, West Newton Borough, Westmoreland County and Yough School District (together referred to as Municipalities), have intervened. The trial court did not reach the merits of the appeal because it believed Filbern had no standing to appeal to court. We reverse.
West Newton Borough is the owner in fee of certain real estate located in the borough which it leases to Claridge Properties, a New York partnership. The lease agreement (Lease) was executed by the parties on December 22, 1977, and provides for a 99-year term. Claridge Properties later assigned the Lease to Claridge Associates (Lessee), a Penn[662]*662sylvania limited partnership. Filbern Manor is an unregistered fictitious name used by Claridge Associates.
West Newton Borough leased the subject real estate with the understanding that the Lessee would build housing for elderly and other citizens on it in connection with state and federal housing programs. Lessee began building the apartment buildings on the premises shortly after the Lease was executed. For several years since the execution of the Lease and the construction of the buildings, the taxing authority issued tax assessments for the improved property in Filbern Manor’s name, and Filbern Manor paid the taxes.
For the year 1986, taxes were assessed against the improved property based on an assessed value of $1,643,-970.00. Filbern appealed that assessment to the Board. The Board upheld the assessment value, and Filbern appealed the decision to the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County.
In the court of common pleas, the Board and the Municipalities, as intervenors, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that Filbern is not a legal entity and is not the Lessee of the property (the successor to Claridge Properties’ interest is technically Claridge Associates, rather than Filbern), and therefore has no interest in the tax assessment. Further, the motion asserted that Filbern was not the “owner” of the property for local tax purposes, and therefore had no standing to appeal to a court under the General County Assessment Law (Law), Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 853, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 5020-1 to 5020-520.
The common pleas court found that Filbern Manor was a business name used by Claridge Associates and that the Board treated Filbern Manor as the taxpayer and dealt with it accordingly. Moreover, the court found that the issue of taxpayer status was not raised at the appeal before the Board. The court reasoned that the Board could not now complain that Filbern was not a legal entity, nor the alter ego of Lessee, able to challenge the appropriateness of the assessment. Standing to prosecute a tax appeal in court is another matter, however, and is governed by Section 518.1 [663]*663of the Law. The court granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds that Filbern was a mere lessee and not the “owner” of the property for tax appeal purposes.
Filbern appealed the dismissal of its appeal to this Court and the Board and Municipalities filed a cross-appeal continuing to argue that Filbern is not a legal entity and is not synonymous with the Lessee.
The issues raised in this appeal are: 1) whether the Lessee is the “owner” of the property in question, and as such is a proper party to appeal to the court of common pleas; and 2) whether Filbern is a legal person or is synonymous with the Lessee of the property.
The General County Assessment Law provides for appeals to court as follows:
Any owner of real estate or taxable property in this Commonwealth, who may feel aggrieved by the last or any future assessment or valuation of his real estate or taxable property, may appeal from the decision of the county commissioners, acting as a board of revision, or the board of revision of taxes, or the board for the assessment and revision of taxes,1 or the Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, in counties of the second class, as the case may be, to the court____
Section 5020-518.1 of the Law, as amended, 72 P.S. § 5020-518.1(a) (footnote added).2 This provision applies to taxes assessed by third class counties such as Westmoreland [664]*664County, as well as counties of other classes. Section 1 of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5020-1.
In Marcus Hook Development Park v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Delaware County, 68 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 229, 449 A.2d 70 (1982), we held that tax assessment appeals to court must be prosecuted by the “real owner.” Id., 68 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 233, 449 A.2d at 73. We determined that Marcus Hook was only the lessee of certain taxable real estate and was not the “real owner;” consequently we held it had no right to appeal a real estate tax assessment to court.3
The facts of the case now before us are distinguishable from those of Marcus Hook, and are in fact more closely analogous to other cases decided by us since our opinion in Marcus Hook. In Marcus Hook, the borough leased real estate to the development company, but there was no mention of taxable leasehold improvements owned by the lessee of the land. In the present case, while the land is leased from the borough, the buildings belong to Lessee.
Recently in Blue Knob Recreation, Inc. Appeal, 122 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 156, 551 A.2d 9 (1988) petition for allowance of appeal denied, 522 Pa. 597, 562 A.2d 321 (1989), we were asked to determine whether leasehold improvements built on land which the Commonwealth leased to Blue Knob were subject to taxation as real estate. The lease provided for thirty-five one-year terms and renewed automatically each year. We stated, “[i]n Pennsylvania, the general rule concerning a lessee’s tax liability is whether ‘there are indicia that the title to the improvements, as well as the leasehold itself, remains in the lessee during the term.’ ” Id., 122 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 158, 551 A.2d at 10 (quoting Venango Federal Savings and Loan Association v. County of Venango, 73 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 313, 315, 457 A.2d 1340, 1341 (1983)). In Blue Knob, the county did not assess the lessee for any of the buildings in existence prior to the execution of the lease, or on the land, but [665]*665only on a new lodge constructed by the lessee, and which the court held was owned by Blue Knob.
Our inquiry into ownership of the leasehold improvement in Blue Knob focused on the terms of the lease and the intentions of the parties as to ownership. See also, Venango Federal Savings and Loan. We held that the facts demonstrated that Blue Knob owned the particular improvements (buildings), and that the property was taxable. As the owner of the taxable property, Blue Knob clearly had standing to appeal under the provisions of the Law cited above.
Turning our attention to the facts now before us, we are convinced that the parties intended that the Lessee is the owner of the leasehold improvements. Paragraph 8(b) of the lease provides:
Except as may otherwise be provided for herein, all buildings, additions, improvements, equipment and appurtenances on or in the demised premises at the commencement of the term, and any buildings, alterations, rebuildings, replacements, changes, additions, improvements, equipment and appurtenances that thereafter may be erected, installed or affixed on or in the demised premises during the term, are and shall be deemed to be the property of the Tenant. (Emphasis added).
In addition, the default provision of the lease in Paragraph 12 states, inter alia, that in the event of default “all title to the buildings and the property of the Tenant therein shall be forfeited to the Landlord.” Since title to the improvements is vested in the Lessee, and since that property is taxable, it necessarily follows that Lessee is the owner of “taxable property,” and as provided in Section 518.1 of the Law, it may prosecute an appeal to the court.
With respect to the Municipalities’ claim that Filbern Manor may not prosecute an appeal in its name since it is not the Lessee or a legal person, we affirm the trial court. The Municipalities sent the tax assessment in the name of Filbern Manor and has been dealing with the Lessee under [666]*666that name for a number of years. Under such circumstances, the Municipalities may not now claim they did not know the true identity of the Lessee, or that they have been prejudiced by the prosecution of the appeal under that name. Macy v. Oswald, 198 Pa.Superior Ct. 435, 182 A.2d 94 (1962); Ross v. McMillan, 172 Pa.Superior Ct. 298, 93 A.2d 874 (1953). Therefore we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss on this basis, and dismiss the cross-appeal.
Accordingly, we grant the appeal of Filbern Manor, and reverse the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County. Further, we deny the cross-appeals of the Board of Assessment Appeals, West Newton Borough, Westmoreland County and Yough School District.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of April, 1991, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County dismissing the appeal of Filbern Manor Apartments in the above-captioned matter is hereby reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the cross-appeal is denied.
Jurisdiction relinquished.