Figueroa v. United States

• Court: District Court, D. Connecticut
• Decided: April 28, 2021
• Docket: 3:16-cv-01075
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

ANGEL FPIeGtiUtiEoRneOrA, v. , Civil No. 3:16cv1075 (JBA)

UNITEDR SeTspAoTnEdSe nOtF AMERICA, April 28, 2021 . RULING DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND GRANTING MOTION FOR CERTIFICATE OF APP EALABILITY On May 25, 2018, Petitioner Angel Figueroa filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s April 25, 2018 ruling denying his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and requests a certificate of appealability. (Mot. [Doc. # 9] at 1; Request for Certificate [Doc. # 10].) For the reasons that follow, Mr. IF.i gueroLa’esg malo Stitoann fdoarr rde c onsideration is denied, but a certificate of appealability will issue. Motions for reconsideration “shall be filed and served within seven (7) days of the filing of the decision or order from which such relief is sought, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum setting forth concisely the controlling decisions or data the movant believes the Court overlooked.” D. Conn. L. R. 7(c)(1). “The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—mattersS, hinra odtehre vr. wCSoXrd Tsr, athnsapt .m, Inigch.t reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” , 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). “The major grounds for justifying reconsideration are ‘an intervening change of controlling lVaiwrg, itnh Ae tal.v Aaiirlawbailyist,y L otfd n. ve.w N aevt’ild Menedceia, toior nth Bed n.eed to correct a clear error or manifest injustice.’” Feder, a9l5 P6r aFc.2tidc e1 2an4d5 ,P 1r2o5ce5d (u2rde sC ir. 1992) (quoting 18 CharIIle. s AlanD Wiscruigshsti o&n A rthur R. Miller, § 4478 (1st ed. 1981)). a. Motion for Reconsideration Mr. Figueroa’s counsel untimely filed his motion for reconsideration thirty days after the Court denied his petition without explanation for this delay. Thus, his motion for reconsideration is procedurally defective and is denied. However, even if the meritCsl awsse rve. Uton ibteed c oStnastiedsered, they fail. Mr. Figueroa discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in , 138 S. Ct. 798, 803 (2018), which is not an intervening change of controlling law regarding the enforceability of appellate review waCivlaersss contained in guilty pleas because it issued before the ruling he challenges. Defendant relies on to claim that “Cenlafsosrcing the waiver in this case would result in a miscarriage of justice.” (Mot. at 1-2.) In , the Supreme Court held that the acceptance of a guilty plea alone does not bar a criminal defendant fromCl laastser appealing that conviction on constitutional grounds. 138 S. Ct. at 801-802. The defendant in had pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm on 1 U.S. Capitol grounds and waived certain rights, but notably absent from the plea agreement was Id. any reference to a waiver of the right to directly appeal the conviction on constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court rejected the Government’s argument that I“db.y entering a guilty plea, [a defendant] inherently relinquishes his constitutional claims.” at 802, 806. Since his plea agreement did “not expressly refer to a waiver of the appeal rIidg.h t here at issue,” Class was permitted to bring his constitutional claiCmlass so n direct appeal. at 806-807. The Supreme Court’s holding in Uwnaitse ldi mStiateteds t vo. dPierpepcet rasppeals and did not discuss its applicability to waivers of collatCelraasls attacks. , 899 F.3d 211, 225,n.7 (3d Cir. 2018) (“The court’s holding [in ], however, was cabined to direct appeal.”) Moreover, Mr. Figueroa, unlike Class, expressly waived hCisl arsigs ht to appeal or collaterally attack his sentence as set forth in the plea agreement. (Ruling at 3.) applied to guilty pleas only in the absence of express waivers and Defendant provides no rationale as to why that holding would impact the analysis of this case, where Mr. Figueroa agreed to such a waiver.

1 Class’s plea agreement waived: “(1) All defenses based upon the statute of limitations; (2) several specified trial rights; (3) the right to appeal a sentence at or below the judicially determined, maximum sentencing guideline raIndg. e; (4) most collateral attacks on the conviction and sentence; and (5) various rights to request or receive information concerning the investigation and prosecution of his criminal case.” at 802. It also stated that “[n]o agreements, promises, understandingsI, do.r representations have been made by the parties or their counsel other than those ClaFsusrther, Defendant does not challenge the constitutionality of the staSteuet Pe eopfp heirss conviction as in . RClaatshser, he challenges a sentencing enhancement applied to him. , 899 F.3d at J2o2h5n, sno.n7 (“[ ] does not bear on our resolution of whether Peppers’s (C) plea precludes his claim because Peppers is not collaJotehrnaslolyn attacking the constitutionality of the statute underlying hisA lcloenn vvi.c Utinointe. d. . S. tIantsetsead, his claim is directed at a sentencing enhancement[, tChlaes As CCA].”); , 2019 WL 4723141, at *1, n.1 (D. Conn. Sept. 26, 2019) (holding inapposite because “petitioner only attacks his sentence,” not the constitutionality of the statute of conviction). The Court disagrees with Mr. Figueroa that the Government impliedly conceded the unenforceability of its waiver because it has subsequently changed the language of its standard plea agreement. A change in the plea agreement language regarding waivers, without an intervening change of law finding such prior waivers unenforceable, does not amount to admission of unenforceabbi. lityC.e rtificate of Appealability A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable juSrliasctsk wv.o MucldD fainnide lthe district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the petitioner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists Iodf. reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Although the Court rejects the basis of Mr. Figueroa’s motion for reconsideration, it does acknowledge that one circuit has concluded that defendants who entered into guilty pleas waiving their appellate rights may still appeal their sentence where it exceeds the statutory maximum absent the Armed CJaorhenesro CnriSmeien Uanl Eitnedh aSntacetems evn. Ct,o wrnheotstee residual clause was deemed Johnson sum, because thWee rlcehsi dual Jcolhanussoen w as struck from the ACCA in and the Supreme Court determined in that announced a substantive rule that applied retroactively, the district court is now deemed to have no statutory authority to impose Cornette’s sentence under the residual clause of the ACCA. AccordBiuntg lsye,e w Uen miteady Srteavtieesw v .C Boarrnneetste’s sentencing challenge notwithstanding the appeal waiver.”). , 953 F.3d 383, 388, n.9 (5th Cir. 2020) (enforcing the defendant’s collateral-review waiver despite his sentence exceeding the current statutor y maximum, noting that “[m]ost other circuits,” including the Second Circuit, have done the same).Because Mr. Figueroa was sentenced steoe f ifteen years’ incarceration, in excess of the ten-year maximum without the ACCA enhancement, ( Ruling at 2-3), it is possible that a reasonable jurist could conclude that his waiver should be unenforceable. Accordingly, a certificate of apIIpIe. alabCiliotny cwluilsl iiossnu e. For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. # 8] is DENIED and his Motion for a Certificate of Appealability [Doc. # 9] is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. /s/ Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 28th day of April 2021.