NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TERESA FIGUEROA, No. 23-951 Agency No. Petitioner, A047-760-366 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 21, 2025** Portland, Oregon
Before: CALLAHAN, M. SMITH, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.
Teresa Figueroa Flores (Figueroa), a Mexican citizen, seeks review of a
decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her application for
asylum, cancellation of removal and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). petition for review. Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we
do not recount them here except as necessary to provide context to our ruling.
Figueroa married Fernando Figueroa (Fernando), a naturalized citizen, in
1999 in Mexico. Impatient with the visa process, Figueroa twice attempted to
enter the United States illegally and both times was removed. During one of her
attempts, Figueroa falsely identified herself as Fernando’s half-sister, a United
States citizen. When she subsequently had her immigration visa interview with the
U.S. consulate, she did not mention her prior removals. She was admitted into the
United States as a permanent resident, and has lived in Hood River, Oregon, since
then.
In 2014, when returning from Mexico, Figueroa was questioned by the
border authorities and charged with not possessing a valid entry document because
she had procured her visa through fraud or willful misrepresentation. The agency
denied Figueroa asylum, cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and
protection under CAT. Figueroa petitions for review asserting that (1) she is
eligible for a fraud waiver, (2) her removal will cause exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to her husband and children, (3) she was denied due process by
the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), and (4) she is entitled to asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under CAT because she reasonably fears persecution if
returned to Mexico.
2 23-951 1. Figueroa has not shown that the agency erred in pretermitting her request
for a fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). The statute authorizes the
waiver of certain misrepresentations upon a showing that but for the
misrepresentation the noncitizen was “otherwise admissible.” While the statute
might be interpreted to allow waiver of the underlying misdeeds that led to the
misrepresentation, we rejected this perspective in Corona-Mendez v. Holder, 593
F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2010). We held that “two grounds of inadmissibility existed
for Corona–Mendez at the time of his fraudulent application for adjustment of
status—the fraud itself and his improper return to the United States after
deportation, without permission to reenter” and that because “237(a)(1)(H) relief is
only available where it will render the petitioner ‘otherwise admissible’ as of the
time the fraud it excuses transpired, the Board properly determined that the
237(a)(1)(H) waiver was statutorily unavailable to Corona–Mendez.” Id. at 1147.
Similarly, here, even if Figueroa’s misrepresentation were waived, she would
remain inadmissible as a noncitizen who had been removed and sought
readmission without permission of the Attorney General (8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)) and as a noncitizen who falsely claimed U.S. citizenship
(8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)). The IJ properly pretermitted Figueroa’s request
for fraud waiver.
2. Figueroa has not shown that the agency erred in finding that her removal
3 23-951 would not cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to her husband and
children. The Attorney General may cancel removal where the noncitizen
“establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). “Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is
defined to require something substantially “beyond the ordinary hardship that
would be expected when a close family member leaves this country.” Matter of
Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 62 (BIA 2001); see also Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137
F.4th 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2025) (“[t]he hardship must be out of the ordinary and
exceedingly uncommon. It must deviate, in the extreme, from the norm.”).
Moreover, in Lemus-Escobar v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 1079, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2025),
we held that while the court has jurisdiction to review a fact-intensive mixed
question, the agency’s factual determinations receive “deferential” review.
The agency discounted the alleged hardships to Figueroa’s husband and
children noting the children’s ages, Fernando’s employment, and the support and
ties the family has in Hood River, Oregon where they have lived for 20 years.
Figueroa does not challenge the factual basis for the agency’s determination, and
she has not shown that, when viewed deferentially, the agency erred in concluding
she had not shown the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship necessary for
cancellation of removal.
4 23-951 3. Figueroa has not shown that she was denied due process in her
immigration proceedings. To prevail on a due process claim, Figueroa must show
that she was denied a full and fair hearing and suffers prejudice therefrom.
Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 2007).
Figueroa asserts that Fernando did not have adequate time to “subjectively
describe” his back injury and his reliance on Figueroa for his personal care. She
also alleges that the IJ failed to give adequate weight to her expert’s opinion.
The record does not show that Figueroa was denied procedural due process.
Her attorney called Fernando as a witness, completed his examination of Fernando,
and declined to ask further questions after Fernando was cross-examined.
Moreover, Figueroa has not made the requisite showing of prejudice as all of her
allegations concerning her husband and children are fully set forth in the record
and she does not identify any particular matter that was not considered by the
agency.
4. Finally, Figueroa has not shown that she is entitled to asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT because of a reasonable
fear of future persecution. The Attorney General may grant relief upon a showing
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TERESA FIGUEROA, No. 23-951 Agency No. Petitioner, A047-760-366 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 21, 2025** Portland, Oregon
Before: CALLAHAN, M. SMITH, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.
Teresa Figueroa Flores (Figueroa), a Mexican citizen, seeks review of a
decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her application for
asylum, cancellation of removal and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). petition for review. Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we
do not recount them here except as necessary to provide context to our ruling.
Figueroa married Fernando Figueroa (Fernando), a naturalized citizen, in
1999 in Mexico. Impatient with the visa process, Figueroa twice attempted to
enter the United States illegally and both times was removed. During one of her
attempts, Figueroa falsely identified herself as Fernando’s half-sister, a United
States citizen. When she subsequently had her immigration visa interview with the
U.S. consulate, she did not mention her prior removals. She was admitted into the
United States as a permanent resident, and has lived in Hood River, Oregon, since
then.
In 2014, when returning from Mexico, Figueroa was questioned by the
border authorities and charged with not possessing a valid entry document because
she had procured her visa through fraud or willful misrepresentation. The agency
denied Figueroa asylum, cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and
protection under CAT. Figueroa petitions for review asserting that (1) she is
eligible for a fraud waiver, (2) her removal will cause exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to her husband and children, (3) she was denied due process by
the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), and (4) she is entitled to asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under CAT because she reasonably fears persecution if
returned to Mexico.
2 23-951 1. Figueroa has not shown that the agency erred in pretermitting her request
for a fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). The statute authorizes the
waiver of certain misrepresentations upon a showing that but for the
misrepresentation the noncitizen was “otherwise admissible.” While the statute
might be interpreted to allow waiver of the underlying misdeeds that led to the
misrepresentation, we rejected this perspective in Corona-Mendez v. Holder, 593
F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2010). We held that “two grounds of inadmissibility existed
for Corona–Mendez at the time of his fraudulent application for adjustment of
status—the fraud itself and his improper return to the United States after
deportation, without permission to reenter” and that because “237(a)(1)(H) relief is
only available where it will render the petitioner ‘otherwise admissible’ as of the
time the fraud it excuses transpired, the Board properly determined that the
237(a)(1)(H) waiver was statutorily unavailable to Corona–Mendez.” Id. at 1147.
Similarly, here, even if Figueroa’s misrepresentation were waived, she would
remain inadmissible as a noncitizen who had been removed and sought
readmission without permission of the Attorney General (8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)) and as a noncitizen who falsely claimed U.S. citizenship
(8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)). The IJ properly pretermitted Figueroa’s request
for fraud waiver.
2. Figueroa has not shown that the agency erred in finding that her removal
3 23-951 would not cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to her husband and
children. The Attorney General may cancel removal where the noncitizen
“establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). “Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is
defined to require something substantially “beyond the ordinary hardship that
would be expected when a close family member leaves this country.” Matter of
Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 62 (BIA 2001); see also Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137
F.4th 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2025) (“[t]he hardship must be out of the ordinary and
exceedingly uncommon. It must deviate, in the extreme, from the norm.”).
Moreover, in Lemus-Escobar v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 1079, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2025),
we held that while the court has jurisdiction to review a fact-intensive mixed
question, the agency’s factual determinations receive “deferential” review.
The agency discounted the alleged hardships to Figueroa’s husband and
children noting the children’s ages, Fernando’s employment, and the support and
ties the family has in Hood River, Oregon where they have lived for 20 years.
Figueroa does not challenge the factual basis for the agency’s determination, and
she has not shown that, when viewed deferentially, the agency erred in concluding
she had not shown the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship necessary for
cancellation of removal.
4 23-951 3. Figueroa has not shown that she was denied due process in her
immigration proceedings. To prevail on a due process claim, Figueroa must show
that she was denied a full and fair hearing and suffers prejudice therefrom.
Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 2007).
Figueroa asserts that Fernando did not have adequate time to “subjectively
describe” his back injury and his reliance on Figueroa for his personal care. She
also alleges that the IJ failed to give adequate weight to her expert’s opinion.
The record does not show that Figueroa was denied procedural due process.
Her attorney called Fernando as a witness, completed his examination of Fernando,
and declined to ask further questions after Fernando was cross-examined.
Moreover, Figueroa has not made the requisite showing of prejudice as all of her
allegations concerning her husband and children are fully set forth in the record
and she does not identify any particular matter that was not considered by the
agency.
4. Finally, Figueroa has not shown that she is entitled to asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT because of a reasonable
fear of future persecution. The Attorney General may grant relief upon a showing
of “credible, direct, and specific evidence” that supports a reasonable fear of
persecution. Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1428 (1995)). A non-citizen who has not suffered past
5 23-951 persecution may still have a reasonable fear of future persecution, but that fear
must be objectively reasonable. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1065 (9th Cir.
2021). For relief under CAT, a non-citizen must show “that it is more likely than
not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). She “cannot simply prove that there exists a
generalized or random possibility of persecution . . . [she] must show that [she] is
at particular risk—that ‘[her] predicament is appreciably different from the dangers
faced by [her] fellow citizens.’” Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Figueroa does not allege any past persecution or that she has ever been
threatened in Mexico. She asserts that criminal groups carry out torture in her
home state of Guerrero and that government officials are corrupt and are complicit
with criminals. But she does not allege that she holds any political opinion or has
any characteristic that is likely to cause her to be the subject of persecution by the
government or with its acquiescence. Nor does she allege any threats of future
persecution or torture. Accordingly, Figueroa has not shown that she is entitled to
asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief. See Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816
F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Where Petitioners have not shown they are any
more likely to be victims of violence and crimes than the populace as a whole in
Mexico, they have failed to carry their burden.”).
6 23-951 The petition is DENIED.
7 23-951