FIG, LLC FBO SEC PTY v. Al-Malik Divine

District Court, S.D. Ohio·Decided September 9, 2025·No. 3:25-cv-00249·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON FIG20, LLC FBO SEC PTY, : Plaintiff, Case No. 3:25-cv-249 V. : Judge Walter H. Rice YESHUA AL-MALIK DIVINE, e¢ a/., Mag. Judge Caroline H. Gentry Defendants.

ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT AND FOR ATTORNEY FEES OF PLAINTIFF FIG20, LLC FBO SEC PTY (DOC. #10); REMAND MOTION IS OVERRULED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RENEWAL UNDER CONDITIONS SET FORTH HEREIN AS TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES; REMAND MOTION IS SUSTAINED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS; MOTION FOR MISJOINDER OF DEFENDANT ANNETTE J. FINLEY (DOC. #5) AND MOTION TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANT YESHUA AL-MALIK DIVINE (DOC. #14) ARE OVERRULED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RENEWAL IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO, COURT OF COMMON PLEAS; TERMINATION ENTRY

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Remand to State Court and for Attorney Fees of Plaintiff FIG20, LLC FBO SEC PTY. (Remand Motion, Doc. #10). On April 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit in the Montgomery County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas (“State Court”) against Defendants Yeshua Al-Malik Divine Republic, an Ecclesiastical Trust, doing business as Ministry of Ancient Mu (“Divine Trust”) and the Montgomery County, Ohio, Treasurer (“Treasurer”), in an

attempt to foreclose the tax lien it held on 4236 Merrinac Ave., in Dayton, Ohio

(“Property”), owned by Divine Trust, and force a sale of the Property. (Compl., Doc. #1-1, PAGEID 24-26). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff added Defendants Annette D. Finley, and Yeshua El-Divine in his capacity as Overseer/Settler of the Property. (Doc. #1-1, PAGEID 55, 4 13). On July 3, 2025, Finley moved to dismiss based on misjoinder, arguing that she had relinquished any interest in the Property when she sold the Property to Divine Trust in 2020. (Misjoinder Motion, Doc. #1-1, PAGEID 64). Plaintiff filed a memorandum contra on July 16, 2025. (Doc. #1-1, PAGEID 77). However, before the State Court could rule on Finley’s Misjoinder Motion, Divine Trust removed the case to this Court on July 21, 2025. (Removal Notice, Doc. #1). Finley’s Misjoinder Motion was subsequently docketed as a separate filing. (Doc. #5). On July 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed its Remand Motion, raising two main grounds for relief: (1) Removal is barred as a matter of law; and (2) even if removal were proper, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. #10, PAGEID 213, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A)). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that it filed a “routine claim for tax certificate foreclosure under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 5721. It does not invoke any federal statute, raise any federal claim, or seek any relief under federal law. Accordingly, there is no basis for federal question jurisdiction.” (/d. at PAGEID 217, citing OHIO REV. CODE § 5721.01 et seq.). Plaintiff continues that Divine Trust failed to “identify any federal statute allegedly violated by Plaintiff, nor does it present any viable federal defense to the claims asserted.” (/d. at PAGEID 217-18). Thus, Plaintiff concludes, the Court lacks

federal question jurisdiction. (/d. at PAGEID 218, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331). As to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Plaintiff argues that Divine Trust “repeatedly identifies [its] mailing address as 6403 Kindred Square, Montgomery [County], Ohio 45449],]” and that Divine Trust is a citizen of Ohio because it “has presented no credible evidence of domicile outside Ohio.” (/d, at PAGEID 218, citing Von Dunser v. Aronoff, 915 F.2d

1071, 1072 (6th Cir. 1990)). Thus, Plaintiff claims, there is not complete diversity, and even if there were, Divine Trust, as an Ohio citizen, could not remove solely on based on diversity due to the “forum defendant rule.” (/d. at PAGEID 218-19, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b}(2); see a/so Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 90 (2005) (brackets removed, interna! quotation marks and citation omitted) (“An in-

state plaintiff may invoke diversity jurisdiction, but § 1441(b) bars removal on the basis of diversity if any party in interest properly joined and served as a defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought.”). Plaintiff argues that, even if subject matter jurisdiction exists, removal is barred and remand is still required. Specifically, Plaintiff notes that Defendants Finley and Montgomery County Treasurer had been properly joined and served prior to removal; thus, they were required to consent to removal, and Divine Trust

was required to indicate their consent in the removal petition, which it did not do. Plaintiff claims that “[t]his omission alone mandates remand.” (Doc. #10, PAGEID 219-20, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A); Loftis v. United Parcel Serv., 342 F.3d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 2003)). Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that Divine Trust, as a non-human entity, may not proceed pro se in federal court, and Divine Trust's failure to obtain

counsel to file the Removal Notice renders that Notice improper. (/d. at PAGEID 220, citing Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, Unit If Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993)). Finally, Plaintiff claims that Divine Trust’s removal action “lacks any objectively reasonable basis[,]” and was “aimed more at delay and disruption than genuine legal redress.” Thus, Plaintiff asserts that Divine Trust should be forced to pay attorney fees to Plaintiff as part of the remand order. (/a. at PAGEID 220-21, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(a); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011)). On July 28, 2025, Divine Trust filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Doc. #14), and on August 20, 2025, filed a memorandum contra the Remand Motion. (Doc. #16). While, in the memorandum, Divine Trust attempts to set forth subject- matter jurisdiction (ad. at PAGEID 251-55), it fails to address Plaintiff's argument that Defendants Montgomery County Treasurer and Finley never gave consent to removal, despite being properly joined and served in the State Court prior to filing the Removal Notice. Nor is there any indication from post-removal filings that either Montgomery County Treasurer or Finley ever consented to removal. This failure to obtain unanimous consent deprives this Court of authority to hear the

case and compels this Court, upon proper motion, to remand the captioned matter

to State Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b}(2)(A); see a/so Loftis, 342 F.3d at 516 (“Failure to obtain unanimous consent forecloses the opportunity for removal under Section 1446.”).

Further, while some district courts post-Loftis have allowed defendants the opportunity to amend the removal notice to cure the defect, see, e.g., Roberts v. Glens Falls Ins.

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FIG, LLC FBO SEC PTY v. Al-Malik Divine, (S.D. Ohio 2025).

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