Fields v. AOL Time Warner, Inc.

261 F. Supp. 2d 971, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7739, 2003 WL 2012450
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedJanuary 7, 2003
Docket02-2402 DA
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 261 F. Supp. 2d 971 (Fields v. AOL Time Warner, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fields v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 971, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7739, 2003 WL 2012450 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DONALD, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon the motion for summary judgment of Defendants, AOL Time Warner, Inc., Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P., and Time Warner Telecom of the Mid-South, L.P. (collectively “Time Warner”). Plaintiffs, Debbie Fields and Mark Jackson, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, assert that Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), requiring minimum wage and overtime compensation for non-exempt employees. Defendants contend that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims because Plaintiffs’ employment positions were those of “outside salesmen,” and thus, exempt from the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Jackson and Ms. Fields began working for Time Warner in June of 2001 and July of 2001, respectively, as Direct Sales Representatives (“DSR”). The DSR positions were advertised as sales positions and required representatives to sell cable services door-to-door. Dep. of Mark Jackson at 17-18 (hereinafter “Jackson Dep. at _”); Dep. of Debbie Fields at 13 (hereinafter “Fields Dep. at_”). Upon hire, Time Warner trained and instructed Plaintiffs as to the products they were to sell, as well as techniques for selling the products. Jackson Dep. at 20; Fields Dep. at 29-30. Time Warner assigned Plaintiffs a list of contacts bi-weekly, called lead sheets. The lead sheets consisted of former customers of Time Warner. Plaintiffs were permitted to make sales only from the list. Plaintiffs received a sales commission for each sale made. Defs.’ Mot. For Summ. J., Commission Scale, Ex. B. Any sales made to persons on the lead sheets resulted in the payment of commissions. Commissions comprised the majority of Plaintiffs’ compensation. Jackson Dep. at 78. Plaintiffs also received compensation for the collection of delinquent accounts and the recovery of Time Warner equipment. Defs.’ Mot. For Summ. J., Commission Scale, Ex. B.

Plaintiffs’ job duties included selling cable subscriptions, auditing cable lines 1 , and collecting delinquent accounts. Plaintiffs were responsible for setting their work schedule and for planning their workday. Jackson Dep. at 85; Fields Dep. at 85. Plaintiffs had sales quotas *973 that they were expected to meet, but no debt collection quotas. Jackson Dep. at 60-61; Fields Dep. at 44. Time Warner counseled DSRs who failed to meet their sales quotas. Jackson Dep. at 81-82.

If a customer maintained a balance with Time Warner, Plaintiffs were required to collect the debt before they could sell services to the potential customer. Plaintiffs were permitted, however, to avoid calling on leads who showed an outstanding back balance. Jackson Dep. at 85-86. Plaintiffs were permitted to forgive, pursuant to the Time Warner “Customer Recovery Program” (“CRP”), up to $299 in debt that was more than twelve months past due in order to make a sale of new services. Jackson Dep. at 43-45; Fields Dep. at 91. Plaintiffs used the CRP to make sales to potential customers who owed back balances to Time Warner, in which instances Plaintiffs did not have to collect the back balance. Id. Time Warners’ payroll records indicate that Mr. Jackson and Ms. Fields collected back balances twice and five times, respectively, and these collections were made in conjunction with sales. Decl. of Inetta Rogers at ¶¶ 9-10 (hereinafter “Rogers Decl. at_”). Mr. Jackson’s collections comprise less than two tenths of one percent of his total gross compensation. Id. at ¶ 11. Ms. Fields’ collections comprise one percent of her total gross compensation. Id. at ¶ 12.

After Plaintiffs terminated their employment with Time Warner, Plaintiffs filed a cause of action against Defendants alleging that they were entitled to minimum wage and overtime during their employment with Defendants. On November 5, 2002, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Plaintiffs were exempt from the FLSA overtime and minimum wage requirements pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The Court will now consider Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment may be granted if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Material facts are those facts which are defined by substantive law and are necessary in order to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence, facts, and any inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Mat-sushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp-, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Walbom v. Erie County Care Facility, 150 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir.1998). Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment has been made, the “adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587,106 S.Ct. 1348.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs argue that they were entitled, pursuant to the FLSA, to be paid minimum wage and overtime during their employment with Time Warner in Memphis. Federal law requires employers to pay employees a statutory minimum wage and overtime pay for hours worked in excess of the statutory maximum. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207. The FLSA exempts, *974 however, “any employee employed ... in the capacity of outside salesman” from the minimum wage and overtime provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).

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Bluebook (online)
261 F. Supp. 2d 971, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7739, 2003 WL 2012450, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fields-v-aol-time-warner-inc-tnwd-2003.