Fidelity Union Life Insurance v. Lorren (In Re Lorren)

45 B.R. 584, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 4394, 12 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 549
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedDecember 21, 1984
Docket19-70178
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 45 B.R. 584 (Fidelity Union Life Insurance v. Lorren (In Re Lorren)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fidelity Union Life Insurance v. Lorren (In Re Lorren), 45 B.R. 584, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 4394, 12 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 549 (Ala. 1984).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GEORGE S. WRIGHT, Bankruptcy Judge.

Two issues are before the Court: (1) The Court must determine whether the bankruptcy court has subject matter jurisdiction of the objection to discharge and the dis-chargeability complaint under Section 727 and 523(a)(2), (4), and (6) 1 of the Code respectively, and (2) the Court must also decide whether abstention under 28 U.S.C. Section 1334(c)(1) (1984) or 28 U.S.C. Section 1334(c)(2) (1984) would be appropriate or is required under the facts of this case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. On July 20, 1980, Charles Hamilton Lorren, Jr., the debtor-defendant, (hereinafter “Lorren”) entered into three agency agreements to sell life insurance with Fidelity Union Life Insurance Company, the plaintiff, (hereinafter called “Fidelity”).

2. Lorren resigned or was terminated by Fidelity on May 16, 1983.

3. Fidelity filed suit against Lorren in the 192nd District Court of Dallas County, *586 Texas (hereinafter the “Dallas Action”) to recover the overpayment of commissions. A proof of claim (Claim # 3) was filed on July 16, 1984 in Lorren’s later Chapter 7 petition for $63,048.40 for such overpayment.

4. On April 19, 1984, Lorren filed a Chapter 7 petition in the Northern District of Alabama.

5. On June 21, 1984 Lorren, individually 2 filed a suit in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama (hereinafter the “Birmingham Action”) against Fidelity and four co-defendants under four counts: (1) Defamation, (2) Slander, (3) Right of privacy, and (4) Tort of outrage, based primarily on a letter written by Fidelity dated June 21, 1983 to policyholders, which had been sold by Lorren.

6. On July 16, 1984 Fidelity filed in this Court an objection to discharge and a dis-chargeability complaint based upon three separate theories: (1) Tortious interference of contract, (2) Misuse of trade secrets, and (3) Civil conspiracy. These objections are based upon the acts of Lorren after the termination of employment with Fidelity and reemployment with another insurance company for the alleged solicitation of pri- or policy holders of Fidelity and other actions by Lorren. 3

7. On July 16, 1984, Fidelity filed a proof of claim for the commission overpayment that was the subject matter of the Dallas Action.

8. On July 30, 1984, Lorren filed a Motion to Abate or in the alternative Motion to Remand which was later withdrawn.

9. On October 29, 1984, Lorren filed a Motion to Dismiss based primarily on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 4

10. On October 29, 1984, Lorren filed a Motion to Abstain based primarily on the pendency of the individually filed Birmingham Action, that the result of the continuation of these proceedings would be piecemeal litigation, and that the instant suit is based upon state law issues.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF DISCHARGEABILITY

Regarding the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 523.05 (15th Ed. 1984) states:

The 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act empowered the bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of particular debts, a type of jurisdiction not generally possessed theretofore. The provision in Bankruptcy Act section 17c granting such jurisdiction has been deleted from the Code in view of the comprehensive grant of jurisdiction prescribed in 28 U.S.C. Section 1471(b) which is adequate to cover the full jurisdiction that the bankruptcy courts had under the Bankruptcy Act over dischargeability and related issues under section 17c of the Act.

On June 28, 1982, the Supreme Court declared in a plurality opinion that the broad grant of jurisdiction to the Article I Bankruptcy Courts was unconstitutional. Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982).

On December 22,1982, the Northern District of Alabama adopted the so-called Emergency or Model Rule 5 as a local rule, *587 which provides that a Bankruptcy Judge may not enter a final judgment in “related proceedings”. Emergency Rule (d)(3)(B) (December 22,1982). Rule (d)(3)(A) defined “related proceedings” as follows:

(d) Powers of Bankruptcy Judges
(3)(A) Related proceedings are those civil proceedings that, in the absence of a petition in bankruptcy, could have been brought in a district court or a state court. Related proceedings include but are not limited to claims brought by the estate against parties who have not filed claims against the estate. Related proceedings do not include: ... proceedings to determine dischargeability of particular debts; proceedings to object to the discharge....

Emergency Rule (d)(3)(A) (December 22, 1982).

On July 10, 1984, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (hereinafter the “1984 Amendment”) adopted new jurisdictional organization, which re-adopted the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 1471(a) and (b) (1978) as 28 U.S.C. Section 1334(a) and (b) (1984). However, the District Court continued to have jurisdiction, but the automatic referral to the Bankruptcy Court by District Court contained in Section 1471(c) of the 1978 law was eliminated and a permissive referral was adopted in 28 U.S.C. Section 157(a) (1984). The bankruptcy judges constitute a “unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court”, 28 U.S.C. Section 151 (1984) as opposed to “an adjunct to the district court”. 28 U.S.C. Section 151 (1978). Section 104(a) of the 1984 Amendment labeled “Chapter 6 — Bankruptcy Judges” clearly defines and distinguishes when the 1984 amendments are referring to “bankruptcy judges” and “district judges”, whereas Section 101(a) of the 1984 Amendment readopted with minor modifications its predecessors and substituted “District” for “Bankruptcy” wherever it appeared.

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Bluebook (online)
45 B.R. 584, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 4394, 12 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 549, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fidelity-union-life-insurance-v-lorren-in-re-lorren-alnb-1984.