TAFT, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). Whatever conclusion this court might have reached upon a construction of the act of 1871, were it a case of first impression, it seems now to be settled by the decision of the supreme court in Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S. 139-154, 8 Sup. Ct. 1101, approving the decision of Mr. Justice Matthews and Judge Hammond at the circuit in Kelly v. Town of Milan, 21 Fed. 842, and of the supreme court of Tennessee in Pulaski v. Gilmore, reported in a note to the latter case, 21 Fed. 870, that the act of 1871 did not confer power to make subscriptions to the stock of railroad companies, or to issue bonds, but only regulated the mode in which such power, when conferred in other acts, should be exercised. Yielding to this view, counsel for the appellant seek to find the power to issue the bonds and coupons in suit in the act of 1852,-and look only to the act of 1871 to regulate the exercise of the power in a constitutional manner. They frankly say that, unless the act of 1852 is in force, and confers the power to issue these bonds, they have no case.
The sole question, then, is whether the act of 1852 is in force. The act of 1852 gave the power to Lawrence county to subscribe for railroad stock, and to issue bonds in payment therefor, if a majority of the voters of the county voting at an election called for the purpose should vote in favor of the subscription. The constitution of 1870 provided that no county, city, or town should be given the power to loan its credit to any corporation, except upon a three-fourths affirmative vote of its qualified voters voting at an election. The legislation of 1852 was, therefore, inconsistent with the limitation upon the power of the county to accept and exercise the right to subscribe for stock and issue bonds, imposed by the constitution of 1870. Section 1 of article-11 of that constitution provided that all laws then in force and in use in the state, not inconsistent with the constitution, should continue in force until they should expire, [579]*579be altered, or repealed by the legislature. The necessary iinplica-lion from the provision, and the necessary effect of the constitution,, even without such a provision, must be that laws inconsistent with the constitution were abrogated and annulled. Counsel for appellant advance the idea that the effect of the constitution was not to annul the act of 1852 entirely, but only to put it in a state of suspended animation, in which it still might confer the power to issue bonds, but would remain inoperative so far as justifying its exercise until some new act should regulate the exercise of the power, in accordance with the new' constitution. The conception of an existing power in a county which has no right to exercise it until subsequent legislation shall confer the right is an elusive one, and difficult to api>rehend. Certainly, we should not affirm it to exist in any given case unless peculiar reasons require it. JSlo such reasons are present here. The act of 1852, prescribed as a condition precedent to the possession of power by a county to issue bonds that a majority of the voters should vote for it. The constitution of 1870 said that a county may not possess such power by legislative grant save upon a condition precedent that three-fourths of the voters shall approve it. To impose a new condition precedent without which power may not he enjoyed is to take away all power, therefore, dependent on another and less onerous condition precedent. It leaves no power existing. It destroys that, and only confers upon the legislature authority to confer new power, subject to the new condition precedent. This, in accord with the opinion of the supreme court of the United States, in the case of Norton v. Board, 129 U. S. 479, 9 Sup. Ct. 822. The town of Brownsville was aulhomed, by act passed February 8, 1870, by the legislature of Tennessee, to Issue bonds for railroad purposes, and receive stock in exchange therefor, upon a majority vote of the electors of the town in favor of the issuing of the bonds. The new constitution requiring a three-fourths vote in such cases was adopted by the people March 26, 1870, and went into effect on the oth day of May of the same year. The election in Brownsville was held in June, 1870, and the vote in favor of the bonds was unanimous. The court held that the inhibition imposed by section 29 of the constitution of 1870 operated directly upon the municipalities themselves, and was absolute and self-executing; and, although power was reserved to the legislature to enable them to give or loan their credit, and to become stockholders, upon the assent of three-fourths of the votes cast at an election to be held by the qualified voters, the county, city, or town was destitute of the power to do so until legislation authorizing such election and action thereupon was had. In delivering the opinion of the court, the chief justice said:
“The prohibition of the gift or loan, of credit or the subscription to stock without a three-fourths vote is not an affirmative grant of authority to give or loan credit or to become a stockholder upon a three-fourths vote. Prior to the constitution, of 1870, the legislature could have conferred on a municipal corporation the power to give or loan its credit, or to subscribe foist ock, on such terms and conditions as the legislature chose to impose; but, after that constitution went into effect, the municipality was deprived, of any power previously conferred, and could thereafter do none of these things [580]*580save by an act of legislature imparting tbe power as limited by tbe constitution.”
After referring to a number of authorities, the chief justice proceeded:
“These cases sufficiently illustrate tbe distinction between tbe operation of a constitutional limitation upon tbe power of tbe legislature and of a constitutional inhibition upon tbe municipality itself. In tbe former case, past legislative action is not necessarily affected, while in the latter it is annulled. Of course, if an entirely new organic law is adopted, provision in tbe schedule or some other part of the instrument must be made for keeping in force all laws not inconsistent therewith, and this was furnished in this instance by the first section of article 11; but such a provision does not perpetuate any previous law enabling a municipality to do that which it is subsequently forbidden to do by the constitution. The inhibition being self-executing, and operating directly upon the municipality, and not in itself enabling the latter to proceed in accordance with the prescribed limitation, further legislation is necessary before the municipality can act.”
The chief justice concluded his opinion with the statement:
“It will be perceived that we do not assent to the view that when the state government commenced under the new constitution the act of February 8, 1870, was amended by section 29 of article 2, so as to substitute a vote of three-fourths for that of a majority, and re-enacted, so to speak, by the. first section of article 11, above quoted. The power of ordinary legislation is vested, under all our constitutions, in the legislatures; and the constitutional convention of Tennessee did not assume to exercise such power.
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TAFT, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). Whatever conclusion this court might have reached upon a construction of the act of 1871, were it a case of first impression, it seems now to be settled by the decision of the supreme court in Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S. 139-154, 8 Sup. Ct. 1101, approving the decision of Mr. Justice Matthews and Judge Hammond at the circuit in Kelly v. Town of Milan, 21 Fed. 842, and of the supreme court of Tennessee in Pulaski v. Gilmore, reported in a note to the latter case, 21 Fed. 870, that the act of 1871 did not confer power to make subscriptions to the stock of railroad companies, or to issue bonds, but only regulated the mode in which such power, when conferred in other acts, should be exercised. Yielding to this view, counsel for the appellant seek to find the power to issue the bonds and coupons in suit in the act of 1852,-and look only to the act of 1871 to regulate the exercise of the power in a constitutional manner. They frankly say that, unless the act of 1852 is in force, and confers the power to issue these bonds, they have no case.
The sole question, then, is whether the act of 1852 is in force. The act of 1852 gave the power to Lawrence county to subscribe for railroad stock, and to issue bonds in payment therefor, if a majority of the voters of the county voting at an election called for the purpose should vote in favor of the subscription. The constitution of 1870 provided that no county, city, or town should be given the power to loan its credit to any corporation, except upon a three-fourths affirmative vote of its qualified voters voting at an election. The legislation of 1852 was, therefore, inconsistent with the limitation upon the power of the county to accept and exercise the right to subscribe for stock and issue bonds, imposed by the constitution of 1870. Section 1 of article-11 of that constitution provided that all laws then in force and in use in the state, not inconsistent with the constitution, should continue in force until they should expire, [579]*579be altered, or repealed by the legislature. The necessary iinplica-lion from the provision, and the necessary effect of the constitution,, even without such a provision, must be that laws inconsistent with the constitution were abrogated and annulled. Counsel for appellant advance the idea that the effect of the constitution was not to annul the act of 1852 entirely, but only to put it in a state of suspended animation, in which it still might confer the power to issue bonds, but would remain inoperative so far as justifying its exercise until some new act should regulate the exercise of the power, in accordance with the new' constitution. The conception of an existing power in a county which has no right to exercise it until subsequent legislation shall confer the right is an elusive one, and difficult to api>rehend. Certainly, we should not affirm it to exist in any given case unless peculiar reasons require it. JSlo such reasons are present here. The act of 1852, prescribed as a condition precedent to the possession of power by a county to issue bonds that a majority of the voters should vote for it. The constitution of 1870 said that a county may not possess such power by legislative grant save upon a condition precedent that three-fourths of the voters shall approve it. To impose a new condition precedent without which power may not he enjoyed is to take away all power, therefore, dependent on another and less onerous condition precedent. It leaves no power existing. It destroys that, and only confers upon the legislature authority to confer new power, subject to the new condition precedent. This, in accord with the opinion of the supreme court of the United States, in the case of Norton v. Board, 129 U. S. 479, 9 Sup. Ct. 822. The town of Brownsville was aulhomed, by act passed February 8, 1870, by the legislature of Tennessee, to Issue bonds for railroad purposes, and receive stock in exchange therefor, upon a majority vote of the electors of the town in favor of the issuing of the bonds. The new constitution requiring a three-fourths vote in such cases was adopted by the people March 26, 1870, and went into effect on the oth day of May of the same year. The election in Brownsville was held in June, 1870, and the vote in favor of the bonds was unanimous. The court held that the inhibition imposed by section 29 of the constitution of 1870 operated directly upon the municipalities themselves, and was absolute and self-executing; and, although power was reserved to the legislature to enable them to give or loan their credit, and to become stockholders, upon the assent of three-fourths of the votes cast at an election to be held by the qualified voters, the county, city, or town was destitute of the power to do so until legislation authorizing such election and action thereupon was had. In delivering the opinion of the court, the chief justice said:
“The prohibition of the gift or loan, of credit or the subscription to stock without a three-fourths vote is not an affirmative grant of authority to give or loan credit or to become a stockholder upon a three-fourths vote. Prior to the constitution, of 1870, the legislature could have conferred on a municipal corporation the power to give or loan its credit, or to subscribe foist ock, on such terms and conditions as the legislature chose to impose; but, after that constitution went into effect, the municipality was deprived, of any power previously conferred, and could thereafter do none of these things [580]*580save by an act of legislature imparting tbe power as limited by tbe constitution.”
After referring to a number of authorities, the chief justice proceeded:
“These cases sufficiently illustrate tbe distinction between tbe operation of a constitutional limitation upon tbe power of tbe legislature and of a constitutional inhibition upon tbe municipality itself. In tbe former case, past legislative action is not necessarily affected, while in the latter it is annulled. Of course, if an entirely new organic law is adopted, provision in tbe schedule or some other part of the instrument must be made for keeping in force all laws not inconsistent therewith, and this was furnished in this instance by the first section of article 11; but such a provision does not perpetuate any previous law enabling a municipality to do that which it is subsequently forbidden to do by the constitution. The inhibition being self-executing, and operating directly upon the municipality, and not in itself enabling the latter to proceed in accordance with the prescribed limitation, further legislation is necessary before the municipality can act.”
The chief justice concluded his opinion with the statement:
“It will be perceived that we do not assent to the view that when the state government commenced under the new constitution the act of February 8, 1870, was amended by section 29 of article 2, so as to substitute a vote of three-fourths for that of a majority, and re-enacted, so to speak, by the. first section of article 11, above quoted. The power of ordinary legislation is vested, under all our constitutions, in the legislatures; and the constitutional convention of Tennessee did not assume to exercise such power. The amendment of a law is usually accomplished according to a prescribed course, and there is nothing here to justify the conclusion that section 29 of article 2 was designed to operate by way of amendment to prior laws, nor can it so operate, nor the act of 1870 be held to have been kept in force, for the reasons already indicated.”
Counsel for appellant concede that, if the language of the supreme court in this case is to be given its full force, it necessarily leads to the annulment of the act of 1852; but they contend that it was unnecessary for the court to decide whether the prior act in that case was absolutely annulled, or only inoperative until such an enabling act as that of 1871 was passed. We feel bound to give to the language of the supreme court its full effect, because we cannot regard the distinction which counsel seek to make a sound one. The conclusion is also supported by language of the supreme court of Tennessee in the case of Nelson v. Haywood Co., 87 Tenn. 781, 11 S. W. 885, in which the court, referring to an act similar to that under consideration in the Brownsville Case, said:
“It is claimed by the county, and it is unquestionably tbe law, that the constitution of 1870, which went into effect on the 5th day of May, 1870, abrogated and annulled the act of February 8, 1870, authorizing the county of Haywood to issue the bonds in question. Const. 1870, art. 2, § 29; Norton v. Commissioners, 129 U. S. 479, 9 Sup. Ct. 322; Aspinwall v. Commissioners, 22 How. 374.”
It may be admitted that this statement was not necessary to the conclusion reached in the case in which it was used, but it is nevertheless very persuasive when announced by the tribunal of last resort in respect to the effect of the constitution of the state.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.