Fidelity Insurance & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Roanoke St. Ry. Co.

98 F. 475, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 3411
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Virginia
DecidedOctober 2, 1899
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 98 F. 475 (Fidelity Insurance & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Roanoke St. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fidelity Insurance & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Roanoke St. Ry. Co., 98 F. 475, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 3411 (circtwdva 1899).

Opinion

PAUL, District Judge.

On the 1st day of May, 1899, a decree of sale was entered ip each of these causes, and the same special commissioners were appointed in each to make sale of the property of the respective corporations. For- convenience, the defendant corporations will be designated as the “Street-Railway Company” and the “Light & Power Company.” On the 1st day of August,' 1899, the commissioners sold the two properties at public auction, and Richard M. Venable became the purchaser. The sales were duly reported by the commissioners, and their confirmation recommended. On the 8th day of August, 1899, the court entered decrees nisi on said reports, and fixed the 18th day of August, 1899, for hearing objections to the confirmation of the sales. On that day R. R. Hicks, trustee in a deéd of trust executed by M. M. Rogers, an unsecured creditor of the Roanoke Street-Railway Company, whose claim of $40,000 is disputed, filed a petition in each case objecting to the confirmation of the sales of the respective properties. Said Hicks, trustee, makes no claim for any debt due him from the Electric Light & Power Company, but states that the said Electric Light & Power Company is indebted to the Street-Railway Company in the sum of $85,950.56, and that, on account of that indebtedness from the Light & Power Company to the Street-Railway Company, he is entitled to share in the proceeds of the sale of the property of the Light & Power Company.

The first objection which the court will consider to the confirmation of these sales is that of the inadequacy of price realized for the respective properties. The master reported, before the decree of sale was entered, that the Street-Railway property was worth $150,-000. This is the amount bid on it, and at which it was knocked down to R. M. Venable, the purchaser. The master reported the Light & Power Company property to be worth between $50,000 and $60,000. On this property the bid was $31,000, and at this price said R. M. Venable became the purchaser.

The ground upon which a court of equity will set aside a sale made under its decree, on account of the inadequacy of price realized, is too well understood to require discussion. The doctrine is thus stated by the supreme court in Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180, 6 Sup. Ct. 686, 29 L. Ed. 839: “A judicial sale of real estate will not be set aside for inadequacy of price, unless the inadequacy is so great as to shock the conscience, or unless there be additional circumstances against its fairness.” The holding of the court in Mining Co. v. Mason, 145 U. S. 349, 12 Sup. Ct. 887, 36 L. Ed. 732, is to the same effect. In 2 Beach, Mod. Eq. Prac. § 821, the grounds for setting aside a judicial sale are stated as follows: “To justify the interference of the court, there must be fraud, mistake, or some accident by which the rights of the parties have been affected. ⅞ * * xt has never yet been decided that mere inadequacy of price was a sufficient reason, of itself, to open a sale.” Id. § 824. There is no allegation of fraud, mistake, or accident in the conduct [477]*477of tlie sale. The only unfairness alleged is that the attitude of the purchaser to the properties offered for sale prevented competition. This will be considered hereafter in this decision. There is no evidence before the court that the properties were not sold for their fair value. There is no offer of an advanced bid nor a better price guarantied on a resale. Tlie court has no assurance that on a resale the properties would bring more, or even as much, as the prices realized at the sales reported. The bonded indebtedness of the Street-Railway Company is $350,000. The indebtedness secured by trust deed on the property of the Light & Power Company is $218,-(>50.50. A mere statement of these figures shows the futility that must attend the efforts of the court to make these properties realize amounts anywhere proximate to the indebtedness of the corporations. They also show’ how remote is the interest of the petitioner in what can be realized from these sales. No order for a resale, with this purpose in view, will be made.

Said Hicks, trustee, as a further objection to the confirmation of these sales, charges that in the purchase of these properties R. M. Venable was not acting for himself, but as the agent of a committee, consisting of himself, Charles R. Spence, and S. Hamilton Graves, and that the said committee was not acting for themselves, but represented the stockholders and certain creditors of the Roanoke Street-Railway Company and the Roanoke Electric Light & Power Company; that this committee was created under an agreement made the 10th of January, 1898, by the bondholders of the Roanoke Railway Company, certain creditors of the Roanoke Electric Light & Power Company, and the stockholders of both companies. This statement is not sustained by the terms of the agreement to which it refers. The agreement is that of the holders of the first mortgage bonds of the Roanoke Street-Railway Company among themselves. Its character and purpose are shewn by the following extracts:

“Roanoke Street Railway. First Mortgage Bondholders’ Agreement.
“Baltimore, January 10th, 1898.
“We, the undersigned, hereby agree to deposit with the Mercantile Trust & Deposit Company of Baltimore the number of first mortgage bonds of the Roanoke Street-Railway Company set opposite our respective names, which ¡ire to be held subject to the order of Richard M. Venable, Charles R. Spence, and S. Hamilton Graves, a committee of the bondholders appointed at a meeting held in Roanoke, Va, on the 22d day of December, 1897. * * * The said committee, or a majority of them, are authorized to represent the owners of said bonds in all proceedings instituted for the collection of tlie same, or the enforcement of the rights of the owners thereof, and to do whatever acts in their judgment may be necessary or desirable for the protection of the interests of said bondholders. ⅜ * ⅜ It is further agreed that, if it shall be necessary to purchase the said railway, or the property of tlie Roanoke Electric Right & Power Company, or other property, for the benefit of the holders of the bonds deposited subject to the order of said committee, the said committee may organize a corporation to own and operate said railway, and such other property as may be purchased by said committee, upon such basis of bonds and stock as, in their opinion, shall be for the best interests of said bondholders.”

This contract is the ground of the second objection to the confirmation of the sale, which is thus specifically stated: “That the property was purchased in pursuance of an agreement between the [478]*478stockholders and certain creditors of these companies, which is illegal, against public policy, to the prejudice of other creditors, and void.” It is insisted that the agreement among the bondholders falls under the condemnation announced by the supreme court in Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co., 174 U. S. 674, 19 Sup. Ct. 827, 43 L. Ed. 1130.

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Bluebook (online)
98 F. 475, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 3411, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fidelity-insurance-safe-deposit-co-v-roanoke-st-ry-co-circtwdva-1899.