Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bank of Smithfield

11 F. Supp. 904, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1419
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedSeptember 28, 1932
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 11 F. Supp. 904 (Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bank of Smithfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bank of Smithfield, 11 F. Supp. 904, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1419 (E.D. Va. 1932).

Opinion

WAY, District Judge.

In 1927 W. E. Laine was elected treasurer of Isle of Wight county, Va. He thereafter qualified and gave the bond required by law, conditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of the office upon which bond plaintiff was surety. As such official, it was his duty to collect and account for the taxes due the county as well as for certain taxes due the state of Virginia.

Laine had two accounts in the defendant bank. One was a personal account in which he kept his personal Linds, and the other an account which was carried on the books of the bank in the name of “W. E. Laine, Treasurer of Isle of Wight County.” Checks drawn on the latter account were signed,’ “W. E. Laine, Treasurer,” Printed in large letters across the top of the face of checks on that account were the words “W. E. Laine, Treasurer, Isle of Wight County, Virginia.” It also appeared from the testimony of the bank’s cashier that the bank knew Laine was county treasurer and that he was depositing in that account the moneys received by him for taxes and other governmental sources of revenue due the county and state.

It was the custom of the bank to honor county warrants drawn on the treasurer and for the treasurer subsequently to reimburse the bank for such warrants, by checks on said account as treasurer in the bank. In September, 1929, the bank had accumulated a number of such warrants, aggregating $4,300 in amount. At that time his account as treasurer carried a balance of less than $1,000, and in order to pay the county warrants held by the bank it was necessary for Laine to replenish that account. Thereupon, he obtained a personal loan from the bank in the sum of $10,150, depositing with the bank as collateral security for the payment of his note two certificates of deposit aggregating the sum of $10,250 issued by the bank and belonging to his father and mother. Laine thereupon deposited the net proceeds of the note, $10,000, to his said account as treasurer.

The note came due on December 7, 1929, and Laine paid it by a check of that date payable to the bank in the sum of $10,150 drawn on his account as treasurer and signed by him as treasurer, which check contained the printed wording above quoted. The bank accepted the check in payment of the note, charged the check to the account of Laine as treasurer, and returned to him the certificates of deposit belonging to the father and mother, which it had held as collateral for payment of the note.

Laine died in May, 1930. An audit disclosed a shortage in his accounts as treasurer of $10,156.97. Demand was made by the county and state upon the surety to make good the shortage, which demand the surety complied with by paying the shortage. Thereupon the surety instituted this suit against the bank and the personal representative of Laine in which the surety alleges, in substance, that having paid the shortage it is subrogated to the rights of the county and state against the bank and the estate of Laine and is entitled to a decree against them for the funds shown to have been misappropriated by Laine and received by the bank when Laine paid his note to the bank in December, 1929.

The evidence in this case is brief and clear. It seems to me that one of the suggestions urged during the trial to the effect that a treasurer who collects and has custody of funds representing taxes due to' the state and county is only a debtor in the ordinary sense to the county and state therefor, is rather startling. It is not easy to believe that such is or was heretofore really the law in Virginia, although it is a fact that the practice of handling taxes in the past may have tended to indicate that such construction was placed upon the law by some officials. That in this case the funds in question were public funds belonging to the state and county, respectively, and were held and deposited by the [906]*906treasurer in his official capacity for the benefit of the state and county is, I think, established. beyond any reasonable doubt. Being public funds, it necessarily follows that the use of any part of them for personal-purposes was a misapplication or misuse which rendered Laine and his surety liable to the state and county according to their respective interests in the funds so misapplied.

We then come to consider the questions whether or not the facts and circumstances surrounding the payment of the note of Laine on December 9, 1929, for $10,150 were such as to put the bank on notice of the ownership of the funds which Laine used to pay his note to the bank and whether or not the bank did anything which materially aided or assisted Laine in misapplying those funds.

With reference to the notice which the bank had of the character of the funds, I hardly see that there is any substantial conflict in the evidence on that issue. Here was a county treasurer who in September, 1929, at the beginning of this transaction, had only about $970 to his credit as such in the bank. He went to the bank and borrowed $10,000 through a purely personal loan. I say “personal loan” because in the nature of things it could not have been anything other than a personal loan. I am not aware of any law and none has been suggested in the argument, empowering Laine personally or as treasurer to make a loan of that character for the benefit of the county or state. It is true that the purpose of the loan was to make good a shortage in Laine’s account to the county and state, and, that it was, therefore, in a sense for their benefit, yet, as I view it, that fact did not and could not change the true character of the loan from a purely personal one to a loan to or for the benefit of the county or state. Had Laine attempted to obtain a loan from the bank to the county such action on his part would have been without authority and would not in fact have altered the personal character of the transaction. As a matter of fact, however, the loan in question was purely personal in form, substance, and purpose. Laine took the $10,-000 and added it to his apparently depleted account which was then down to $970. He personally owed the note to the bank, and he personally obtained all the benefit from the loan, and the bank was careful to require unquestioned collateral security for the full face value of the note.

When .the note matured, the bank, knowing how Laine’s account as treasurer was kept, with full knowledge of the character of the deposits which Laine made in that account, and with the notice which the check of December 9, 1929, bore on its face —unmistakable earmarks and warnings that the funds in that account were public funds —nevertheless honored the check and accepted it in discharge of Laine’s personal note due the bank and thereupon released the collateral which had been deposited as security for the payment of the note.

. It is true, as suggested in argument, that the bank could not have prevented treasurer Laine from drawing a check for a similar amount to a third person or from going somewhere else and cashing a check on his treasurer’s account. In such a supposed case, the bank not having knowingly aided in the misapplication, and not having full knowledge of the ownership of the funds being used to pay the note, would not be responsible for receiving the funds and applying them to the note as directed by Laine. Such would have been a perfectly good payment, and the bonding company would have to lose the money and be without recourse against the bank; but in the instant case, the bank, although acting in good faith, added materially to the power of Laine.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Halifax Corp. v. Wachovia Bank
604 S.E.2d 403 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2004)
Clifton v. State
24 Ill. Ct. Cl. 404 (Court of Claims of Illinois, 1963)
Bank of Giles County v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.
84 F.2d 321 (Fourth Circuit, 1936)
Jones v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
182 S.E. 560 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1935)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
11 F. Supp. 904, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1419, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fidelity-deposit-co-v-bank-of-smithfield-vaed-1932.