FFP Operating Partners, L.P. v. Love

884 S.W.2d 898, 1994 Tex. App. LEXIS 2343, 1994 WL 515271

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 23, 1994
• Docket: 06-94-00027-CV
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

BLEIL, Justice.

FFP Operating Partners, L.P., d/b/a Nu-Way Food Store # 229, appeals from a judgment awarding Carla Love damages for work-related injuries. On appeal it maintains that the trial court reversibly erred by refusing to instruct the jury panel to disregard a statement made by Love’s attorney during voir dire indicating that Love was not covered by any form of workers’ compensation. We conclude that there is no reversible error and affirm.

Love was injured while working at a Nu-Way convenience store and brought suit against her employer to recover for her injuries. During voir dire of the jury panel, Love’s attorney remarked:

As the Court told you, this is a negligence case, but she was working at the time of this injury, and Carla is not covered by any form of Workman’s Compensation Law due to the election of the Defendant, so this is strictly a negligence claim.

Nu-Way’s counsel objected to the statement and asked that the jury panel be instructed to disregard the comment. The trial court overruled the objection.

Nu-Way contends that injecting the issue of workers’ compensation coverage into the trial was irrelevant and prejudicial and that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury panel to disregard the statement.

Disclosing Nu-Way’s nonsubscriber status to the jury was not — at the time of voir dire — relevant to any issue. To mention Nu-Way’s decision not to elect coverage under the workers’ compensation law was improper unless that was a fact sought to be proved by the plaintiff. The objection and request for an instruction to the jury panel to disregard the statement should have been sustained on the basis that the complained-of statement was not relevant to any issue in this negligence action. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 402. Therefore, the remark to the jury panel was inappropriate. In this common-law negligence case, while the defendant loses certain of its common-law defenses, the plaintiff must only prove the employer’s negligence. Tex.Labor Code Ann. § 406.033(d) (Vernon 1994).

No judgment in a civil case shall be reversed on appeal because of trial court error unless the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of the appellant as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper judgment. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1). In making this determination, the court must review the entire record. McCraw v. Mans, 828 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex.1992).

Nu-Way brought forth a partial statement of facts in this case that includes only the proceedings during voir dire and the opening statements of counsel. Nu-Way argues that the remark was harmful in that it clouded the issues for the jury and worked injury on Nu-Way as a nonsubscriber. However, without the complete statement of facts, this court cannot review the entire record to find support for Nu-Way’s argument of harmful error requiring reversal of the judgment. See Dennis v. Hulse, 362 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex.1962). The burden is on the appellant or other party seeking review to see that a sufficient record is presented to show error requiring reversal. Tex.R.App.P. 50(d). We find nothing in this record which even tends to show that Nu-Way was harmed by the attorney’s remark. Nu-Way fails to show error requiring reversal.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.