Few v. Weekes

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Few v. Weekes

162 S.E.2d 884, 118 Ga. App. 190, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1349

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJune 27, 1968

Docket43511

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 162 S.E.2d 884 (Few v. Weekes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Few v. Weekes, 162 S.E.2d 884, 118 Ga. App. 190, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1349 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968).

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Opinions

Pannell, Judge.

1. There is no liability on the part of an operator of a motor vehicle who, while driving, is suddenly and unexpectedly stricken by some illness, such as a fainting spell, or a heart attack, which renders him unconscious or incapable of controlling the vehicle, the lack of control of which is the proximate cause of injury to another, and where the driver had no cause to anticipate such illness, fainting spell or heart attack at the time and place under investigation. Such lack of control of the vehicle under these circumstances does not constitute negligence. Freeman v. Martin, 116 Ga. App.237 (1) (156 SE2d 511).

2. “If a driver, from intoxication, is in a condition which renders him incapable of operating it [an automobile] with proper diligence and skill, and this is known or palpably apparent to one entering the car, this is a fact, which may be proved for the consideration of the jury, along with other facts, to throw light on the question of whether such person exercised ordinary care in entering the car or in remaining in the car, or in reference to his conduct while in it.” Powell v. Berry, 145 Ga. 696, 700 (89 SE 753, LRA 1917A 306). Anything to the contrary in Division 2 of the opinion and the headnote in Freeman v. Martin, supra, must yield to the superior authority of the Supreme Court of this State.

3. It being a jury question as to whether the cause of the automobile leaving the road was a heart attack had by the defendant driver (from which he died) or the intoxication of the driver, and whether or not the plaintiff assumed the risk or was guilty of contributory negligence in riding with a driver who he knew had consumed two drinks of alcohol, the liability of the defendant was a question for the jury, and the judgment granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Bell, P. J., Hall, Deen, Quillian, and Whitman, JJ., concur. Jordan, P. J., concurs in the judgment. Felton, C. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur in Division 1 of the opinion, and dissent from Divisions 2 and 8. [191]*191Poole, Pearce & Cooper, George W. Bryan, Jr., Robert R. Smith, for appellant. Long, Weinberg & Ansley, Ben L. Weinberg, Jr., John K. Dunlap, for appellee.

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Pannell, Judge.

1. There is no liability on the part of an operator of a motor vehicle who, while driving, is suddenly and unexpectedly stricken by some illness, such as a fainting spell, or a heart attack, which renders him unconscious or incapable of controlling the vehicle, the lack of control of which is the proximate cause of injury to another, and where the driver had no cause to anticipate such illness, fainting spell or heart attack at the time and place under investigation. Such lack of control of the vehicle under these circumstances does not constitute negligence. Freeman v. Martin, 116 Ga. App.237 (1) (156 SE2d 511).

2. “If a driver, from intoxication, is in a condition which renders him incapable of operating it [an automobile] with proper diligence and skill, and this is known or palpably apparent to one entering the car, this is a fact, which may be proved for the consideration of the jury, along with other facts, to throw light on the question of whether such person exercised ordinary care in entering the car or in remaining in the car, or in reference to his conduct while in it.” Powell v. Berry, 145 Ga. 696, 700 (89 SE 753, LRA 1917A 306). Anything to the contrary in Division 2 of the opinion and the headnote in Freeman v. Martin, supra, must yield to the superior authority of the Supreme Court of this State.

3. It being a jury question as to whether the cause of the automobile leaving the road was a heart attack had by the defendant driver (from which he died) or the intoxication of the driver, and whether or not the plaintiff assumed the risk or was guilty of contributory negligence in riding with a driver who he knew had consumed two drinks of alcohol, the liability of the defendant was a question for the jury, and the judgment granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Bell, P. J., Hall, Deen, Quillian, and Whitman, JJ., concur. Jordan, P. J., concurs in the judgment. Felton, C. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur in Division 1 of the opinion, and dissent from Divisions 2 and 8. [191]*191Poole, Pearce & Cooper, George W. Bryan, Jr., Robert R. Smith, for appellant. Long, Weinberg & Ansley, Ben L. Weinberg, Jr., John K. Dunlap, for appellee.

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162 S.E.2d 884, 118 Ga. App. 190, 1968 Ga. App. LEXIS 1349, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/few-v-weekes-gactapp-1968.

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