FILED Feb 23 2024, 9:44 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Fernando Marroquin, Appellant-Plaintiff
v.
Christina Reagle, Appellee-Defendant
February 23, 2024 Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-MI-2545 Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court The Honorable Kristine A. Osterday, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D01-1903-MI-90
Opinion by Judge Vaidik Judges May and Kenworthy concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024 Page 1 of 6 Vaidik, Judge.
Case Summary [1] Fernando Marroquin was convicted of Class D felony sexual misconduct with a
minor, which is not (and has never been) a crime that requires sex-offender
registration in Indiana. However, he then moved to Virginia, where such a
crime requires lifetime registration. When he later moved back to Indiana, he
was told he must register for life because he had been required to do so in
Virginia. The basis for this purported requirement is Indiana Code section 11-8-
8-19(f), which provides, “A person who is required to register as a sex or violent
offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other
jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.”
Marroquin challenged the Indiana registration requirement, and the trial court
ruled that Section 11-8-8-19(f) applies even when the only reason the offender
would have to register in another jurisdiction is the existence of an Indiana
conviction. We disagree and reverse.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In 1998, the State charged Marroquin with Class D felony sexual misconduct
with a minor, alleging that he “touch[ed], fondle[d] and caress[ed]” the breast
of a fourteen-year-old girl. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 103-04; see also Ind.
Code § 35-42-4-9(b) (1998). Marroquin pled guilty and was sentenced to a short
period of incarceration followed by two-and-a-half years of probation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024 Page 2 of 6 [3] Marroquin’s conviction did not require him to register as a sex offender in
Indiana. See I.C. § 5-2-12-4 (1998) (recodified at I.C. § 11-8-8-5 in 2006).1 But
Marroquin moved to Virginia in 2000 and lived there until 2018. When he
moved there, Virginia law required that he register for ten years based on the
Indiana conviction. In 2007, Virginia amended its law to require lifetime
registration for offenders like Marroquin. Marroquin registered as required the
entire time he lived in Virginia.2
[4] In 2018, Marroquin moved back to Indiana. The Elkhart County Sheriff’s
Office told him he needed to register in Indiana for life, just as he had been
required to do in Virginia, under Section 11-8-8-19(f). Marroquin then sued the
Commissioner of the Department of Correction, seeking a declaratory
judgment that he need not register. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The trial court denied Marroquin’s motion and granted the
Commissioner’s. The court held that, under Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143
(Ind. 2016), the registration requirement under Section 11-8-8-19(f) “is triggered
if, when an offender moves to Indiana, he is required to register in the state
1 Marroquin says his conviction required him to register for ten years in Indiana. He is incorrect. Since their original enactment in 1994, Indiana’s registration statutes have never required registration for Class D felony sexual misconduct with a minor (or its successor, Level 6 felony sexual misconduct with a minor). See I.C. § 5-2-12-4 (1994) (recodified at I.C. § 11-8-8-5 in 2006). 2 The trial court expressed some doubt as to whether Marroquin was actually required to register for life in Virginia, see Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 132, but both parties tell us that he was. We accept the parties’ representation for purposes of this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024 Page 3 of 6 from which he came, regardless of the state of conviction.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. II pp. 134-35.
[5] Marroquin now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [6] Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Here, the
relevant facts are undisputed. The only issue is the proper interpretation of
Indiana Code section 11-8-8-19(f). Statutory interpretation is an issue of law
that we review de novo, giving no deference to the trial court’s ruling. Tyson v.
State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 90 (Ind. 2016).
[7] Again, Section 11-8-8-19(f) provides, “A person who is required to register as a
sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required
by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is
longer.” Marroquin contends this statute doesn’t apply when the requirement to
register in another jurisdiction is based entirely on the existence of an Indiana
conviction—that is, when there is no “independent requirement” to register in
another jurisdiction. Appellant’s Br. p. 10. We agree.
[8] The first part of Section 11-8-8-19(f)—“A person who is required to register as a
sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction . . .”—matches language from Section
11-8-8-5, the statute that defines “sex or violent offender.” As relevant here, that
statute provides that a “sex or violent offender” is (1) a person who has been Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024 Page 4 of 6 convicted of any of a list of Indiana criminal offenses, I.C. § 11-8-8-5(a), or (2)
“a person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any
jurisdiction,” id. at (b)(1). In discussing the latter provision, subsection (b)(1),
our Supreme Court has explained that “by requiring registration from
individuals who are required to register elsewhere, Indiana avoids becoming a
safe haven for offenders attempting to evade their obligation.” Tyson, 51 N.E.3d
at 96 (holding that offender who had to register in Texas based on Texas offense
also had to register in Indiana). In other words, the purpose of Section 11-8-8-
5(b)(1) is to ensure that a person who is required to register in another
jurisdiction because of a sex offense in that jurisdiction cannot avoid
registration by moving to Indiana. See id. at 95 (explaining that “Indiana is
choosing to defer to offender status determinations made by other states”). And
Section 11-8-8-19(f) simply establishes how long such out-of-state offenders
must register in Indiana. Because Marroquin committed his sex offense in
Indiana, he is not included in Section 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and is not subject to
Section 11-8-8-19(f).
[9] The Commissioner argues, and the trial court found, that our Supreme Court
reached the opposite conclusion in Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143 (Ind. 2016).
There, the Court cited Sections 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and 11-8-8-19(f) in upholding the
Indiana registration requirement of an offender who committed child molesting
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FILED Feb 23 2024, 9:44 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Fernando Marroquin, Appellant-Plaintiff
v.
Christina Reagle, Appellee-Defendant
February 23, 2024 Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-MI-2545 Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court The Honorable Kristine A. Osterday, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D01-1903-MI-90
Opinion by Judge Vaidik Judges May and Kenworthy concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024 Page 1 of 6 Vaidik, Judge.
Case Summary [1] Fernando Marroquin was convicted of Class D felony sexual misconduct with a
minor, which is not (and has never been) a crime that requires sex-offender
registration in Indiana. However, he then moved to Virginia, where such a
crime requires lifetime registration. When he later moved back to Indiana, he
was told he must register for life because he had been required to do so in
Virginia. The basis for this purported requirement is Indiana Code section 11-8-
8-19(f), which provides, “A person who is required to register as a sex or violent
offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other
jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.”
Marroquin challenged the Indiana registration requirement, and the trial court
ruled that Section 11-8-8-19(f) applies even when the only reason the offender
would have to register in another jurisdiction is the existence of an Indiana
conviction. We disagree and reverse.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In 1998, the State charged Marroquin with Class D felony sexual misconduct
with a minor, alleging that he “touch[ed], fondle[d] and caress[ed]” the breast
of a fourteen-year-old girl. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 103-04; see also Ind.
Code § 35-42-4-9(b) (1998). Marroquin pled guilty and was sentenced to a short
period of incarceration followed by two-and-a-half years of probation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024 Page 2 of 6 [3] Marroquin’s conviction did not require him to register as a sex offender in
Indiana. See I.C. § 5-2-12-4 (1998) (recodified at I.C. § 11-8-8-5 in 2006).1 But
Marroquin moved to Virginia in 2000 and lived there until 2018. When he
moved there, Virginia law required that he register for ten years based on the
Indiana conviction. In 2007, Virginia amended its law to require lifetime
registration for offenders like Marroquin. Marroquin registered as required the
entire time he lived in Virginia.2
[4] In 2018, Marroquin moved back to Indiana. The Elkhart County Sheriff’s
Office told him he needed to register in Indiana for life, just as he had been
required to do in Virginia, under Section 11-8-8-19(f). Marroquin then sued the
Commissioner of the Department of Correction, seeking a declaratory
judgment that he need not register. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The trial court denied Marroquin’s motion and granted the
Commissioner’s. The court held that, under Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143
(Ind. 2016), the registration requirement under Section 11-8-8-19(f) “is triggered
if, when an offender moves to Indiana, he is required to register in the state
1 Marroquin says his conviction required him to register for ten years in Indiana. He is incorrect. Since their original enactment in 1994, Indiana’s registration statutes have never required registration for Class D felony sexual misconduct with a minor (or its successor, Level 6 felony sexual misconduct with a minor). See I.C. § 5-2-12-4 (1994) (recodified at I.C. § 11-8-8-5 in 2006). 2 The trial court expressed some doubt as to whether Marroquin was actually required to register for life in Virginia, see Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 132, but both parties tell us that he was. We accept the parties’ representation for purposes of this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024 Page 3 of 6 from which he came, regardless of the state of conviction.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. II pp. 134-35.
[5] Marroquin now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [6] Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Here, the
relevant facts are undisputed. The only issue is the proper interpretation of
Indiana Code section 11-8-8-19(f). Statutory interpretation is an issue of law
that we review de novo, giving no deference to the trial court’s ruling. Tyson v.
State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 90 (Ind. 2016).
[7] Again, Section 11-8-8-19(f) provides, “A person who is required to register as a
sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required
by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is
longer.” Marroquin contends this statute doesn’t apply when the requirement to
register in another jurisdiction is based entirely on the existence of an Indiana
conviction—that is, when there is no “independent requirement” to register in
another jurisdiction. Appellant’s Br. p. 10. We agree.
[8] The first part of Section 11-8-8-19(f)—“A person who is required to register as a
sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction . . .”—matches language from Section
11-8-8-5, the statute that defines “sex or violent offender.” As relevant here, that
statute provides that a “sex or violent offender” is (1) a person who has been Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024 Page 4 of 6 convicted of any of a list of Indiana criminal offenses, I.C. § 11-8-8-5(a), or (2)
“a person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any
jurisdiction,” id. at (b)(1). In discussing the latter provision, subsection (b)(1),
our Supreme Court has explained that “by requiring registration from
individuals who are required to register elsewhere, Indiana avoids becoming a
safe haven for offenders attempting to evade their obligation.” Tyson, 51 N.E.3d
at 96 (holding that offender who had to register in Texas based on Texas offense
also had to register in Indiana). In other words, the purpose of Section 11-8-8-
5(b)(1) is to ensure that a person who is required to register in another
jurisdiction because of a sex offense in that jurisdiction cannot avoid
registration by moving to Indiana. See id. at 95 (explaining that “Indiana is
choosing to defer to offender status determinations made by other states”). And
Section 11-8-8-19(f) simply establishes how long such out-of-state offenders
must register in Indiana. Because Marroquin committed his sex offense in
Indiana, he is not included in Section 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and is not subject to
Section 11-8-8-19(f).
[9] The Commissioner argues, and the trial court found, that our Supreme Court
reached the opposite conclusion in Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143 (Ind. 2016).
There, the Court cited Sections 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and 11-8-8-19(f) in upholding the
Indiana registration requirement of an offender who committed child molesting
in Indiana, moved to Iowa (where he had to register based on the Indiana
conviction), then returned to Indiana. But the offender didn’t raise the statutory
issue Marroquin raises here. That is, the offender didn’t dispute that he fell
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024 Page 5 of 6 within the language of Sections 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and 11-8-8-19(f). He argued only
that applying these statutes to him violated the ex post facto clause of the
Indiana Constitution because the statutes didn’t exist when he committed his
crime. Id. at 144. Our Supreme Court addressed and rejected that constitutional
argument, but it didn’t address the statutory argument Marroquin makes here.
Therefore, the Court’s holding doesn’t control the outcome of this appeal.
[10] Because Section 11-8-8-19(f) doesn’t apply to Marroquin, and because Indiana
doesn’t require registration for Class D felony sexual misconduct with a minor,
we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Commissioner
and remand for the entry of summary judgment for Marroquin.
[11] Reversed and remanded.
May, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Scott H. Duerring South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General David A. Arthur Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024 Page 6 of 6