Fernando Gonzalez Bonelly v. Warden, Florida Soft Side South Facility, U.S. Attorney General

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

FERNANDO GONZALEZ

BONELLY, Case No. 2:26-cv-804-KCD-NPM

Plaintiff,

v.

WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH FACILITY, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Defendants. /

ORDER Petitioner Fernando Gonzalez Bonelly has filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his detention by U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. 1.)1 He claims that his continued imprisonment violates the Fifth Amendment as interpreted by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Respondents oppose the petition. (Doc. 9.) For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED. I. Background Bonelly is a native of Cuba who entered the United States in 1981 as a lawful permanent resident. (Doc. 9 at 2.) In the ensuing decades, he was convicted of drug crimes and grand theft. (See Doc. 9-1 at 35-49.) He was then

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. ordered removed from the United States. (Id. at 50.) When that removal did not come to fruition, he was placed on an order of supervision. (Id. at 12-18.)

On November 1, 2025, Bonelly attended a routine ICE check-in appointment and was detained. (Id. at 9.) This emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus followed. ICE has given Bonelly notice that it intends to remove him to Mexico. (See id. at 1.) Still, Bonelly argues his removal is not

reasonably foreseeable because ICE attempted to remove him to Mexico but was not successful and asks this Court to order his immediate release. (Doc. 1 at 7-8.) II. Legal Framework

The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of

reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at

*2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025). III. Discussion The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a

noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the individual on

supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas, the authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may

detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. at 659. And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the

alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a

claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.

Applied here, Bonelly cannot satisfy the initial temporal requirement. ICE took him into custody on November 1, 2025. Because he has been detained for just over five months, he remains within the window in which his detention is presumptively reasonable. See Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case

No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”); see also Jiang v. Mukasey, No. 2:08-cv- 773-FtM-29DNF, 2009 WL 260378, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2009); Noel v.

Glades Cnty. Sheriff, No. 2:11-cv698-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 6412425, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2011). Seemingly recognizing this problem, Bonelly’s petition jumps to the burden-shifting framework, arguing that his removal to Mexico is not likely

in the foreseeable future. (Doc. 1 at 7.) This argument puts the cart before the horse. Until the six-month Zadvydas period concludes, detention is presumptively reasonable, and any due process claim is not ripe. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8

(S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months’). Bonelly also notes that he has pulmonary emphysema and other chronic health issues. (Doc. 1 at 7.) To the extent this is an argument for habeas relief, it is summarily rejected. Challenges to conditions of confinement are not appropriately raised in the habeas context. See Vaz v. Skinner, 634 F. App’x 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Petitioner’s § 2241 petition is not the appropriate vehicle for raising an inadequate medical care claim, as such a claim challenges the conditions of confinement, not the fact or duration of that confinement.”). Bonelly’s due process claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, so the habeas petition is denied without prejudice to him refiling a new petition should his current detention exceed the six-month mark, and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 16, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek os ot United States District Judge