Felt v. Bell

68 N.E. 794, 205 Ill. 213
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 26, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 68 N.E. 794 (Felt v. Bell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Felt v. Bell, 68 N.E. 794, 205 Ill. 213 (Ill. 1903).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Ricks

delivered the opinion of the court:

The record in this case discloses a transaction which is palpably fraudulent. Bell was induced, by false representations of Mason as to the contract price, to part with $7000 in money and his note for $1333.33 for a one-third interest in patent rights, although the vendors had placed a valuation of only $7000 upon the entire interest. It is no defense to the' allegation of fraud to contend that Bell was willing to pay $8333.33 for a one-third interest and that he actually obtained that interest for the amount paid, for if we concede that he obtained the very thing he expected to obtain, and paid no more therefor than he, after investigation, had concluded was reasonable, it does not follow that he was not grossly imposed upon. (Veazie v. Williams, 8 How. 134; Pendergast v. Reed, 29 Md. 398; 96 Am. Dec. 539.) He would not have paid $8333.33 for a one-third interest if he had known that the entire property was to be purchased for $7000, and that Mason was to profit by the transaction to the extent of receiving a two-thirds interest without" any expense whatever. Mason represented as a fact—not as an opinion—that the valuation and price fixed upon the patent rights were $25,000. By this deception Bell was induced to part with a greater sum of money for a one-third interest than the vendors asked for the entire interest. He was misled by the false misrepresentations of Mason,—representations which were made to deceive him and which did deceive him. An unconscionable advantage was taken, which it is within the sphere of equity to remedy. If, therefore, the record shows that the defendants are in any way implicated in the fraud by active procurance or deceptive conduct, and if it can be further shown that no rule of equity will be contravened, there will be a clear case for the applicaton of the equitable remedy of rescission. Cortes Co. v. Tannhauser, 45 Fed. Rep. 730; Yeoman v. Lasley, 40 Ohio St. 190.

It is next to be determined whether or not defendants Felt and Tarrant and the Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Company have become implicated in this fraudulent scheme executed by Mason. Bell swears that before the sale was made Felt and Tarrant each told him that the contract price was $25,000. Felt and Tarrant deny this. Each one swears that he had no conversation with Bell relative to the price of the patent rights, but that all their negotiations were with Mason, and that they fixed the price to him at $7000. It is not necessary to weigh this testimony, for the record shows, we think, that De-Berard, the agent of the defendants Felt and Tarrant and the Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Company, while within the scope of his authority, was an active participant in the fraud, and that said defendants have adopted the benefits of the transaction. Therefore, whether it was with or without their knowledge, the defendants are subject to equitable action. DeBerard, the financial agent of the defendant company, drew the assignments in accordance with the directions given by Mason. On the 15th of May, 1891, he went to the vaults of the Commercial Safety Deposit Company with Felt, Mason and Bell. The assignments were transferred, and DeBerard received from Bell $7000 in cash and his note for $1333.33, and from Mason he received $900 cash and his check for $15,766.67, making the entire consideration received $25,000. A few days after this Mason went to DeBerard and demanded his money back. DeBerard thereupon delivered to him the $900 cash and the check for $15,766.67. He retained the $7000 and the note for $1333.33. DeBerard attempts to explain his attitude by saying that he understood at the time that the consideration was to be $7000; that he was surprised to receive the note from Bell and the money from Mason, but that he thought the matter was between Bell and Mason, and he “just kept quiet, and that is all:” We cannot believe that was all. Even if the matter were between Mason and Bell, there was a surplus of $18,000 being paid to him. Is it possible that a man will innocently receive $18,000, for which there is absolutely no consideration, and fail to manifest some surprise? Even if he had not known of this scheme before, being a man of financial experience he must have known that such a proceeding was colorable.

We are considering this transaction in a light most favorable to defendants. These conclusions are drawn from the testimony of DeBerard alone. Bell’s testimony tends to make DeBerard’s conduct much more culpable; but we may disregard his testimony and still find sufficient evidence to make it clear that DeBerard, by affirmative acts, made himself a party to the fraudulent scheme. Let ns consider his subsequent conduct. Take, for instance, DeBerard’s own version of his attitude. He did not know of the fraud. He understood the consideration to be $7000, and was surprised to receive $18,000 in excess of that, but kept quiet because it was a matter between Bell and Mason. Mason came several days later and demanded his money and check, and DeBerard unhesitatingly returned them. That is to say, knowing that there were two joint purchasers, and knowing that one was to receive a two-thirds interest and the other a one-third interest in the patent rights, he returned to the one who was to receive the greater interest the entire amount he had paid. If he had been innocent, would he have kept all the consideration from one joint purchaser and returned all that the other had paid? Moreover, not only did he make the $7000 cash given by Bell pay for the entire patent interest, but he kept the note made by Bell for $1333.33, and one of the objects of this suit is to enjoin the negotiation of that note. Later on we see the defendant company, through Felt, one of the firm and company, offering to surrender this note to Bell as part of the consideration for a proposed purchase of Bell’s interest in the patent rights. This evidence, and the inferences deducible from it, show clearly that DeBerard had guilty knowledge of the fraud practiced by Mason, and that to assist in its perpetration he lulled the complainant into security by going through the form of receiving from Mason the sum of $16,666.67, being Mason’s two-thirds of the purchase price. The law does not permit one in this manner to assist in cheating another. (Beidler v. Crane, 135 Ill. 92.) It is not necessary for the purpose of making DeBerard’s conduct fraudulent, to show that there was a fiduciary relation between him and Bell. It is sufficient that Mason and Bell, with the knowledge of DeBerard and the company, were about to enter into the relation of co-purchasers, and that this was a fiduciary relation. Bunn v. Sclnellbacher, 163 Ill. 328; Cortes Co. v. Tannhauser, supra.

It is undoubtedly true that Mason committed a fraud, and it is just as clear to us that DeBerard assisted affirmatively in its commission. This being the case, we need not attempt to show that Mason was actually the agent of the defendants in this transaction, or that his commission for the sale was to be a two-thirds interest, for which he was ostensibly to pay $16,666.67 and actually paid not one cent. Nor does it affect this conclusion to admit, as the appellants urge, that Mason was Bell’s agent. We recognize the general rule that notice to the agent is notice to the principal; but it would be, indeed, a novel doctrine if we should hold that if an agent has knowledge that he is defrauding the principal, the principal cannot have a remedy, for the reason th at, being charged with the knowledge of his agent in the fraud, he was a guilty party in the plot to defraud himself.

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Bluebook (online)
68 N.E. 794, 205 Ill. 213, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/felt-v-bell-ill-1903.