Felipe Leon-Roman, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Olinsky & Associates, PLLC

District Court, N.D. New York·Decided August 12, 2026·No. 5:25-cv-00462·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FELIPE LEON-ROMAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, 5:25-cv-462 Plaintiff, (ECC/CBF)

v.

OLINSKY & ASSOCIATES, PLLC,

Defendant.

Casondra Turner, Esq., for Plaintiff Nicole Mastrocinque, Esq., for Defendant Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge: ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING SETTLEMENT; CERTIFYING CLASS; APPROVING NOTICE; AND SETTING DATE FOR FINAL APPROVAL HEARING I. INTRODUCTION On April 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed this diversity class action against Defendant Olinsky & Associates, PLLC (Olinsky) alleging negligence, breach of implied contract, and unjust enrichment related to a data incident where personally identifiable information and medical treatment information belonging to Plaintiff and putative class members was compromised. Dkt. No. 1. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement and certification of the proposed settlement class for settlement purposes. Dkt. No. 24. After considering Plaintiff’s submissions, Dkt. Nos. 24, 25, the settlement agreement and release, Dkt. No. 25, and the oral arguments of counsel presented during a preliminary hearing held by videoconference, the motion for preliminary approval of the settlement is granted pursuant to the terms and conditions stated in this Order, and the settlement class described below is conditionally certified for settlement purposes only. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW1 “Preliminary approval of a proposed settlement is the first in a two-step process required [by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 23(e)] before a class action may be settled.” In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig. (NASDAQ), 176 F.R.D. 99, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). “At this stage, [the court] need only decide whether the terms of the Proposed Settlement are ‘at least

sufficiently fair, reasonable and adequate to justify notice to those affected and an opportunity to be heard.’” In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2262, 2018 WL 3475465, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2018) (quoting NASDAQ, 176 F.R.D. at 102). “This analysis is ‘a determination that there is what might be termed ‘probable cause’ to submit the proposal to class members and hold a full-scale hearing as to its fairness.’” Id. (quoting In re Traffic Exec. Ass’n E. R.Rs., 627 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1980)). III. DISCUSSION A. Settlement Class “Before approving a class settlement agreement, a district court must first determine whether the requirements for class certification in Rule 23(a) and (b) have been satisfied.” In re

Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig. (In re AIG), 689 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2012). When the litigation is “being settled, rather than litigated, the Court need not consider the manageability issues that litigation would present.” Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 147 F. Supp. 3d 123, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quotation omitted). “The district court must also determine whether the action can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).” In re AIG, 689 F.3d at 238. Here, Plaintiff seeks certification of the settlement class under Rule 23(b)(3), “which permits certification where ‘the court finds that

1 The legal discussion in this order is largely taken from Hill v. Montgomery, No. 14-cv-933 (BKS/DJS), 2020 WL 5531542 (Sept. 15, 2020). the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). Although trial management concerns “drop out of the predominance analysis,” when considering a

settlement class, “the certifying court must still determine whether the ‘the legal or factual questions that qualify each class member’s case as a genuine controversy’ are sufficiently similar as to yield a cohesive class.” Id. at 240 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)). 1. Rule 23(a)(1) a. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the proposed class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” In general, numerosity is presumed where a putative class has 40 or more members. Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 252 (2d Cir. 2011). The proposed class satisfies the numerosity requirement because there are approximately 521 class

members. Dkt. No. 24. b. Commonality and Typicality Next, a plaintiff seeking class certification must show “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). A question of law or fact is common to the class if the question is “capable of classwide resolution—which means that its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). The common questions must generate “common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Mazzei v. Money Store, 829 F.3d 260, 272 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350). “Where the same conduct or practice by the same defendant gives rise to the same kind of claims from all class members, there is a common question.” Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns Inc., 780 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014)). Typicality “requires that the claims of the class representatives be typical of those of the

class, and is satisfied when each class member’s claim arises from the same course of events, and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant’s liability.” Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 504 F.3d 229, 245 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2001)). But typicality “does not require that the factual background of each named plaintiff’s claim be identical to that of all class members; rather, it requires that the disputed issue of law or fact occupy essentially the same degree of centrality to the named plaintiff’s claim as to that of other members of the proposed class.” Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 293 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006). “The commonality and typicality requirements tend to merge into one another, so that similar

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Felipe Leon-Roman, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Olinsky & Associates, PLLC, (N.D.N.Y. 2026).

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Related

Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
521 U.S. 591 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
131 S. Ct. 2541 (Supreme Court, 2011)
In Re Literary Works in Electronic Databases
654 F.3d 242 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Restaurant Group, Inc.
659 F.3d 234 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co.
267 F.3d 147 (Second Circuit, 2001)
Linda Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Incorporated
764 F.3d 750 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo
577 U.S. 442 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Mazzei v. Money Store
829 F.3d 260 (Second Circuit, 2016)
Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani
126 F.3d 372 (Second Circuit, 1997)
Berkson v. Gogo LLC
147 F. Supp. 3d 123 (E.D. New York, 2015)
Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG
443 F.3d 253 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co.
471 F.3d 24 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Johnson v. Nextel Communications Inc.
780 F.3d 128 (Second Circuit, 2015)