IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA WAYCROSS DIVISION
FELIPE IGNACIO RIVADENEIRA,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:21-cv-12
v.
THE GEO GROUP, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff has failed to comply with this Court’s March 17, 2021 and August 7, 2025 Orders and this Court’s Local Rules. Docs. 7, 109; Local R. 11.1. As discussed in further detail below, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s Complaint, doc. 1, for failure to follow this Court’s Orders and Local Rules and failure to prosecute, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.1 I DENY as moot the pending Motions in this case. Docs. 110, 119, 121.
1 A “district court can only dismiss an action on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair . . . . To employ fair procedure, a district court must generally provide the plaintiff with notice of its intent to dismiss or an opportunity to respond.” Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). A magistrate judge’s report and recommendation provides such notice and opportunity to respond. See Shivers v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union 349, 262 F. App’x 121, 125, 127 (11th Cir. 2008) (indicating a party has notice of a district court’s intent to sua sponte grant summary judgment where a magistrate judge issues a report recommending the sua sponte granting of summary judgment); Anderson v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1296 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (noting report and recommendation served as notice claims would be sua sponte dismissed). This Report and Recommendation constitutes fair notice to Plaintiff her suit is due to be dismissed. As indicated below, Plaintiff will have the opportunity to present her objections to this finding, and the presiding district judge will review de novo properly submitted objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see also Glover v. Williams, No. 1:12-CV- 3562, 2012 WL 5930633, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 18, 2012) (explaining magistrate judge’s report and BACKGROUND On February 3, 2021, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Doc. 1. Plaintiff also moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which I granted by Order dated March 17, 2021. Doc. 7. I advised Plaintiff he was to
notify the Court of any change in his address in writing or his case would be dismissed. Id. at 3 (citing Local R. 11.1). After this Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants, Plaintiff filed an appeal with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Docs. 82, 85, 87. The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part and remanded this case to this Court to review Plaintiff’s state law claims against four Defendants. Doc. 98. I then directed service of Plaintiff’s Complaint on these four Defendants on July 14, 2025. Doc. 100. The Clerk of Court mailed this Order to Plaintiff using the mailing address Plaintiff provided. Staff note dated July 14, 2025. However, the July 14, 2025 Order was returned to the Court as undeliverable, with the notation “Return to Sender, Refused, Unable to Forward.” Doc. 106 at 10. I issued a show cause Order on August 7, 2025, and directed Plaintiff to notify the Court whether his address had
changed and advised Plaintiff his failure to respond to this Court’s Orders would result in the dismissal of his cause of action. Doc. 109. This mailing, too, was returned as undeliverable, with the notation “Return to Sender, No Longer at This Address.” Doc. 116 at 4. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any change in his address, and the times to do so have elapsed. Additionally, this Court’s Local Rules require parties to notify the Court, in writing, of any change in address, which Plaintiff has failed to do. Local R. 11.1.
recommendation constituted adequate notice and petitioner’s opportunity to file objections provided a reasonable opportunity to respond). DISCUSSION The Court must now determine how to address Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this Court’s Orders and Local Rules and to prosecute. For the reasons set forth below, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s Complaint and DENY
Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. I. Dismissal for Failure to Follow This Court’s Orders and Local Rules and to Prosecute A district court may dismiss a plaintiff’s claims sua sponte based on either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) or the court’s inherent authority to manage its docket. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962);2 Coleman v. St. Lucie Cnty. Jail, 433 F. App’x 716, 718 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)). In particular, Rule 41(b) allows for the involuntary dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims where he has failed to prosecute those claims, comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or local rules, or follow a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 718; Sanders v. Barrett, No. 05-12660, 2005 WL 2640979, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct.
17, 2005) (citing Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir. 1993)); cf. Local R. 41.1(b) (“[T]he assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of record, sua sponte . . . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without prejudice[,] . . . [based on] willful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court.” (emphasis omitted)). Additionally, a district court’s “power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce its orders and ensure prompt disposition of lawsuits.” Brown v. Tallahassee Police Dep’t, 205 F. App’x 802, 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983)).
2 In Wabash, the Court held a trial court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute “even without affording notice of its intention to do so.” 370 U.S. at 633. Nonetheless, in the case at hand, the Court advised Plaintiff his failure to comply with the Court’s Orders could result in dismissal of this action. Docs. 7, 109; see also Local R. 11.1. It is true dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is a “sanction . . . to be utilized only in extreme situations” and requires a court to “(1) conclud[e] a clear record of delay or willful contempt exists; and (2) mak[e] an implicit or explicit finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Thomas v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 170 F. App’x 623, 625–26 (11th Cir.
2006) (quoting Morewitz v. West of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA WAYCROSS DIVISION
FELIPE IGNACIO RIVADENEIRA,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:21-cv-12
v.
THE GEO GROUP, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff has failed to comply with this Court’s March 17, 2021 and August 7, 2025 Orders and this Court’s Local Rules. Docs. 7, 109; Local R. 11.1. As discussed in further detail below, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s Complaint, doc. 1, for failure to follow this Court’s Orders and Local Rules and failure to prosecute, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.1 I DENY as moot the pending Motions in this case. Docs. 110, 119, 121.
1 A “district court can only dismiss an action on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair . . . . To employ fair procedure, a district court must generally provide the plaintiff with notice of its intent to dismiss or an opportunity to respond.” Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). A magistrate judge’s report and recommendation provides such notice and opportunity to respond. See Shivers v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union 349, 262 F. App’x 121, 125, 127 (11th Cir. 2008) (indicating a party has notice of a district court’s intent to sua sponte grant summary judgment where a magistrate judge issues a report recommending the sua sponte granting of summary judgment); Anderson v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1296 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (noting report and recommendation served as notice claims would be sua sponte dismissed). This Report and Recommendation constitutes fair notice to Plaintiff her suit is due to be dismissed. As indicated below, Plaintiff will have the opportunity to present her objections to this finding, and the presiding district judge will review de novo properly submitted objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see also Glover v. Williams, No. 1:12-CV- 3562, 2012 WL 5930633, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 18, 2012) (explaining magistrate judge’s report and BACKGROUND On February 3, 2021, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Doc. 1. Plaintiff also moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which I granted by Order dated March 17, 2021. Doc. 7. I advised Plaintiff he was to
notify the Court of any change in his address in writing or his case would be dismissed. Id. at 3 (citing Local R. 11.1). After this Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants, Plaintiff filed an appeal with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Docs. 82, 85, 87. The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part and remanded this case to this Court to review Plaintiff’s state law claims against four Defendants. Doc. 98. I then directed service of Plaintiff’s Complaint on these four Defendants on July 14, 2025. Doc. 100. The Clerk of Court mailed this Order to Plaintiff using the mailing address Plaintiff provided. Staff note dated July 14, 2025. However, the July 14, 2025 Order was returned to the Court as undeliverable, with the notation “Return to Sender, Refused, Unable to Forward.” Doc. 106 at 10. I issued a show cause Order on August 7, 2025, and directed Plaintiff to notify the Court whether his address had
changed and advised Plaintiff his failure to respond to this Court’s Orders would result in the dismissal of his cause of action. Doc. 109. This mailing, too, was returned as undeliverable, with the notation “Return to Sender, No Longer at This Address.” Doc. 116 at 4. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any change in his address, and the times to do so have elapsed. Additionally, this Court’s Local Rules require parties to notify the Court, in writing, of any change in address, which Plaintiff has failed to do. Local R. 11.1.
recommendation constituted adequate notice and petitioner’s opportunity to file objections provided a reasonable opportunity to respond). DISCUSSION The Court must now determine how to address Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this Court’s Orders and Local Rules and to prosecute. For the reasons set forth below, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s Complaint and DENY
Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. I. Dismissal for Failure to Follow This Court’s Orders and Local Rules and to Prosecute A district court may dismiss a plaintiff’s claims sua sponte based on either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) or the court’s inherent authority to manage its docket. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962);2 Coleman v. St. Lucie Cnty. Jail, 433 F. App’x 716, 718 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)). In particular, Rule 41(b) allows for the involuntary dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims where he has failed to prosecute those claims, comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or local rules, or follow a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 718; Sanders v. Barrett, No. 05-12660, 2005 WL 2640979, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct.
17, 2005) (citing Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir. 1993)); cf. Local R. 41.1(b) (“[T]he assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of record, sua sponte . . . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without prejudice[,] . . . [based on] willful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court.” (emphasis omitted)). Additionally, a district court’s “power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce its orders and ensure prompt disposition of lawsuits.” Brown v. Tallahassee Police Dep’t, 205 F. App’x 802, 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983)).
2 In Wabash, the Court held a trial court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute “even without affording notice of its intention to do so.” 370 U.S. at 633. Nonetheless, in the case at hand, the Court advised Plaintiff his failure to comply with the Court’s Orders could result in dismissal of this action. Docs. 7, 109; see also Local R. 11.1. It is true dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is a “sanction . . . to be utilized only in extreme situations” and requires a court to “(1) conclud[e] a clear record of delay or willful contempt exists; and (2) mak[e] an implicit or explicit finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Thomas v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 170 F. App’x 623, 625–26 (11th Cir.
2006) (quoting Morewitz v. West of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (Lux.), 62 F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995)); see also Taylor v. Spaziano, 251 F. App’x 616, 619 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Morewitz, 62 F.3d at 1366). By contrast, dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute is not an adjudication on the merits, and, therefore, courts are afforded greater discretion in dismissing claims in this manner. Taylor, 251 F. App’x at 619; see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719; Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03. While the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss cases with caution, dismissal of this action without prejudice is warranted. See Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute § 1983 complaint where plaintiff did not respond to court order to supply defendant’s current address for purpose of service); Taylor, 251 F. App’x at
620–21 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute, because plaintiffs insisted on going forward with deficient amended complaint rather than complying or seeking an extension of time to comply with court’s order to file second amended complaint); Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute § 1983 claims where plaintiff failed to follow court order to file amended complaint and court had informed plaintiff non-compliance could lead to dismissal). With Plaintiff having failed to comply with the Court’s Orders and Local Rules, the Court cannot move forward with this case. Moreover, Plaintiff was given notice of the consequences of his failure to follow the Court’s Orders, and Plaintiff has not done so. Thus, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to follow this Court’s Orders and Local Rules and to prosecute and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal. II. Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though Plaintiff has not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address that issue in the Court’s order of dismissal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (noting trial court may certify appeal is not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is filed”). An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies, either before or after the notice of appeal is filed, the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. County of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual
allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). An in forma pauperis action is frivolous and not brought in good faith if it is “without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Moore v. Bargstedt, 203 F. App’x 321, 323 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009). Based on the above analysis of Plaintiff’s failure to follow this Court’s Orders and failure to prosecute, there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal. CONCLUSION For the above-stated reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to follow this Court’s Orders and Local Rules and to prosecute and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of
dismissal. I further RECOMMEND the Court DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. I DENY as moot any pending Motions. Any objections to this Report and Recommendation shall be filed within 14 days of today’s date. Objections shall be specific and in writing. Any objection that the Magistrate Judge failed to address a contention raised in the Complaint must be included. Failure to file timely, written objections will bar any later challenge or review of the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings and legal conclusions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Harrigan v. Metro Dade Police Dep’t Station #4, 977 F.3d 1185, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 2020). To be clear, a party waives all rights to challenge the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal by failing to file timely, written objections. Harrigan, 977 F.3d at 1192–93; 11th Cir. R. 3-1. A copy of the
objections must be served upon all other parties to the action. Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 17th day of October, 2025.
BENJAMIN W. CHEESBRO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA